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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume I Vietnam, 1961 Department of State Washington, DC

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, December 4, 1961.

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Harriman, Rusk, and the President; and initialed by Johnson for Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.

725. Embtels 754/2/ and 756./3/ While Diem has not gone as far as we would like in improving his public image and we will desire continue press specific matters in this field, we agree that text memo of understanding is sufficient basis upon which to move ahead. Therefore hope that you can arrange for prompt transmission of Diem's letter to the President. Question public release exchange of letters not yet decided.

/2/Document 305.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 305.

Subsequent message will give guidance on handling ICC questions raised Embtel 720/4/ as well as guidelines defoliant program, concept on use of US minesweepers and number of B-26's under Jungle Jim program.

/4/Not found.

Believe it important that for moment you remain at your post for completion these initial steps in launching program. However, agree consultation desirable on USG mission organization for implementing program as well as how we can best keep pressing GVN on decisions and actions that will be required to maximize momentum and impact our joint effort. Will communicate further with you this regard.

Rusk

 

307. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to President Diem/1/

Saigon, December 5, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files FRC 66 A 878, POL US Foreign Policy. Secret. Drafted by Toussaint.

Dear Mr. President: I am pleased to inform you that my government is prepared to proceed with the program we have discussed on the basis of the memorandum which Your Excellency approved on December 4. A copy of the memorandum is enclosed.

With regard to United States military personnel who arrive in the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam pursuant to our understanding, I assume that they will, for the duration of their stay, be entitled to the same privileges and immunities accorded the members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and that all equipment and material pertaining to the units in question will remain the property of the government of the United States. I would appreciate Your Excellency's confirmation of my understanding on these points since it should form part of our respective records in this matter.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration./2/

/2/The source text is unsigned.

 

Enclosure

Memorandum of Understanding/3/

Saigon, December 4, 1961.

/3/Secret.

The purpose of this memorandum is to record the essential points which have been agreed in recent discussions between the GVN and the U.S.

1. The basic immediate objective is to enable the GVN to take and maintain the offensive against the Viet Cong. The basic long-range objective is to enable South Viet-Nam to develop its freely-chosen institutions in peace and security.

2. To accomplish this, an increased Vietnamese effort will be mounted. The fundamental responsibility of the GVN for the conduct of the war will not be impaired. A closer and more effective relationship will be established, however, between the GVN and the U.S.A.

3. With the above objectives in mind, the U.S. has indicated its readiness to participate in a sharply increased joint effort with the GVN. This will involve increases in forms of aid previously furnished and, in addition, fundamentally new steps in GVN-U.S. collaboration, namely, (a) the participation of U.S. uniformed personnel in operational missions with GVN forces, and (b) closer consultation with U.S. advisers, as agreed, in planning the conduct of the security effort.

4. Before taking such far-reaching steps, the U.S. has sought, and the GVN has given, assurances that the GVN will take measures to increase its efficiency and to increase its public support in Viet-Nam and abroad.

5. With regard to increasing its efficiency, the GVN is prepared to do the following:

a. Reactivate and use fee National Infernal Security Council (NISC). This involves semi-weekly meetings, the creation of a secretariat to formulate decisions and directives, and the use of the NISC as the mechanism for the transmission of directives to subordinate commands for the prosecution of the war.

b. Military command structure. The GVN considers that a reorganization of the military command structure is necessary, and will consult with the U.S. on specific measures to this end.

c. Intelligence. . . .

d. Joint surveys of provinces. The GVN agrees to institute with the U.S. joint provincial surveys, it being understood that the surveys would be directed principally to military and intelligence matters. The surveys will be started immediately.

e. Border Ranger force. The GVN is prepared to release from other duties sufficient Ranger Companies to produce a border Ranger force of about 5,000 men; and to employ this force as a mobile striking force against infiltrators in the northwest.

f. Military coordination. The GVN agrees that there should be the closest coordination between GVN and U.S. commanders in operations involving U.S. military units. Specifically, it is understood that U.S. helicopter units and U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval units would be under exclusive U.S. command and would be used only with the agreement of the U.S. commander. It is further understood that the GVN will not take decisions or actions involving joint operations without full prior consultation with the qualified U.S. agencies.

g. Administration. It is agreed that U.S. advisers will be accepted in certain GVN administrative organs in addition to the military, subject to the request of the GVN. It will be necessary to fulfill this understanding by mutual agreement and on a case by case basis, with due regard for the requirement for administrative support, the personality and discretion of the U.S. adviser, and his technical qualifications.

h. Legislative measures. Legislation has already been enacted giving the President of Viet-Nam broad emergency powers during the next two years. It is considered, therefore, that the President of Viet-Nam already has the constitutional authority to carry out the arrangements mentioned above.

6. With regard to winning public support at home and abroad, the GVN has already taken or has initiated a variety of actions, of which the following should be noted:

a. Creation of a national flood relief and rehabilitation organization.
b. Creation of provincial councils.
c. Institution of military training for women.
d. Investigation of speculators.
e. Proposals to reduce official salaries and entertainment.
f. Plans for improved military allowances and survivor benefits.
g. Creation of a National Economic Council.

7. The GVN will, in addition, take prompt measures of its own to:

a. give a broader sense of participation in the war effort to the people of South Viet-Nam.
b. develop more contacts between officials of the GVN and the people.
c. develop a more effective public information service.
d. bring non-Communist prisoners promptly to public trial.
e. develop and announce an amnesty policy for Viet Cong defectors.

8. While continuing vigorously to develop the infrastructure of democracy in Viet-Nam-in which the United States will do its utmost to help-the Government of Viet-Nam recognizes also the importance, in relation to its fight with international Communism, of developing at all levels its democratic institutions, and will take all practical and feasible steps to this end. While the determination of such steps rests of course with the GVN, the GVN will continue to consider suggestions of the U.S. Government in this regard in the spirit of the new partnership.

 

308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, December 5, 1961.

/1/Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-561. Secret; Niact, For Ambassador Nolting. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with the President, and initialed by Cottrell for Rusk. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.

727. Deptel 725./2/ The President would like you to know that he believes you have "done a good job". He asks that if you consider it useful you inform President Diem that he appreciates the indications of Diem's cooperation which he regards as important to "both of us" and he hopes that President Diem will keep him informed of any thoughts he may have as our common effort goes forward. He is counting on the efforts of President Diem and all of his people.

/2/Document 306.

Rusk

 

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, December 5, 1961, 2:07 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with Harriman and with McGeorge Bundy (in substance), and signed by Cottrell for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok.

728. Embtel 760./2/ No objection your letter to Diem set forth reftel. Re publicizing letters you recall in Deptel 619/3/ we indicated Diem letter need not be verbatim copy of our suggested draft but should cover substantive points. Therefore we cannot tell what kind of reply we will get from Diem. It is possible that publicizing exchange of letters may not strike right note for world and public opinion. Therefore we reserving judgment until receipt Diem letter.

/2/Dated December 5 and received by the Department of State at 8:32 a.m. that day, it contained the revised text of President Kennedy's letter which Nolting said he planned to send to Diem on December 6 if the Department did not object. Nolting also said that he planned to raise with Diem the matter of Diem's reply to Kennedy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-561) For the first draft of the President's letter, see Document 257.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 257.

When you present proposed draft letter you should delete all working commencing "on our mutual concern" and ending "our two peoples can be rightly proud of them". Reason is that these several sentences contain too much reference to mutuality and international partnership which are not consonant with Diem's insistence on retaining responsibility for war against Viet Cong plus our own reluctance to bind ourselves this closely in view Saigon press campaign and other recent indications of Vietnamese reserve.

Rusk

 

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, December 5, 1961, 4:19 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1261. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman (TF/VN) on November 28; redrafted by U. Alexis Johnson on December 4; cleared with Cottrell, Salans, Cleveland, Anderson, and Cross (all SEA), McConaughy, Cleveland (IO), and the Secretary. Repeated to ten posts.

729. Re Embtels 684 and 720./2/

/2/Telegram 684 is printed as Document 268. Telegram 720 is not printed.

1. Concur that our present policy re Geneva Accords increasingly difficult to implement and should be further developed. Concur specifically that arrival USS Core with two helicopter companies will bring matter to a head. (Embtel 720)

2. We fear that using rotation argument as you suggest will again involve us in numbers game which frustrating, time-consuming and fruitless in present context. It will stretch accords to point where credibility of our legal theory and our good faith in advancing it may be cast into serious doubt. It would impress no one and would not redound to our credit, to suddenly raise "ceiling" from 888 to 3500 seven years after signing of Geneva Accords.

3. Instead, we consider SVN and we have a good, legally sound position which we can take publicly in response to questions and which would provide us with a firm political base for whatever actions we would later judge necessary including taking issue to UN. This position would be presented in first instance by GVN to ICC along following lines:

NVN is committing acts of aggression in flagrant violation of Geneva Accords, and GVN has consequently requested US for additional support in men and materiel. These measures are being taken as requirements of legitimate self-defense necessitated by North Vietnamese breaches of Accords. As soon as North Vietnamese end their aggressive acts and resume their observance of Geneva Accords, these measures of support can be terminated, GVN is asking ICC increase its frontier patrols.

4. We would then state in response to queries that "US has acceded to GVN's request for expanded aid in men and materiel and is determined to help SVN preserve its independence. This is sole objective of US. US will terminate these measures as soon as NVN ends its acts of aggression."

5. Ambassador Nolting authorized take up this matter with GVN and seek persuade it to clarify its position with ICC along these lines.

6. Department will discuss with British, Canadians and Indians upon receipt word Nolting GVN concurs this course action.

Rusk

 

311. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/

Washington, December 6, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.

A final direct word from me on South Viet-Nam, as a member of your personal staff.

I do not believe that all the choppers and other gadgetry we can supply South Viet-Nam will buy time and render their resources effective if we do not get a first class man out there to replace McGarr. McGarr is an excellent officer, but he lacks the critical qualities to make this partnership move. At the moment the problem is tied up in a disagreement between State and Defense on the kind of structural command changes-if any-that are necessary. In my view the structural command changes are virtually irrelevant; what we need is a young Van Fleet. In addition, it is equally crucial that we free Ed Lansdale from his present assignment and get him out to the field in an appropriate position. He is a unique national asset in the Saigon setting; and I cannot believe that anything he may be able to do in his present assignment could match his value in Southeast Asia. On this matter you may have to have a word with the Attorney General./2/

/2/Rostow later wrote that President Kennedy decided not to appoint Lansdale as an adviser to Diem. The reasons, said Rostow, "lay deep in the American military and the civil bureaucracy. The American ambassador and the ranking general in Saigon-and the departments backstopping them in Washington-did not want another American that close to Diem." (Rostow's undated draft manuscript of a book, Chapter 34. D. 562 National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-15-71)

 

312. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of State/1/

Washington, December 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/12-761. Top Secret.

Dear Dean: I attach our proposed concept for elevating the status of the senior US military man in Vietnam to that of a "Commander, US Forces Vietnam". This draft reflects discussions with CIA and AID, and is a revision of an earlier draft./2/

 

Essentially, I believe that if we are to give full impact to the increased efforts we are now making, and to take full advantage of the additional weight that the Nolting-Diem memorandum/3/ gives us in the conduct of the counter-insurgency effort, we must signalize the change by such an elevation of the senior military man. The attached proposal would give him a status, under CINCPAC, comparable to that now held by the Taiwan Defense Command, by the US Commander in Japan, and by the Commander in Korea, who is of course also the UN Commander.

/3/The enclosure to Document 307.

The attached draft would maintain the existing situation vis-a-vis AID activities, with the military role confined to the coordination of those AID activities that have a clear relationship to the counterinsurgency effort. I understand that full coordination now prevails for such activities as roads, telecommunications, and police support. We propose no change in this.

. . . . . . .

The attached proposal envisages a relationship with the Ambassador that falls within the terms of the President's basic letter of May 29, 1961,/4/ i.e., that an area "military commander" is not under the Ambassador's command, but retains his direct line of authority via the JCS to me and thence to the President. Obviously, political and basic policy matters must remain in Ambassador Nolting's hands. We must of course take every precaution so that neither Diem, nor anyone else, can play off the two senior US representatives against each other. But the military man should have his status enhanced if he is to move into a new and more active role, and should have complete access to Diem and all other top GVN officials on matters connected with the counter-insurgency effort, keeping the Ambassador fully advised. I need hardly say that in our nomination for the position we shall give weight to capacity to work cooperatively under such an arrangement.

/4/See footnote 5, Document 271.

I should like to get a resolution of this issue as soon as possible, and to have your views before I go to Honolulu direct from Paris./5/ I would anticipate that a new arrangement would require Presidential approval, which might be sought promptly upon my return from Honolulu.

/5/ McNamara was planning to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris.

Sincerely,

Bob

 

Attachment/6/

/6/Top Secret.

CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE
UNIFIED COMMAND, UNITED STATES FORCES, VIETNAM

General

1. Subject to agreement with the Government of Vietnam (GVN), as represented by letters which will be exchanged by President Kennedy and President Diem (copies of which will be made available), the United States will establish a subordinate unified command with Headquarters in Saigon.

2. The objective of this establishment will be to increase US military and economic assistance to the GVN, short of introduction of combat forces, and to increase US participation in the direction and control of Armed Forces of Vietnam (RVNAF) counter-insurgency operations, in order to assist the GVN to contain and eventually to eliminate the Viet Cong. To this end the command will draw together, under single command and control, all those US activities in Vietnam, including military intelligence operations and MAAG South Vietnam, which are related to the counter-insurgency effort.

3. The command title will be "United States Forces, Vietnam" (USFV); the commander's short title will be "COMUS Forces Vietnam "

Mission and Functional Responsibilities

4. The mission of COMUS Forces Vietnam will be to assist and support the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to prevent the fall of Vietnam to communism, to defeat communist insurgency, and to destroy the Viet Cong.

5. The commander's responsibilities, in discharging the above mission under CINCPAC, will include but not be limited to the following:

a. Exercise operational command over all US military forces in Vietnam, including MAAG South Vietnam.

b. Plan and conduct all US ground, sea and air operations in Vietnam, including US efforts undertaken in support of RVNAF combat operations against the Viet Cong.

c. Exercise full control of all US military intelligence efforts in Vietnam.

. . . . . . .

e. Participate with the RVNAF at all appropriate levels in intelligence activities, the development of plans, and the conduct of operations, to the extent necessary to insure the effective employment of RVNAF forces.

f. Coordinate, through the Chief of US Operations Mission, and other appropriate members of the US Diplomatic Mission, all US economic aid related to the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam.

g. Function, on a direct and personal basis, as principal US military advisor to the GVN and as single US spokesman in Vietnam for US military matters.

h. Conduct planning, in coordination with PACOM agencies and other appropriate agencies, for the effective application and employment of US and GVN resources in execution of his mission. Such plans will be subject to approval by CINCPAC.

Command Arrangements and Relationships

5. [sic] USFV will be a subordinate unified command of PACOM with a joint staff; COMUS Forces Vietnam will report directly to CINCPAC. USFV will be comprised of US forces organized into Army, Naval and Air Force Service components and assigned for the accomplishment of the mission.

6. Relationship with CINCPAC:

a. COMUS Forces Vietnam will coordinate all relevant activities with CINCPAC, who has over-all responsibility for the Pacific area, including Southeast Asia. As directed by CINCPAC, COMUS Forces Vietnam will communicate and coordinate directly with subordinate agencies of PACOM in areas adjacent to Vietnam.

b. CINCPAC will be responsible to provide logistic and communications support to meet USFV requirements. Requirements which exceed CINCPAC resources will be referred promptly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, and when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC will make available necessary staff and forces, including air and naval forces operating in direct support, for the execution of the COMUS Forces Vietnam mission.

7. Relationship with the US Ambassador, Vietnam:

The status of COMUS Forces Vietnam will be co-equal with that of the Ambassador. In this connection reference is made to a letter from the President to all Ambassadors, dated 29 May 1961, which is pertinent to this relationship (copy attached as Annex hereto)./7/

/7/Not found as an attachment, but see footnote 4 above.

 

313. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

New Delhi, December 7, 1961, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-761. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Saigon. Received in the Department at 3:32 a.m.

1631. Thach arriving today sees Desai today and Prime Minister tomorrow. I shall not see him except by accident at Desai's house should latter think it especially useful. I braced Desai to make following points:

(1) The best way to stop any American military involvement in South Vietnam is to call off operations;

(2) We want peace in the area;

(3) We have no ambitions in North Vietnam and no intention of supporting GVN on any ambitions there. Desai will make sufficiently clear that latter has hands sufficiently full at present;

(4) Our desire for peace presumes no willingness to have a Communist take-over;

(5) Appointment of Harriman whose reputation, position and firm judgment are so well known is manifest of future course of policy.

Desai and I had a general exchange which brought out little that was new. He asked how I would feel if they would proclaim a 5year standstill in the area calling off the infiltration and subversion and using the period to let tensions cool. I said this sounded all right. I gather he will make some such suggestion for what it might be worth. He noted that a total stand-down in Hanoi would not solve all problems, helpful as it might be. I said we were under few illustrations.

Galbraith

 

314. Telegram From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, at Palm Beach/1/

Washington, December 7, 1961, 4:50 p.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T - 29-71. Top Secret; Priority. The President was staying at his father's residence after addressing the delegates to the National Convention of the AFL-CIO in Miami earlier in the day.

CAP 5416-61. Eyes only for the President. Based upon a study of the Status Reports of December 5th,/2/ I would say that implementation actions taken under the approved Vietnam program are moving forward well. The following points seem worth calling to your attention.

/2/Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)

a. The Core, and two freighters, carrying the two helicopter companies, a total of 44 helicopters, have been directed to proceed to Saigon./3/ Core has an expected date of arrival of December 8th or 9th, and the two freighters will follow about 4 days later. The off-loading of this equipment will receive wide public attention and will make clear the fact that we are embarking upon a major program of reinforcement in South Vietnam.

/3/An unsigned handwritten note addressed to Bromley Smith, dated December s, indicates that "State gave Defense go-ahead on Core to proceed to Saigon based on Cottrell's talk with the President yesterday." (Ibid.)

b. Except for actions to provide an emergency delivery of about 100,000 tons of rice, there is insufficient evidence of progress in the economic field. The approved recommendations included a review of economic programs in Vietnam to assure that top priority was being given to those actions relating most directly to the counter-insurgency campaign. I have requested additional information from State.

c. The U.S. military personnel present or authorized for South Vietnam now amount to 3,679, broken down as follows:

(1) MAAG-1905

(2) Military units to be stationed in South Vietnam--1774.

d. A number of decisions remain to be taken which are now being worked on by the responsible departments and agencies. They include the following:

(1) Will ChiNat Special Force personnel be introduced into South Vietnam for the purpose of assisting in training of the Civil Defense Force? Diem desires to obtain from 3,000 to 5,000 trainers for this purpose.

(2) What changes should be instituted in the U.S. military command in Saigon? Assuming a new military commander is to be introduced, who should he be, and what should his relations be to the Ambassador and to the senior representative of CIA?

(3) Is there a need for better organization of the business at the Washington end? At the present time State, Defense and CIA are forwarding three separate reports to the White House./4/ There is no agency short of the President with the responsibility and authority to scrutinize the interdepartmental actions taken and to direct corrective action when such is necessary.

/4/Not further identified.

 

315. Editorial Note

On December 8, 1961, the Department of State announced that it had released a two-part report entitled A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam, which had been referred to informally within the government as the Jorden Report. A transcript of the Secretary of State's news conference that day, at which he issued a statement regarding the release of the report and responded to questions about Vietnam, is in Department of State Bulletin, December 25, 1961, pages 1053-1059.

Part I of the report consisted of an introduction and the following eight chapters:

I. The Background
II. The Setting (South Viet-Nam)
III. The Pattern of Viet Cong Activity in the South
IV. Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam
V. The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam
VI. Evidence of External Guidance and Support of the Viet Cong
VII. The Present Danger
VIII. Conclusions

Part II consisted of photographs and documents referred to in Part I.

Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman held four separate meetings on December 7 with representatives of the Vietnamese, Australian, French, British, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippine, Thai, Indian, and Canadian Embassies in Washington to present them copies of the publication and brief them on its contents. A composite memorandum of these four conversations, drafted by C. Benjamin Wood, is in Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-761. Harriman also met separately with British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore that day. Harriman's memorandum of the conversation as it related to Vietnam reads:

"I gave the British Ambassador copies of the Viet-Nam White Paper. After a discussion of it, the Ambassador raised the subject of whether the Soviet Government as a co-chairman should be called upon to use its influence to end the aggressive actions to the North Vietnamese. He said his government felt that to approach them now might be considered a sign of weakness, and that it might be more effective if done after some progress had been made in putting down the guerrillas or after an important victory was won.

"I replied that I understood this question was still under discussion. The argument for doing it now was that it might be some time before the situation improved. Obviously, if the approach was made now, it must be vigorous. It should include an expression of firm determination to prevent South Viet-Nam's being taken over by force and to warn the Soviets not to permit escalation. He said he expected the matter would come up in discussions between Lord Home and the Secretary in Paris. He mentioned also the activities of the Thompson group, expressing the hope that they would achieve the objectives of assisting Viet-Nam without interfering with MAAG. I told him that we were anxious that the Thompson mission should continue and believed that such minor differences that occurred could be straightened out in Saigon.

"I emphasized our determination to support Viet-Nam and that the dispatch of combat forces was not excluded. He indicated that the British Government agreed it was wise to make sure the North Vietnamese understood this." (Ibid., 751K.00/12-961)

 

316. Memorandum of a Conversation/1/

US/MC/6

Quai d'Orsay, Paris, December 11, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret. Drafted by Brown. There is no indication on the source text that it was approved by the Secretary. Rusk was in Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial meetings.

PARTICIPANTS
French:
M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. de Carbonnel
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Soutou
M. de Beaumarchais
M. Manac'h
M Froment-Meurice

United Kingdom:
Lord Home
Sir Shuckburgh
Sir Rumbold
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Butler

United States:
The Secretary
Ambassador Gavin
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Lyon
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Brown

SUBJECT
Vietnam

The Secretary said that the talks with Diem had led to considerable agreement and that additional steps are being taken to deal with the guerilla problem: improving intelligence, regrouping forces, improving civilian and military channels so as to improve action capability. We are providing additional economic and military support. Our objective is to help Vietnam do the job itself. We do not have in mind for the present sending organized units of American ground forces. We will supply aircraft and helicopters with American pilots. So far as the Geneva Accords are concerned, we want to concentrate on continuing violations from the North. We do not believe we are in violation because the relevant provisions have been suspended by the actions taken by North Vietnam.

Lord Home said that he agreed that Diem must be helped to fight and that he should be able to clean up the bad areas. The UK is concerned about the Geneva Accords. He hoped the US Government would not announce publicly that it is not bound by the Geneva settlement. It would render the British co-Chairman position difficult and might have an adverse effect in Laos. . . .

The Secretary said that we have tried to avoid statements on the Geneva Accords. If questions are asked it would seem preferable to turn the question around to inquire into what the North is doing. If, in time, the other side comes into compliance, then we can cease extraordinary assistance. We can leave the Accords and Under Secretary Smith's statement/2/ where they are. The purpose of the White Paper was to reveal North Vietnam activities and to prove to the Indians and others that it is not simply a question of civil disturbance.

/2/For Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith's statement at Geneva on July 21, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, p. 1500.

. . . . . . .

 

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, at Paris/1/

Washington, December 12, 1961, 6:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1261. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared with Cottrell, Wallace C. Magathan, and Harriman, and initialed by Johnson for Acting Secretary Ball.

Tosec 32. Following is draft of suggested reply to Secretary McNamara's letter to you of December 7/2/ on command relationships in Viet-Nam. Draft has been discussed with Bundy in Defense and General Taylor, and has approval of Department. If you concur, suggest it be transmitted to McNamara prior to his departure for Honolulu. (Assume McNamara has available there copy of his 7 December letter to you.)

/2/Document 312.

"Following are my comments on your proposed concept for elevating the status of the senior US military man in Viet-Nam as outlined in your letter of December 7.
 
"I completely agree with you that we must take full advantage of the new undertakings by the Government of South Viet-Nam in order to produce a return consonant with the effort we are making there. In doing this, we must carefully avoid any appearance of 'taking over' or stressing the 'big partner' relationship with the Government of Viet-Nam. We should also exhibit scrupulous regard for Vietnamese national pride and avoid, insofar as possible, giving the Communists any grounds for casting the United States in the role of Viet-Nam's former French masters, or of picturing the GVN as a puppet regime of the United States.
 
"Finally, I believe we must keep in mind the special nature of the effort to suppress the Viet Cong. While the threat continues to grow, it essentially retains the features of a guerrilla war. Viet-Nam may be a combat theater, but it is not yet such a theater in the conventional sense of the term. As you know, there are no present plans to send US combat troops to Viet-Nam.
 
"The immediate object of both sides is the loyalty of the populace. The role of the RVNAF is to seek out and destroy the Communist partisans, but, without the support of the people and the resources of the hinterland, the RVNAF would have little chance of accomplishing its mission. Also, if the GVN were to fail to marshal its resources effectively, no amount of American aid alone could save the day. Clearly, in this all-embracing conflict, virtually every activity of the GVN and the Country Team is 'related to the counter-insurgency effort.'
 
"Accordingly, I believe we should design a command arrangement which recognizes a predominantly advisory and supporting role of the American military to the RVNAF-a role which acknowledges the dual politico-military nature of the counter-insurgency effort, which accommodates Vietnamese nationalist sensibilities and which clearly continues to lodge local authority and responsibility for basic US policy with the Ambassador.
 
"I also believe that the situation in Viet-Nam differs not only from that of the normal and usual MAAG contemplated in the President's basic letter of May 29, 1961,/3/ but also from that of an 'area military commander' who exercises command authority with respect to an 'area' extending beyond the borders of a single country.
 
/3/See footnote 5. Document 271.
 
"At the same time, American military assistance to the RVNAF is a separable element of the over-all American program of assistance to the GVN in suppressing the Communist guerrillas. On the military level and in conformity with basic policy, the senior American military officer should be free to make appropriate arrangements for lateral contacts with RVNAF, to plan military operations and to make decisions. This system proved its validity in Greece and I believe we would be well advised to adhere to it now. I agree with you that, regardless of the care exercised by the senior American officials, the GVN would seek to exploit a system of divided authority. We should present the GVN with no such temptation.
 
"Although the senior US military officer in South Viet-Nam will have certain US forces under his operational command, at this stage of the conflict his major role would be that of a staff officer, of [a] RVNAF military adviser and planner. Should the character of the conflict change and should the US assume responsibility for the conduct of the campaign, as in Korea, his function could be changed very quickly.
 
"I suggest that it may be possible best to reflect the foregoing situation by converting the MAAG into a 'military assistance command' with a joint staff and Service components, the commander's title to be 'Commander, US Military Assistance Command, VietNam'. Another alternative might be to retain the title of Chief of MAAG for the senior military representative in Viet-Nam by giving him the concurrent title of 'Commander, US Forces, Viet-Nam'. In any event, I consider it important to retain the concept of 'military assistance' and avoid any implication that the US is assuming full responsibility for and direction of all of the military effort in VietNam.
 
"I agree with you that, whatever title and command arrangement is eventually adopted, Ambassador Nolting should retain responsibility for political and basic over-all policy matters. While the senior US military representative should have responsibility for the conduct of military operations, training, and other clearly military matters, with, of course, direct communication to CINCPAC on such matters and economic aid related thereto, in view of the dual nature of the conflict, I believe it important that he receive guidance from the Ambassador on all other matters. In cases of differences of view, both representatives would, of course, be free to communicate such differences to Washington for decision in accordance with already existing procedures. I would expect that, in accordance with arrangements worked out with the Ambassador, the senior US military representative would directly furnish advice to the GVN, including President Diem, on all matters relative to security and maintaining internal security in South Viet-Nam and to the organization and employment of the RVNAF, keeping the Ambassador appropriately informed of his actions.
 
"I will look forward to discussing this question further with you in the light of the results of your visit to CINCPAC with the view of promptly recommending to the President decisions that will enable us more effectively and vigorously to pursue our objectives with respect to Viet-Nam".

Ball

 

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, December 13, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Secretary.

801. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson from Nolting. Thanks for your 760,/2/ which I have studied closely.

/2/Telegram 760, December 10, summarized the contents of McNamara's letter of December 7 to Rusk and the attached proposal and commented that the Department of State was inclined to accept the substance of the proposal as an important recognition of the increased scale of the U.S. military effort but that publicly the new commander should continue to be known as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The telegram asked for Nolting's comments and suggestions. (Ibid., 751K.00/12-1061)

Regret to say I have most serious concerns with what is apparently proposed as it applies to complex problem of Viet-Nam. The Communist insurgency in Viet-Nam is as you know, carried on by political, psychological, economic, guerrilla, and military means under political direction at every stage and level. This is the essence of the new Communist subversive warfare. Our counter-insurgency effort must, in my judgment, be equally well-balanced and flexible otherwise we are likely either to lose the fight or to throw this country into another Korean-type war. Under present conditions, by setting up an area military command here, I think we will not only risk poor coordination, but we will almost inevitably build into our effort a disproportionate emphasis, in resources and planning as well as appearance, on a military solution to the problem of Viet Cong insurgency in Viet-Nam. I am profoundly convinced that the problem cannot be solved on a military basis (although military force is an indispensable element), and I think my military colleagues here agree with this, as do all members of our task force.

My second point is related to the above. US efforts vis-à-vis the GVN over many months have been in the direction of encouraging and aiding them to take the offensive against the Viet Cong in many fields, not alone in the military. The GVN itself has been inclined to put too much emphasis upon military measures relative to civil measures. The establishment of a US area military command here would, I am afraid, encourage this tendency.

Broadly speaking, my view is that there should continue to be a unified all-agency effort in this country (i.e. the task force concept) supported and directed on a day to day basis by an all-agency directorate in Washington. I believe a way can be found within this framework to preserve a clear-cut military chain of command over US operational units presently planned for Viet-Nam without establishing a military command structure which would throw the total effort out of balance. Standby plans for military operations and command should be made for instant use in the event of escalation or a change in the nature of the present war.

I am sure I do not need to add that my strong convictions expressed above are based on what I consider to be the compelling interests of the United States in this matter, and are not dictated by considerations of a personal or jurisdictional nature./3/

/3/ In telegram 772 to Saigon eyes only for Nolting, December 13, Johnson replied that prior to receiving Nolting's telegram, the Department had already transmitted to Secretary Rusk in Paris a draft letter to McNamara (see supra) which Johnson thought met Nolting's concerns and which in any event left the decisions open until after the Secretary of Defense conference in Honolulu. Johnson said that at the Honolulu conference Nolting should feel free to express his own views even if they differed from those in the letter. He also noted that decisions on this matter would be made only after Nolting returned to Washington for consultation early in 1961. (Ibid., 751K.00/2-1361)

Nolting

 

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/

Washington, December 13, 1961, 7:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1361. Confidential. Drafted by Robert S. Lindquist (FE); cleared with Wood, Harriman, and SPA; and initialed by Harriman for the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Canberra, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Paris for the Secretary of State, and Geneva.

3228. DeptOff (Harriman) Dec 11 discussed current Viet-Nam situation separately with British and Australian Ambassadors. Major point emphasized to both mission chiefs was that US believes concerted international non-military assistance to Diem Government rather than sole US support highly desirable and hopes other governments can be persuaded make meaningful contributions. Harriman suggested possibility assistance might be coordinated through existing organization such as Colombo Plan if we found bilateral dealings resulted in overlapping activity. While guardedly receptive idea of concerted help to Viet-Nam, both Ambassadors non-committal re specific means coordination. Both undertook discuss with home governments.

British Ambassador concerned that US help to Diem not ignore Geneva Accords since subsequent North Vietnamese compliance with Accords might then undermine position of US and others helping Diem. Harriman revealed that in contemplated exchange of notes between Diem and President, latter would make point that new measures no longer necessary if North Viet-Nam adhered to Accords. Harriman stressed necessity Russians and Chinese be aware Western determination prevent Viet Cong victory but at same time allay suspicions, especially Chinese, re ultimate US intentions.

Returning discussion concerted assistance, Harriman noted possible provision Philippine medical team, Malayan guerrilla instruction, Thompson Mission, etc., either undertaken or under consideration. Suggested other types help might include flood relief. Stressed importance encourage other Asian support. British Ambassador said British playing down Thompson Mission since Thompson "sold as Tunku's man." Added Tunku aware danger posed in South Viet-Nam but suggested direct participation Malayan personnel perhaps not politically possible for Tunku. Ormsby-Gore said British opposed GRC participation. Re aid to Diem, British have thought in bilateral rather than multilateral terms.

Ball

 

320. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, December 13, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/12-761. Secret. Drafted by Cottrell and Johnson.

Dear Bill: I appreciate the difficulties you outlined in your letter of December 7/2/ in providing expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps. I can also appreciate why the employment of GRC special forces might provide a possible solution, from a strictly technical point of view.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

On the other hand, this solution raises certain difficult problems.

1. In most free countries the prospect of ChiNats fighting on the mainland of Asia raises the specter of opening a "Pandora's Box".

2. As you know, quite apart from whether Chinese are Communists or Nationalists, prejudice against them is strong throughout Southeast Asia, including Viet-Nam, even though the GVN is apparently receptive to accepting some of them in the present emergency.

3. One of our objectives in Viet-Nam is to assist the Vietnamese to counter successfully the Communist-directed insurgency without attracting substantial ChiCom intervention. The introduction of ChiNats would certainly in some degree increase this hazard.

For the above reasons, I believe we should not introduce ChiNat forces into Viet-Nam at this time but should continue to explore other alternatives.

For instance, I believe we should closely examine whether interpreters are indispensable. Experience in the police training programs in Viet-Nam, which may be similar to the individual and small unit training required for the Self Defense Corps, indicates that interpreters are not indispensable.

Additionally, we might examine the possibilities of getting experts from Malaya, the Philippines or Thailand, who are experienced in this work.

Another possibility might be to obtain a more precise estimate of the nature and extent of the training required through the results of our provincial survey teams, which are about to commence their investigations. We may find that training and equipping the Self Defense Corps should be done progressively in areas which become "white", closely following an integrated plan of clearing areas, setting up Civil Guard units and ARVN back-up for quick reaction when the Self Defense Corps gives the alarm. An immediate nationwide on-the-spot training in white, pink, or red areas may invite serious trouble for the program.

Our relative success in Laos with Mobile Training Teams suggests the idea of traveling teams to train, advise, and equip rather than "on-the-spot" training by a large number of trainers scattered thinly in villages, vulnerable to VC attack.

The above thoughts are offered as possible alternatives which I believe should be explored before we consider utilizing GRC forces. Of course, if Chinese Communist forces are introduced into Viet-Nam this would substantially change the situation.

Sincerely,

Alex/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

 

321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, December 14, 1961, 8:02 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Heinz and Wood, cleared with Cottrell, DOD/ISA, and USIA, and initialed by Harriman for the Acting Secretary. Also sent to CINCPAC for PolAd.

781. Joint State-Defense message. Task Force/VN. Subject: Defoliants. Defense prepared give go-ahead to first stage defoliant operations upon receipt from CINCPAC of plans and Washington approval for first stage of operation. Decision is that first operations undertaken will be clearance of jungle growth along roads and trails used by ARVN for tactical operations. SecDef has stated that he desires these operations commence as soon as plans receive Washington (Defense and State) approval.

In anticipation press inquiries re use defoliant for jungle road clearance, we propose reply following lines: Noting Communist guerrillas use roadside underbrush to ambush civilian buses, trucks, and passenger cars, making roads unsafe for daily travel by people of the country, GVN has asked U.S. for assistance in program of clearance of jungle growth along roads of Vietnam. U.S. equipment will be used. Road clearance will aid the ARVN in patrolling roads to protect people and will facilitate normal maintenance. Operation involves use of materials which are similar those used every day for weed clearance rights of way in the United States. As our people know from experience, these defoliants of the 2-4D variety are not harmful to humans, animals, or the soil. Since there are miles of jungle roads in Vietnam, U.S. planes and personnel are actively cooperating in this jungle growth clearance operation. C-123 type planes are being used. They are piloted by U.S. crews in uniform.

Your comments requested on above proposed statement which we suggest would also be used in Saigon by U.S. agencies in response to expected queries there.

Deptel 556/2/ and Airgram CA-623/3/ propose certain procedures for GVN. We would suggest that matter of informing South Vietnamese people be responsibility of the GVN.

/2/Not found.

/3/Dated December 8, it contained the Vietnam Task Force's suggestions regarding publicity in connection with the use of defoliants. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-861)

Since defoliant is harmless to personnel and animals, we intend to play it in a low key although we feel it will make a definite contribution to counter-guerrilla operations. (on lines para A, 1 CA-623)/4/

/4/This paragraph dealt with defoliation along roads. It reads "Action preceded by low key, provincial level announcement emphasizing this normal procedure keep road shoulders clear underbrush and tying action to road maintenance effort. Mimeographed announcement including statement that spray harmless to man, animals, and soil for distribution inhabited areas near roads. Before undertaking overall road clearance project large-scale trial run should be undertaken, after proper publicity, and popular reaction to trial run assessed".

We believe it important to emphasize that in this operation we are merely clearing jungle growth along the sides of roads, that we are not attacking any human targets, and that its primary purpose is to prevent the guerrilla forces from utilizing this jungle cover for ambushing Vietnamese forces.

We also anticipate that the ground work laid in connection with this jungle road clearance operation will establish a framework within which we can combat future Communist propaganda blasts for other phases of defoliant operations, i.e., tactical Zone D, border clearance and eventually food denial.

Ball

 

322. Editorial Note

On December 15, 1961, the White House released the texts of a letter from President Diem to President Kennedy, dated December 7, and a reply by President Kennedy, dated December 14. The text of Diem's letter was substantially the same as the draft contained in Document 257. In his letter, President Kennedy said that the American people were "deeply disturbed by the assault" on South Vietnam and were prepared to help "protect its people and to preserve its independence." Kennedy also told Diem:

"We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway."

For full texts of this correspondence, see Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1962, pages 13-14.

 

323. Letter From the Charge in Vietnam (Trueheart) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/

Saigon, December 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 320 GVN-U.S. Secret; Official-Informal.

Dear Cott: I am enclosing a copy of a proposed letter from President Diem to President Kennedy./2/ During a long meeting yesterday,/3/ the President mentioned to the Ambassador that he was planning to send such a letter in response to President Kennedy's message on the occasion of Vietnamese National Day./4/ Fritz indicated interest and Diem offered to send him a copy. The enclosure arrived this morning with a covering note stating that Diem planned to send the letter "soon".

/2/Not found attached to the source text, but a copy of the proposed letter is in Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Cambodia, Oct-Dec 1961. The copy bears several marginal notations, including, "This is message Thuan gave Trueheart, but which was never officially sent-and never will be, we hope."

/3/A nine-page memorandum of the conversation Nolting and McGarr had with Diem from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on December 14, which was called by Diem to explain "his new concept of the danger facing South Vietnam," is attached to McGarr's memorandum of December 18 to Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)

/4/For text of this letter, dated October 24 and released by the White House on October 26, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 680-681.

Fritz did not have a chance to do anything about this prior to his departure for Honolulu. Accordingly, when I saw Thuan on another matter this afternoon, I took it on myself to mention the letter and to say with appropriate expressions of difference that I felt bound to let him know as a friend and on a strictly personal basis that I thought such a letter would be badly received in Washington. Thuan had obviously not seen or heard of the letter and expressed considerable interest in it. (It is of course patently a Nhu production.) I gave him a brief sketch of the contents, mentioning particularly the references to the Civil Guard and to American domestic politics./5/ I said that, whatever might be the validity of the statements regarding the Civil Guard, I thought they would not be understood in Washington at a time when we had embarked on a greatly increased effort to assist the GVN. The reference to alleged policy differences between the Republican and Democratic administrations was also not likely to be helpful to the GVN, in my opinion. Finally, I repeated that I had no wish to undermine my usefulness in Viet-Nam, but I felt obliged as a friend to indicate what I thought might be the Washington reaction to such a communication. Thuan appeared to take this very well and gave me a most friendly pat on the back as I departed. Whether he will be able to do anything about the letter is another matter.

/5/Apparently a reference to Diem's contention in his letter that the Eisenhower administration's failure to understand properly the "phenomenon of modern underdevelopment" led to a reduced role for the Civil Guard and his expression of gratitude to "the new Democratic Administration for having better evaluated the mission of the Civil Guard and for permitting it to be trained at present by MAAG." Diem also stated that the "chief reason for the long continued American refusal to convert the Civil Guard into a real guerilla army is a certain opinion to the effect that I entertained a sinister plan to create a personal army with the American money."

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

William C. Trueheart /6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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