DARWIN Digitale Dissertationen German Version Strich

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Digitale Dissertation

Daniel Matthias Brickwell :
On the potential influence of the German Banks
Zu den Einflusspotenzialen der Grossbanken

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Abstract

This paper shows that the public discussion about the power of the German banks has been too widely focussed. Of Germany's financial intermediaries only five universal banks and two insurances possess enough influence, that the potential for abuse is given. Their influence is mainly concentrated on the 100 largest companies, who generate 35% of the sales and 20% of the economic value added of all German companies. The distribution of the shareholdings gives reason to assume that the intermediaries only hold stakes were they can also exert some measure of control. Chapter 5 shows that the characteristics of a financial intermediary such as diversified shareholdings and better financial information through the nature of its business, clearly advantage financial intermediaries as agents of corporate control. This also means they are the better corporate controllers from the perspective of the other shareholders. Therefore a restriction of the industrial shareholdings of financial intermediaries is not advantageous. One should even hope that the financial intermediaries will not voluntarily divest all such holdings in the process of the current restructuring of their industrial portfolios. A special case however are the cross shareholdings of the financial intermediaries amongst themselves. These are examined closely in Chapter 3. Financial cross shareholdings have been mainly excluded from the public discussion about the power of the banks, as the previous studies have mainly concentrated on the banks industrial holdings. Of concern in this regard is the future relationship of Allianz/Dresdner with Deutsche Bank and the cross shareholdings with Munich Re and HypoVereinsbank. Here regulation to end these cross shareholdings should be considered. Other problems which have been associated with the influence of banks on industrial companies such as the preference of Hausbanks for investment banking business, the restriction of the German market for corporate control and the neglect of the minority shareholder interests are not a result of the banks industrial shareholdings, but of the German system for proxy voting rights the "Depotstimmrecht". The votes cast by financial intermediaries through their own shareholdings are considerably smaller than those with Depotstimmrecht. In Chapter 5 demonstrates that the Depotstimmrecht, contrary to the general opinion, can not be justified via a Delegated Monitoring Model, as banks enjoy no economies of scale for receiving delegated proxy voting rights. Unlike the regulation for shareholdings there are no disclosure regulations for the Depotstimmrechte. The Depotstimmrecht allows banks to act as equity owners without any capital expenditure. Furthermore the bank's service is not directly compensated. Without compensation the smaller banks lack incentive to utilize the Depotstimmrecht in the best interest of shareholders, but the larger banks have an incentive to use the Depotstimmrecht for their own purposes.

Table of Contents

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Titelblatt
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Einleitung 1
2. Hypothesen zur Macht der Banken 7
2.1. Die Diskussion um die Macht der Banken 7
2.2. Anhäufung von nicht legitimierter Macht 9
2.3. Verzerrung des Wettbewerbs für Finanzdienstleistungen 10
2.4. Einfluss der Banken auf die Gütermärkte 12
2.5. Behinderung des Kapitalmarkts 14
3. Das Ausmaß der Einflusspotenziale 17
3.1. Auftrags- oder Depotstimmrecht 17
3.2. Beteiligungsbesitz 36
3.3. Die Beteiligungsstruktur von Großunternehmen 47
3.4. Aufsichtsratsmandate 69
3.5. Kreditvergabe 79
4. Kumulative Betrachtung der Einflusspotenziale 89
4.1. Bankeneinfluss und Unternehmensergebnis 91
4.2. Die Stellung der Großbanken am Kapitalmarkt 98
4.3. Entwicklungsstand des Aktienmarktes 101
4.4. Schlussfolgerungen für den Gesetzgeber 106
5. Thesen zum Bankeneinfluss 107
5.1. Interessenlage der Banken 107
5.2. Thesen zur Rolle der Banken als Kreditgeber 110
5.3. Hausbanken und langfristige Bindung 113
5.4. Bankeneinfluss und Unternehmenskontrolle 115
5.5. Beteiligungen und Unternehmenswert 117
5.6. Banken und Stimmrechtsvertretung 136
5.7. Depotbanken als Interessenvertreter der Aktionäre 136
6. Änderungsvorschläge und -möglichkeiten 173
6.1. Der Einfluss der Banken 173
6.2. Beschränkung des Beteiligungsbesitzes 174
6.3. Veränderung des Depotstimmrechts 177
7. Anhang 181
8. Literaturverzeichnis 193

More Information:

Online available: http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2002/39/indexe.html
Language of PhDThesis: german
Keywords: German Banks, Corporate Governance, Influence
DNB-Sachgruppe: 17 Wirtschaft
Date of disputation: 22-Nov-2001
PhDThesis from: Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin
First Referee: Prof. Dr. Lutz Kruschwitz
Second Referee: Prof. Dr. Manfred Hein
Contact (Author): Brickwell@t-online.de
Contact (Advisor): kruschwl@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Date created:24-Mar-2002
Date available:03-Apr-2002

 

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