FU Berlin Digitale Dissertation
Gordon Gillespie : Dummett and the A critique of Dummetts conception of a theory of meaning with regard to mathematics and Wittgenstein´s anti-reductionism with respect to meaning and understanding Dummett und die "Krankheit, erklären zu wollen"
|Abstract| |Table of Contents| |More Information|

Abstract The project of a non-circular explanation of linguistic communication is ill-motivated; we are confronted with no genuine problem concerning meaning and understanding, which demands a solution in form of such an explanation! This view of Wittgenstein´s is to be argued for in this thesis -- in the framework of a critical discussion of Dummett´s conception of a theory of meaning. The critique of this conception is divided in two parts. In the first part of the critique it is to become clear (with regard to mathematics) that the conception is anti-realistic to a by far greater degree than Dummett believes -- to a highly questionable degree. In the second part of the critique it is to be shown (no longer with specific regard to mathematics): Dummett, in contrast to most other reductionists with respect to meaning and understanding, does not take a mere reductionistic dogma as his starting point, but rather, indeed, a genuine problem concerning linguistic communication -- the same problem that is Wittgenstein´s starting point. However, if, following Wittgenstein, the linguistic utterances of individual speakers are located properly within a certain vast communal practice this problem can be solved without tying semantical to allegedly more basic facts.

Table of Contents Download the whole PhDthesis as a zip-tar file or as zip-File For download in PDF format click the chapter title       Kopf Titelseite, Angaben, Danksagung, Lebenslauf und (ausführliches) Inhaltsverzeichnis 0       Hilfsdefinitionen (und -konventionen) 8 Einleitung   12       Teil I     Kapitel 1 Dummetts Bedeutungstheorie-Konzeption 25 Kapitel 2 Das Manifestations- und das Normativitätsargument 46       Teil II     Kapitel 3 Die intuitionistische Analyse mathematischer Wahrheit 58 Kapitel 4 Die Labilität des nur lokal revisionistischen Intuitionismus 69 Kapitel 5 Das Manifestations- und das Normativitätsargument und der strikte Finitismus 81 Kapitel 6 Die Zweifelhaftigkeit der Gebrauchsthese in Dummetts Lesart 92       Teil III     Kapitel 7 Wittgensteins Psychologismus-Kritik 101 Kapitel 8 Wittgensteins Auflösung des Problems einer Erklärung sprachlicher Kommunikation 111       Revue (der wichtigsten Punkte) 128 Literaturverzeichnis   132

More Information:
Online available:	http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2002/223/indexe.html
Language of PhDThesis:	german
Keywords:	Wittgenstein; Dummett; theory of meaning; intuitionism
DNB-Sachgruppe:	10 Philosophie
Date of disputation:	12-Jul-2002
PhDThesis from:	Fachbereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften, Freie Universität Berlin
First Referee:	Prof. Dr. Holm Tetens
Second Referee:	Prof. Dr. Peter Bieri
Contact (Author):	gordongillespie@web.de
Contact (Advisor):	tetens@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Date created:	31-Oct-2002
Date available:	07-Nov-2002

 

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