Chapter X: The Search for Atomic Age Division

After the Korean War the Eisenhower administration adopted a military posture that emphasized nuclear capability through air power rather than ground combat. Three considerations dictated this change: limited resources, a worldwide commitment to contain communism, and the desire to reduce defense spending. Given the declining number of ground combat troops, the Army fielded fewer divisions, but because the possibility of nuclear war remained, Army leaders wanted to devise units that could fight and survive on a nuclear as well as on a conventional battlefield. The divisions developed by the Army for the two combat environments were smaller than in the past, and they were authorized weapons and equipment still under development and not yet in the inventory. The newly designed divisions, however, staked out a role for the Army on the atomic battlefield, which justified appeals for funds to develop new weapons.

Some Army planners thought a general war would be too costly to wage by conventional means because the Communist bloc could field more men and resources than the United States and its allies. Firepower appeared to be the answer for overcoming the enemy. Ever since the United States dropped the first atomic bomb in 1945, American military planners had pondered the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The Army, however, was hampered in its effort to understand the effects of tactical nuclear weapons by the lack of data. Studies suggested that nuclear weapons could be used much like conventional artillery. To achieve the aim of increased firepower with decreased manpower, the Army began to take a closer look at that proposition in the early 1950s.2

when it asked the Infantry School to examine both infantry and airborne infantry regiments. Four goals were to guide the effort: elimination of nonfighters; expansion and more effective use of firepower; simplification and improved organization and control; and a reduction in the size of the regiment. Army Field Forces dropped the last goal when it decided austerity should begin in service and support units before being applied to infantry and airborne infantry regiments. Both regiments were to be alike except for the number of antitank weapons.3

The infantry regiment recommended by the Infantry School consisted of three rifle battalions, a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, an antitank company, and a weapons company armed with .50-caliber machine guns. Removed from the regiment were the medical, heavy mortar, and tank companies. Assets of the tank company were transferred to the division and those of the heavy mortar company to the division artillery; instead of the medical company, medical personnel were assigned directly to the infantry battalions. The study proposed merging the heavy weapons company of each infantry battalion with the battalion headquarters company, except for the heavy .50-caliber machine guns, which were to be integrated into each battalion's three rifle companies. Additional automatic rifles were placed in the battalions, and more communication personnel were assigned throughout the regiment.4

Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Commandant of the Infantry School, had many reservations about the proposed changes and believed that thorough field testing was needed to evaluate them. As a result, an underequipped and understrength 325th Infantry, an element of the 82d Airborne Division, began testing the organization in May 1953 and completed the evaluation in September. The results indicated that the proposed regimental organization was less effective than the one then being used in Korea.5

In the meantime, the Tactical Department of the Infantry School had also begun work on a new type of infantry division. The redesign effort also sought to eliminate nonfighters and to increase firepower as well as to simplify the organization and improve control at the divisional level by using task force organizations similar to those in the armored division. A fixed organization such as an infantry regiment, the studies noted, forced the commander to base his operational plans on the organization rather than on the mission. Task force structures would permit him to organize his forces to accomplish a broader variety of missions. The division that evolved consisted of three brigade headquarters, nine infantry battalions, two armored battalions, division artillery, and combat and combat service support. The brigade headquarters elements had no permanently assigned combat or support units. No reduction resulted in the size of the division, which totaled 18,762 officers and enlisted men.6

Although Army Field Forces became the executive agent for the study, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth did much of the work required to meet the tight schedule. The study centered on infantry and armored divisions because of the similarity between infantry and airborne divisions. Changes in the infantry division would automatically apply to major aspects of the airborne division. By the fall of 1954 Army Field Forces had developed the Atomic Field Army, or "ATFA-1," which it believed could be organized in 1956.8

Under ATFA-1 infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible (Chart 26). The infantry division included a separate headquarters battalion; signal, engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. Within the division headquarters battalion were aviation and reconnaissance companies, and within its headquarters and service company were three combat command headquarters along with the divisional staff. One 4.2-inch mortar and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions made up the division artillery. The support command, a new organization, comprised a battalion, which included medical, maintenance, supply and transport, and personnel service companies. Divisional elements lost all administrative functions except those needed to maintain unit efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions were concentrated in battalion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were minimal; the divisional G-1 and G-4 functions were reduced to policy, planning, and coordinating activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, were to use task force organizations as situations required. Combat command headquarters, the combat arms battalions, and the support units were the building

The armored division (Chart 27) retained its task force structure. It consisted of headquarters, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three medium and three heavy tank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. The headquarters battalion was the same as in the infantry division except for the reconnaissance unit, which was a separate battalion. The artillery was also similar to that in the infantry division, but the 105-mm. howitzers were self-propelled rather than towed. A maintenance battalion and a supply and transport battalion were assigned to the support command, but the division had no separate medical or personnel service units, those functions being integrated into the support battalion. The strength of the division was approximately 12,000 officers and enlisted men, a drop of almost 2,700 soldiers.10

In February 1955 the 3d Infantry Division in Exercise FOLLOW ME and the 1st Armored Division in Exercise BLUE BOLT tried out these new organizations. The results of the infantry division test showed that independent infantry battalions and the combat commands added flexibility and that the support command provided an acceptable base from which to improve logistical functions. Generally, however, the division lacked the capability to wage sustained combat operations. It needed more on-the-ground strength to execute normal battlefield missions during an atomic war and larger reconnaissance forces to cover the extended frontages and depths envisaged for the nuclear battlefield. Additional antitank and artillery weapons were also required. Staffs at division, combat command, and battalion levels were too small to be fully effective. BLUE BOLT neither proved nor disproved that the 1st Armored Division possessed less vulnerability to atomic attacks. But the use of the same command posts for combat command headquarters and tank battalions increased the division's vulnerability to air attacks, as did the omission of the antiaircraft artillery battalion. 12

Following the exercises Army Field Forces revised the two organizations, and the 3d Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division again tested them, this time in Operation SAGEBRUSH, a joint Army and Air Force exercise. Both divisions retained combat commands, but their staffs were increased to allow them to conduct operations from separate command posts. The infantry division had two tank

Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch, the "Marne" Division commander, and Maj. Gen. Robert L. Howze, commanding "Old Ironsides," reached different conclusions about the revised divisions. Lynch found that the infantry division operated in much the same manner as a conventional division with an improved logistical system. He nevertheless concluded that the Army should return to the traditional- division organization with three regimental combat teams, which, he believed, were as flexible as combat commands. Furthermore, Lynch thought regimental organization fostered morale; encouraged teamwork between subordinate and superior commanders, as well as their staffs; provided knowledge about capabilities and weaknesses of units and their leaders; and stimulated cooperative working methods. Lynch's proposed changes raised the divisional strength to 21,678 officers and enlisted men. Howze, on the other hand, found the armored division generally acceptable. He suggested returning all mess and second-echelon maintenance to the company level, converting the medical unit to a battalion, forming headquarters and service companies or batteries for battalions in all the arms, concentrating antiaircraft resources into one battalion, and augmenting maintenance throughout the division. Howze did not specify the strength of his proposed division, but Lt. Gen. John H. Collier, Fourth Army commander, in whose area the operation was conducted, reported on the test and recommended 15,819 of all ranks.14

In 1956 the U.S. Continental Army Command, which had replaced Army Field Forces, distributed revised tables of organization for Atomic Field Army divisions throughout the Army for review and comment. While controversies persisted, the command noted that gains had been made in the infantry division's ability to carry out a variety of missions and to protect itself against atomic attack. The Atomic Field Army studies refrained from making any revolutionary changes

in the armored division. Recommended changes incorporated such desirable features as the area system of communications, the administrative services company as a home for special staffs and the replacement section, an aviation company for more flexibility in the use of aircraft, and the new support command for better logistical support.15

The Army's search for austere units that could survive on both conventional and nuclear battlefields thus appeared to have gone nowhere. Those who had tested or commented on the Atomic Field Army divisions either disagreed with or had misunderstood the overall objectives of Ridgway and the Army Staff. Maj. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, opposed a "lean" division because he thought it would sacrifice training between the combat arms and services. He also thought that such a division was inappropriate for use as a mobilization base. The college, he noted, preferred "a very flexible outfit, which could be beefed up or skinned down as necessary on deployment."17

Furthermore, those who evaluated the divisions paid little heed to use of tactical atomic weapons. Over 250 simulated tests had been conducted in the SAGEBRUSH exercise. Taylor concluded after the exercises that "we in the Army have a long way to go before we understand the problems of using these weapons," noting that "we would have probably destroyed ourselves and all our friends had we tossed atomic weapons about a real battlefield in the way we did in this maneuver."18

of PENTANA. Ridgway wanted the study to outline broad doctrinal and organizational concepts applicable to sustained ground combat on the Eurasian land mass during the period 1960-70. While the study was to make use of the maximum technological developments, including nuclear weapons of all types, Ridgway also desired that the Army retain a capability for conventional warfare.19

Completed in December 1955, the Army War College study called for a completely air transportable 8,600man division to replace infantry, airborne, and armored divisions. The new division was to be built around five small, self-sufficient "battle groups" that would include their own artillery. The battle groups were to meet the tactical requirements for dispersion of forces, operations in depth, and increased flexibility and mobility on the atomic battlefield. Organic division artillery, although meager, included the Honest John, a surface-to-surface rocket with a nuclear warhead. The division had minimal logistical and administrative support and lacked tanks, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units (Chart 28).20

Not surprisingly, many Army leaders found the PENTANA division unacceptable. When General John E. Dahlquist, commander of the Continental Army Command, forwarded the study to Washington, he noted that the reaction of the arms and services to the division was directly related to the impact of the proposal on their strengths and missions. Those who perceived an increase in responsibility endorsed the idea, those who saw no change acquiesced, and those who discerned a diminution of strengths and responsibilities violently opposed it. The Armor School objected to the lack of divisional tanks, the Artillery School desired more conventional artillery, and the Command and General Staff College questioned the division's staying power. The most damning comment came from Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., who considered the concept "completely unacceptable intellectually and scientifically."21

Nevertheless, Chief of Staff Taylor approved the PENTANA study on 1 June 1956 as a goal for future research and development of new weapons, equipment, and organizations. It was not an entirely new idea for him. As the commander of the Eighth Army he had experimented with a division having five subordinate elements in the Korean Army. In the meantime, the Army was to fill the gap

Before Taylor approved the PENTANA study, he had directed the reorganization of the airborne division using a modification of the concept. He judged the existing airborne division incapable of functioning effectively either in an airborne role or in sustained ground combat. It could neither be divided into balanced task forces nor be airlifted. Taylor suggested a division of 10,000 or 12,000 men organized into five battle groups that fielded nuclear weapons. Including such arms in the division, he believed, would both stimulate their development and assist in developing doctrine for their use.23

On 15 December 1955, the Continental Army Command submitted a proposal for an airborne division that incorporated features of both the PENTANA and ATFA studies. Each one of its five battle groups would consist of four infantry companies; a 4.2-inch mortar battery; and a headquarters and service company comprising engineer, signal, supply, maintenance, reconnaissance, assault weapons, and medical resources. A divisional support group made up of a maintenance battalion and administrative, medical, and supply and transport companies provided logistical services. The divisional command and control battalion assets included the division headquarters, a headquarters and service company, an aviation company, and a reconnaissance troop. A signal battalion furnished a grid communication system, and a small engineer battalion provided the resources needed to construct an airstrip within forty-eight hours. The artillery fielded three

Taylor approved the concept in February 1956 with the following modifications: the addition of a fifth infantry company to each battle group, an increase in the number of 105-mm. howitzer batteries from three to five (while reducing the number of pieces from eight to five), inclusion of a band, and the elimination of the attached food service company. He also wanted the administration company moved from the support group to the command and control battalion and the artillery group redesignated as division artillery.25

Following Taylor's guidance, the command published tables of organization and equipment on 10 August 1956 known as ROTAD (Reorganization of the Airborne Division). The division had 11,486 officers and enlisted men (Chart 29), and, for the first time in its history, all men and equipment, except for the Honest Johns, could be carried on existing aircraft. The designers of the new division thought that it was capable of operating from three to five days independently, but it would need to be reinforced for operations that lasted for a longer period.26

To test what Taylor called the new "pentomic" 27 division, he selected his former unit, the 101st Airborne Division, then serving as a training division at Fort Jackson. On 31 April 1956, the division moved without its personnel and equipment to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it was reorganized, acquiring personnel from the 187th and 508th Regimental Combat Teams and equipment from the 11th Airborne Division that had been left at Fort Campbell after the unit had participated in the GYROSCOPE program.28

The "Screaming Eagles" conducted a series of individual unit evaluations rather than one divisional exercise. Lt. Gen. Thomas E Hickey, the test director, judged the new division suitable for short-duration airborne assaults, with improved prospects for survival and success during either an atomic or a conventional war. However, he noted major deficiencies in the direct support artillery-its short range and lack of lethality; in logistical resources, which were less effective than in the triangular division; and in the total strength of the division. The division was so austere that it could not undertake garrison duties and maintain combat readiness.29

The test findings and Hickey's recommendations worked their way through the Continental Army Command. Dahlquist agreed with most of Hickey's proposals except for the artillery and support group. He believed that 105-mm. howitzers should be retained as direct support weapons because they could be airlifted in two helicopter loads or towed by 3/4-ton trucks. Rather than decreasing the number of artillery batteries, he wanted the division to retain five, each with six pieces. He opposed changes in the support group because its structure had not been fully tested, and he felt that Hickey's recommendation to eliminate it was premature.31

The Army Staff agreed with Dahlquist's views regarding the number of artillery batteries but not on increasing the number of pieces in each battery. No change in the support group won approval, and the staff opposed the elimination of the infantry platoon from the reconnaissance troop, the addition of the military intelligence detachment, and alterations in the rank of company and battery commanders. The Continental Army Command published tables of organization for the pentomic airborne division reflecting the views of the Army Staff in June 1958 without a change in unit's overall strength. Both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions adopted them by December.32

Shortly after the 101st Airborne Division began testing ROTAD, Taylor directed the Continental Army Command to develop a new infantry division along similar pentagonal lines. It was to have five battle groups (a headquarters and service company, one mortar battery, and four infantry companies each); conventional and nuclear artillery; tank, signal, and engineer battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with ground and air capabilities; and trains. The trains, who commander was responsible for the activities of the service troops in the rear area, were to include a transportation battalion, an aviation company, and an administration company. The transportation battalion was to have sufficient armored personnel carriers to move an entire battle group at one time, and the aviation company was to be placed in the trains for better supervision of its maintenance. Taylor wanted to

On 15 October 1956 the Continental Army Command forwarded manning charts (Chart 30) for "ROCID" (Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division) to Washington. The planners followed Taylor's general guidance but recommended a division slightly larger than expected. They provided the tank and engineer battalions with five companies each and the division artillery with two battalions-five batteries of 105-mm. howitzers in one and an Honest John rocket, one 8-inch howitzer, and two 155-mm. howitzer batteries in the other. Each 105-mm. howitzer battery fielded six pieces and boasted of its own fire direction center, and each mortar battery in the battle group had assigned liaison, fire direction, forward air controller, and forward observer personnel. In addition to headquarters and headquarters detachment and band, the division trains included medical, ordnance, and transportation battalions and aviation, administrative, and quartermaster companies.34

Taylor hesitated to adopt the pentagonal structure for the armored division because he feared that such a change would make the organization too large. Nevertheless, Lt. Gen. Clyde Eddleman, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, instructed the Continental Army Command to modernize the division by adding atomic weapons, increasing target acquisition capabilities, and reducing the number of vehicles. To carry out his wishes, the command added a reconnaissance and surveillance platoon to the reconnaissance battalion, provided aircraft in the aviation company to support it, and replaced the 155-mm. howitzers in one battery of the general support battalion with 8-inch howitzers that could fire nuclear rounds. No significant reduction in the number of vehicles took place because the atomic and conventional battlefields required more transportation resources than authorized in the existing division. A command and control battalion that included administration and aviation companies was added. To offset increases in the divisional elements, the command eliminated the antiaircraft artillery battalion.35

On 5 November 1956 the Army Staff approved the pentomic armored division with some exceptions. The staff directed the formation of separate divisional headquarters, aviation, and administrative companies in place of the suggested command and control battalion and moved the administration company to the trains. The former 155-mm. howitzer battalion was reorganized as a composite unit comprising an Honest John, an 8-inch howitzer, and two 155-mm. howitzer batteries. The Army published the "ROCAD" (Reorganization of the Current Armored Division) tables reflecting these changes in December 1956. They called for a division of 14,617 officers and enlisted men (Chart 31), 34 fewer than included in the 1955 tables. The tank count stood at 360, of which 54 were armed with 75-mm. guns and 306 with 90-mm. guns. All the medium tanks were in four tank battalions.36

After the Continental Army Command completed the tables of organization for infantry and armored divisions, Taylor met with Army school commandants on 28 February 1957 to sell them on the pentomic reorganization of the Army. He noted that the doctrine of massive retaliation ruled out nuclear war, but that the chance existed that war might stem from unchecked local aggression or error. The Army had to be prepared to prevent or stop a small war as well as conduct a nuclear conflict. He believed that the new divisions, although controversial, could meet both challenges.37

More important was what Taylor did not say about the pentomic divisions and why the Army was adopting them. The Army's budget called for unglamorous weapons and equipment such as rifles, machine guns, and trucks, which had little appeal for Congress or the nation. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson earlier had returned the Army's budget to Taylor, directing him to substitute "newfangled" equipment that Congress would support.

The Army's literature soon reported on such ideas as "convertiplanes," which combined the advantages of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft; one-man "flying platforms"; and the adoption of pentomic divisions, which fielded nuclear weapons. Later Taylor wrote, "nuclear weapons were the going thing and, by including some in the division armament, the Army staked out its claim to a share of the nuclear arsenal.." 38

When reorganizing Regular Army infantry and armored divisions in 1957 under the pentomic structure, several major changes were made in the force to accommodate a cut of 100,000 men and changing world conditions. In the Far East, the United States agreed to withdraw all ground combat troops from Japan. Subsequently the 1st Cavalry Division moved to Korea, where it replaced the 24th Infantry Division. While the 7th Infantry Division remained in Korea, the 24th was eventually reorganized in Germany to replace the 11th Airborne Division. Also in Germany, the 3d Infantry Division replaced the 10th Infantry Division, which was returned to Fort Benning as part of GYROSCOPE. With these changes U.S. Army, Europe, still fielded five divisions, the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions and the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions. The European command also retained an airborne capability by reorganizing two battle groups in the 24th Infantry Division as airborne units. At Fort Benning, Georgia, the 2d Infantry Division, which earlier had been reduced to zero strength, replaced the 10th Infantry Division, which was inactivated. The 5th Infantry Division was also inactivated at Fort Ord; the 1st Armored Division, less its Combat Command A, was reduced to zero strength; and the 25th Infantry Division was cut one battle group. When the game of musical chairs with divisions was over, the Regular Army consisted of fifteen divisions. In most cases only the division names and flags moved, not the personnel and equipment. These changes in the divisional designations reflected the desire of Army leaders to keep divisions with outstand-

As the Army reorganized and shuffled divisions around the world, it adopted the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) for infantry, artillery, cavalry, and armor. During the ATFA and PENTANA studies a debate arose regarding unit designations. Traditionally regiments were the basic branch element, especially for the infantry, and their long histories had produced deep traditions considered essential to unit esprit de corps. The new divisional structure, replacing infantry regiments with anonymous battle groups, threatened to destroy all these traditions. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker settled the question on 24 January 1957 when he approved the Combat Arms Regimental System. Although regiments would no longer exist as tactical units except for armored cavalry, certain distinguished regiments were to become "parent" organizations for the combat arms. Under the new concept, the Department of the Army assumed control of regimental headquarters, the repository for a unit's lineage, honors, and traditions, and used elements of the regiments to organize battle groups, battalions, squadrons, companies, batteries, and troops, which shared in the history and honors of their parent units.40

When infantry regiments were eliminated in divisions as tactical units, they were also eliminated as nondivisional organizations. The Army replaced the nondivisional regimental combat teams with separate, flexible combined arms "brigades," shifting the concept of a brigade. Instead of being composed of two or more regiments or battalions of the same arm or service, the concept encompassed a combined arms unit equivalent to a reinforced regiment. Initially only two brigades were formed. First was the 2d Infantry Brigade, activated at Fort Devens on 14 February 1958 to replace the 4th Regimental Combat Team. No tables of organization existed for the unit, which at the time consisted of a headquarters, two battle groups, one artillery battalion, a reconnaissance troop, two engineer and two armor companies, and trains. The last element was an adaptation of the trains of an infantry division and consisted of a headquarters element and administration, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical companies. A miniature division, the 2d Brigade had 4,188 officers and enlisted men commanded by a brigadier general. To support the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Third United States Army organized the 1st Infantry Brigade on 25 July 1958. It contained two battle groups; one artillery battalion (one Honest John, one 155-mm. howitzer, and two 105-mm. howitzer batteries); armor, transportation, and engineer companies; and signal and chemical platoons, but no trains. A colonel commanded the 3,600 officers and enlisted men assigned to the unit. 41

general, such efforts elicited favorable reports, finding the divisions to be adequate for atomic and conventional warfare. In particular, the command noted the new infantry division's flexibility, unity of command, mobility, and decisive combat power in terms of nuclear firepower. The infantry division, however, suffered from deficiencies in four areas-staying power, ground surveillance, artillery support, and staff organization. To correct these problems, the command made several recommendations: adding a fifth rifle company and a radar section to each battle group; eliminating the 4.2-inch mortar as an artillery weapon (but retaining some in the headquarters company of the battle group); reorganizing the artillery into one divisional composite battalion (one Honest John and two 8-inch howitzer batteries) and five 105/155-mm. howitzer battalions (two self-propelled and three towed); and bolstering the aviation company with an aircraft field maintenance element, an avionics repair team, and approach control teams. More staff officers were essential, particularly for the G-3 operation sections. The transportation battalion's truck company was found to be inadequate, and officers in the field suggested that all companies in the battalion be equipped with armored personnel carriers.42

As in the development of the pentomic airborne division, rank structures also came under scrutiny. Because of the increased command responsibility, the Continental Army Command recommended that the commander of the headquarters company of the battle group be raised from a captain to a major and that commanders of the smaller artillery battalions be reduced from lieutenant colonels to majors. Compared to an infantry regiment, the new battle group lacked billets for majors, a circumstance that would adversely affect the career pattern of infantry officers.43

On 29 December 1958 Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Lt. Gen. James E. Moore approved the recommendations for reorganizing the infantry division with some changes. He rejected changes in the grades of the commanders of artillery battalions and the headquarters company of the battle groups and vetoed additional armored personnel carriers for the transportation battalion. He dropped an 8-inch howitzer battery from the composite artillery battalion, leaving it with only one 8-inch howitzer battery and one Honest John battery, and split the headquarters company of the battle group into two organizations, a headquarters company and a combat support company. All tactical support, including the radar section and the reconnaissance, heavy mortar, and assault weapons platoons, were to be contained in the battle group's combat support company to achieve improved command and control. A separate transportation detachment was added to provide third-echelon aircraft maintenance. With this guidance in hand, the Continental Army Command published new tables of organization for the division, without a change in its overall strength-13,748 of all ranks (Chart 32).44

In 1959 and 1960 the Army placed Regular Army infantry and armored divisions under the revised tables that resulted from the field tests. Also, to meet a Department of Defense manpower ceiling of 870,000, the Army Staff decided to eliminate the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. The Fifth United States Army reduced the division to zero strength and later inactivated it, cutting the number of active Regular Army divisions to fourteen. In Korea the Army continued to resort to the Korean Argumentation to U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, begun during the Korean War, to keep the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th Infantry Division at full strength; each division was assigned about 4,000 South Koreans.46

The Army Staff had delayed reorganization of the reserves, but in 1959 it decided to realign National Guard and Army Reserve divisions under pentomic structures. A controversy immediately surfaced over the required number of reserve divisions. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy decided on 37 divisions, 27 National Guard and 10 Army Reserve. By 1 September 1959 the twenty-one infantry and six armored divisions in the Guard had reorganized, and one month later ten Army Reserve infantry divisions completed their transition, but at a reduced strength. The eleventh combat division, the 104th, in the Army Reserve was converted to training, for a total of thirteen training divisions, all of which were in the Army Reserve.47

Following the pattern established by the regulars, the states eliminated nondivisional regimental combat teams from the Guard and replaced them with separate combined arms brigades. Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Arizona organized the 29th, 92d, and 258th Infantry Brigades, respectively. These units had varying numbers of combat arms elements but lacked trains needed to support independent operations.48

When reserve units began to adopt pentomic configurations, the Continental Army Command developed separate organizational tables for training divisions. These tables permitted the Army Reserve to retain the existing authorization of three general officers-the commander and two assistant commanders-and ensured standardization of these noncombat divisions. Each training division consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, five regiments (an advanced individual, a common specialist, and three basic combat training regiments),49 a receiving company, and a band (Chart 33). Each division in reserve status had about 3,100 of all ranks and on mobilization would run a replacement training center capable of training 12,000 men. The continental armies reorganized the

One of the objectives of the pentomic reorganization was to enable the units to absorb new equipment. The M14 rifle, a 7.62-caliber rifle that could fire in semiautomatic or automatic modes, replaced the vintage M1 rifle, the carbine, the submachine gun, and the Browning automatic rifle; the 7.62-caliber M60 machine gun replaced the heavy water-cooled and light air-cooled Browning .30caliber machine guns. These new weapons simplified production; reduced spare parts, maintenance, and training time; and used standard NATO cartridges, permitting greater compatibility with Western European weapons. The diesel-powered M60 tank, armed with a 105-mm. gun, and the low silhouette, air-transportable M113 armored personnel carrier also entered the Army's inventory. Work began on new antiaircraft weapons, recoilless rifles, and 4.2-inch mortars, but most did not become available for several more years.51

When the Army completed the pentomic reorganization in 1960, it had 51 combat divisions in its three components (14 in the Regular Army, 10 in the Army Reserve, and 27 in the National Guard), 5 infantry brigades (2 in the Regular Army and 3 in the Guard), and 1 Regular Army armored combat command. Although divisions were organized for nuclear warfare, only a few were actually ready for combat. Some Regular Army divisions continued to conduct their own basic training courses to reduce costs and personnel, and Korean nationals served in the divisions in Korea. Guard units ranged between 55 and 71 percent of their authorized strengths, while Army Reserve organizations varied from 45 to 80 percent.52

In sum, as the Eisenhower administration reduced the Army's budget from $16 billion to $9.3 billion between 1953 and 1960, the total force dropped to the lowest number of divisions since the beginning of the Korean War. On the surface, changing concepts of warfare during this period led the Army to adopt pentomic divisions, structures that fell outside traditional organizational practices. But whatever the concerns of Army leaders for operating on a nuclear battlefield, Taylor, the primary force behind the new divisions, clearly was using the pentomic concepts to get increases in the military budget from political leaders who were less interested in supporting more conventional military systems. Nevertheless, the fertile ideas of this period resulted in new organizational concepts and new equipment and weapon systems, all of which were to see further development in the next two decades.