Chapter III:
The Test -- World War I
Both [French and British]
commissions were anxious for an American force, no matter how small . .
. . I opposed this on the ground that the small force would belittle our
effort; was undignified and would give a wrong impression of our
intentions. I held out for at least a division to show the quality of
our troops and command respect for our flag.
Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott 1
World War I, an unprecedented
conflict, forced fundamental changes in the organization of United
States Army field forces. The infantry division remained the Army's
primary combined arms unit, but the principles governing its
organization took a new direction because of French and British
experiences in trench warfare. Column length or road space no longer
controlled the size and composition of the infantry division; instead,
firepower, supply, and command and control became paramount. The cavalry
division received scant attention as the European battlefield offered
few opportunities for its use.
Between 6 April 1917, when the
nation declared war, and 12 June, when the first troops left the United
States for France, the War College Division of the Army General Staff'
revised the structure of the infantry division extensively. British and
French officers spurred the changes when they visited Washington, D.C.,
to discuss the nation's participation in the war. They believed the
American division lacked firepower and presented command and control
problems because of its many small units. But they also had their own
political-military agenda. Believing that time precluded organizing and
training U.S. units, they wanted the nation's immediate involvement in
the war to be through a troop replacement program for their drained
formations, a scheme that became known as "amalgamation.."2
Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh L.
Scott opposed Americans' serving in Allied units, believing that the
U.S. division could be reorganized to overcome any French and British
objections. Such a unit would prove the quality of the American soldier
and ensure that the Allies did not underestimate the nation's war
efforts. Scott directed the War College Division to study a divisional
structure comprising two infantry brigades, each having
two large
infantry regiments, as a means of reducing the span of control. It was
also to include light and heavy
[47]
General Scott
artillery, signal
and engineer troops, and service units. A small
division, some 13,000 infantrymen, would allow
greater mobility and enhance the ability to
exchange units in the line and maintain battle
momentum. The French and the British had found
that for each unit on line-army corps, division,
brigade, regiment, battalion, or company-they
needed a comparable unit prepared to relieve it
without mixing organizations from various
commands. The French had tried relief by army
corps but had settled on relief by small
divisions. Scott felt that his proposal would
ease the difficulty of exchanging units on the
battlefield.3
By 10 May 1917, Majs. John
McAuley Palmer, Dan T. Moore, and Brunt Wells of the War College
Division outlined a division of 17,700 men, which included about
11,000 infantrymen in accordance with Scott's idea. In part it
resembled the French square division. Planners eliminated 1 infantry
brigade and cut the number of infantry regiments from 9 to 4,
thereby reducing the number of infantry battalions from 27 to 12.
But regimental firepower increased, with the rifle company swelling
from 153 officers and enlisted men to 204, and the number of
regimental machine guns rising dramatically from 4 to 36. To
accommodate the additional machine guns, Palmer, Moore, and Wells
outlined a new infantry regimental structure that consisted of
headquarters and supply companies and three battalions. Each
battalion had one machine gun company and three rifle companies.
Given the reduction in the number of infantry units, the proportion
of artillery fire support per infantry regiment increased without
altering the number of artillery regiments or pieces. The new
division still fielded forty-eight 3-inch guns, now twelve pieces
per infantry regiment. The division was also authorized a regiment
of twenty-four 6-inch howitzers for general support, and twelve
trench mortars of unspecified caliber completed the division's
general fire support weapons.4
Cavalry suffered the largest
cut, from a regiment to an element with the division headquarters, a
change in line with British and French recommenda-
[48]
General Bliss
tions. The Allies argued that
trench warfare, dominated by machine guns and artillery weapons,
denied cavalry the traditional missions of reconnaissance, pursuit,
and shock action. Mounted troops, possibly assigned to the division's
headquarters company, might serve as messengers within the division
but little more. The Allies further advised that the Army should not
consider sending a large cavalry force to France. Horses and fodder
would occupy precious shipping space, and the French and British had
an abundance of cavalry. Engineer, signal, and medical battalions and
an air squadron rounded out the divisions. 5
To conduct operations, the
French advocated a functional divisional staff, that would include
a chief of staff and a chief of
artillery as well as intelligence, operations, and supply officers,
along with French interpreters. Although small, such a body would have
sufficient resources to allow the division to function as a tactical
unit while a small headquarters troop would furnish work details.
Adjutants alone were to comprise the staff of the infantry and
artillery brigades, which had no headquarters troop for work details.
The next higher headquarters, the army corps, would provide planning
and administration for active operations.6
Based on the report of 10 May,
War College Division officers prepared tables of organization that
authorized 19,000 officers and enlisted men for the division (Chart
3), an increase of about 1,300. No basic structural changes took
place; self-sufficiency justified the additional men. On 24 May Maj.
Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, the Acting Chief of Staff, 7
approved the tables,
but only for the initial expeditionary force. He hoped, as did the
staff, that Congress would authorize a larger infantry regiment,
providing it with more firepower. Bliss also recognized that the
expeditionary commander might wish to alter the division. With these
factors in mind, he felt that time would permit additional changes in
the divisional structure because a second division would not deploy in
the near future. If a large expeditionary force was dispatched in the
summer of 1917, its deployment would rest on political, not military,
objectives.8
Early in May Scott alerted
Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of the Southern Department,
about the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to France and
asked him to select one field artillery and four infantry regiments
[49]
Infantry Divisions, 24 May 1917
1 Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 1917, sub: Plans for a possible
expeditionary force to France, indicates that the division would total
19,922, but a check of the, math indicates that the total was 18,919.
[50]
16th Infantry, 1st Division, parades in Paris, 4 July 1917; below,
Gondrecourt, France, training area.
[51]
for overseas service. Pershing
nominated the 6th Field Artillery and the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th
Infantry. Following a preplanned protocol, the French requested the
deployment of a division to lift Allied morale, and President Woodrow
Wilson agreed.9
Shortly thereafter an
expeditionary force was organized. The regiments picked by Pershing, filled to war
strength with recruits, moved to Hoboken, New Jersey. On 8 June Brig. Gen.
William L. Sibert assumed command and began organizing the 1st Expeditionary
Division. Four days later its initial elements sailed for France without most of
their equipment, as the French had agreed to arm them. Upon arrival in France,
one divisional unit-the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry paraded on 4 July in
Paris, where the French people enthusiastically welcomed the Americans. Following
the reception, the division's unschooled recruits, except the artillerymen,
underwent six months of arduous training at Gondrecourt, a training area
southeast of Verdun, while the division artillery trained at a French range near Le
Valdahon.10
Upon completion of the Army's
first World War I divisional study the 1st Expeditionary Division was
deployed. Even before that investigation was finished, however, two new
groups initiated additional studies. Pershing, who had been appointed
commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on 26 May, headed one
group; Col. Chauncey Baker, an expert in military transportation and a
West Point classmate of Pershing, headed the other. Previously Majors
Palmer, Moore, and Wells had consulted Pershing as they developed their
ideas about the infantry division, and he found no fault with them.
Nevertheless, Pershing's staff began exploring the organization of the
expeditionary forces en route to France. Lt. Col. Fox Conner, who had
served as the War College Division interpreter for the French mission
while in Washington; the newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Palmer; and
Majs. Alvin Barker and Hugh A. Drum assisted Pershing in this work.11
Independently, Secretary of War
Newton D. Baker directed Colonel Baker and twelve other officers to study
the British, French, and Belgian armies. After six weeks the secretary
expected Baker to make recommendations that would help in organizing
American forces. Colonel Baker himself met Pershing in England, and both
agreed to work together after Baker conducted separate investigations in
England, France, and Belgium. A single report, known as the General
Organization Project, resulted from these efforts. Reflecting a consensus
of the Baker and Pershing planners, it covered all aspects of the
organization of the AEF except for the service of rear troops. 12
The General Organization Project
described an infantry division of about 25,000 men consisting of two
infantry brigades (each with two infantry regiments and one three-company
machine gun battalion), a field artillery brigade (com-
[52]
\
Officers of the American Expeditionary Forces and the Baker mission
prising one 155-mm. howitzer
regiment, two 3-inch [approximately 75-mm.] gun regiments, and one trench
mortar battery), an engineer regiment, a signal battalion, and trains. The
trains included the division's headquarters troop and military police,
ammunition, supply, ambulance, field hospital, and engineer supply units.
The air squadron was omitted from the division. 13
During the course of their work,
Pershing and Baker reversed the rationale for the division. Instead of an
organization that could easily move in and out of the trenches, the
division was to field enough men to fight prolonged battles. Both planning
groups sensed that the French and British wanted that type of division but
lacked the resources to field it because of the extensive losses after
three years of warfare. To sustain itself in combat, the division needed
more, not less, combat power. The infantry regiment reverted to its prewar
structure of headquarters, machine gun, and supply companies and three
battalions each with four rifle companies. The rifle companies were
increased to 256 officers and enlisted men, and each company fielded
sixteen automatic rifles.14
Because the law specified only one machine
gun company per regiment, the General Organization Project recommended the
organization of six brigade and five divisional machine gun companies.
These were to be organized into two battalions of three companies each and
one five-company battalion. Eight of these companies augmented the four in
the infantry regiments, thus providing each divisional infantry battalion
with a machine gun company. The three remaining companies were assigned as
the divisional reserve; two were comparable to those in the infantry
regiments, and the other was an armored motorcar machine gun company
labeled "tank" company.15
[53]
The major dispute between
Pershing's staff and the Baker Board developed over the artillery general
support weapon. The board's position, presented by future Chief of Staff
Charles E Summerall, was that one regiment should be equipped with either
the British 3.8- or 4.7-inch howitzer because of their mobility, while
Pershing's officers favored a regiment of French 155-mm. howitzers. The
need for firepower and the possibility of obtaining 155s from the French
undoubtedly influenced the staff, and its view prevailed. For high-angle
fire, Baker's group proposed three trench mortar batteries in the
division, but settled for one located in the field artillery brigade and
six 3-inch Stokes mortars added to each infantry regiment.16
The report also recommended
changes in cavalry and engineer divisional elements. An army corps, it
suggested, needed two three-squadron cavalry regiments to support four
divisions. Normally one squadron would be attached to each division, and
the army corps would retain two squadrons for training and replacement
units. The squadrons withdrawn from the divisions would then be
reorganized and retrained. Divisional engineer forces expanded to a
two-battalion regiment, which would accommodate the amount of construction
work envisioned in trench warfare. Infantrymen would do the simple digging
and repairing of trenches under engineer supervision, while the engineer
troops would prepare machine gun and trench mortar emplacements and
perform major trench work and other construction.17
Pershing sought a million men by
the end of 1918. He envisioned five army corps, each having four combat
divisions, along with a replacement and school division, a base and
training division, and pioneer infantry, cavalry, field and antiaircraft
artillery, engineer, signal, aviation, medical, supply, and other
necessary units. The base and training division was to process incoming
personnel into the theater, and the replacement and school division was to
provide the army corps with fully trained and equipped soldiers. Because
these support divisions did not need to be at full strength, Pershing
foresaw some of the soldiers serving as replacements in combat divisions
and others as cadre in processing and training units. He also anticipated
that some surplus units would be attached to army corps or armies.
Furthermore, Pershing wanted a seventh division for each army corps, not
counted in his desired force of a million men, which was to be organized
and maintained in the United States to train officers before they came to
France. To assemble the first army corps, he asked the War Department to
send two combat divisions, followed by the replacement and school
division, the other two combat divisions, and finally the base and
training division. When five army corps arrived in France, Pershing would
have twenty combat divisions and ten processing and replacement divisions.
Also, five more divisions were to be in training in the United States.18
The General Organization Project
reached Washington in July, and Bliss noted the shift in divisional
philosophy. Instead of a division that could move quickly in and out of
trenches, Pershing wanted a unit with sufficient overhead (staff,
communications, and supply units) and enough infantry and artillery to
permit continuous fighting over extended periods. Because Pershing would
com-
[54]
mand the divisions sent
to Europe, neither Bliss nor the General Staff questioned his
preference. Also, the lack of experienced divisional-level officers
and staffs made a smaller number of larger divisions more practical.19
Using the General Organization
Project, the War College Division prepared tables of organization,
which the War Department published on 8 August 1917 (Chart 4). The
tables for what became known as the "square division"
included a few changes in the division's combat arms. For example, the
five-company divisional machine gun battalion was reduced to four
companies by eliminating the armored car machine gun unit. Pershing
had decided to submit a separate tank program because he considered
tanks to be assets of either army corps or field army. In the infantry
regiment, the planners made the 3-inch mortars optional weapons and
added three one-pounder (37-mm.) guns as antitank and anti-machine gun
weapons. The supply train was motorized, and the ammunition and
ambulance trains were equipped with both motor- and horse-drawn
transport. The additional motorized equipment in the trains stemmed
from the quartermaster general's attempt to ease an expected shipping
shortage, not to enhance mobility. Crated motor vehicles occupied less
space in an ocean transport than animals and fodder.20
The War College Division
also provided a larger divisional staff than Pershing had recommended
because the unit most likely would have both tactical and
administrative roles. The staff comprised a chief of staff, an
adjutant general, an inspector general, a judge advocate, and
quartermaster, medical, ordnance, and signal officers. In addition,
interpreters were attached to overcome any language barriers,
particularly between the Americans and the French. As an additional
duty, the commanders of the field artillery brigade and the engineer
regiment held staff positions. A division headquarters troop with 109
officers and enlisted men would furnish the necessary services for
efficient operations. The infantry brigade headquarters included the
commander, his three aides, a brigade adjutant, and eighteen enlisted
men who furnished mess, transportation, and communications services.
The field artillery brigade headquarters was larger, with nine
officers and forty-nine enlisted men, but had similar functions.
Planners did not authorize headquarters detachments for either the
infantry or field artillery brigade.21
While Pershing and Baker
investigated the organizational requirements for the expeditionary
forces, steps were taken to expand the Army at home. These measures
included the formation of all 117 Regular Army regiments authorized in
the National Defense Act of 1916 and the drafting of the National
Guard into federal service and of 500,000 men through a selective
service system. Draftees were to fill out Regular Army and National
Guard units and to provide manpower for new units. Organizations
formed with all selective service personnel eventually became
"National Army" units. Although the War Department was
unsure of either the final structure of the infantry division or the
number of divisions need-
[55]
Infantry Division, 8 August 1917
[56]
ed, it decided to organize 32
infantry divisions immediately, 16 in the National Guard and 16 in the
National Army. The Army contemplated no additional Regular Army divisions.
Although existing Regular Army regiments could be shipped overseas and
organized into divisions if necessary, most regulars were needed to direct
and train the new army. Unlike past wars, draftees rather than volunteers
would fight World War 1.22
To organize National Guard and
National Army divisions, the Army Staff adopted extant plans. For the
Guard it used the Militia Bureau's scheme developed following the passage
of the National Defense Act, and for the National Army it turned to a
contingency plan drawn up in February 1917 to guide the employment of
draftees. Divisions in both components had geographic bases. As far as
practicable, the area that supported a Guard division coincided with a
National Army divisional area.23
The thirty-two new divisions
needed training areas, but the Army had only one facility large enough to
train a division, Camp Funston, a subpost of Fort Riley, Kansas.
Therefore, the staff instructed territorial commanders to select an
additional thirty-two areas, each large enough to house and train a
division. Early in the summer Secretary Baker approved leasing the sites.
To save money, he decided to build tent cities for the National Guard
divisions in the southern states, where winters were less severe, while
camps for National Army divisions, which were to have permanent buildings,
were located within the geographic areas that supported them.24
Establishing a tentative occupancy
date of 1 September, the Quartermaster Corps began constructing the
training areas in June. It designed each site to accommodate a
three-brigade division as called for under the prewar tables of
organization. When Bliss approved the square division in August, the camps
had to be modified to house the larger infantry regiments. Although the
changes delayed completion of the training areas, the troops' arrival
date, 1 September, remained firm.25
The War College Division and the
adjutant general created yet another system for designating divisions and
brigades and their assigned elements. Divisions were to be numbered 1
through 25 in the Regular Army, 26 through 75 in the National Guard, and
76 and above in the National Army. Within the Regular Army numbers,
mounted or dismounted cavalry divisions were to begin with the number 15.
The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for sixty-five Regular Army
infantry regiments, including a regiment from Puerto Rico. From those
units, excluding the ones overseas, the War Department could organize
thirteen infantry divisions in addition to the 1st Expeditionary Division
already in France. This arrangement explains the decision to begin
numbering Regular Army cavalry divisions with the digit 15. The system did
not specify the procedure for numbering National Guard or National Army
cavalry divisions. It reserved blocks of numbers for infantry, cavalry,
and field artillery brigades, with 1 through 50 allotted to the Regular
Army, 51 through 150 to the National Guard, and 151 and
[57]
above to the National Army. The
designation of each Guard or National Army unit, if raised by a single
state, was to have that state's name in parentheses. Soldiers in
National Guard and National Army units were also to wear distinctive
collar insignia showing their component.26
As the summer of 1917 advanced,
the War Department announced additional details. In July it identified
specific states to support the first sixteen National Guard and the
first sixteen National Army divisions and designated the camps where
they would train. At that time the department announced that the
designations of the National Guard's 5th through 20th Divisions were to
be changed to the 26th through the 41st to conform with the new
numbering system. In August the adjutant general placed the 76th through
the 91st Divisions, National Army units, on the rolls of the Army and
announced the appointment of commanders for both National Guard and
National Army divisions. In addition to the 1st Expeditionary Division
in France, the War College Division adopted plans to organize six more
Regular Army divisions. No plans were made to concentrate their
divisional elements for training, but they were to be brought up to
strength with draftees.27
When the initial planning phase
for more divisions closed, the mobilization program encompassed 38
divisions-16 National Guard, 16 National Army, and 6 Regular Army. With
these, exclusive of the 1st Expeditionary Division in France,
redesignated on 6 July as the 1st Division, the War Department met
Pershing's requirement for thirty divisions. The divisions in excess of
Pershing's needs were to be held in the United States as replacement
units.
Between 22 August 1917 and 5
January 1918, the Army Staff authorized one cavalry and three
additional infantry divisions, for a total of forty-three divisions.
But establishing these units proved a monumental task for which the
Army was woefully unprepared. Besides unfinished training areas and
the absence of a system for classifying new recruits as they entered
service, the Army faced a shortage of equipment and officers. The
quartermaster general claimed that the only items of clothing he
expected to be available to outfit the National Army men were hats and
cotton undershirts. Except for a handful of Regular Army officers, the
National Army made do with newly minted officers fresh from twelve
weeks of training.28
Formation of the new Army
nevertheless began with the organization of the National Guard
divisions. In August Guard units, which had been drafted into federal
service and temporarily housed in state camps and armories, reported to
their designated training camps and formed divisions in agreement with
the 3 May tables. During September and October the division commanders
reorganized the units to conform to the new square configuration as the
26th through 41st Divisions (Table
3).
[58]
Geographic Distribution of National Guard Divisions, World War I
Old
Designation |
New
Designation |
Geographic Area |
Camp |
| 5th |
26th |
Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Connecticut |
-
Greene, N.C. I
|
| 6th |
27th |
New York |
Wadsworth, S.C |
|
7th
|
28th
|
Pennsylvania |
Hancock, Ga. |
| 8th |
29th |
New Jersey, Virginia,
Maryland, Delaware,2 and District of
Columbia |
McClellan, Ala. |
| 9th |
30th |
Tennessee, North Carolina, and
South Carolina |
Sevier, S.C. |
| 10th |
31st |
Georgia, Alabama,
and Florida |
Wheeler, Ga. |
| 11th |
32d |
Michigan and
Wisconsin |
MacArthur, Tex. |
| 12th |
33d |
Illinois |
Logan, Tex. |
| 13th |
34th |
Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and South Dakota |
Cody, N.M. |
| 14th |
35th |
Missouri and
Kansas |
Doniphan, Okla |
| 15th |
36th |
Texas and Oklahoma |
Bowie, Tex |
| 16th |
37th |
Ohio and West
Virginia3 |
Sheridan, Ala |
| 17th |
38th |
Indiana and Kentucky |
Shelby, Miss |
| 18th |
39th |
Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas |
Beauregard, La. |
| 19th |
40th |
California, Nevada,
Utah, Colorado,
Arizona, and New Mexico |
Kearny, Calif. |
| 20th |
41st |
Washington,
Oregon, Montana, and
Wyoming |
Fremont, Calif4 |
1 Division concentrated at
various locations in New England.
2 Delaware troops relieved
from the division 8 January 1918.
3 Reassigned to the 38th
Division.
4 Camp changed from Camp
Fremont, California, to Camp Greene, North Carolina.
[59]
At that time division commanders
broke up many historic state regiments to meet the required
organizations in the new tables, a measure that incensed the states and
the units themselves.29
The histories of the 26th and 41st Divisions were somewhat different. Deciding to send another division
to France as soon as possible, on 22 August Secretary Baker ordered
Brig. Gen. Clarence E. Edwards, commander of the Northeastern
Department, to organize the 26th Division in state camps and armories
under the square tables. Without assembling as a unit, the 26th departed
the following month for France, where it underwent training. To
accelerate the formation of the 41st Division, its training site was
shifted from Camp Fremont, California, which needed a sewage system, to
Camp Greene, North Carolina. Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett took over the camp
on 18 September and the next day organized the 41st under the 8 August
tables. In October its first increment of troops departed for France.30
Before the 26th Division went
overseas in September, many states had wanted the honor of having their
units become the first in France and pressed Baker and the War
Department for that assignment. To stop the clamor, Baker proposed to
Bliss that he consider sending a division to Europe representing many
states. Maj. Douglas MacArthur, a General Staff officer, had earlier
suggested that when Guard divisions adopted the new tables some militia
units would become surplus and might be grouped as a division. MacArthur
described the division as a "rainbow," covering the entire
nation. After consulting Brig. Gen. William A. Mann, Chief of the
Militia Bureau, the War College Division drafted a scheme to organize
such a division with surplus units from twenty-six states and the
District of Columbia. On 14 August the 42d Division was placed on the
rolls of the Army, and six days later its units began arriving at Camp
Mills, New York, eventually a transient facility for soldiers going to
France. The following month Mann, who was reassigned from the Militia
Bureau and appointed the division commander, organized the "Rainbow
Division," which sailed for France a few weeks later.31
The organization of the sixteen
National Army divisions also began in August when the designated
division commanders, all Regular Army officers, and officer cadres
reported to their respective training camps. Immediately thereafter the
commanders established the 76th through the 91st Divisions and a depot
brigade for each (Table 4).32
On 3 September the first draftees arrived.
The depot brigades processed the new draftees while the divisions began
a rigorous training program. Many of these men, however, quickly became
fillers for National Guard and Regular Army units going overseas, one of
the reasons that National Army divisions were unready for combat for
many months.33
One Regular Army infantry
division, the 2d, was organized in France. When the first troops
deployed, the U.S. Marine Corps wanted a share of the action, and
Secretary Baker agreed that two Marine regiments should serve with the
Army. The 5th Marines sailed with the 1st Expeditionary Division, and
Pershing assigned
[60]
Geographic Distribution of National Army Divisions World War I
| Designation |
Geographic Area |
Camp |
| 76th |
Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Connecticut |
Devens, Mass. |
| 77th |
Metropolitan New York
City |
Upton, N.Y. |
| 78th |
New York and northern
Pennsylvania |
Dix, N.J. |
| 79th |
Southern Pennsylvania |
Meade, Md. |
| 80th |
New Jersey, Virginia,
Maryland, Delaware, and District of Columbia |
Lee, Va.
|
| 81st |
Tennessee, North Carolina,
and South Carolina |
Jackson, S.C. |
| 82d |
Georgia, Alabama, and
Florida
|
Gordon, Ga.
|
| 83d |
Ohio and West Virginia |
Sherman, Ohio |
| 84th |
Indiana and Kentucky |
Taylor, Ky. |
| 85th |
Michigan and Wisconsin |
Custer, Mich. |
| 86th |
Illinois |
Grant, Ill. |
| 87th |
Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi |
Pike, Ark. |
| 88th |
Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and South Dakota |
Dodge, Iowa
|
| 89th |
Missouri, Kansas, and
Colorado |
Funston, Kans. |
| 90th |
Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona,
and New Mexico |
Travis, Tex.
|
| 91st |
Washington, Oregon,
California, Nevada,
Utah, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming |
Lewis, Wash. |
them as security detachments and
labor troops in France. Shortly thereafter he advised the War Department
that the marines did not fit into his organizational plans and
recommended that they be converted to Army troops. The marines, however,
continued to press for a combat role. Eventually the Departments of War
and the Navy agreed that two Regular Army infantry regiments, initially
programmed as lines of communication troops, and the two Marine
regiments (one serving in France and one from the United States) should
form the core of the 2d Division. The adjutant general informed Pershing
of the decision, and Brig. Gen. Charles A. Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps,
organized the 2d Division on 26 October 1917 at Bourmont, Haute-Marne,
France. The division eventually included the 3d Infantry Brigade (the
9th and 23d Infantry and the 3d Machine Gun Battalion), the 4th Marine
Brigade (the 5th and 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion
[Marines]), the 2d Field Artillery Brigade, and support units.34
[61]
Draftees drill in civilian clothes, Camp Upton, New York
The 3d through the 8th
Divisions, Regular Army units, were organized between 21 November 1917
and 5 January 1918 in the United States. Of these divisions, only the
4th and 8th assembled and trained as units before going overseas because
the Guard and National Army units occupied the divisional training
areas. The 4th replaced the 41st Division at Camp Greene, and the 8th
occupied Camp Fremont upon its completion. To fill the divisions,
partially trained draftees were transferred from National Army units, a
process that eroded the concept of the three separate components-the
Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army.35
As the three-component idea
deteriorated, Baker discussed the elimination of such distinctions
altogether with Scott and Bliss. The officers opposed the action,
believing it would undermine the local pride that National Guard and
National Army units exhibited. General Peyton C. March, who had served
as Army Chief of Staff since the spring of 1918, disagreed. He announced
that the nation had but one army, the United States Army, and
discontinued the distinctive names and insignia for the three
components. After 7 August 1918, all soldiers, including those in
divisions, wore the collar insignia of the United States Army.
Nevertheless, the men still considered their divisions as belonging to
the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the National Army.36
All-black units comprised a
special category of troops. The draft of the
[62]
Camp Meade, Maryland, 1917
National Guard included some
black units, and the War Department directed the organization of
additional regiments if sufficient numbers of black draftees reported to
National Army camps. In October 1917 Secretary Baker ordered the units
at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Sherman, Dix, Upton, and Meade to form
the 92d Division. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Ballou organized a division
headquarters at Camp Funston later that month, but the division did not
assemble or train in the United States. The following June the 92d moved
to France and first saw combat in the Lorraine area.37
After the organization of the
92d there remained the equivalent of four black infantry regiments in
the United States, and the staff anticipated that their personnel would
serve as replacements for the 92d or lines of communication troops in
France. For administrative purposes, these black troops were organized
in December 1917 as the 185th and 186th Infantry Brigades. Shortly
thereafter the Headquarters, 93d Division (Provisional), a small
administrative unit, was organized. Never intended to be a tactical
unit, it simply exercised administrative control over the two brigades
while they underwent training.38
Puerto Ricans comprised another
segregated group in the Army, and the General Staff gave special
consideration to them when organizing divisions. Initially it planned a
provisional Puerto Rican division using the prewar tables that called
for three infantry brigades, but that idea was soon dropped. Instead,
the War Plans
[63]
Division, which had
succeeded the War College Division, endorsed the creation of a
Spanish-speaking square division (less the field artillery brigade),
to be designated the 94th Division. Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, Chief
of Field Artillery, opposed the organization of the field artillery
brigade because the Army lacked Spanish-speaking instructors and an
artillery training area in Puerto Rico. He believed that a brigade
could be furnished from artillery units in the United States. Others
opposed formation of the division on ethnic grounds, arguing that
Puerto Ricans might not do well in combat. Proponents countered that
good leadership would guarantee good performance in combat. The staff
worked out a compromise. The divisional designation was to be
withheld, but the organization of the divisional elements was to
proceed. The infantry regiments were assigned numbers 373 through 376,
which would have been associated with the National Army's 94th
Division. During the war the Army organized only three of those
regiments, with approximately 17,000 Puerto Rican draftees, but never
formed the 94th Division itself 39
Pershing ignored French and
British recommendations that cavalry divisions not be sent to France.
Himself a cavalryman, the general decided that he might use such a
force as a mobile reserve. After all, both Allies still hoped for a
breakthrough and maintained 30,000 to 40,000 mounted troops to exploit
such an opportunity. Most of the Regular Army cavalry regiments,
however, had been scattered in small detachments along the Mexican
border and had furnished personnel for overseas duty. The cavalry arm
needed to be rebuilt. That process began when the secretary of war
approved the formation of the 15th Cavalry Division. On 10 December
1917, Maj. Gen. George W Reed organized its headquarters at Fort
Bliss, Texas; the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; the
2d Brigade at Bliss, Texas; and the 3d at Douglas, Arizona. The
division had two missions: to prepare for combat in France and to
patrol the Mexican border.40
The breakup of the 15th
Cavalry Division began shortly after its formation. Responding to
Pershing's request for army corps troops, the War Department detached
the division's 6th and 15th Cavalry and sent them to France. Because
of the paucity of cavalry units, they were not replaced in the
division. In May 1918 Maj. Gen. Willard Holbrook, the Southern
Department commander, informed the chief of staff of the Army that the
situation on the border required the remainder of the division to
remain there. Holbrook further stated that border-patrol work could be
improved if the divisional organization were abandoned. On 12 May the
division headquarters was demobilized, but the division's three
cavalry brigades continued to serve on the border until July 1919,
when their headquarters were also demobilized. With the demobilization
of the division, Pershing's hope for a cavalry division died. Baker
informed him that all remaining mounted troops were needed in the
United States.41
When the first phase of the
mobilization ended on 5 January 1918, the Army had 42 infantry
divisions, 1 short-lived cavalry division, and 1 provisional division
of 2 infantry brigades. All divisions were in various stages of
training. Shortages of uniforms, weapons, and equipment remained
acute.
[64]
By the spring of 1918 Pershing
had requested more divisions than he had outlined in the General
Organization Project because the Allies' fortunes had drastically
changed. Russia had been forced out of the war, and the British and
French armies had begun to show the strain of manpower losses sustained
since 1914. Although Germany also felt the effects of the long war, it
was busy transferring troops from the now defunct Eastern Front to the
West for one final offensive. Alarmed, the Allies wanted 100 U.S. Army
divisions as soon as possible. Within the War Department the request
caused considerable debate as to its feasibility, particularly with
regard to raw materials, production, and shipping of war supplies. Only
in July did President Wilson approve a plan to mount a 98-division force
by the end of 1919, 80 for France and 18 in reserve in the United
States.42
During the debate over force
structure, the War Plans Division considered whether the additional
divisions should be Regular Army or National Army units. Not all Regular
Army infantry regiments authorized under the National Defense Act of
1916 had been assigned to divisions, thus raising the question of why
those regiments should exist. The War Plans Division recommended that
the Regular Army infantry regiments become the nuclei of the next group
of divisions, which would be completed with National Army units. The
National Army units would pass out of existence after the war.43
In July 1918 Secretary Baker
approved the organization of twelve more divisions. Regular Army
infantry regiments in the United States and from Hawaii and Panama
formed the core of the 9th through 20th Divisions (Table 5).44
These
divisions, organized between 17 July and 1 September, occupied camps
vacated by National Guard and National Army divisions that had gone to
France. Conforming to Pershing's fixed army corps idea, the 11th and
17th Divisions were scheduled to be replacement and school divisions,
while the 14th and 20th were programmed as base and training divisions.
The only change in these divisions from the others was in their
artillery. The 11th and 17th had one regiment each of 3-inch
horse-drawn guns, 4.7-inch motorized howitzers, and 6-inch motorized
howitzers, while the 14th and 20th each had one 3-inch gun regiment
carried on trucks, one regiment of 3-inch horse-drawn guns, and one
regiment of 6-inch motorized howitzers. These artillery units were to be
detached from the divisions and serve as corps artillery, except the
3-inch gun regiment carried on trucks, which was to serve as part of
army artillery.45
As the Army Staff perfected
plans to organize additional Regular Army divisions, steps had been
taken to assure adequate military forces in Hawaii. On 1 June 1918, the
president called the two infantry regiments from the Hawaii National
Guard into federal service, and they replaced units that had transferred
to the United States from Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter.46
The Philippine Islands also
proved to be a potential source of manpower for fighting World War 1.
When the United States entered the conflict, the Philippine
[65]
Expansion of Divisional
Forces, 1918
| Division |
Component |
Camp |
| 9th |
RA and NA |
Sheridan, Ala. |
| l0th |
RA and NA |
Funston, Kans. |
| 11th |
RA and NA |
Meade, Md. |
| 12th |
RA and NA |
Devens, Mass. |
| 13th |
RA and NA |
Lewis, Wash. |
| 14th |
RA and NA |
Custer, Mich. |
| 15th |
RA and NA |
Logan, Tex. |
| 16th |
RA and NA |
Kearny, Calif |
| 17th |
RA and NA |
Beauregard, La. |
| 18th |
RA and NA |
Travis, Tex. |
| 19th |
RA and NA |
Dodge, Iowa |
| 20th |
RA and NA |
Sevier, S.C. |
| 95th |
NA |
Sherman, Ohio |
| 96th |
NA |
Wadsworth, N.Y. |
| 97th |
NA |
Cody, N.M. |
| 98th |
NA |
McClellan, Ala. |
| 99th |
NA |
Wheeler, Ga. |
| 100th |
NA |
Bowie, Tex. |
| 101st |
NA |
Shelby, Miss. |
| 102d |
NA |
Dix, N.J. |
people offered to raise a
volunteer infantry division to be a part of American forces. The
offer was declined, but Congress authorized federalizing the
Philippine Militia to replace U.S. Army units if necessary. Nine
days after the armistice President Wilson ordered nascent militia
into federal service for training, and the 1st Division, Philippine
National Guard, was organized under the prewar divisional structure.
The division, however, lacked many of its required units, and its
headquarters was mustered out of federal service on 19 December
1918.47
There were also two Regular
Army nondivisional infantry regiments in the Philippine Islands. In
July 1918 they joined an international force for service in Siberia.
To bring the regiments to war strength, 5,000 well-trained
infantrymen from the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, California,
joined the Siberian Expedition.48
In July 1918 Secretary
Baker approved final expansion of divisional forces, which involved
black draftees. The plan required black units to replace sixteen white
pioneer infantry regiments serving in France. These white units were
to be organized into eight infantry brigades and eventually be
assigned to divisions partially raised in the United States. By 11
November the War Department had organized portions of the 95th through
the 102d Divisions in the United States (see Table 5), but the
brigades in France had not been organized.49
[66]
The General Staff had approved
several changes in the August 1917 structure when the Army began to
organize the last group of infantry divisions for World War I. Changes
included reducing the division's reserve machine gun battalion from a
four-company organization to a two-company unit and increasing the
infantry brigade's machine gun battalions from three to four companies.
Although the total number of machine gun units remained the same, the
realignment afforded better command and control within the infantry
brigades. More Signal Corps men were added, and more motorized
ambulances were provided for the sanitary trains. Usually each
modification brought a change in the strength of the division, which by
November 1918 stood at 28,105 officers and enlisted men.50
The demands of combat led to
several changes in divisional weapons. The French agreed to replace all
U.S. 3-inch guns with their 75-mm. guns in exchange for supplies of
ammunition. The 3-inch Stokes mortars, optional weapons in the infantry
regiment, were made permanent. To defend the division against enemy
airplanes, antiaircraft machine guns were authorized in the field
artillery regiments. The most significant change, however, involved
machine guns and automatic rifles. In September 1918 elements of the
79th and 80th Divisions used new machine guns and automatic rifles
invented by John M. Browning. The Browning water-cooled machine gun was
a lighter, more reliable weapon than either the British Vickers or the
French Hotchkiss, and the Browning automatic rifle (BAR) surpassed the
British Lewis and French Chauchat in reliability. New Browning weapons,
however, were not available in sufficient quantities for all divisions
before the end of the war.51
Pershing formally modified the
division staff during the war. In February 1918 he adopted the European
functional staff, which he had been tentatively using since the summer
of 1917. Under that system the staff consisted of five sections: G-1
(personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations), G-4 (supply), and G-5
(training). Each section coordinated all activities within its sphere
and reported directly to the chief of staff, thereby relieving the
commander of many routine details.52
Pershing and his staff also
changed plans for assembling army corps to meet conditions in France.
When four divisions had arrived in France, the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d,
the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) staff began planning a corps
replacement and school division. After reviewing the readiness status of
the divisions, the staff recommended that the 42d be reorganized as the
replacement and school unit. Pershing disagreed. For political reasons,
the "Rainbow" Division had to be a combat unit. Also, he did
not agree that the army corps required a replacement and school unit at
that time; he wanted a base and training division to receive and process
replacements. For that job he selected the 41st Division, which had just
begun to arrive in France.53
[67]
Shortly thereafter Pershing
revised the replacement system for the AEF. Instead of relying on a
replacement and school division and a base and training division for
each army corps, he split the replacement function between the army
corps and the "communications zone," the area immediately
behind the battlefield controlled by the "Service of the
Rear." In the communications zone a depot (base and training)
division would process personnel into the theater, while a replacement
(replacement and school) division in each army corps distributed new
personnel to their units. He assigned the 41st Division to the Service
of the Rear (later the Services of Supply) as a depot division, which
was to receive, train, equip, and forward replacements (both officers
and enlisted men) to replacement divisions of the corps, and designated
the 32d Division as the I Army Corps' replacement unit. But when the
German offensive began along the Somme (21 March to 6 April 1918), the
32d Division was assigned to combat duty. To channel replacements from
the depot division to their assigned units, each army corps instead
established a replacement battalion. The depot division processed
casuals into the theater, and the replacement battalions forwarded them
to the units. The 41st served as the depot division for the AEF until
July 1918. No replacement division was organized during World War 1.54
The German offensive on the
Somme upset Pershing's organizational plans. He offered all American
divisions to the French Army. The 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions were
sent to various quiet sectors of the line, and they and more recent
arrivals did not come under Pershing's control until late in the summer
of 1918. He also placed the four regiments of the black 93d Division
(Provisional) at the disposal of the French with the understanding that
they would be returned to his control upon request. The French quickly
reorganized and equipped the regiments under their tables of
organization. Although they were to be returned to Pershing's control
after the crisis, they remained with French units until the end of the
war. The headquarters of the provisional 93d Division was discontinued
in May 1918.55
The Army and the nation did not
have enough ships to transport forces to France, and this lack was a
major obstacle to the war effort. After lengthy discussions in early
1918, the British agreed to transport infantry, machine gun, signal, and
engineer units for six divisions in their ships. Upon arrival in France,
these units were to train with the British. The divisional artillery and
trains were to be shipped when space became available, and they were to
train in American training areas. The British executed the program in
the early spring of 1918, eventually moving the 4th, 27th, 28th, 30th,
33d, 35th, 77th, 78th, 80th, and 82d Divisions. By June 1918 the
nation's transport capability had increased markedly. In addition, the
adoption of the convoy system greatly reduced the effect of German
submarines, allowing the number of divisions in France to rise rapidly (Table
6).
56
As more divisions arrived,
Pershing revamped his ideas about the army corps. He made it a command
consisting of a headquarters, corps artillery, technical troops, and
divisions. The divisions and technical troops could be varied for each
specific operation. Under his system, patterned after the French, the
army corps
[68]
165th Infantry, 42d Division, in trenches, June 1918
became a more mobile, flexible
command. The concept also took advantage of the limited number of
American divisions in the theater, shifting them among army corps as
needed. Eventually, Pershing organized seven army corps.
To maintain them, the 39th,
40th, 41st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions served as depot organizations.
The 31st Division was slated to become the seventh depot division but
never acted in that role, having been broken up for needed replacements.
Because depot divisions needed only cadres to operate, most of the
personnel, except for men in the field artillery brigades, were also
distributed to combat divisions as replacements. After additional
training, the field artillery brigades assigned to the 41st, 76th, 83d,
and 85th Divisions saw combat primarily as army corps artillery. Those
assigned to the 39th and 40th were still training when the fighting
ended.57
When the Services of Supply
reorganized the 83d and 85th Divisions as depot units, some of their
elements were used as special expeditionary forces. The 332d Infantry
and 331st Field Hospital, elements of the 83d Division, participated in
the Vittorio Veneto campaign on the Italian front during October and
November 1918. The 339th Infantry; the 1st Battalion, 310th Engineers;
the 337th Ambulance Company; and the 337th Field Hospital of the 85th
constituted the American contingent of the Murmansk Expedition, which
served under British command in North Russia from September 1918 to July
1919.58
[69]
Deployment of Divisions to France
| Division |
Dates of Movement Overseas |
Remarks |
| 1st |
June-December |
1917 |
| 2d |
September 1917-March
1918 |
Organized in France |
| 3d |
March-June 1918 |
|
| 4th |
May June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 5th |
March-June 1918 |
| 6th |
June-July 1918 |
| 7th |
July-September 1918 |
| 8th |
November
1918 |
Headquarters only |
| 26th |
September 1917-January
1918 |
| 27th |
May-July
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 28th |
April-June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 29th |
June July 1918 |
| 30th |
May June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 31st |
September-November
1918 |
Skeletonized |
| 32d |
January-March 1918 |
| 33d |
May-June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 34th |
September October
1918 |
Skeletonized |
| 35th |
April-June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 36th |
July-August 1918 |
| 37th |
June-July 1918 |
| 38th |
September-October
1918 |
Skeletonized |
| 39th |
August September
1918 |
Depot, later skeletonized |
| 40th |
July-September
1918 |
Depot |
| 41st |
November 1917-February
1918 |
Depot |
| 42d |
October-December 1917 |
| 76th |
July-August
1918 |
Depot |
| 77th |
March May
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 78th |
May June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 79th |
July-August 1918 |
| 80th |
May-June
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 81st |
July-August 1918 |
| 82d |
April-July
1918 |
British shipping program |
| 83d |
June August
1918 |
Depot |
| 84th |
August-October
1918 |
Depot, later skeletonized |
| 85th |
July August
1918 |
Depot |
| 86th |
September-October
1918 |
Skeletonized |
| 87th |
June-September
1918 |
Broken up for laborers |
| 88th |
August-September 1918 |
| 89th |
June-July 1918 |
| 90th |
June-July 1918 |
| 91st |
June-July 1918 |
| 92d |
June-July 1918 |
| 93d |
December 1917-April
1918 |
Provisional unit, discontinued
May 1918 |
[70]
Heavy losses during the greatest
American involvement in World War I, the Meuse-Argonne campaign that
began on 26 September 1918, created a need for additional replacements.
One week of combat left divisions so depleted that Pershing ordered
personnel from the 84th and 86th Divisions, which had just arrived in
France, to be used as replacements.59
The arrangement was supposed to be
temporary, and at first only men from infantry and machine gun units
served as replacements. Eventually all divisional personnel were
swallowed up, except for one enlisted man per company and one officer
per regiment who maintained unit records. The manpower shortage
persisted. On 17 October the 31st Division, programmed as the depot
division, was skeletonized and its men used as replacements. The 34th
and 38th Divisions were also stripped of their men as they arrived from
the United States. Nevertheless, the high casualty rate took a toll on
all combat units, and Pershing slashed the authorized strength of
infantry and machine gun companies from 250 to 175 enlisted men, thereby
temporarily reducing each division by 4,000 men. Smaller combat
divisions, however, conducted some of the fiercest fighting of the
war-attacks against the enemy's fortified positions on the hills between
the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River.60
While scrambling for personnel,
Pershing again reorganized the replacement system, trying to improve its
responsiveness to the flexible army corps and army organizations. Army
corps replacement battalions failed because divisions left the corps so
rapidly that the battalions were unable to keep up with them. Therefore,
he ordered the 40th and 85th Divisions to serve as regional replacement
depots for the First and Second Armies, respectively, and the 41st and
83d as depot divisions in the Services of Supply. The other two depot
divisions, the 39th and 76th, were stripped of their personnel. The
replacement system, however, remained unsatisfactory to the end of the
war.61
Divisions in France also
suffered from a shortage of animals for transport. As the quartermaster
general had
predicted in 1917, units never had more than half the
transportation authorized in their tables of organization for lack of
animals. In some divisions artillerymen moved their pieces by hand. To
overcome the shortage, Pershing's staff planned to motorize the 155-mm.
howitzer regiments and one regiment of 75-mm. guns in each division. By
November 1918, however, only eleven 155-mm. howitzer regiments had been
thus equipped.62
Troop shortages also hit support
units. During the fall of 1918 the commander of the Services of Supply,
Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, requested personnel from three combat
divisions for labor units in his command. On 17 September Pershing's
headquarters reassigned three divisions scheduled to arrive from the
United States to Harbord. Only one of these, the 87th, reported before
the end of the fighting, and it was broken up for laborers in the
Services of Supply.63
Handicapped by the scarcity of
men and animals, Pershing sought ways to make divisions more effective
combat units. In October 1918 he advised new division commanders to use
their personalities to increase the patriotism, morale,
[71]
Traffic congestion in the Argonne, November 1918
and fighting spirit of their
men. One way to develop unit esprit, Pershing suggested, was for
divisions to adopt distinctive cloth shoulder sleeve insignia. At that
time the 81st Division had already begun using such insignia. On his
return to the United States after visiting the Western Front in the fall
of 1917, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles J. Bailey, had
authorized a shoulder sleeve insignia for his unit. He instructed the
men not to wear the patch until after leaving the United States. When
the division arrived in France, the insignia came to Pershing's
attention. Bailey explained that no official sanction existed for the
emblem, but that it created comradeship among the men, helped to develop
esprit, and aided in controlling small units in open warfare. Pershing
apparently liked the idea for he ordered all divisions to adopt shoulder
sleeve insignia. Within a short time the other divisions had their own
shoulder patches, many adopting their divisional property symbols. Along
with the insignia, the men began to adopt divisional nicknames, such as
"Big Red One" and "Wildcat" for the 1 stand 81st
Divisions, respectively.64
Combat, particularly in the
Meuse-Argonne campaign, tested the assumptions that lay behind the large
square division. Designed to conduct sustained frontal attacks, not
maneuver, it was thought to possess tremendous firepower and endurance.
The division's firepower, however, proved ineffective. The lack of wire
and the continual movement of infantry units in the offensive hindered
communications between infantry and artillery. In addition, the French
transportation
[72]
network could handle only so
many men, guns, and supplies. Traffic congestion bogged down the
movement of units and also prevented communication. When divisions were
on the line they suffered from the lack of food, ammunition, and other
supplies. Part of the logistical problems also rested with a division's
lack of combat service troops to carry rations, bury the dead, and
evacuate casualties.65
By Armistice Day, 11 November
1918, the Army had fielded 1 cavalry division, 1 provisional infantry
division, and 62 infantry divisions. Of this total, 42 infantry
divisions and the provisional division deployed to Europe (see Table
6),
with one, the 8th Division, not arriving until after the fighting had
ended. On the Western Front in France, 29 divisions (7 Regular Army, 11
National Guard, and 11 National Army) fought in combat. Of the others, 7
served as depot divisions, 2 of which were skeletonized, and 5 were
stripped of their personnel for replacements in combat units, laborers
in rear areas, or expeditionary forces in North Russia or Italy. The
provisional black division was broken up, but its four infantry
regiments saw combat. Starting from a limited mobilization base, this
buildup, lasting eighteen months, was a remarkable achievement.
Despite the difficulties, World
War I brought about more coordination among the combat arms, combat
support, and combat service organizations in the infantry division than
ever before. Infantry could not advance without support from engineers
and artillery; artillery could not continue to fire without a constant
supply of ammunition. Transportation and signal units provided the vital
materiel and command connections, while medical units administered to
the needs of the wounded. This complex type of combined arms unit became
possible because of advances in technology, weapons, communications, and
transportation.
The adoption of the unwieldy
square division, however, proved to be less than satisfactory.
Pershing's staff believed that a division of 28,000 would conserve the
limited supply of trained officers, maximize firepower, and sustain
itself effectively in combat. In practice, the square division lacked
mobility. Its deficiencies became apparent during the important
Meuse-Argonne offensive, when American divisions bogged down and
suffered excessive casualties. The successes and failures of the
infantry division's organization set the stage for a debate that would
surround it for the next twenty years.
[73]
Endnotes
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