Chapter IV:
The Aftermath of World War I
that the work of this Board
was undertaken so soon after the close of hostilities that the members
were unduly influenced by the special .situation which existed during
our participation in the World War.
General John J. Pershing 1
The abrupt end of World War I
and the immediate demand for demobilization threw the Army into
disarray, but out of the disorder eventually came a new military
establishment. Between the armistice in November 1918 and the summer of
1923 the Army occupied a portion of Germany, demobilized its World War I
forces, helped revise the laws regulating its size and structure, and
devised a mobilization plan to meet future emergencies. Amid the turmoil
Army officers analyzed and debated their war experience, arguing the
merits of a large, powerful infantry division designed to penetrate an
enemy position with a frontal assault versus a lighter, more mobile unit
that could outmaneuver an opponent. The cavalry division received a
similar but less extensive examination. After close scrutiny, the Army
adopted new infantry and cavalry divisions and reorganized its forces to
meet postwar conditions.
Hostilities ended on 11 November
1918, but the Army still had many tasks to perform, including the
occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine River. For that
purpose, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, at the direction of General
Pershing, organized the Third Army on 15 November. Ten U.S. divisions
eventually served with it-the 1st through 5th, 32d, 42d, 89th, and 90th
in Germany and the 33d in Luxembourg-as well as the French 2d Cavalry
Division. Also elements of the 6th Division began moving toward the
bridgehead in later April 1919, but that movement was halted in early
May. Divisional missions included the administration of civil
government, the maintenance of public order, and the prevention of
renewed aggression.2
The divisional structure proved
unsatisfactory for the military government role. Its organization could
not mesh with the civil government of Germany, and the Third Army lacked
the time and expertise needed to mature a uniform civil affairs program.
Furthermore, assigned areas for the divisional units shift-
[79]
American Troops cross the Rhine at Coblenz, Germany, January 1919.
ed rapidly as divisions departed
the bridgehead for the United States. Yet, under the terms of
occupation, the entire bridgehead had to remain under American
supervision. By the summer of 1919 American divisions had left for home,
and the military government functions moved from the tactical units to
an area command, the Office of Civil Affairs. With the departure of the
divisions, only brigade-size or smaller units remained in Germany, and
they too departed by January 1923.3
As the Third Army grappled with
occupation duty, officials in Washington confronted the problem of
demobilizing the wartime army. On 11 November 1918 a quarter of a
million draftees had been under orders to report for military duty. With
the signing of the armistice the War Department immediately halted the
mobilization process, but it had no plans for the Army's transition to a
peacetime role.4
One man, Col. Casper H. Conrad
of the War Plans Division, had begun to study demobilization, and he
submitted his report eleven days after the armistice. From Conrad's
several proposals on disbanding the forces, Chief of Staff March decided
to discharge soldiers by units rather than by individuals. Because
National Guard and National Army divisions originally had geographical
ties, he also ruled that units returning from overseas would be
demobilized at the centers nearest to where their men had entered the
services. 5
Demobilization began in November
1918. March first disbanded the partially organized divisions in the
United States, making their camps available as dis-
[80]
1st Field Artillery Brigade, 1st Division, on occupation duty
in Germany, August 1919
charge centers. In January 1919
Pershing sent home the divisions that had been skeletonized or had
performed replacement functions. Combat divisions followed, beginning
with the 92d, the Army's only black division. A year after the armistice
the Army had demobilized fifty-five of its sixty-two divisions,
including all the National Guard and National Army units (Table 7). Before
the units left service, the War Department gave the American people the
opportunity to show their appreciation to the men who had fought in the
war. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington held
divisional parades and over five hundred regiments marched through the
streets of their hometowns.6
After November 1919 only the 1st
through the 7th Divisions and a few smaller units remained active.
All were Regular Army units. These divisions retained their wartime
configurations, but personnel authorizations for fiscal year 1920
prevented full manning. Divisional regiments had the strengths
prescribed in the prewar tables of organization issued on 3 May 1917,
and the ammunition, supply, and sanitary trains had only enough men to
care for their equipment. Within only a year, the mighty combat force
the Army had struggled to build during 1917-18 had vanished without any
plans to replace it.7
The helter-skelter pace of demobilization and the
lack of any sound transitional planning greatly undermined efforts to
create an effective peacetime force. A student of demobilization,
Frederic L. Paxon, characterized this situation as worse than a
"madhouse in which the crazy might be incarcerated. They were at
large." 8
[81]
Demobilization of Divisions
| Division |
Returned to U.S. |
Demobilized |
Camp/Location |
| 1st |
September 1919 |
|
Zachary Taylor,
Ky |
| 2d |
August 1919 |
|
Travis, Tex. |
| 3d |
August 1919 |
|
Pike, Ark. |
| 4th |
August 1919 |
|
Dodge, Iowa |
| 5th |
July 1919 |
|
Cordon, Ga. |
| 6th |
June 1919 |
|
Grant,
Ill. |
| 7th |
June 1919 |
|
Funston, Kans. |
| 8th* |
September 1919 |
|
September 1919
Dix, N.J. |
| 9th |
# |
February 1919 |
Sheridan, Ala. |
| 10th |
# |
February 1919 |
Funston,
Kans. |
| 11th |
# |
February 1919 |
Meade, Md. |
| 12th |
# |
February 1919 |
Devens, Mass. |
| 13th |
# |
March 1919 |
Lewis, Wash. |
| 14th |
# |
February 1919 |
Ouster, Mich. |
| 15th |
# |
February 1919 |
Logan, Tex. |
| 16th |
# |
March 1919 |
Kearny, Calif |
| 17th |
# |
February 1919 |
Beauregard,
La. |
| 18th |
# |
February 1919 |
Travis, Tex. |
| 19th |
# |
February 1919 |
Dodge, Iowa |
| 20th |
# |
February 1919 |
Sevier, S.C. |
| 26th |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Devens, Mass. |
| 27th |
March 1919 |
April 1919 |
Upton, N.Y. |
| 28th |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 29th |
May 1919 |
May 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 30th |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Jackson, S.C. |
| 31st |
December 1918 |
January 1919 |
Cordon, Ga. |
| 32d |
May 1919 |
May 1919 |
Ouster,
Mich. |
| 33d |
May 1919 |
June 1919 |
Grant, Ill. |
| 34th |
January 1919 |
February 1919 |
Grant, Ill. |
| 35th |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Funston,
Kans. |
| 36th |
June 1919 |
June 1919 |
Bowie,
Tex. |
| 37th |
April 1919 |
June 1919 |
Sherman,
Ohio |
| 38th |
December 1918 |
January 1919 |
Zachary Taylor, Ky |
| 39th |
December 1918 |
January 1919 |
Beauregard, La. |
| 40th |
March 1919 |
April 1919 |
Kearny,
Calif. |
| 41st |
February 1919 |
February 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 42d |
May 1919 |
May 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 76th |
December 1918 |
January 1919 |
Devens, Mass. |
| 77th |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Upton,
N.Y. |
| 78th |
June 1919 |
June 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 79th |
May 1919 |
June 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 80th |
May 1919 |
June 1919 |
Lee, Va. |
| 81st |
June 1919 |
June 1919 |
Hoboken,
N.J. |
| 82d |
May 1919 |
May 1919 |
Upton, N.Y. |
| 83d |
January 1919 |
October 1919 |
Sherman, Ohio |
| 84th |
January 1919 |
July 1919 |
Zachary Taylor, Ky |
| 85th |
March 1919 |
April 1919 |
Ouster,
Mich. |
| 86th |
January 1919 |
January 1919 |
Grant, Ill. |
| 87th |
January 1919 |
February 1919 |
Dix, N.J. |
| 88th |
June 1919 |
June 1919 |
Dodge,
Iowa |
[82]
TABLE 7-Continued
| Division |
Returned to U.S. |
Demobilized |
Camp/Location |
| 89th |
May 1919 |
July 1919 |
Funston, Kans |
| 90th |
June 1919 |
June 1919 |
Bowie,
Tex. |
| 91st |
April 1919 |
May 1919 |
Presidio
of San Francisco, Calif. |
| 92d |
February 1919 |
February 1919 |
Meade,
Md. |
| 93d@ |
|
|
| 95th |
# |
December 1919 |
Sherman, Ohio |
| 96th |
# |
January 1919 |
Wadsworth, N.Y.
|
| 97th |
# |
December 1918 |
Cody, N.Mex. |
| 98th |
# |
November 1918 |
McClellan,
Ala. |
| 99th |
# |
November 1918 |
Wheeler, Ga. |
| 100th |
# |
November 1918 |
Bowie, Tex. |
| 101st |
# |
November 1918 |
Shelby,
Miss. |
| 102d |
# |
November 1918 |
Dix, N.J. |
Notes:
* Only part of the division
overseas.
# Did not go overseas.
@ Provisional division,
headquarters demobilized in France in May 1918.
[83]
Although rapid demobilization
destroyed the Army's combat effectiveness, military and congressional
leaders wanted to avoid what they considered the major mistake made
after every earlier war-the loss of well-trained, experienced, combat
soldiers. Notwithstanding that World War I was to have been "the
war to end all wars," perceived international realities required
that the nation be prepared for war. Both Congress and the War
Department had been considering changes in the National Defense Act, and
Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, Chief of the War Plans Division, suggested that
March obtain the AEF's views on the new Army establishment. He suspected
that division, corps, and army organizations used in the "Great
War" might not meet future battlefield requirements because they
were tied so closely to trench warfare, a type of warfare he thought
unlikely to recur.9
Under War Department orders,
Pershing set up boards in France to examine the AEF experiences with the
arms and services and to draw appropriate lessons for the future. At his
staff's suggestion, he also convened the Superior Board to review the
other boards' findings. In April Pershing relieved Dickman as the
commander of Third Army and appointed him and other senior officers to
the review board. All its members had close professional ties to
Pershing and had witnessed from various positions the
"success" of the heavy infantry division during the war. The
board's primary mission was an examination of that infantry division.
After a two-month investigation, the Superior Board tendered its
recommendation, basically endorsing the World War I square division with
modifications. Changes centered on improvements in combat and service
support, firepower, and command and control. 10
[83]
5th Field Artillery troops at the 1st Division parade, September
1919
Changes in command and control
touched all divisional echelons. The board recommended headquarters
detachments for artillery and infantry brigades along with larger
staffs. Because the ammunition train served primarily with the artillery
brigade, it proposed making the train an organic element of that unit
but serving both artillery and infantry troops. Similarly, the board
members believed that the engineer train should be a part of the
engineer regiment. Following the principle of placing resources under
the control of those who used them, the board wanted to drop the machine
gun battalion from the infantry brigade and place a machine gun company
in each infantry battalion. The board members believed that only when
the infantry commander had his own machine gun company could he learn to
handle it properly. For training in mass machine gun fire, the board
advised that the companies assemble occasionally under a brigade machine
gun officer. It also advocated the retention of a divisional machine gun
officer and a divisional machine gun battalion to provide a reserve for
barrage or mass fire.
The board regarded the rear area
division train headquarters and the accompanying military police as
unnecessary. When needed, the division commander could appoint an
officer to command the rear elements. The military police could become a
separate company. The war had disclosed complex communication problems,
particularly in the use of radios, but no uniform signal organization
existed. To overcome that defect, the board advised that a closer
examination of divisional signal needs be conducted with consideration
given to dividing them along functional lines.
Turning to firepower, the
Superior Board recommended the elimination of ineffective weapons and
the addition or retention of effective ones. Based on wartime
experience, the 6-inch mortar battery in the field artillery brigade was
[84]
deleted and a howitzer company
added to the infantry regiment. The infantry was to continue to use
37-mm. guns and 3-inch Stokes mortars temporarily, but eventually
howitzers were to replace the mortars. The board found that mortars
lacked mobility, accuracy, and range and were difficult to conceal and
supply. The board looked upon tractor-drawn artillery pieces as a
success in combat and felt that retention of motorized artillery was
appropriate if future wars were fought in countries having an extensive
road net like that in France. For flexibility, however, the board
advised that one 75-mm. gun regiment remain horse-drawn and the other be
motor-drawn, along with a motorized 155-mm. howitzer regiment. They
decided that the new weapon, the tank, used during the war to break up
wire entanglements and to reduce machine gun nests, belonged to the
infantry, but instead of assigning tank units to the division, the
officers placed them at army level. Tanks could then be parceled out to
divisions according to need.
The board also addressed the
combat support needs of the division. Since the division routinely
employed aircraft for artillery observation, liaison, registration of
fire, and reconnaissance, the board suggested the addition of an air
squadron, a balloon company, a photographic section, and an intelligence
officer to the division. The board endorsed the addition of a litter
battalion to the sanitary train to improve medical support and the
elimination of all horse-drawn transportation from that unit and from the
rest of the division, except for artillery. Because engineers had often
been used as infantry in combat, some board members proposed reducing
the number of engineer troops. The board concluded, however, that while
engineers often had been employed as infantry, this practice stemmed
from a failure to understand their role. It advised the retention of the
engineer regiment.
Summarizing the requirements for
the future infantry division, the Superior Board recommended that it be
organized to meet varying combat and terrain conditions encountered in
maneuver warfare but have only those elements that it customarily
needed. The army corps or army level would supply infrequently used
organizations. The board's report endorsed a square division that
numbered 29,000 officers and enlisted men-an organization "imbued
with the divisional spirit, sense of comradeship and loyalty, that will
guarantee service . . . in critical moments when the supreme effort must
be made."11
Although Pershing had not
employed a cavalry division in France, the Superior Board also examined
its structure in light of Allied experiences, particularly in Italy and
Palestine. The board concluded that, except for distant reconnaissance
by airplanes, the missions of mounted troops-screening, shock action,
and tactical reconnaissance-remained important on the postwar
battlefield. To conduct such missions, the cavalry division needed to
capitalize on its mobility and firepower. Finding the 1917 unit of
18,000 men too large, the board entertained two proposals for
reorganizing it. One called for a division of three cavalry regiments,
an artillery regiment, and appropriate combat and service support units;
the other comprised two cavalry brigades, each with two cavalry
regiments,
[85]
Superior Board Members. Left to right, Maj. Gens. Joseph T.
Dickman, John L. Hines, and William Lassiter, Col. George R Spalding,
Brig. Gen. William Burtt, and Col. Parker Hitt.
and a machine gun squadron, an
artillery regiment, and auxiliary units. The board rejected the
three-regiment unit because it eliminated a general officer billet,
recommending instead a square cavalry division of some 13,500 men.
The Superior Board completed its
work on 1 July 1919, but Pershing held the report to consider its
findings. He did not
forward it to the War Department until almost a year later. 12
Although Pershing temporarily
shelved the Superior Board Report, Congress and the War Department
proceeded to explore postwar Army organization. On 3 August 1919,
Secretary Baker proposed a standing army of approximately 500,000 men
and universal military training for eighteen- and nineteen-year-old
males. With that number the department envisaged maintaining one cavalry
and twenty infantry divisions. March testified that before 1917, when
the Army was stationed at small, scattered posts, officers had no
occasion to command brigades or divisions or gain experience in managing
large troop concentrations. Under the proposed reorganization, officers
would have the opportunity to command large units and to train combined
arms units, thus correcting a major weakness of past mobilizations.13
[86]
After much debate Congress
amended the National Defense Act on 4 June 1920, providing for a new
military establishment but scuttling the unpopular universal military
training proposal. Instead it authorized a Regular Army of 296,000
officers and enlisted men, a National Guard of 435,000 men, and an
Organized Reserve (Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps) of
unrestricted size. To improve mobilization the law required that the
Army, as far as practical, be organized into brigades, divisions, and
army corps, with the brigades and divisions perpetuating those that had
served in the war. The new law replaced the old territorial departments
with corps areas, which assumed the tasks of administering and training
the Army. Each corps area was to have at least one National Guard or
Organized Reserve division. Corps areas were to be combined into army
areas for inspection, mobilization, maneuver, and demobilization. Rather
than mandating the structure of regiments as in the past, Congress
authorized the number of officers and enlisted men for each arm and
service and instructed the president to organize the units. To advise on
National Guard and Organized Reserve matters, Congress directed the
formation of committees with members from the Regular Army and both
reserve components.14
On 1 September 1920, the War
Department established the general outline of the postwar Army. It
consisted of three army areas divided into nine corps areas (Map 1).
Each army area supported one Guard and two Reserve cavalry divisions,
and each corps area maintained one Regular, two Guard, and three Reserve
infantry divisions, all to be sustained by combat support and combat
service support units to be perfected later. 15
Six committees of the War Plans
Division developed the postwar Army. Only one, however, the Committee on
Organization, dealt directly with the structure of the division through
the preparation of organizational tables. Until that work was completed,
no realistic calculation of future military requirements could be made.
The other committees defined the roles of the National Guard and the
Organized Reserves, estimated the number of Regular Army personnel
required to train and administer them, established manning requirements
for foreign garrisons, determined the number of regulars needed for an
expeditionary force, and fixed the distribution of the Regular Army in
the United States to meet strategic and training considerations.16
The Committee on Organization
prescribed a 23,000-man square division patterned after the unit of
World War I. Seeking comments from beyond the confines of the General
Staff, Col. William Lassiter of the War Plans Division sent the tables
to the commandants of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; the
General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the General
Staff College in Washington, D.C., as well as to General Pershing's AEF
headquarters in Washington.17
Faced with the possibility of
having a decision made without his views being considered, on 16 June
Pershing finally forwarded the Superior Board report along with his
comments about the infantry division, which differed substantially
[87]
[88-89]
from the board's findings, to
Baker. In comments prepared mostly by Col. Fox Conner, Pershing
suggested a 16,875-man division having a single infantry brigade of
three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron, and
combat support and combat service support units, a design that
foreshadowed the triangular division the Army adopted for World War 11. 18
Pershing felt the Superior Board
undertook its work too soon after the close of hostilities and that its
report suffered unduly from the special circumstances on the Western
Front. After examining all organizational features, he concluded that no
one divisional structure was ideal for all battlefield situations.
Factors such as the mobility and flexibility of the division to meet a
variety of tasks, the probable theater of operations, and the road or
rail network available to support the division had to be weighed. The
most likely future theater of war for the Army was still considered to
be North America, and he believed that the infantry divisions employed
in France were too unwieldy and immobile for that region. Therefore, he
recommended a small mobile division. 19
According to Pershing, specific
signposts marked the path to a smaller division, among them putting
infrequently used support units at the army corps or army level,
organizing the divisional staff to handle needed attached units, making
a machine gun company an integral part of the infantry battalion, and
providing horse- or mule-drawn vehicles throughout the division because
of the poor roads in the United States. Summarizing the requirements for
the infantry division, he wrote: "The division should be small
enough to permit its being deployed from . . . a single road in a few
hours and, when moving by rail, to permit all of its elements to be
assembled on a single railroad line within twenty-four hours; this means
that the division must not exceed 20,000 as maximum.."20
On 18 June representatives from
the General Staff and Pershing's headquarters conferred to iron out the
differences between the two positions. The conference failed to reach
agreement. Therefore, at Baker's direction, a special committee met to
solve this organizational issue.21
Like the Superior Board, the
Special Committee, commonly referred to as the Lassiter Committee, drew
upon the talents of former AFT officers. From the General Staff, besides
Colonel Lassiter, came Lt. Col. Brunt H. Wells, Maj. John W Gulick, and
Capt. Arthur W Lane. Majs. Stuart Heintzelman and Campbell King
represented the General Staff College; Maj. Hugh A. Drum, the General
Services Schools; and Col. Charles S. Farnsworth, the Infantry School.
Col. Fox Conner and Capt. George C. Marshall spoke for Pershing. Except
for Farnsworth, who had commanded the 37th Division during combat, all
had held army corps, army, and General Headquarters staff positions
where they had gained firsthand knowledge about the operation of
divisions and higher commands in France. In addition, Wells had helped
draft the initial proposal for the square division adopted during the
war; Conner had been a French interpreter for the General Staff in 1917
when the proposal was prepared; and Heintzelman had edited General
Pershing's report of operations in France.22
[90]
Meeting between 22 June and 8
July 1920, the committee examined three questions: Was the World War I
division too large? If so, should the Army adopt a smaller division
comprising three infantry regiments? Finally, if a division of four
infantry regiments were retained, could it be reduced to fewer than
20,000 men, a figure acceptable to Pershing?23
The committee reviewed all
previous divisional studies and recommendations; acquainted itself with
views held by officers of the General Staff, departments, and operating
services of the Army about divisions; and investigated the views about
them developed at the service schools since the end of the war.
Approximately seventy officers appeared before the committee, including
Col. William (Billy) Mitchell of the Air Service and Brig. Gen. Samuel
D. Rochenback, the former chief of the Tank Corps, who testified about
two new weapon systems used in the war-the airplane and the tank.24
From the evidence, the committee
concluded that the wartime infantry division was too large and unwieldy.
In reality it had been an army corps without the proper organization.
The division's size made moving the unit by road and railroad or passing
through lines an extremely complex and time-consuming process.
Furthermore, its size had complicated the problems of command and
control of all activities in combat.25
The committee examined various
organizational options. The argument for three (versus four) infantry
regiments in the division centered on the division's probable area of
employment, North America. Experts deemed another war in Europe
unlikely, and they doubted that the Army would again fight on a
battlefield like that seen in France. They felt technological advances
in artillery, machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and
highly organized lines and flanks resting on impassable obstacles, such
as those encountered on the Western Front. Future enemies would most
likely organize their forces in great depth; therefore, the Army had to
be prepared to overcome that challenge.
Nevertheless, the committee
believed a division of four infantry regiments, although lacking the
flexibility of Pershings suggested unit, would have the necessary
mobility and striking power. Divisional support troops needed to be
reduced, but the retention of the square division preserved the
organizations for army corps and armies that had been developed during
the war. Because most officers were familiar with those units, no change
in doctrine was required above the division level. On a more mundane
level, the retention of general officers' billets also influenced those
who wanted to keep the square division. Its brigades required brigadier
generals, which allowed officers to rise from second lieutenants to
general officers within their specialties, while a smaller triangular
division would terminate that progression at the colonel level.
Concluding its examination, the committee decided a field commander
could more readily modify the square division to oppose a lesser enemy
than strengthen a smaller organization to fight a powerful foe.26
The third question remained:
Could the Army reduce the size of the square division to increase
mobility'? Recommendations to achieve this included a reduc-
[91]
tion in the number of platoons
in the infantry company from four to three and a cut in the number of
companies in the battalion by a like amount, a realignment of the ratio
between rifles and machine guns, elimination of the 155-mm. howitzers,
and the removal of unnecessary support troops. The division could obtain
additional troops from pools of combat support and service units located
at the army corps or army level. The Lassiter Committee concluded that
the square division could be cut in size yet retain much of its
firepower.27
After making its report, the
Lassiter Committee prepared tentative tables of organization for the
division, which March approved on 31 August. When the War Department
distributed the draft tables in the fall of 1920 for the division, it
totaled 19,385 officers and enlisted men (Chart 5) and covered about
thirty miles of road space in march formation. To arrive at that
strength and size, each of the four infantry regiments lost 700 men. The
regiment consisted of three infantry battalions and supply, howitzer,
and headquarters companies. Each battalion included one machine gun
company and three rifle companies. The assignment of a machine gun
company to each infantry battalion simplified command and control of
those weapons, and the realignment of the guns created a substantial
saving in personnel. Machine gun units were eliminated from the infantry
brigades, and the divisional machine gun battalion was replaced by a
tank company, which was to serve as a divisional mobile reserve. The
committee endorsed Pershing's suggestion of a divisional tank company
but was aware that a single company could not mount an effective attack
on a stabilized front; the large numbers of tanks required for that type
of operation would have to come from the army level. The committee
dropped the 155-mm. howitzer regiment but stipulated its return to the
division when these weapons acquired the necessary mobility for use on
the North American continent. The engineer regiment and train were
combined and reorganized initially as a battalion because the planners
thought that the division had little need for large numbers of engineers
in mobile warfare, which precluded building extensive fortifications,
trenches, and similar works. The chief of engineers and others, however,
insisted that the regiment be retained to assure mobility, permit
training of lieutenant colonels and colonels, and provide the
opportunity for higher grade officers to serve at least one year in five
with troops. March thus decided to retain the engineer regiment but
reduced its number from 1,831 officers and enlisted men to 867. All
these changes husbanded personnel spaces and increased mobility without
lessening firepower.28
Substantial reductions also took
place in divisional services. The committee cut the size of the
ammunition train from 1,333 to 169 officers and enlisted men and changed
its mission to serve only the field artillery brigade. Ammunition
resupply for all other divisional elements shifted to the tactical units
and quartermaster train. That train consisted of half motorized and half
animal-drawn transportation, presuming the potential theater of
operations to be the rugged North American continent. Ordnance personnel
formerly
[92]
Infantry Division, 7 October 1920
Notes
1 Division headquarters detachment absorbed 27 April
1921 by the division headquarters company.
2 On 20 April 1921 the motorcycle company was moved to
the trains and the service company added to special troops.
[93]
attached to the various
regiments and the mobile repair shop were grouped in an ordnance
company, centralizing all ordnance maintenance. A signal company
replaced the signal battalion, and it assumed responsibility for message
traffic between division and brigade headquarters. Within the infantry
and field artillery regiments, men from the combat arms were to handle
all communications. The new division abandoned the train headquarters
and military police organization, following the recommendation of the
Superior Board, but retained a separate military police company. Given
the many small separate companies in its structure (division
headquarters, signal, tank, service, ordnance, and military police), the
division included a new organization, headquarters, special troops, to
handle their administration and discipline.
The committee substituted a
medical regiment for the sanitary train and revamped health services.
Three hospital companies replaced the four used during the war, and the
number of ambulance companies in the regiment was similarly reduced. In
addition, a sanitary (collecting) battalion comprising three companies
corrected the need for litter-bearers, who had previously been taken
from combat units. Veterinarians, formerly scattered throughout the
division, now formed a veterinary company. A laboratory section, a
supply section, and a service company completed the new regiment.
Despite the innovations, the regiment fielded about the same number of
men as its World War I counterpart.29
Attesting to the greater depth
envisaged for the battlefield, an air squadron of thirteen airplanes was
to serve as the reconnaissance unit for the division. As under the
wartime configuration, units for ground reconnaissance were to be
attached as needed.30
Although the committee's
infantry division was larger than that contemplated in Pershing's
proposal, the planners believed it had only those organic elements
necessary for immediate employment under normal conditions. In an
emergency, the new division could be quickly adjusted to meet an enemy
armed with inferior arms and equipment. The problem the planners tried
to address was how to design a division to deal with superior forces
without significantly modifying it. The committee's division,
nevertheless, had its opponents. Conner and Marshall of Pershing's staff
still preferred the smaller triangular division for its mobility and
ease of command and control. Years later Marshall recalled that if
Heintzelman and King had not been such "kindly characters,"
the triangular division would have been adopted instead of Drum's large
division.31
The question arises why
Pershing, after becoming chief of staff on 1 July 1921, failed to
replace the infantry division with one more compatible with his concept
of battlefield mobility. Marshall pointed out later that the basic
recommendation for retaining the square infantry division came from his
own officers, the Superior Board. To disavow their advice would have
been an embarrassment. Furthermore, by July 1921 the reorganization of
the divisions had already begun. To undo so much work would have been
unrealistic and would have implied a lack of leadership within the Army.
Therefore, the square
[94]
infantry division stood with the
understanding that it might be modified to deal with a particular enemy.32
The Lassiter Committee
apparently devoted little attention to the cavalry division and recorded
less about its rationale for retaining the unit. Mobility and firepower
dominated the new organization. The Cavalry Journal, the official organ
for the arm, had repeatedly condemned the 1917 organization as an
absurdity. Burdened with more than 18,000 men and 16,000 animals, the
division was too large and cumbersome. It required a preposterous amount
of road space, roughly thirty miles, and was incapable of maneuver
because it lacked an efficient communication system.33
The postwar cavalry division,
approximately two-fifths the size of its predecessor, abandoned the
three-brigade structure (Chart 6). It included two cavalry brigades (two
cavalry regiments and one machine gun squadron each), one horse
artillery battalion, and combat and service support units. Each cavalry
regiment consisted of two squadrons (of three troops each), a
headquarters and headquarters troop and a service troop. Initially the
committee desired a third squadron to train men and horses, which
represented a major investment in time and money. March denied the
request because the Army was to maintain training centers. Unlike the
infantry, which incorporated the machine gun into the regiment, cavalry
maintained separate machine gun squadrons of three troops each because
of the perceived immobility of such weapons compared with other
divisional arms. A headquarters for special troops was authorized, under
which were placed the division headquarters troop, a signal troop, an
ordnance maintenance company, and a veterinary company. All
transportation was pack- or animal-drawn, except for 14 cars, 28 trucks,
and 65 motorcycles scattered throughout various headquarters elements in
the division. Without trains, the division measured approximately 6.5
miles if the men rode in columns of twos. The Army chief of staff
approved the new cavalry division on 31 August 1920.34
After approving both types of
divisions, March directed the preparation of final tables of
organization. When published the following year, the infantry division
fell just below Pershing's recommendation of 20,000, numbering 19,997
officers and enlisted men. The cavalry division totaled 7,463.35
As the War Plans Division
prepared the new tables, it also developed tables for understrength
peacetime units because the Army's leadership did not expect to be able
to maintain the number of men authorized under the National Defense Act.
These tables were designed so that the units could expand without having
to undergo reorganization. The peacetime infantry division was thus cut
to 11,000 with all elements retaining their integrity except the
division headquarters and military police companies, which were
combined. The peacetime cavalry division strength was set at 6,000. But
severe cuts in the War Department's budget made it impossible initially
even to publish the peacetime tables. Fortunately, the service journals
undertook that task.36
[95]
Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921
1 Includes four Medical Department personnel and two
Chaplains that were attached.
[96]
March directed the War Plans
Division to implement the tentative tables of organization he had
approved. Planning for reorganization of the Army had been under way
since 5 June 1920, when the War Plans Division had set up committees to
carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act. Officers from the
General Staff, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves helped
formulate the plans.37
One committee, originally
charged with defining the missions of the National Guard and the
Organized Reserves, widened its task to encompass the Regular Army. The
committee delineated four missions for the regulars: form an
expeditionary force in an emergency; furnish troops for foreign and
coastal defense garrisons; provide personnel to develop and train the
reserve components; and supply the administrative overhead of the Army.
The National Guard's dual missions remained unchanged. It contributed to
the federal forces during national emergencies or war and supplied the
states with forces to maintain law and order and cope with local
disasters. The mission of the Organized Reserves was to expand the Army
during war or national emergencies. Because of the strong antiwar
sentiment after World War I, the expense of maintaining large numbers of
enlisted men, the lack of training facilities, and the possible adverse
effect on the recruitment for the Guard, units of the Organized Reserves
were to have only officers and enlisted cadres. After a declaration of
war or national emergency, the remainder of the enlisted men would come
from voluntary enlistments or the draft.38
Another committee looked into
the number of divisions that could be organized and supported during
peacetime. Given a Regular Army of 296,000 officers and enlisted men,
the committee determined that the War Department could maintain nine
infantry divisions (one per corps area), three cavalry divisions (one
per army area), and one infantry brigade of black troops in the United
States. Of these divisions, one cavalry and three infantry divisions
were to be ready for war while the others were to be at reduced
strength. This arrangement evenly distributed the expeditionary forces
throughout the nation and provided an infantry division to serve as a
model for the reserves within each corps area.39
In view of the great personnel
turbulence caused by the rapid demobilization, the committee recommended
that the Regular Army quickly rebuild its seven existing infantry
divisions to meet the strength in the new peacetime tables and permit
the units to conduct realistic training. The other two planned infantry
divisions could be organized after the first seven had reached their
reduced strength level, and when all nine attained that level one or
more divisions could be increased to full manning for war. How the
Regular cavalry divisions were to be formed remained unaddressed. With
486,000 men in the National Guard, the committee envisioned forming
eighteen Guard infantry divisions, two for each corps area, and three or
more Guard cavalry divisions, at least one for each army area. For the
Organized Reserves, twenty-seven infantry divisions were contem-
[97]
plated, three per corps area,
and three or more cavalry divisions, at least one for each army area.40
When March approved the
structure of infantry and cavalry divisions, he also sanctioned the
formation of divisions based on that report. Instead of three Regular
Army cavalry divisions, he saw a need for only two. The Army's
mobilization base would thus be fifty-four infantry divisions and eight
or more cavalry divisions.41
Reorganization of the Regular
Army began in late 1920 as the infantry elements of the 1st through 7th
Divisions began to adopt the new peacetime tables. In the 2d Division a
Regular Army infantry brigade, the 4th, replaced the Marine Corps unit
that had been attached to the division in France. As tables for other
divisional units became available, they too were put into effect.42
All this work quickly appeared
somewhat premature. By the fall of 1921, cuts in Army appropriations
indicated that the Regular Army could not support seven infantry
divisions in the United States. Secretary of War John W Weeks,
therefore, instituted a policy allowing inactive units to remain on the
"rolls" of the Army but in an inoperable status-that is,
without personnel and equipment. Congressional insistence on maintaining
the tactical division frameworks to ensure immediate and complete
mobilization made such arrangements necessary. Judging that nothing was
wrong with the mobilization plan, but recognizing the shortage of funds
for the fiscal year, Weeks directed that some units be taken "out
of commission" or inactivated. The policy represented a marked
departure from past Army experience. Previously, when a unit could not
be maintained or was not needed, it was removed from the rolls of the
Army either by disbandment or consolidation with another unit. Acting
otherwise threatened to obscure the Army's reduced strength through a
facade of paper units.43
Nevertheless, under the new
system the Army cut the divisional forces in September and October 1921
by inactivating the 4th through the 7th Divisions, except for the even
numbered infantry brigade in each. These brigades-the 8th, 10th, 12th,
and 14th-remained active to serve as the nuclei of their parent
divisions upon mobilization. To save even more personnel, the 2d
Division, programmed at wartime strength, was placed under the reduced
strength tables, leaving the Army without a fully manned division in the
United States.44
During the summer of 1921 the
General Staff turned its attention to Regular Army cavalry divisions. On
20 August the adjutant general constituted the 1st and 2d Cavalry
Divisions to meet partial mobilization requirements, and the following
month the commander of the Eighth Corps Area organized the 1st Cavalry
Division. The headquarters of the division and its 2d Brigade were
located at Fort Bliss, Texas, and that of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at
Douglas, Arizona. Resources were not available to organize a second
cavalry division until World War II.45
The Regular Army divisions
underwent postwar reorganization and reduction even before the War
Department could determine their permanent stations. A committee
established in June 1920 to make recommendations about posting units
never submitted a report because of the unsettled size of the Regular
Army.
[98]
When Congress funded a Regular
Army of 150,000 enlisted men for 1922, the Acting Chief of Staff, Maj.
Gen. James G. Harbord, directed a new war plans group to prepare an
outline for stationing these troops. If possible, he wanted units to
have adequate housing and training facilities as well as to be located
where the men could assist in the development of the reserve components.
The recommendations called for the Second and Ninth Corps Areas each to
have an infantry division, the Eighth Corps Area to have both infantry
and cavalry divisions, and the remaining corps areas each to have a
reinforced brigade.46
As the existing divisions and
brigades moved to their permanent stations in 1922, the Army organized
the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades to complete the Regular Army portion
of the plan (Table 8). To fulfill mobilization requirements for
nine Regular Army infantry divisions, the adjutant general also restored
the 8th and 9th Divisions to the rolls in 1923, but they remained
inactive except for their 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades. The
stationing plan allowed the regulars to support the reserves, but only
the 2d Division was concentrated at one post-Fort Sam Houston, Texas.47
The last large unit recommended
for the Regular Army in 1920 was a black brigade scheduled for service
along the Mexican border. However, only four black regiments, two
cavalry and two infantry, remained after the war, and the War Department
decided that they should not be brigaded. In 1922 two of them, the 10th
Cavalry and the 25th Infantry, served along the border. Of the
remainder, the 9th Cavalry was stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, the home
of the Cavalry School, and the 24th Infantry was posted to Fort Benning,
Georgia, where the Infantry School had been established.48
The post-World War I Army also
maintained forces in the Philippine Islands, China, the Panama Canal
Zone, Puerto Rico, Germany, and Hawaii. To assure that these areas were
adequately garrisoned, the War Plans Division examined their manning
needs. Based upon its findings, March approved the formation of the
Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. In 1921 the commanders
of those overseas departments organized their units as best they could
from available personnel and equipment. The infantry and field artillery
brigades and many of the other divisional elements had numerical
designations that would be associated with the 10th, 11th, and 12th
Divisions. These elements, all table of organization units, could be
assigned wherever needed in the force. Because the divisions themselves
were not expected to serve outside of their respective territories, they
had territorial designations. The division headquarters were at Quarry
Heights, Canal Zone; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and Fort William
McKinley, Philippine Islands. Personnel for the Hawaiian and Panama
Canal Divisions came from the Regular Army, but the Philippine Division
was filled with both regulars and Philippine Scouts, with the latter in
the majority.49
Section V of the National
Defense Act prescribed a committee to devise plans for organizing the
National Guard divisions. Formed in August 1920, this group consisted of
Regular Army and Guard officers who represented their embryonic
[99]
Distribution of Regular Army
Divisions and Brigades, 1922
| Corps Area |
Unit |
Station |
| First |
18th Infantry Brigade
(9th Division) |
Fort
Devens, Mass. |
| Second |
1st Division |
Fort Hamilton,
N.Y. |
| Third |
16th Infantry Brigade
(8th Division) |
Fort
Howard, Md. |
| Fourth |
8th Infantry Brigade
(4th Division) |
Fort
McPherson, Ga. |
| Fifth |
10th Infantry Brigade
(5th Division) |
Fort
Benjamin Harrison, Ind. |
| Sixth |
12th Infantry Brigade
(6th Division) |
Fort
Sheridan, Ill. |
| Seventh |
14th Infantry Brigade
(7th Division) |
Fort
Omaha, Neb. |
| Eighth |
2d Division
1st Cavalry Division |
Fort Sam
Houston, Tex. Fort Bliss,
Tex. |
| Ninth |
3d Division |
Fort Lewis,
Wash. |
(Units in parentheses are the
inactive parent organizations.)
corps areas. Within a short time
the committee presented the states with a blueprint for eighteen
infantry divisions. Corps area commanders were to resolve any divergent
views or disputes among the states over the allotment of the units. The
plan offered the states the 26th through the 41st Divisions, organized
during World War I, and three new units, the 43d, 44th, and 45th
Divisions, as Guard units. The 42d "Rainbow" Division was
omitted because it lacked an association with any particular state or
geographic area. All corps areas except the Fourth received two
divisional designations. The states in the Fourth Corps Area, which had
raised the 30th, 31st, and 39th Divisions during World War I, decided
to reorganize the 30th and 39th Divisions. By the spring of 1921 the
states had agreed on the allotment of most units in the infantry
divisions, the War Department had furnished the new divisional tables of
organization, and the states had begun to reorganize their forces
accordingly. Between 1921 and 1935 the National Guard Bureau granted
federal recognition to the headquarters of all eighteen Guard infantry
divisions (Table 9). Although a few divisions lacked federally
recognized headquarters until the 1930s, most of the divisional elements
were granted federal recognition in the 1920s.50
The historical continuity of
Guard units rested upon geographic areas that supported the
organizations, and during the reorganization most units adopted the
designations used during World War I. Some shifting of units to new
geographic areas took place, resulting in some designation changes. For
example, in World War I Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had raised
the 39th Division, but
[100]
when the 39th was reorganized in
the postwar era Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana supported
the unit. Subsequently, a joint board of Regular and Guard officers
recommended that the division be renamed the 31st Division, a unit that
during the war had raised troops from Florida, Alabama, and Georgia.
Secretary Weeks approved the change, and on 1 July 1923 the 39th
Division was replaced by the 31st Division.51
The allocation and organization
of the Guard cavalry divisions followed the same procedure as the
infantry divisions. But in order to use all existing cavalry units, a
fourth cavalry division was added to the force. In 1921 the formation of
the 21st through 24th Cavalry Divisions began with the First, Second,
and Third Army Areas supporting the 21st, 22d, and 24th Cavalry
Divisions, respectively. The 23d was the nation's at-large cavalry
division, supported by all army areas (Table 10). In a short time
the divisions had the prescribed cavalry regiments and machine gun
squadrons but not the majority of their support organizations. 52
The organization of the third
component's units began in 1921 when the War Department published
Special Regulations No. 46, General Policies and Regulations for the
Organized Reserves. The regulations explained the procedures for
administering, training, and mobilizing the Organized Reserves and
provided a tentative outline for the corps area commanders to follow in
organizing the units. Using the outline and a 6 April 1921 troop
allotment for twenty-seven infantry divisions, corps area commanders set
up planning boards to establish the units. In locating them, the boards
considered the distribution and occupations of the population,
attempting to station the units where they would be most likely to
receive effective support. For example, a medical unit was not located
in an area where there was no civilian medical facility. After
determining the location of the units and giving the Guard some time to
recruit, thus avoiding competition with it, officers began to organize
the 76th through the 91st and the 94th through the 104th Divisions.53
Recruiting the units proved to
be slow. Regular Army advisers were armed with lists of potential
reservists and little else. There were not enough recruiters, office
space and equipment, or funds available to accomplish the work.
Furthermore, a marked apathy toward the military prevailed throughout
the nation. By March 1922, however, all twenty-seven infantry divisions
had skeletal headquarters (see Table 9).54
To complete the divisional
forces in the Organized Reserves, the War Department added the 61st
through the 66th Cavalry Divisions to the rolls of the Army on 15
October 1921. Corps area commanders followed the same procedures used
previously for the infantry divisions in allotting and organizing them.
Within a few months they too emerged as skeletal organizations (see
Table 10).55
Thus, in early 1923 the Army had
66 divisions in the mobilization force shared among three components11
in the Regular Army (2 cavalry and 9 infantry), 22 in the National Guard
(4 cavalry and 18 infantry), and 33 in Organized Reserves (6 cavalry and
27 infantry). In addition, three understrength
[101]
Allotment of Reserve Component
Infantry Divisions, 1921
| Corps Area |
Division |
Component |
Location |
First
|
26th
43d |
NG
NG |
Massachusetts
Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont |
| |
76th
94th
97th |
OR
OR
OR |
Connecticut
and Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont |
Second
|
27th
44th |
NG
NG |
New York
New Jersey, New York, and Delaware |
|
77th
78th
98th |
OR
OR
OR |
New York
New Jersey and Delaware
New York |
| Third |
28th
29th |
NG
NG |
Pennsylvania
Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia |
|
79th
80th |
OR
OR |
Pennsylvania
Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia |
|
99th |
OR |
Pennsylvania |
| Fourth |
30th |
NG |
Georgia, Tennessee,
North Carolina, andSouth Carolina |
|
39th |
NG |
Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and Louisiana |
|
81st
82d
87th |
OR
OR
OR |
North Carolina and
Tennessee
South Carolina and Georgia
Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama |
Fifth
|
37th
38th |
NG
NG |
Ohio
Kentucky, Indiana, and West Virginia |
|
83d
84th
100th |
OR
OR
OR |
Ohio
Indiana
Kentucky and West
Virginia |
Sixth
|
32d
33d
85th
86th
101st |
NG
NG
OR
OR
OR |
Michigan and
Wisconsin
Illinois
Michigan
Illinois
Wisconsin |
| Seventh |
34th |
NG |
Iowa, Minnesota,
North Dakota, and South Dakota |
|
35th
88th |
NG
OR |
Nebraska, Kansas, and
Missouri
Minnesota, Iowa, and North
Dakota |
[102]
TABLE 9-Continued
| Corps Area |
Division |
Component |
Location |
|
89th |
OR |
South Dakota,
Nebraska, and Kansas |
|
102d |
OR |
Missouri and Arkansas |
Eighth
|
36th
45th
|
NG
NG
|
Texas
Oklahoma, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Arizona |
|
90th
95th
103d |
OR
OR
OR |
Texas
Oklahoma
New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona |
Ninth
|
40th
41st
|
NG
NG
|
California, Nevada,
and Utah
Washington, Oregon,
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho |
|
91st
96th
104th |
OR
OR
OR |
California
Oregon and Washington
Nevada, Utah, Wyoming,
and Idaho |
Allotment of Reserve Component
Cavalry Divisions, 1921
| Division |
Component |
Location |
| 21st |
NG |
New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and New Jersey |
| 22d |
NG |
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin |
| 23d |
NG |
Alabama, Massachusetts, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Wisconsin |
| 24th |
NG |
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming |
| 61st |
OR |
New York and New Jersey |
| 62d |
OR |
Maryland, Virginia,
District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania |
| 63d |
OR |
Tennessee, Louisiana,
Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, Oklahoma, and Colorado |
| 64th |
OR |
Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Vermont, and New Hampshire |
| 65th |
OR |
Illinois, Michigan, and
Wisconsin |
| 66th |
OR |
Nebraska, Missouri, Utah,
and North Dakota |
[103]
infantry divisions were located
overseas. No separate brigades existed. In almost every case, however,
these divisions, which varied from inactive units to partially manned
organizations, were "paper tigers:"
After World War I the Army
quickly demobilized its forces, but memories of the unpreparedness of
1917 caused the nation to change the way it maintained its military
forces. Infantry and cavalry divisions, rather than regiments or smaller
units, became the pillars that would support future mobilization.
Officers examined the structure of those pillars and adopted a modified,
but powerful, square infantry division designed for frontal attack and a
small light cavalry division for reconnaissance. Although the lessons of
war influenced the structure of these divisions, more traditional
criteria regarding their local geographical employment continued to
affect their organization. But with no real enemy in sight and the
nation's adoption of a generally isolationist foreign policy, it is not
surprising that Congress provided neither the manpower nor the materiel
to equip even a caretaker force adequately.
[104]
Endnotes
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