-
-
- In 1939 the Army created a protective
mobilization force for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The force
included the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th Divisions, which were organized under
the new triangular configuration. These forces, however, still needed to
be manned and trained for war. Congressional increases in the size of the
Regular Army, which began that year, provided much of the needed manpower,
while the largest peacetime maneuvers ever undertaken by the Army to date
provided a taste of war in 1940.2
Between 5 and 25 May 1940 the 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Infantry Divisions joined
the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, a provisional brigade
of light and medium tanks, and other units for maneuvers near
-
- 67th Infantry (Provisional Tank Brigade), at Third Army maneuvers,
1940
-
- the Louisiana and Texas border, a
step envisaged at the turn of the century to train an army corps. Not surprisingly,
the exercises highlighted weaknesses in most units in almost every area of
concern, including organization.3
-
- To improve the infantry division,
it was again reorganized, making it more powerful and easier to command
and control. A headquarters and headquarters battery, which provided a fire
direction control center and a brigadier general as commander of the division
artillery, replaced the field artillery section in the division headquarters.
Four field artillery battalions, three direct support and one general support,
replaced the two regiments. The direct support battalions were to be armed
with newly approved 105-mm. howitzers, while the general support battalion
fielded 155-mm. howitzers and 75-mm. guns, the latter retained primarily
as antitank weapons. Each field artillery battalion also was outfitted with
six 37-mm. antitank guns. To counter operations such as the German blitzkrieg,
which had proven so successful in Poland, antitank resources were centralized
in the infantry regiments to form regimental antitank companies outfitted
with 37-mm. antitank guns. In infantry battalions the number of antitank
"guns"-the .50-caliber machine guns-was doubled. For targets of
opportunity, more 81-mm. mortars were added to the heavy weapons company
and three 60-mm. mortars were authorized for each rifle company. A reconnaissance
troop appeared in the division, reflecting the growth in its operational
area on the battlefield, and the number of collecting companies in the medical
battalion was increased from one to three. Finally, new tables of orga-
- [144]
- 37-mm. gun and crew, 1941
-
- nization eliminated the infantry section
with its general officer in the division headquarters but provided an assistant
division commander with the rank of brigadier general. These changes brought
the strength of the division to 15,245 officers and enlisted men, with its
combat power still focused in the three regimental combat teams (Chart
12).4
-
- Despite the trend in foreign armies
to replace horse cavalry with mechanized units, the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, decided to table any organizational decisions
affecting the cavalry. Until a definite theater of operations could be ascertained,
the Army needed to prepare general purpose forces. The horse was capable
of going where a machine could not, and the cavalry division appeared to
have a place in the force. Among the questions Andrews wanted answered was,
again, whether the division should be built on a triangular or square configuration.
He also wanted to explore if and how horse and mechanized units could operate
together within a cavalry corps.5
-
- After the 1940 maneuvers Maj. Gen.
Kenyon A. Joyce, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, recommended retention
of the square cavalry division. A division with two brigades, each with
two cavalry regiments, was easily split into strike and reserve forces.
If the division were organized along triangular lines, the regiments would
have to be enlarged to maintain their firepower, but it would make them
too large for effective command and control. Joyce suggested that the cavalry
regiment comprise a headquarters; headquarters and service, machine gun,
and special weapons troops; and two rifle squadrons of three troops each.
He
- [145]
- Infantry Division, 1 November 1940
-
- 1 Includes ten people for the surgeon's office in the division headquarters.
- AT = Antitank
-
- [146]
- wanted to strengthen the two-battalion
field artillery regiment by creating batteries of six rather than four 75-mm.
howitzers and adding a truck-drawn 105-mm. howitzer battalion. To improve
mobility, the division needed enough trucks to move horses and equipment to
the battlefield. He suggested the elimination of only one organization-headquarters,
special troops-which facilitated administration in garrison, but not in the
field.6
-
- Joyce decided that horse and mechanized
units were compatible within a cavalry corps since the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) had successfully conducted joint
operations during the maneuvers. He urged the Army to maintain a corps that
included both types of units. The proportion of horse and mechanized units
could vary to meet various tactical situations, but he thought the corps
should be strong in artillery and engineers and contain sufficient support
troops to enable it to operate with maximum speed, flexibility, and striking
power.7
-
- The revised cavalry division remained
square and was to have 11,676 officers and enlisted men (Chart 13).
Divisional cavalry regiments conformed to Joyce's recommendations, but instead
of increasing the size of the field artillery regiment, one truck-drawn
105-mm. howitzer battalion and two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions replaced
it. As in the infantry division, the cavalry division received antitank
weapons. The new wartime division tables authorized a divisional antitank
troop fielding twelve 37-mm. antitank guns and a weapons troop having antitank
guns and 81-mm. mortars within each brigade. The engineer, quartermaster
(formerly the division train), and medical squadrons were enlarged to meet
the needs of the bigger division. Draft, pack, and riding horses were limited
to the cavalry brigades and the division artillery, while other elements
of the division were motorized. Headquarters, special troops, was eliminated.8
-
- As the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers
drew to a close and the fall of France appeared imminent, the War Department
authorized an increase in the number of active Regular Army infantry divisions
and the adoption of the new tables. Between June and August 1940 the Army
activated the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions.
-
- Neither those divisions nor the
other active divisions had sufficient personnel to meet the new manning
levels. The 1st Cavalry Division did not adopt the revised configuration
until early in 1941 when it concentrated at Fort Bliss for training.9
-
-
- During the 1940 maneuvers the Army
also had tested a provisional mechanized division. After the German invasion
of Poland in 1939, Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee had called for "armored"
divisions separate from both infantry and cavalry. Chaffee's 7th Cavalry
Brigade (Mechanized), Brig. Gen. Bruce Magruder's Provisional Tank Brigade
(organized in 1940 with infantry tank units), and the 6th Infantry made
up the new unit. At the conclusion of the exercises, Chaffee; Magruder;
Col. Alvan C. Gillem, Magruder's executive officer; Col. George S.
- [147]
- Cavalry Division, 1 November 1940
-
-
- [148]
- General Chaffee
-
- Patton, commander of the 3d Cavalry
at Fort Myer, Virginia; and other advocates of tank warfare met with the G-3,
General Andrews, in a schoolhouse at Alexandria, Louisiana, to discuss the
future of mechanization. All agreed that the Army needed to unify its efforts.
The question was how. Both the chief of cavalry and the chief of infantry
had attended the maneuvers, but they were excluded from the meeting because
of their expected opposition to any change that might deprive their arms of
personnel, equipment, or missions.10
-
- Returning to Washington, Andrews
proposed that Marshall call a conference on mechanization. The crisis in
Europe had by then increased congressional willingness to support a major
rearmament effort, and at the same time the success of the German panzers
highlighted the need for mechanization, however costly. Andrews' initiative,
made three days after the British evacuated Dunkirk, noted that the American
Army had inadequate mechanized forces and that it needed to revise its policy
of allowing both infantry and cavalry to develop such units separately.
He suggested that the basic mechanized combined arms unit be a division
of between 8,000 and 11,000 men. With the chief of cavalry planning to organize
mechanized cavalry divisions, which mixed horse and tank units, such a conference
seemed imperative. Marshall approved Andrews' proposal.11
-
- From 10 to 12 June 1940 Andrews
hosted a meeting in Washington centering on the organization of mechanized
divisions. Along with the General Staff and the chiefs of the arms and services,
Chaffee, Magruder, and other tank enthusiasts attended. Andrews disclosed
that the War Department would organize an independent armored force, belonging
to neither the Infantry nor Cavalry branches, in the form of "mechanized
divisions." In such divisions the command and control echelon would
consist of a headquarters and headquarters company and a signal company.
A reconnaissance battalion with an attached aviation observation squadron
would constitute the commander's "eyes," which would operate from
100 to 150 miles in advance and reconnoiter a front from 30 to 50 miles.
At the heart of the division was an armored brigade made up of a headquarters
and headquarters company, one medium and two light armored regiments, a
field artillery regiment, and an engineer battalion. Using the two light
armored regi-
- [149]
- menu as the basis for two combat teams,
the division was to conduct reconnaissance, screening, and pursuit missions
and exploit tactical situations. An armored infantry regiment, along with
armored field artillery, quartermaster, and medical battalions and an ordnance
company, supported the armored brigade. Similar to the German panzer division,
it was to number 9,859 officers and enlisted men.12
-
- When approving the establishment
of the Armored Force to oversee the organization and training of two mechanized
divisions on 10 July 1940, Marshall also approved designating these units
as "armored" divisions. Furthermore, he directed the chief of
cavalry and the chief of infantry to make personnel who were experienced
with tank and mechanized units available for assignment to the divisions.
On 15 July, without approved tables of organization, Magruder organized
the 1st Armored Division at Fort Knox from personnel and equipment of the
7th Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Infantry. Concurrently, Brig. Gen. Charles
L. Scott, a former regimental commander in the 7th Cavalry Brigade, activated
the 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning using men and materiel from the
Provisional Tank Brigade. Marshall selected Chaffee to command the new Armored
Force.13
-
- Four months later the War Department
published tables of organization for the armored division (Chart 14).
It resembled the unit developed during the summer, except that the engineer
battalion was removed from the armored brigade and assigned to the division
headquarters, and the ordnance company was expanded to a battalion. To the
surprise of Chaffee, who had supervised the preparation of the tables, the
authorized strength of the division rose from 9,859 to 12,697, including
attached personnel.
-
- The division fielded 381 tanks and
97 scout cars when all units were at war strength.14
Chaffee envisaged the establishment of corps-size units commanding both
armored and motorized divisions, the latter essentially an infantry division
with sufficient motor equipment to move all its personnel. On 15 July 1940
the War Department selected the 4th Division, which had recently been reactivated
as part of the Regular Army's expansion, for this role. Collocated with
the 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning, the 4th's divisional elements had
earlier experimented with motorized infantry. Eventually the department
published tables of organization for a motorized division that retained
the triangular structure but fielded 2,700 motor vehicles including over
600 armored half-track personnel carriers.15
-
- Along with the reorganization and
expansion of divisional forces, the Army increased unit manning levels and
concentrated units for training. A peacetime draft, adopted on 16 September
1940, provided the men, and eventually the strength of all divisions neared
war level. Prior to 1940 units were scattered over 130 posts, camps, and
stations in the United States, but with mobilization Congress provided funds
for new facilities. The Quartermaster Corps, during the winter of 19401,
built accommodations for 1.4 million men, including divisional posts of
the type constructed in World War I. 16
- [150]
- Armored Division, 15 November 1940
-
- 1 Includes ten people for the surgeon's office in the division headquarters.
-
- [151]
- Half-track personnel car, 1941
-
- But as in World War I, equipment shortages
could not be quickly remedied and greatly inhibited preparation for war. Among
other things, the Army lacked modern field artillery, rifles, tanks, and antitank
and antiaircraft weapons. Although acutely aware of the shortages, Marshall
believed that the Army could conduct basic training while the production of
weapons caught up. 17
-
-
- As the possibility that the nation
might be forced into the European war increased, some members of the War
Department favored federalization of the National Guard to correct deficiencies
in its training and equipment. In August 1940, after much debate, Congress
approved the induction of Guard units for twelve months of training. It
also authorized their use for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and
the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine
Islands. 18
-
- Induction of Guard units began on
Monday, 16 September, with federalization of the 30th, 41st, 44th, and 45th
Divisions, less their tank and aviation units. These latter units eventually
served in World War II, but not as divisional organizations. The divisions
were considerably understrength, each having approximately 9,600 men, but
training camps were not prepared even for that number. To bring the divisions
to war level, the War Department supplied draftees and within
- [152]
- six months all eighteen Guard infantry
divisions had entered federal service and were training at divisional posts.
19
-
- Federal law required Guard units
to be organized under the same tables as the regulars. But the Guard divisions
had not yet adopted the triangular configuration, and the General Staff
hesitated to reorganize them immediately as they were in federal service
only for training. Furthermore, the staff feared political repercussions
when general and field grade officers were eliminated to conform to the
new tables.20
-
- The National Guard also maintained
two separate infantry brigades, the 92d and 93d, which did not fit into
any war plans of 1940. At the request of the National Guard Bureau, New
York converted the 93d to the 71st Field Artillery Brigade, and Minnesota
reorganized the 92d as the 101st Coast Artillery Brigade, and the units
entered federal service as such.21
-
- Although war plans did not call
for separate infantry brigades in the United States, the War Department
authorized a new 92d Infantry Brigade in the Puerto Rico National Guard
to command forces there. The new headquarters came into federal service
on 15 October 1940, but served less than two years without seeing combat.
In July 1942 the Caribbean Defense Command inactivated the brigade and replaced
it with the Puerto Rican Mobile Force.22
-
- Besides infantry divisions and brigades,
the National Guard maintained four partially organized cavalry divisions
and one cavalry brigade. As these forces did not fit into any current war
plans, the General Staff initiated a study in August 1940 to determine the
Guard's requirements for horse and mechanized units. It concluded that the
Guard needed both types of organizations, but not four horse cavalry divisions.
At the time of the study it was rumored that the personnel from two cavalry
divisions would form the nuclei of two armored divisions. The states, however,
objected to the loss of cavalry regiments, and Armored Force leaders believed
that armored divisions were too big and complicated for the Guard. On 1
November 1940 the National Guard Bureau withdrew the allotment of the 21st
through 24th Cavalry Divisions, which in effect disbanded them. Some of
their elements were used to organize mechanized cavalry regiments. After
November the 56th Cavalry Brigade, a Texas unit, remained the only large
unit authorized horses in the National Guard. It entered federal service
before the end of the year.23
-
- With 18 infantry divisions, 1 infantry
brigade, and 1 cavalry brigade from the National Guard undergoing training
in 1941, a crisis soon developed regarding their future. The 1940 law had
authorized the federalization of the Guard for only one year, and that period
was about to expire for some units. But the units were now filled with both
draftees and guardsmen, and the release of the latter from federal service
would completely break up these units. In the summer of 1941 the War Department
thus prevailed upon Congress to extend the Guard units and men on active
duty. This decision allowed Marshall to conduct the great General Headquarters
Maneuvers in the summer and fall of 1941.24
- [153]
-
- Using the protective mobilization
plan, in 1941 the Army also proceeded to increase the number of cavalry,
armored, and infantry divisions in response to the growing threat of war.
The Regular Army organized a second cavalry division against a backdrop
of domestic politics. As a result of debates over increasing the size of
the Army, Congress had provided "That no Negro because of race, shall
be excluded from enlistment in the Army for service with colored military
units now organized and to be organized." 25
In the midst of the 1940 presidential campaign prominent black leaders complained
bitterly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the limited number of
black units. Under political pressure the Army activated the 2d Cavalry
Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 April 1941, with one black and one
white brigade.26
-
- Armored divisions were viewed as
far more essential than cavalry divisions. As early as 6 August 1940, Chaffee,
commanding the Armored Force, planned more armored divisions, and he directed
the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions to maintain a 25 percent overstrength as
cadre for additional units. In January 1941 the War Department approved
the establishment of two more armored divisions, and on 15 April the Armored
Force activated the 3d and 4th at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and Pine Camp
(later Fort Drum), New York, respectively. Shortly thereafter plans surfaced
for two more armored divisions. The 5th Armored Division, added to the rolls
in August, became a reality in October, and the 6th joined the force in
January 1942.27
-
- The European war clearly demonstrated
a need to have antitank forces. Marshall had decided that all units had
an antitank role, but he also recognized the requirement for specific counter-armor
units. He did not want to assign them to an existing arm because their organization,
tactical doctrine, and development seemed beyond the scope of any one arm.
The problem struck the new Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 3, Brig. Gen. Harry
L. Twaddle, as similar to that of employing the machine gun during World
War I. As an expedient, separate machine gun battalions had been established,
although the guns were prevalent in all combat formations. Twaddle believed
that antitank units, which would not be a part of any existing arm, should
also be organized as an expedient to provide the strongest antitank capability
possible; later the Army could sort out whether they were infantry or field
artillery weapons.28
-
- Twaddle's staff developed plans
to provide four antitank battalions for each existing division. One battalion
would serve with the division and the three others would be held at higher
echelons for employment as needed. For the upcoming maneuvers the War Department
authorized the formation of provisional antitank battalions in June 1941,
using the antitank guns from field artillery battalions. The following December,
after the maneuvers, the battalions were made permanent organizations and
redesignated as tank destroyer units to indicate their offensive nature.
They were not divisional elements, as recommended by First, Third,
- [154]
- Tanks of the 68th Armored, 2d Division, participate in the Louisiana
Maneuvers, 1941
-
- and Fourth Army commanders after
the 1941 maneuvers, but assigned to General Headquarters (GHQ). This arrangement
placed the units outside the control of the existing arms, thus creating
basically a new homogeneous antitank force. The independent tank destroyer
battalions would later prove an organizational error, denying division commanders
a major resource that they habitually needed. It did, however, focus attention
on an area that was a growing tactical concern.29
-
- The possible theater of operations
shifted from the Western Hemisphere to the Pacific in 1941 as relations
deteriorated between the United States and Japan. To be prepared for that
contingency, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, commanding the Hawaiian Department,
requested permission to expand the square Hawaiian Division into two triangular
infantry divisions with the primary mission of defending Oahu, the most
populous of the islands and a major base of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Recognizing
that the Regular Army lacked the units required for the reorganization,
Short proposed that Guard units complete the two divisions. The department
approved Short's proposal, and on 1 October he reorganized and redesignated
the Hawaiian Division as the 24th Infantry Division and activated the 25th
Infantry Division. Elements of the Hawaiian Division were distributed between
the two new divisions, and, as planned, each had one Hawaii National Guard
and two Regular Army infantry regiments. Divisional strengths hovered around
11,000 men.30
- [155]
- Provisional Tank Destroyer, Fort Meade, Maryland, 1941
-
- About the same time the Army introduced
two new distinctions into its official lexicon. First, the word "infantry"
was made a part of the official designation of such divisions. In the past
the word infantry was understood, but, because of the expanding variety of
divisions, the Army needed some way to distinguish among them. The adjutant
general specified that unit designations thus include the major combat element
or even the type of unit when the former was not sufficiently descriptive.
Some divisions issued general orders introducing infantry as a part of the
official name, and the adjutant general constituted the 25th specifically
as an infantry division. The term, however, was not officially added to the
tables of organization, documents that technically controlled the names of
units, until 1942.31
-
- The second change concerned the
meaning of the term "Army of the United States." Before 1940 it
had embraced the Regular Army, the National Guard while in the service of
the United States, and the Organized Reserves. With the growth of the force,
the term Army of the United States was broadened to encompass units that
had not been a part of the mobilization plans during the inter-war years.
The 25th Infantry Division was the first division-size unit activated under
the expanded definition.32
-
- In the Pacific area, the defense
of the Philippine Islands presented unique problems. They were too distant
and too scattered for ground defense. Nevertheless, Marshall asked the local
commander, General Douglas MacArthur, whether
- [156]
- Divisions Active on 7
December 1941
-
| Component |
Division |
Date Activated or Inducted Into Federal
Service |
Location |
| RA |
1st Infantry |
* |
Fort Devens,
Mass. |
| RA |
2d Infantry |
* |
Fort Sam
Houston, Tex. |
| RA |
3d Infantry |
* |
Fort Lewis,
Wash. |
| RA |
4th Infantry |
1 June 1940 |
Fort Benning,
Ga. |
| RA |
5th Infantry |
16 October
1939 |
Fort Custer,
Mich. |
| RA |
6th Infantry |
10 October
1939 |
Fort Leonard
Wood, Mo. |
| RA |
7th Infantry |
1 July 1940 |
Fort Ord,
Calif. |
| RA |
8th Infantry |
1 July 1940 |
Fort Jackson,
S.C. |
| RA |
9th Infantry |
1 August
1940 |
Fort Bragg,
N.C. |
| RA |
24th Infantry |
* |
Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii |
| AUS |
25th Infantry |
1 October
1941 |
Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii |
| NG |
26th Infantry |
16 January
1941 |
Camp Edwards,
Mass. |
| NG |
27th Infantry |
15 October
1940 |
Fort McClellan,
Ala. |
| NG |
28th Infantry |
17 February
1941 |
@Indiantown Gap
Military Reservation,
Pa. |
| NG |
29th Infantry |
3 February1941 |
@Fort George
G. Meade, Md. |
| NG |
30th Infantry |
16 September
1940 |
Fort Jackson,
S.C. |
| NG |
31st Infantry |
25 November
1940 |
Camp Blanding,
Fla. |
| NG |
32d Infantry |
15 October
1940 |
Camp Livingston,
La. |
| NG |
33d Infantry |
5 March
1940 |
Camp Forrest,
Tenn. |
| NG |
34th Infantry |
10 February
1941 |
Camp Claiborne,
La. |
| NG |
35th Infantry |
23 December
1940 |
Camp Joseph
T. Robinson, Ark. |
| NG |
36th Infantry |
25 November
1940 |
Camp Bowie,
Tex. |
| NG |
37th Infantry |
16 October
1940 |
Camp Shelby,
Miss. |
| NG |
38th Infantry |
17 January
1941 |
Camp Shelby,
Miss. |
| NG |
40th Infantry |
3 March
1941 |
Fort Lewis,
Wash. |
| NG |
41st Infantry |
16 September
1940 |
Fort Lewis,
Wash. |
| NG |
43d Infantry |
24 February
1941 |
Camp Shelby,
Miss. |
| NG |
44th Infantry |
16 September
1940 |
Fort Dix,
N.J. |
| NG |
45th Infantry |
16 September
1940 |
Camp Berkeley,
Tex. |
| RA |
1st Cavalry |
* |
Fort Bliss,
Tex. |
| RA |
2d Cavalry |
15 April
1941 |
Fort Riley,
Kans. |
| RA |
1st Armored |
15 July
1940 |
Fort Knox,
Ky. |
| RA |
2d Armored |
15 July
1940 |
Fort Benning,
Ga. |
| RA |
3d Armored |
15 April
1941 |
Camp Beauregard,
La. |
| RA |
4th Armored |
15 April
1941 |
Pine Camp,
N.Y. |
| RA |
5th Armored |
1 October
1941 |
Camp Cooke,
Calif. |
-
- NOTES: *Active before 1 September
1939.
- @En route from maneuvers, arrived
at home station 9 December 1941.
- [157]
- General Short reviews the Hawaiian Division, September 1941.
-
- he wanted a Guard division to reinforce
his ground units. MacArthur instead asked for authority to reorganize the
Philippine Division as a triangular unit and to fill its regimental combat
teams with Regular Army personnel. Since the division's formation in 1921,
most of its enlisted men were Philippine Scouts, and he wanted to use them
to help organize new Philippine Army units. Marshall approved the request
and initiated plans to send two infantry regiments, two field artillery battalions,
a headquarters and headquarters battery for the division artillery, a reconnaissance
troop, and a military police platoon to the islands. The Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and other installations in the Pacific on 7 December 1941 aborted
the plan.33
-
- At the time of the attack the Army
had thirty-six divisions, excluding the Philippine Division (Table 12),
and two brigades on active duty. The nation was thus much better prepared
for war in December 1941 than in April 1917.
-
-
- The Japanese attack and the ensuing
American declaration of war on Japan, Germany, and Italy immediately shifted
the focus of Army planning from hemispheric defense to overseas operations.
The first priority was to streamline the square National Guard divisions.
Even before the attack Marshall had asked Twaddle to explore that possibility,
believing that the surplus
- [158]
- units could be used overseas or to
create new organizations as some divisions appeared to lend themselves to
expansion. In November 1941 Twaddle took the 121st and 161st Infantry from
the square 30th and 41st Divisions and reassigned them. At the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor he had replaced the 34th Infantry with the 121st Infantry
in the 8th Division and had slated the 34th and the 161st for deployment to
the Philippines. The day after the attack he attached one infantry regiment
each from the 32d, 33d, and 36th Divisions to the Fourth Army to augment the
forces protecting the West Coast. A week later the 124th Infantry from the
31st Division was assigned to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.34
-
- On 31 December 1941, Marshall asked
Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, GHQ, to investigate bottlenecks
that had developed during attempts to ship units overseas. Six days later
McNair told Marshall that the Guard divisions used to organize task forces
going overseas had "overheads" (noncombat personnel) that approached
the "grotesque" and recommended their immediate reorganization
as triangular divisions.35
Shortly thereafter Marshall directed the staff to prepare plans for reorganizing
thirteen of the eighteen Guard divisions, omitting five because they already
had orders for overseas duty. Ultimately either Marshall or his deputy approved
the conversion to triangular formations of all Guard divisions except one,
the 27th, which was targeted for Hawaii where that command was planning
to receive a square division. Twaddle's staff prepared instructions for
the reorganization, which he sent to the division commanders for comment.
Units that the states had not adequately supported were to be eliminated.36
-
- The reorganization began with the
32d and 37th Divisions on 1 February 1942. All infantry brigades were disbanded
except the 51st, an element of the 26th Division. One infantry brigade headquarters
company from each division was converted and redesignated as the division
reconnaissance troop, except in the 28th and 43d Divisions. In the 43d both
infantry brigade headquarters companies were disbanded, and in the 28th
one brigade headquarters company became the reconnaissance troop and the
other the division's military police company. The headquarters and headquarters
battery of each field artillery brigade became the headquarters and headquarters
battery, division artillery. Other divisional elements were reorganized,
redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded. The reorganization was completed
on 1 September 1942 when the 27th Division, which had arrived in Hawaii
that summer, adopted the triangular configuration.37
-
- In January 1942 the War Department
created Task Force 6814 from surplus National Guard units to help defend
New Caledonia, a French possession in the Pacific. Among these units were
the 51st Infantry Brigade headquarters and the 182d Infantry from the 26th
Division (Massachusetts) and the 132d Infantry from the 33d Division (Illinois).
The units arrived in New Caledonia in March and others quickly followed.
Eventually the Operations Division (OPD), War Department General Staff,38
instructed Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, commanding Task Force 6814, to
organize a division. Because he lacked men and equipment for a
- [159]
- Camp Shelby, Mississippi, home of the 37th and 38th Divisions, 1941
-
- complete table of organization unit,
the staff decided that the division would carry a name rather than a numerical
designation. Titles such as "Necal" and "Bush" surfaced,
but Patch turned to the men assigned to the task force for suggestions. Pfc.
David Fonesca recommended "Americal" from the phrase "American
Troops on New Caledonia," and on 27 May 1942 Patch activated the Americal
Division.39
-
-
- With the attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December the "great laboratory" phase for developing and
testing organizations, about which Marshall wrote in the summer of 1941,
closed, but the War Department still had not developed ideal infantry, cavalry,
armored, and motorized divisions. In 1942 it again revised the divisions
based on experiences gained during the great GHQ maneuvers of the previous
year. As in the past, the reorganizations ranged from minor adjustments
to wholesale changes.
-
- The Chief of Infantry, Maj. Gen.
Courtney H. Hodges, proposed the principal change in the infantry division,
the addition of a cannon company to the infantry regiment to provide it
with artillery that could move forward as rapidly as the troops advanced
on foot. The Chief of Field Artillery, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, opposed
the idea, contending that all cannon should be in artillery units. McNair,
appointed Chief of Army Ground Forces (AGF) in March 1942 and responsible
for organizing and training all ground combat units, also objected. For
five years the division had been in a state of flux in an effort to make
it light
- [160]
- and therefore easier to handle.
Command and control had replaced road space as the basic factor behind divisional
size. Constant changes were destroying those goals. McNair advised Marshall
that the division should have a maximum of 15,000 men with the arms being
fixed accordingly and that it should not be increased in size at the insistence
of arm-conscious chiefs. His view did not prevail. Hodges won the armament
battle, and a cannon company became a part of each infantry regiment.40
-
- The addition of regimental cannon
companies was not the only change in the infantry division. To increase
artillery firepower, the tables provided twelve rather than eight 155-mm.
howitzers and eliminated the 75-mm. guns, which had been assigned to tank
destroyer units, as antitank weapons. To protect the division from hostile
aircraft, the number of .50-caliber machine guns rose from sixty to eighty-four.
Improved reconnaissance capabilities were also added to the infantry division,
with ten light armored cars replacing the sixteen scout cars in the reconnaissance
troop. In the infantry regiments themselves, intelligence and reconnaissance
platoons replaced intelligence platoons.41
-
- The GHQ maneuvers of 1941 had also
revealed a need for more trucks in the division. McNair, however, believed
that the suggested number of trucks was excessive, requiring too much space
on ships when sent overseas. Although the number of trucks was cut at his
insistence, the division still had 315 more vehicles under the 1942 tables
than those of 1940. Finally, the new tables split the division headquarters
and military police company into two separate units, a headquarters company
and a military police platoon. These changes together added about 270 men
to the division (Chart 15).42
-
- Modifications continued even after
publication of the new tables of organization for the infantry division.
Army Ground Forces withdrew the small ordnance maintenance platoon from
the headquarters company of the quartermaster battalion and reorganized
the unit as a separate ordnance light maintenance company to improve motor
repair. After this change, food and gasoline supply functions became the
responsibility of the regiments and separate battalions in the division,
and the quartermaster battalion was reduced to a company to provide trucks
for water supply and emergency rations and to augment the division's ability
to move men and equipment.43
-
- The cavalry division retained its
square configuration after the 1941 maneuvers, but with modifications. The
division lost its antitank troop, the brigades their weapons troops, and
the regiments their machine gun and special weapons troops. These changes
brought no decrease in divisional firepower, but placed most weapons within
the cavalry troops. The number of .50-caliber machine guns was increased
almost threefold. In the reconnaissance squadron, the motorcycle and armored
car troops were eliminated, leaving the squadron with one support troop
and three reconnaissance troops equipped with light tanks. These changes
increased the division from 11,676 to 12,112 officers and enlisted men.44
- [161]
- Infantry Division, 1 August 1942
-
-
- [162]
- The GHQ maneuvers also had a significant
impact on the organization of the armored division. The exercises led to numerous
situations that called for infantry, artillery, and armor to form combat teams,
but the division lacked the resources to organize them. The division as organized
was heavy in armor but too light in both infantry and artillery. The armored
brigade complicated the command channel, while the service elements needed
greater control. To correct these weaknesses, the Armored Force, under the
direction of Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, dramatically reorganized the division
(Chart 16). The armored brigade headquarters and one armored regiment
were eliminated, and the remaining two armored regiments were reorganized
to consist of one light and two medium tank battalions each. Three self-propelled
105-mm. howitzer battalions replaced the field artillery regiment and battalion,
and control of the division artillery passed to an artillery section in the
division headquarters. The infantry regiment was reorganized to consist of
three battalions of three companies each, and trucks replaced armored personnel
carriers. The engineer battalion was authorized four, rather than three, line
companies and a bridge company. Two combat command headquarters were authorized
but were to have no assigned units, allowing the division commander to build
fighting teams as the tactical situation dictated yet still have units in
reserve. Maintenance and supply battalions replaced ordnance and quartermaster
battalions, the maintenance unit taking over all motor repairs in the division.
For better control of the service elements, division trains were added and
placed under the command of a colonel. A service company was also added to
provide transportation and supplies for the rear echelon of the division headquarters
company.45
-
- The 4th Division had tested the
motorized structure along with attached tank, antitank, and antiaircraft
artillery units during the Carolina portion of the GHQ maneuvers in the
fall of 1941. At their termination, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Fred
C. Wallace, reported to General Twaddle that the force was "undesirably
large." Furthermore, deficiencies existed in command and control, traffic
control, administrative support, rifle strength, communications, motor maintenance,
ammunition supply, and engineer capabilities. Also, the attached units-tank,
antitank, and antiaircraft artillery battalions-needed to be permanently
assigned to the division.46
-
- When the War Department published
new tables of organization for the motorized division in the spring of 1942
(Chart 17), it differed considerably from the structure tested by
Wallace. In those tables, the hand of McNair, who almost always opposed
"special" units, was evident. The division closely resembled an
infantry division. Motorized infantry regiments were to have an organization
similar to standard infantry regiments. Gone were armored half-track personnel
carriers, but the regiment was to have enough trucks to move all its men
and equipment. The division headquarters and headquarters company and the
artillery were identical to their counterparts in the infantry division,
and the reconnaissance battalion was the same as that of the cavalry division.
A reconnaissance company was added to the engineer battalion. The ordnance
unit remained company size,
- [163]
- Armored Division, 1 March 1942
-
- 1 Includes chaplains.
-
- [164]
- Motorized Division, 1 August 1942
-
- 1 The table for a motorized division authorized the division
HHC 297 officers and enlisted men while the one for an infantry division
authorized the unit 313. Both divisions, however, used the same tables for
their headquarters and headquarters company
-
- [165]
- and a military police company was
added. As redesigned, the motorized division fielded nearly 17,000 men. Following
McNair's idea that a unit should have only those resources it habitually needed,
the division, as other infantry divisions, lacked organic tank, tank destroyer,
and antiaircraft artillery battalions.47
-
- Before all the tables for the revised
divisions were published in 1942, the War Department alerted the field commands
about the pending reorganization of their units. Divisions were to adopt
the new configurations as soon as equipment, housing, and other facilities
became available. Most divisions adhered to the revised structures by the
end of 1942.48
-
- In the summer of 1942 the Army organized
a fifth type of division. Between World Wars I and II it had experimented
with transporting units in airplanes, and in 1940 the chief of infantry
studied the possibility of transporting all elements of an infantry division
by air. When the Germans successfully used parachutists and gliders in Holland
and Belgium in 1940, the Army reacted by developing parachute units. The
mass employment of parachutes and gliders on Crete in 1941stimulated the
development of glider units. Both types of units were limited to battalion
size because tacticians did not envision airborne operations involving larger
units. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee, commander of the U.S. Army Airborne Command,
which had been established to coordinate all airborne training, visited
British airborne training facilities in England in May 1942 and following
that visit recommended the organization of an airborne division.49
-
- At that time the British airborne
division consisted of a small parachute force capable of seizing a target,
such as an airfield, and a glider force to reinforce the parachutists, leaving
the remainder of the division to join those forces through more conventional
means. Lee reported to McNair that the British had found the movement of
ordinary troops in gliders wasteful because about 30 percent of the troops
suffered from air sickness and became ineffective during air-land operations.
Since the British were organizing airborne divisions, in which glider personnel
were to receive the same training as parachutists, Lee suggested the U.S.
Army also organize them. Heeding Lee's suggestion, McNair outlined to Marshall
a 9,000-man airborne division that could have a varying number of parachute
or glider units in accordance with tactical circumstances.50
-
- Although the General Staff accepted
the proposal, it had several reservations. The division selected for the
airborne role had to have completed basic training but should not be a Regular
Army or National Guard unit, as many traditionalists in those components
wanted nothing to do with such an experimental force. For ease of training,
it also had be stationed where air facilities and flying conditions were
good. The 82d Division met the criteria. It was an Organized Reserve unit,
training under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, and located at Camp Claiborne,
Louisiana. McNair recommended that it be the basis for two airborne divisions
with the existing parachute infantry regiments assigned to them. For the
designation of the second airborne division, the staff selected the 101st,
an Organized Reserve unit that was not in active military service.51
- [166]
- Paratroopers stage a special demonstration for members of Congress,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 1941.
-
- The Third Army and the Airborne
Command executed McNair's recommendation on 15 August 1942. The 82d Infantry
Division (less the 327th Infantry, the 321st and 907th Field Artillery Battalions,
the 82d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, and the Military Police Platoon) plus
the 504th Parachute Infantry became the 82d Airborne Division. Concurrently,
the adjutant general disbanded the 101st Division in the Organized Reserve
and reconstituted it in the Army of the United States, activating it as
the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. The 502d Parachute
Infantry, the 327th Glider Infantry, and the 321st and 907th Glider Field
Artillery Battalions were assigned as divisional elements. Shortly thereafter
each division was authorized an antiaircraft artillery battalion, an ordnance
company, and a military police platoon. The parachute infantry elements
did not immediately join their divisions, but by early October 1942 all
elements of both divisions assembled at Fort Bragg for training.52
-
- On 15 October 1942 the War Department
published the first tables of organization for the airborne division (Chart
18). Reflecting the light nature of the unit, the parachute infantry
regiment had only .30-caliber machine guns and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars
besides the individual weapons, and its field artillery battalions used
75-mm. pack howitzers. In the division artillery, however, a new antitank
weapon was introduced, the 2.36-inch rocket launcher (the "bazooka").
Transportation equipment ranged from bicycles and handcarts to 2-1/2-ton
trucks,
- [167]
- Airborne Division, 15 October 1942
-
-
- [168]
- but the airborne division had only
401 trucks as opposed to over 1,600 in an infantry division. The new division
numbered 8,505 officers and enlisted men, of whom approximately 2,400 were
parachutists.53
-
- The Airborne Command also trained
smaller parachute and glider units and requested the authority to organize
tactical airborne brigades in 1942. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen.
Joseph T. McNarney, turned down the request, believing that only divisions
should conduct operations involving more than a regiment. The Airborne Command,
nevertheless, organized the 1st Parachute Infantry Brigade, a nondeployable
unit, to assist in training parachute units.54
-
-
- After 7 December 1941 the General
Staff also turned its attention to the future size of the Army and the number
of divisions required to wage and win the war. Some officers believed that
as many as 350 divisions might be needed, while others estimated considerably
fewer. Outside considerations included the manpower needs of the other services
and civilian industry as well as the speed at which divisions could be organized,
equipped, and trained given the limited pool of experienced leaders and
industrial limitations. On 24 November 1942, nearly a year after United
States entered the war, the War Department published a troop basis 55
that called for a wartime force structure of 100 divisions-62 infantry,
20 armored, 10 motorized, 6 airborne, and 2 cavalry-to be organized by 1943
within a total Army force of 8,208,000 men.56
-
- Meanwhile, the Army continued to
expand the number of divisions. Working with tentative troop bases early
in 1942, the General Staff decided to bring the Organized Reserve divisions
into active military service. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an
executive order calling units of the Organized Reserves into active military
service for the duration of the war plus six months. The order was a public
relations document more than anything else because most Organized Reserve
personnel were already on active duty.57
-
- Members of General Twaddle's staff
next examined the sequence for inducting infantry divisions. They considered
such factors as the number of World War I battle honors earned by units;
the location and availability of training sites, particularly in the corps
areas where divisions were located; and the ability of the Army to furnish
divisional cadres. Based on these considerations, the staff established
a tentative order, beginning with the 77th Division, which had the most
combat service in World War I, and ending with the 103d, which had not been
organized during World War I.58
-
- Meanwhile, corps area commanders
prepared the Organized Reserve units for induction early in 1942 by placing
the infantry divisions under the 1940 tables of organization. Infantry and
field artillery brigades were eliminated, with the headquarters and headquarters
companies of the infantry brigades consolidated to form divisional reconnaissance
troops. As in the National Guard divisions, the
- [169]
- headquarters and headquarters batteries
of the field artillery brigades became the headquarters and headquarters
batteries of the division artillery. Other units within the division were
reduced, redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded to fit the triangular configuration.
The six Organized Reserve cavalry divisions were dropped from the tentative
troop program and disbanded.59
-
- Induction of the infantry divisions
began on 25 March 1942, and by 31 December, twenty-six of the twenty-seven
divisions were on active duty (Table 13). The 97th Infantry Division
was not inducted into active military service until February 1943 because
personnel were not available for its reorganization. Since none of these
divisions had reserve cadre or equipment, the Army Ground Forces had to
rebuild them totally. That process started when the War Department assigned
a commander and selected a parent unit to provide a cadre. Approximately
thirty-seven days before reorganization of the division, the commander and
his staff reported to the unit's station. Officers and enlisted cadre, about
1,400 men from the parent unit, followed some seven days later, and shortly
thereafter the remaining 500 officers arrived. Within five days after the
arrival of all officers and cadre, a stream of about 13,500 recruits began
to report. The division was considered reorganized and active fifteen days
after the first fillers reached the division. Fifty-two weeks of training
followed, which included seventeen weeks of basic and individual training.
The divisions, after their initial fill, were to rely on replacement centers
for personnel.60
-
- Along with the reorganization of
the Organized Reserve units, the War Department expanded the number of divisions
in the Army of the United States. Reversing a post-World War I policy, the
staff planned to activate some all-black divisions to accommodate the large
number of black draftees. On 15 May 1942 Army Ground Forces organized the
93d Infantry Division at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Although it had the same
number as the provisional Negro unit of World War I, it had no relationship
or lineal tie with the old 93d. Following its activation, the Army Staff
chartered at least three more all-black infantry divisions the 92d, 105th,
and 107th. The 92d Division, the all-black unit of World War I, was to be
reconstituted, but the other two were to be new units. Under the plan, the
93d Infantry Division was to furnish the cadre for the 92d, the 92d for
the 105th, and the 105th for the 107th. Army Ground Forces organized the
92d on 15 October 1942, but a shortage of personnel for worldwide service
units prevented the formation of the others. Eventually the 105th and 107th
Divisions were dropped from the activation list.61
-
- To meet the number of divisions
in the troop basis, the Armored Force activated nine more armored divisions
in 1942, the 6th through the 14th. In organizing them, it followed the same
cadre system as the Army Ground Forces used for infantry divisions.62
-
- With the increased number of armored
divisions, Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the G-3 on the General Staff, discerned
a way to eliminate unwanted cavalry divisions. He suggested to Army Ground
Forces that it consider converting the two
- [170]
- Divisions Activated or
Ordered Into Active Military Service in 19421
-
| Component |
Division |
Date |
Location |
| AUS |
6th Armored |
15 February |
Fort Knox, Ky. |
| AUS |
7th Armored |
1 March |
Camp Polk, La. |
| OR |
77th Infantry |
25 March |
Fort Jackson, S.C. |
| OR |
82d Airborne |
25 March |
Camp Claiborne, La. |
| OR |
90th Infantry |
25 March |
Camp Berkeley, Tex. |
| AUS |
8th Armored |
1 April |
Fort Knox, Ky. |
| OR |
85th Infantry |
15 May |
Camp Shelby, Miss. |
| AUS |
93d Infantry |
15 May |
Fort Huachuca, Ariz. |
| AUS |
Americal |
27 May |
New Caledonia |
| OR |
76th Infantry |
15 June |
Fort George G. Meade,
Md. |
| OR |
79th Infantry |
15 June |
Camp Pickett, Va. |
| OR |
81st Infantry |
15 June |
Camp Rucker, Ala. |
| AUS |
9th Armored |
15 July |
Fort Riley, Kans. |
| AUS |
10th Armored |
15 July |
Fort Benning, Ga. |
| OR |
80th Infantry |
15 July Camp |
Forrest, Tenn. |
| OR |
88th Infantry |
15 July |
Camp Gruber, Okla. |
| OR |
89th Infantry |
15 July |
Camp Carson, Colo. |
| OR |
95th Infantry |
15 July |
Camp Swift, Tex. |
| AUS |
11th Armored |
15 August |
Camp Polk, La. |
| OR |
78th Infantry |
15 August |
Camp Butner, N.C. |
| OR |
83d Infantry |
15 August |
Camp Atterbury, Ind. |
| OR |
91st Infantry |
15 August |
Camp White, Oreg. |
| OR |
96th Infantry |
15 August |
Camp Adair, Oreg. |
| AUS |
101stAirborne |
15 August |
Camp Claiborne, La. |
| AUS |
12th Armored |
15 September |
Camp Campbell, Ky. |
| OR |
94th Infantry |
15 September |
Fort Custer, Mich. |
| OR |
98th Infantry |
15 September |
Camp Breckinridge, Tenn. |
| OR |
102d Infantry |
15 September |
Camp Maxey, Tex. |
| OR |
104th Infantry |
15 September |
Camp Adair, Oreg. |
| AUS |
13th Armored |
15 October |
Camp Beale, Calif. |
| OR |
84th Infantry |
15 October |
Camp Howze, Tex. |
| AUS |
92d Infantry |
15 October |
Fort McClellan, Ala. |
| AUS |
14th Armored |
15 November |
Camp Chaffee, Ariz. |
| OR |
99th Infantry |
15 November |
Camp Van Dorn, Miss. |
| OR |
100th Infantry |
15 November |
Fort Jackson, S.C. |
| OR |
103d Infantry |
15 November |
Camp Claiborne, La. |
| OR |
86th Infantry |
15 December |
Camp Howze, Tex. |
| OR |
87th Infantry |
15 December |
Camp McCain, Miss. |
-
- 1 Table in chronological order.
- [171]
- Regular Army horse divisions to mechanized
cavalry because there was no foreseeable role for horse-mounted units. Maj.
Gen. Mark W Clark, Chief of Staff of Army Ground Forces, disagreed, as did
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. The latter opposed the conversion because
the war was worldwide, and he believed that horse cavalry could be useful
in many places, particularly in areas where oil was scarce, a reference to
the other types of divisions that required large quantities of petroleum products.
He also opposed the conversion because of the time required to train new horse
cavalry units. Nevertheless, because of a shortage of men in the summer of
1942, the 2d Cavalry Division was inactivated to permit organization of the
9th Armored Division. White cavalrymen were assigned to the 9th, and the all-black
4th Cavalry Brigade became a nondivisional unit. Later, when preparing troops
for operations in the North African theater, the engineer and reconnaissance
squadrons and the 105-mm. howitzer battalion were withdrawn from the 1st Cavalry
Division and sent to North Africa.63
-
- With the activation of additional
armored divisions, General Twaddle decided to convert some infantry divisions
to motorized divisions. He selected the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions for
reorganization, which was accomplished by August 1942. The staff planned
to form three more such divisions that year, but Army Ground Forces reorganized
only the 90th because of shortages in personnel and equipment. On 9 April
1942 the adjutant general officially redesignated the 6th, 7th, and 8th
Divisions as motorized. The 4th Division issued general orders adopting
the "motorized" designation under an Army Ground Forces directive.64
-
- From the fall of 1939 to the end
of 1942 divisional designs fluctuated as the nation prepared for war. The
War Department revised infantry and cavalry divisions, developed and revised
armored and motorized divisions, and created airborne divisions. During
this period of organizational upheaval, the Army retained the basic idea
of three regimental combat teams for the infantry division and adopted the
same concept for the motorized and airborne divisions. The armored division
was held to two fighting teams, as was the horse cavalry division. Many
officers, however, wanted to eliminate the latter because they saw no role
for the horse on the modern battlefield. The trend within all types of divisions
was to increase firepower and standardize divisional elements so that they
could be interchanged. Organizational questions remained, however, such
as the nature and location of antitank weapons or the amount of organic
transportation in any tactical unit. The period proved fruitful, for the
Army organized the divisions needed to pursue the war. By 31 December 1942
the Army had fielded 1 cavalry, 2 airborne, 5 motorized, 14 armored, and
51 infantry divisions, for a total of 73 active combat divisions.
- [172]
Endnotes
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