- Chapter VIII:
The Road Programs
The extensive highway system in the Republic of Vietnam was
constructed mainly during the past five decades. Before 1954,
approximately 20,000 kilometers of road existed, of which about
6,000 kilometers were national or interprovincial and 14,000
kilometers were rural or secondary roads. By the time of the
cease-fire in 1954, most of the country's highway network had been
destroyed, and long segments of the highway system had become
impassable to motorized traffic. The highways that remained were
generally inadequate for military usage because of either faulty
design or poor surfacing. Most bridges were destroyed. The national
highway system, particularly National Route 1, sustained the most
damage. Six hundred and fifty kilometers of Route 1 from Phan Thiet
to Hue were largely impassable. To reopen the road approximately 240
bridges with a total length of 11,295 meters had to be
reconstructed, endless culverts installed, and thousands of cubic
meters of fill had to be replaced where erosion had taken its toll.
In the government of Vietnam, the Director General of Highways is
responsible for administration of the design, construction, and
maintenance of the national and interprovincial routes, while the
provincial roads and city streets are administered by local
governments. However, in 1971, the director was assigned the
maintenance responsibility for rural roads, while reconstruction of
rural roads remained a provincial function.
Efforts of the Director General to repair and maintain the highway
system were halted by the enemy. Even if the government had been
successful, it is doubtful that a satisfactory level of highway
maintenance could have been attained; the increased weight and
volume of heavy military vehicles would have quickly negated the
Vietnamese effort. In 1966 Army engineer troops began to reopen
highways and rebuild bridges to support tactical and logistic
traffic. The engineer force was probably adequate, but its effort
was limited by other priority missions.
In early 1967 the idea of a formal highway restoration program,
initially utilizing troops and later civilian contractors, was
conceived as the result of a combined effort on the part of the
government of
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Vietnam, the United States Agency for International Development,
and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The combined Central
Highways and Waterways Coordination Committee (CENCOM) was formed to
establish priorities of restoration, to develop standards of
construction, and to fund actual construction. CENCOM was comprised
of representatives from the Vietnamese General Staff, the Agency for
International Development, the Directorate of Highways, the Military
Assistance Command, and the Marine Director of Public Works. The
chairman was the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese joint General
Staff. The program envisioned the eventual restoration and upgrading
of approximately 4,075 kilometers of highway, which the committee
considered essential in support of military operations, to stimulate
economic development, and to accelerate the pacification program by
opening up rural areas. The information of the combined committee
permitted the development of a national restoration program in
consonance with military campaign plans.
In April 1968 the Agency for International Development published a
formal announcement of the transfer of the highway mission, with the
exception of secondary road projects, to the MACV Director of
Construction. Included in the transfer were the Nui Sap Quarry
operation, the National Highway Training School, the Suoi Lo
Maintenance and Repair Parts Activity, and nineteen USAID engineers.
The Director of Construction then organized a Lines of
Communications Division to advise the Vietnamese Director General of
Highways and to co-ordinate the massive contractor and troop effort
involved in the highway restoration program. The Lines of
Communications Division organized five district highway advisory
detachments to correspond with the highway directorate's field
organization. The detachments' primary mission was to advise the
Vietnamese District Engineer and his staff.
The advisory mission was established as a three-phase operation.
Phase I was to effect transition of the ongoing organization from
USAID control to MACV. Phase II was to substantially increase the
advisory effort available to the Vietnamese District Engineer. Phase
III would be the transferral of the responsibility back to the
Agency for International Development in 1971. The objective of the
highway restoration program was to upgrade designated highways over
a four-year period to adopted standards and in accordance with
established priorities.
Construction standards followed the criteria established by the
American Association of State Highway officials. The standards which
were identified by letters A through F had a design life for a Class
A road of twenty years down to ten years for Classes C or D.
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Pavement structure design procedures were standardized using
estimated traffic factors to approximate a twenty-year design life.
Each class of highway had specific geometrics. Cross sections of
each class are shown in Chart 7. The Class F highway was an
innovation introduced by MACV's Director of Construction. This class
made maximum use of the existing French-constructed highway and
based its
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alignment on the existing embankment. Essentially this class
highway called for laying a rock or asphalt stabilized base over the
existing highway and a widening of the traveled way, or actual road
less shoulders, to seven meters. The entire surface would then be
paved with an asphaltic concrete. Design life would not be
specified. The Class F highway would be constructed extensively in
the delta, thus minimizing embankment and realignment requirements
and speeding up the highway restoration program there.
Sixteen engineer battalions undertook the U.S. Army's portion of
the highway restoration program. The work force was composed largely
of construction battalions; however, an average of three combat
battalions augmented with equipment companies were engaged in the
program at any given time. Although restoration of the roads was
their main task, construction units frequently received orders to
support combat units or were given other priority missions. Unit
commanders tried to construct all highways in accordance with
established priorities, but on many occasions combat engineers
called on them for help and missions were shifted.
To carry out the program, units had to establish base camps along
the routes to be upgraded. This requirement made it necessary to
devote a part of the available manpower to base camp and industrial
site construction. Quarries and asphalt plants had to be
established, construction routes and security had to be maintained,
and that drew off more manpower.
To maintain construction schedules, a vast amount of material had
to be procured and transported to the construction sites. Initially
the demand on procurement and transport was light, since
construction was centered near large U.S. logistics bases. But as
demands increased and construction forces moved farther away from
the larger bases, a tremendous burden was placed on the entire
supply system. To reduce the number of times material was handled,
the Engineers attempted to ship directly from supply points to
users. Stocks of cement, asphalt, and culvert material began to
dwindle rapidly. As material shortages threatened delay,
logisticians pulled out all the stops and attempted to meet demands
any way possible. Critically needed items were improvised or
borrowed from other services.
In 1966 there was an acute shortage of rock in III and IV Corps
areas. At that time there were only two sources for crushed rock-a
contractor-operated quarry near Saigon University and the quarries
thirty miles away at Vung Tau. Because Vung Tau had no connecting
roads, the rock produced there was used there with only small
quantities being shipped by barge to the Long Binh area. The need
for rock was so urgent that a special "buy" of rock was
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made from a Korean contractor who shipped rock all the way from
quarries in Korea.
When the first shipment of rock arrived in Saigon, headaches
really began. Customs, harbor, and lighterage problems combined to
produce lengthy delays and creeping costs. A scheme was finally
devised whereby the rock was loaded into "smaller craft"
at Saigon for the trip to Thu Duc, to be unloaded there by heavy
equipment into trucks for the short haul to Long Binh. A crane with
a two cubic-yard clamshell, or heavy steel scoop, was positioned at
Thu Duc to unload the rock. There was considerable consternation as
the small craft loaded with rock began arriving at Thu Duc. The
small craft were hundreds of sampans-the largest nearing twenty feet
stem to stern and loaded to within six inches of freeboard. The
weight and size of the clamshell would have sunk them easily.
Reluctantly, conveyors and hand labor were used to bring the rocks
ashore. Stockpiles from which the clamshell could operate slowly
grew on the beach. Since this method of supplying rock was rather
nightmarish, the first shipload was also the last. The contract was
terminated.
The entire highway restoration program was originally scheduled
for completion by 1974. But because of the tactical and economic
importance of the program, General Westmoreland directed the Army to
have the majority of the roadwork finished by 1971. The principal
obstacle was the shortage of construction equipment. The solution
was for the Army to purchase high-production commercial equipment to
augment the standard items used by engineer units. In mid-1968 the
U.S. Army in Vietnam, in conjunction with the Army Engineer
Construction Agency and the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades, studied
the equipment problem from all angles. The study resulted in a
recommended list of commercial construction equipment that would be
needed to meet the target completion date of December 1971. In
determining the type of equipment required, specialists developed
seven general categories and assigned each category a rating
reflecting its importance to the success of the project.
In mid-1968 the rock production capabilities of both engineer
brigades received a thorough analysis including actual and
anticipated assets. These capabilities were then compared with all
other rock requirements. From this study it became apparent that
additional rock-crushers would be required to complete the road
program by the specified time. Eight 250-tons-per-hour (TPH),
readily portable, crushing plants were selected and included in the
equipment purchase order. High-volume crushers were considered the
key to the success of the project. As these crushers reached
Vietnam,
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ROCK-CRUSHING OPERATION, essential to virtually all phases of
construction.
they replaced the lower capacity 75-TPH plants. The, newer 250TPH
plant was as portable as the 75-TPH plant but easier to operate and
maintain, produced at least three times as much rock, and required
fewer operators. Although the larger plant was designed with
emphasis on high-volume base rock production, the all-electric plant
had the capability of producing well-graded aggregates. The rapid
rate of road improvement in 1969 was possible only because six
225-TPH rock-crushers had arrived from CONUS depot stocks. These
crushers played a major part in the program until the Military
Construction 250-TPH crushers arrived. These crushers required only
one operator whereas the 75-TPH needed three. As the new crushers
arrived in the theater, many of the 75-TPH units which were not
economically repairable were turned in. The operators previously
required for the 75-TPH crushers were then available for other
equipment.
The scarcity of rock-drilling equipment also hindered progress.
Engineer units had far too few drills capable of keeping up with the
increased demand for rock. Reinforcements in drilling equipment were
necessary to feed the eight 250-TPH crushers and the six 225-TPH
crushers. To meet the demand, thirty-six track drills and
600-cubic-foot-per-minute air compressors were added to the
equipment purchase list.
Requirements for hauling rock within the quarries were met by
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ROCK DRILL operating on quarry face.
purchasing one hundred 15-cubic-yard Euclid dump trucks in 1967.
But to load the Euclids, feed the crushers, and stockpile aggregate,
twenty-nine 6-cubic-yard tractor shovels were needed. Far simpler to
operate and faster and easier to maintain, each of these units could
replace two 40-ton shovels. Furthermore, an experienced heavy equipment
operator could become reasonably proficient on the
machine in a matter of several days, whereas many months were
required for him to become equally proficient on a crane shovel.
To augment existing trucks, 226 twelve-cubic-yard, hydraulically
operated, dump trucks were selected for purchase. Under comparable
conditions, these trucks have twice the capacity of the military
5-ton dump truck and were requested specifically to haul large
quantities of base rock and asphaltic concrete on medium to long
hauls over improved roads.
The earth compaction equipment used by engineer units was not in
scale with the projected construction rate of 774 kilometers a year.
Compactors capable of doing more work in less time were urgently
needed to augment the equipment in the construction battalions. The
purchase of sixty commercial heavy-duty compactors certainly
increased the capabilities of our engineer units.
The concept of the road program also included the rapid placing of
pavement. In addition to strengthening and protecting the road-bed, paving would make mine emplacement more difficult for the
enemy. To supplement existing military equipment and to speed up the
over-all paving rate, six asphalt pavers and fourteen asphalt
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SHEEPSFOOT ROLLER compacting a runway extension at Bu Dop
airstrip.
distributors were ordered. To redirect and channel the runoff
which results from the torrential monsoon rains, seven asphalt curb
extruders were included in the order. These were put to use
primarily in the Central Highlands, but were also used to
manufacture curb and gutter systems for villages and towns in other
areas.
To keep culvert installation ahead of over-all road building, and
at the same time assure quality construction, hand compactors were
requested to speed up culvert backfilling and compaction operations.
Twelve backhoes were also added to the equipment list to aid in the
placement of culverts and excavation in restricted areas. Thousands
of man-hours required for hand excavation of culverts and trenches
and many hours of equipment time on crane mounted shovels or
clamshells were saved by the backhoes.
The addition of commercial cement mixers had been requested to
accelerate the construction of concrete abutments, deck slabs, and
approach slabs for bridges along the roads. This equipment was
designed to minimize the labor force needed for concrete work. There
were approximately 675 new bridges with an average span length of
forty feet to be constructed to satisfy immediate tactical
requirements. The type of bridge planned required approximately
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165 cubic yards of concrete per bridge. The small 16S cement
mixers were being replaced by central batch plants and transit
mixers which greatly reduced the stockpiling requirements and the
man-hours needed to produce the concrete required for each bridge.
By carrying a dry mix in the transit mixers, more than one bridge
could be worked on at one time. In the long run, both production and
maintenance man-hours were significantly reduced.
In the Mekong Delta all rock and other conventional material for
road and other construction had to be imported. Crushed rock
produced at quarries in the upper regions of the country moved by
barge into the delta for the road construction program. Barge
offloading facilities were constructed, and an Army Engineer
Hydrographic Survey team charted many of the canals of the delta to
develop water transportation routes. To reduce cost the use of a
lime-cement stabilized base or sub-base in lieu of a conventional
base was planned for all delta road construction. Elsewhere in
Vietnam the use of stabilization techniques was planned to reduce
requirements in areas where little rock was available. The
procurement of sophisticated stabilization equipment capable of
mixing stabilizing agents, such as cement, calcium chloride, and
emulsified asphalt with aggregate, was considered vital for project
completion. A total of nine 300-TPH stabilization plants and three
self-propelled stabilization machines were requested. These plants
represented a revolutionary change in theater construction methods.
While the addition of commercial construction equipment increased
production, the redeployment of engineer battalions, which began in
September 1970, reduced U.S. troop strengths below that needed to
meet the December 1971 completion date. To partially offset the
troops losses, some engineer battalions were augmented with local
labor. Initially the local laborers were used for unskilled or
semiskilled duties. However, by the end of 1970, the Vung Tau quarry
was predominantly staffed with Vietnamese labor; several dump truck
platoons employed Vietnamese drivers; and carpenter prefab and
bridge deck prefab yards were almost entirely Vietnamese operated.
In early 1971 an all-Vietnamese asphalt concrete paving train was
being organized.
The secondary road program, as it neared completion, was a
significant incentive to the development of Vietnam, particularly in
the areas of agriculture, economy, and mobility. This diversified
highly. productive program permitted U.S. and Vietnamese engineers
to work side by side and eventually developed a proficiency in
Vietnamese units for both construction and maintenance of the road
system.
The stimulus to agriculture was particularly pronounced in
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previously evacuated areas. Construction of a secondary road
presupposed a relatively secure area, which was ripe for
resettlement. While the road was not necessary for the movement of
relocated people and their few personal belongings, it was crucial
to the establishment of a market for their crops. A difference of a
few miles and a few hundred feet in elevation often resulted in
differing climate and soil conditions which dictate the primary
production of tea and manioc, rather than rice; hence the need for
easily accessible markets in other than the settlers' own village.
The opening or reconstruction of secondary and rural roads was
recognized by General Westmoreland and pacification officials as
critical to the pacification and economic growth of Vietnam. The
tremendous advances in pacification in the delta, for example, were
a direct result of the road building program.
The railway system in Vietnam was originally constructed by the
French between 1902 and 1936. Immediately after the Geneva Agreement
in 1954, the Republic of Vietnam mobilized its financial, technical,
and labor resources under the newly formed semiautonomous railway
agency, the Vietnam Railway System, and began the reconstruction of
its road between Saigon and Dong Ha near the 17th parallel. By
August 1959 the reconstruction of the main line and branch lines was
completed, except for the Loc Ninh branch. The United States
government through the embassy's Operating
SCRAPERS PREPARE A RIGHT OF WAY before crushed rock is dumped.
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Mission assigned a railway adviser to Vietnam in 1957 at the
request of the Vietnamese government.
From 1960 to 1964 the Vietnamese Railway System operated scheduled
freight and passenger trains on the entire line, transporting
approximately half a million tons of cargo and four million
passengers annually. In 1962 the U.S. military assigned security
advisers to the Vietnamese Military Rail Security Forces. During
this period the system continued to upgrade its entire organization
by modernizing shop facilities, mechanizing track maintenance,
changing motive power from steam to diesel-electric, and replacing
rolling stock with modern equipment. The United States assisted with
commodity grants amounting to $12 million and a development loan of
$7.8 million. The Australian government furnished ten modern
passenger cars valued at U.S. $900,000.
In November 1964, typhoons Joan and Iris, the worst to strike
Vietnam in sixty-five years, did considerable damage to the railway
system and, with unabated Viet Cong sabotage, the railway was
severed in many places with operations restricted to five separated
segments.
In 1966 the U.S. government through the Agency for International
Development pledged further support in commodities provided that the
Vietnamese took the initiative to secure and reopen the rail system.
This action was sanctioned by the U.S. military, which acquired and
brought into the country two hundred rail cars and ten switching
locomotives to supplement the fleet of Vietnamese rolling stock for
the handling of military cargo.
This second reconstruction effort began in December 1966 and
progressed in those areas where security was re-established. During
this second reconstruction period the U.S. government assisted with
U.S. $11 million in commodity grants. The system reopened 340
kilometers of main line in areas where security was restored. The
government subsidized the road for this reconstruction in the amount
of Vietnamese $211 million, in addition to the subsidy for
operations or sabotage.
The railway contributed significantly to the war effort, the
pacification program, and the economic growth of South Vietnam. For
instance, a considerable amount of the rock aggregate used in the
construction of the Tuy Hoa and Phu Cat airfields, as well as Route
1 and other highways, was transported by rail. As of early 1971 the
railroad was in operation in three separate areas with approximately
60 percent, or 710 kilometers, of the 1,240 kilometers of main line
and branch line track in use. The longest run, approximately 400
kilometers, from Song Long Song to Phu Cat handled a number of rock
trains daily for highway construction work. Military
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VIETNAMESE ENGINEERS drive piles for a bridge span near Qua
Giang with new American equipment.
cargo from Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay still moves by rail to Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang, and Phan Rang. The
system also transports approximately 11,000 passengers weekly over this line. Another segment of 103 kilometers from Hue to Da
Nang,
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which was reopened in January 1969, has averaged approximately
2,000 tons of cargo and 1,500 passengers a week. The remaining 80
kilometers from Saigon to Xuan Loc, serving the Thu Duc industrial
area and the Long Binh and Newport military complex play an
important role in transporting civilian and military cargo Operation
of this line has eliminated a large number of truck run; from the
congested streets of Saigon and the Bien Hoa Highway Three
round-trip passenger trains operate daily over this section of the
road, transporting an average of 40,000 commuters a week.
The economics of moving cargo by rail, plus the advantage of
releasing trucks for work in the provinces, made rail traffic
attractive to the Vietnamese Army and U.S. military.
The entire road program, both the rail and vehicular systems; has
undergone a tremendous change as has Vietnam. The bridge
reconstruction portion of the road program involved the building of
approximately five hundred bridges totaling over 30,000 meters,
During mid-1968, Army engineers were constructing highways to MACV
standards at an equivalent rate of 285 kilometers per year. At the
same time, they were building bases and supporting combat
operations-including land clearing, tactical roads, tactical
airfields, landing zones, and fire bases. Road construction has
continually been paced by crushed rock production and rock-hauling
capability. The Army relied on the contractor's crushers for 38
percent of the 180,000 cubic yards of rock required monthly to
maintain a construction rate of 285 kilometers per year in 1968.
Before a $49 million fund cut was imposed by the Department of
Defense, in mid-1970 goals were assigned for the highway restoration
program.
| Vietnamese Army responsibility |
165 km. |
| Contractor responsibility |
988 km. |
| U.S. Army troop responsibility |
2,520 km. |
| U.S. Navy responsibility |
430 km. |
| Total |
4,103 km. |
As of 17 October 1970, the revised highway restoration program was
63 percent complete with 2,297 kilometers of pavement completed out
of a total of 3,660 kilometers. As a result of the fund cuts and
program review, 442 kilometers of the 4,103 kilometers CENCOM
Program were deferred. The Vietnamese engineers accepted
responsibility for improving 353 additional kilometers in the
program. The revised program totals and goals were as follows:
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|
Revised Program |
Pavement Completed |
Percent Completed |
| Vietnamese Army responsibility |
518 km. |
10 km. |
2 |
| Contractor responsibility |
902 km. |
715 km. |
79 |
| U.S. Army troop responsibility |
1,853 km. |
1,195 km. |
64 |
| U.S. Navy responsibility |
387 km. |
387 km. |
100 |
| Total |
3,660 km. |
|
|
As primary and secondary roads were built or improved, displaced
refugees settled along these roads, constructed new homes, and
tilled the land. Commercial traffic traveled back and forth with
decreasing fear as the area became generally pacified. Land clearing
to remove vegetation along roads and in other selected areas, thus
denying the enemy ambush sites and sanctuaries for resupply, also
accomplished what repeated infantry operations could not. And as the
rail service was improved and security provided, the demand
increased. During 1970 cargo transported by rail climbed 15 percent
over 1969 (from 530,000 to 610,000 metric tons). The net
ton-kilometer evaluation increased 100 percent from 1969 to 1970
(from 24 million to 48 million net ton-kilometers). The number of
passengers transported by rail increased 40 percent from 1969 to
1970 (from 1.75 million to 2.4 million). The net results of the
combined program have not yet proved their greatest worth, but are
well along the way. I consider the road development program the
single most effective and important development program undertaken
by American effort in Vietnam.
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page created 15 December 2001
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