Chapter XIV: Conclusions

AR-600-3, The Women's Army Corps-General Provisions, was revised for the last time in June 1976. As a result of the changes in the mission, composition, and administration of the WAC, AR-600-3 was cut down to two pages. AR-600-3 was rescinded on 1 May 1979 by DA Pamphlet 310-1, 1 May 1979, p. 61.

Between 1942 and 1972, the Corps-WAAC and WAC-made steady progress. During World War II, 140,000 women joined the Corps. Once in service, they adjusted easily to Army life and proved themselves well disciplined, effective workers. After V-J Day, most-never thinking the WAC would become permanent-returned to civilian life. By 1948, Corps strength had fallen to 4,699 enlisted women, including 1,453 women serving with Air Force. That year a worsening world situation and strong urging from General Eisenhower and Colonel Hallaren persuaded a reluctant Congress to admit women into the Regular Army and Organized Reserve. But Congress ensured that the women would not engage in combat duties, be promoted above lieutenant colonel, or command men. During the Korean War, WAC strength climbed to 12,000 officers and enlisted women, but, thereafter, declined to 9,000. The Vietnam War during the 1960s again increased the Corps to 12,000. Despite these numbers, the Army, obtaining the bulk of its manpower through the draft, had relatively few women. WACs made up less than 2 percent of overall Regular Army strength. For its part, the WAC leadership, fearing the possibility of lower enlistment standards, did not press for many more. The great change came after Vietnam. WAC strength did not follow the expected falling-off pattern of previous wars; instead, loss of the draft inspired the Army to initiate an expansion campaign that increased the WAC to 53,000 by the end of 1978 and gave no hint of slowing. The reasons for the expansion were clear: men were slow to volunteer; women did not hesitate; women cost less than men to train and maintain. 1

Through the years the WAC successfully achieved its primary mission, which was to provide the Army with a small group of well-trained women who could serve during mobilization as a cadre to train thousands more women volunteers. The mobilization mission often obscured the day-to-day missions of filling personnel requisitions and providing satis-

factory careers for the women. Because the Army did everything by branch, the WAC became a special branch-by regulation, not law-so that it could fit into the Army system and perform its missions. Unlike the other branches, however, the Corps did not manage a particular Army function. Instead, it provided personnel to the other branches. But no matter what the branch or MOS, the WAC Career Management Branch held assignment jurisdiction over every WAC officer, except the director, and commanders of WAC detachments held command jurisdiction over the enlisted women. Through the WAC Career Management Branch and through her influence on Army policy regarding WAC matters, the director controlled the missions and women of the Corps until 1974. The WAC Career Management Branch was then discontinued and the officers reassigned to other branches. By 1975, most WAC detachments had been absorbed by male units. The primary WAC mission was now the expansion campaign, guided by a general officer steering committee. Women now filled interchangeable spaces, and other branches and divisions in the Military Personnel Center controlled the careers of the enlisted women and officers.

From the beginning, the Corps' insistence upon high entry and retention standards kept it one of the elite groups of the Army. To perform its missions and maintain a good reputation, the Corps accepted only women who were well educated as well as being physically and mentally fit and who had high moral standards. These entry and retention qualifications, the career obstacles and assignment restrictions, and the continuing battle for acceptance by the men had a bonding effect on the women. Mandatory discharge of pregnant women and mothers decreased costs for the Army and strengthened the career image of the Corps. Women with behavioral problems were discharged, and the Corps seldom received unfavorable publicity. Whether they remained in the Corps for one tour or for a career, the women knew the constraints and difficulties of working in a man's world, but they found satisfaction in their work, travel, and camaraderie. They became dedicated to the Corps and to the Army.

After the expansion began, the standards of enlistment and retention for women were reduced one by one until, by 1979, they matched those of male volunteers in every respect. The quality of the women in the Army did not, however, fall to any perceptible degree-unemployment rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the Army could set relatively high enlistment qualifications for both men and women.2

Progress in training and wider utilization of women was slow between 1942 and 1972, but changes did occur. By the end of World War II, enlisted women who had initially been assigned only as clerks, cooks, drivers, and telephone operators could serve in almost every MOS, provided that it did not involve combat. This situation changed somewhat after the Corps was accepted into the Regular Army in 1948. Thereafter, few women were trained and assigned in maintenance and repair MOSs associated with heavy labor, dirty work, or safety-toe shoes. The Corps wanted to project a ladylike, junior executive image for women working in administration, medical care, and communications. In the 1960s the need to provide more diversified jobs led to the opening of repair, maintenance, and technical MOSs, but women still worked in clean environments using machines such as data processors, missile master computers, flight operations devices, office machines, and communications equipment. After 1972, when all but 48 MOSS opened to women, they were again, as at the end of World War II, trained and assigned in all MOSs, clean or dirty, except the combat MOSS.

The officers initially worked only with WAC troops or recruiting, but by the end of World War II they, like enlisted women, performed duty in all but the combat MOSs. After 1948, their assignments were limited primarily to administrative duties, but after the Korean War, they received more military training and could specialize in a number of career fields. After the WAC Career Management Branch was discontinued in 1974 and after the combat exclusion policy was established in 1977, WAC officers could be assigned to any branch except Infantry and Cannon Field Artillery and in any MOS for which they could qualify. For WAC officers, too, utilization had come full circle.

Progress was apparent in WAC uniforms and housing and in the removal of career obstacles. Women received a stylish taupe-colored uniform ensemble in 1951 to replace the olive drab World War II uniforms. Unfortunately, the new uniform was less comfortable than the old one. Hence, after men were authorized a green uniform in the late 1950s, women pushed for and in 1961 received a similar, modern, Army-green uniform of their own. In 1954, the Corps obtained a permanent training center and "home" at Fort McClellan, and women in the field detachments gradually moved into rehabilitated or newly constructed buildings.

Between 1948 and 1972, the WAC directors succeeded in persuading Congress to give military women credit for WAAC and continued service, to allow them promotions above the grade of lieutenant colonel, and to authorize them the same monetary allowances for dependents that men received. After 1972, Congress passed laws that authorized women to enlist at age seventeen with their parents' consent; to serve an obligatory term of six years on active duty or in a reserve component as men did; and, beginning in 1976, to enter the U.S. Military Academy. A change in Army regulations in 1973 permitted women to command men except in

combat units. These and other policy changes over the years eliminated most of the career obstacles and assignment restrictions under which the WACs had served.

The women who directed the WAC were outstanding leaders, role models, and advisers on women's matters. Perhaps the only thing the directors had in common was their individuality. They came from different backgrounds, had varying primary interests, and displayed a diversity of personal skills. Most took a conservative approach in advancing the goals of the Corps because such an approach matched the tenor of traditional Army leadership. But whether conservative or reform minded, none hesitated to oppose Army policies they believed would jeopardize the interests of the Corps.

Because the Corps was comparatively small and its problems few, the chief of staff and the DCSPER usually gave the director of the WAC the final decision on WAC policies and procedures. Nonetheless, the directors did not always get their own way. Colonel Hallaren could not eliminate the separate promotion list; Colonel Gorman did not win the housing battle; and General Hoisington lost the fight for a "no waiver" policy. In most instances, major commanders also accepted the advice of the director as well as that of their own WAC staff advisers in day-to-day management of Corps personnel and policy. Through her network of WAC staff advisers and detachment commanders, the director enjoyed excellent communications at all levels and knew what was happening in the Corps and how Army and WAC policies affected the women. Each director required that women who served as WAC Center commanders, WAC staff advisers, and unit commanders take a personal interest in their subordinates' careers and in resolving any problems they had. As a result, the enlisted women received an abundance of counseling and supervision and participated in morale-building activities which resulted in unparalleled spirit and camaraderie within the Corps. Communications, personal interest, and esprit de corps were the keys the directors held in the successful management of the Corps.

Each director had her share of success and disappointment, and the Corps' goals were advanced slowly but surely until 1972. Then national and world events disrupted this quiet progress: the United States left Vietnam without achieving victory; the draft ended; the women's rights movement achieved full stride. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War forced the administration to end the draft, creating a manpower gap. To help fill it, the Army initiated the VOLAR Project and the WAC expansion campaign, both of which were successful. At the same time, continued heavy public criticism of the war, the military, and the economy forced the administration to appease many groups.

The women's movement comprised a number of diverse groups throughout the United States. Its spokeswomen achieved popularity and media attention by supporting a wide range of issues, including affirma-

tive action programs, abortion rights, gay rights, civil rights, student and child welfare, and antipoverty programs. Its most fervently pursued goal was passage of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. The movement attracted supporters among men and women of all ages and walks of life. It attracted women in the armed services, including WACs. They liked not only the movement's goals for women in general, but also those that affected women in the military. Among those goals were the registering and drafting of women, equalization of enlistment qualifications and retention regulations, combat service for women, elimination of separate women's organizations within the military, admission of women to West Point, and retention of pregnant women and mothers on active duty. The movement's large following and political influence on Ford and Carter administration appointees in the Pentagon enabled it to accomplish most of its goals affecting military women. The goals not attained included registering and drafting women and allowing women in combat. After the movement failed to obtain ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, its popularity waned. It had, however, helped to bring about some of the notable changes which were making military careers attractive to women.

Well before the draft was ended, the Army initiated several major actions to ensure its ability to replace draftees with volunteers to meet its requirements after June 1973. First, from 1970 to 1973, it conducted the Experimental Program for a Volunteer Army (Project VOLAR) that eliminated some unattractive features from Army life and raised the standard of living and the quality of life for Army people. The project improved recruitment and reenlistment rates.

The second major action was the WAC expansion that increased WAC strength from 12,780 to 53,000 in its first six years, 1972-1978. The Corps lost its director and separate status in the midst of the project, but the expansion continued until 1981. The success of the expansion resulted in women's being distributed more evenly between the United States and overseas, being assigned in a wider range of MOSs including many that were nontraditional, and being freed from many assignment and location restrictions that dated back to the 1940s. By 1977, the success and continuing momentum of the expansion led the secretary of the Army to direct that the strength of women officers, all branches, be increased to 15,000 and that of enlisted women to 80,000 by the end of FY 1983.

The expansion, however, was both good and bad, depending upon one's view. A result that pleased almost everyone was that the fourfold increase in WAC strength between 1972 and 1978 helped to close the manpower gap created by the elimination of the draft. This did not please those who believed that a draft kept the services racially balanced and gave them better educated, more physically fit, and more trainable servicemen than the all-volunteer system. But the draft was gone, and the addition of 41,000 women was tantamount to receiving three divisions, a gift any army welcomed.

On the negative side, the roller-coaster speed with which the WAC expansion proceeded took everyone by surprise and created new difficulties. The detailed plans for the expansion had provided for uniforms and housing to keep pace with the expected recruitment. But when enlistments exceeded this planned-for pace, lead times for supplying these items to the training center and detachments evaporated. Nevertheless, cadre at the WAC Center and School, the Army service schools, and the women's first duty stations managed the deluge with exceptional effort and ingenuity. The Army was swamped with women enlistees, but no one wanted to slow the surge. The Army urgently needed the manpower, and, after waiting thirty years to show that the WAC could mount a successful recruiting effort, its leaders did not want to halt the momentum. Two years after the expansion began, however, recruiters were forced to suspend enlistments when, from time to time, they exhausted their quota of school commitments. Fortunately, this did not halt the momentum, and enlistments recommenced as soon as school quotas became available. The magic behind the momentum appeared to be in the opening of all but forty-eight MOSs to women, a high unemployment rate, and the hopeful spirit aroused by the women's rights movement.

As the Army exploited the success of the expansion, difficulties continued to plague its progress. Expansion planners had anticipated some help from the WAC mobilization plan. The plan called for opening another training center on the West Coast to receive women who were enlisted west of the Mississippi. In 1974, however, this idea could not be implemented because ERA supporters would have construed it as an action to continue segregating women. Instead, the Army opened additional basic training battalions for women at several existing Army training centers. The mobilization plan also directed that a stockpile of women's uniforms be located in depots close to existing and proposed training centers. But a survey revealed that women's uniforms were being distributed as fast as the manufacturers could produce them. To obtain the needed uniforms quickly, the Army gave clothing manufacturers bonuses to produce them in record time. Mobilization plans also called for post commanders to provide housing for increased numbers of women by double-decking beds in WAC barracks or by leasing civilian facilities until they could rehabilitate old buildings or construct new ones. Expansion consumed space so rapidly that a new housing policy was needed in 1973 to allow commanders to combine housing and administration for enlisted men and women, provided they could provide privacy for each group. Though the mobilization plan provided little help in the expansion, it inspired some innovations in solving training and housing shortages for women. However, other challenges initiated by the expansion awaited men and women in the Army.

As thousands of WACs moved into jobs and units that had never before held women, history began to repeat itself. The women entered

and sought acceptance as the WAAC pioneers had, and many men in the Army objected to or ignored their presence as their fathers had in 1942. Adjustment was not easy on either side. Male commanders and NCOs in the 1970s had not yet become accustomed to volunteers instead of draftees when women entered in large numbers, an event for which they had little warning and no preparation. When they attempted to manage them as they managed men, they found that the old techniques did not work. Most women required more information, privacy, and counseling than men; women complained about harassment, discrimination, and poor housing; women got pregnant, needed child-care facilities, and, without training, could not lift heavy objects or make a six-mile run. The adjustment was just as hard on the women. Progress in achieving unit cohesiveness depended upon the commander's acceptance of women and his ability to communicate a favorable attitude to the men of the unit. It also depended upon whether the women's response was hostile or understanding. Gradually, as more women entered the formerly all-male units and it became obvious they would stay, rapprochements evolved and men and women learned to work together more easily, even if not wholly approving of each other.

At the Pentagon, as the manpower gap closed, the hierarchy began to question whether the Army was enlisting too many women and whether the high percentage would affect missions. To find the answers, the Army launched so many studies that their numbers were ridiculed. Yet most fulfilled a serious purpose. As the number of WACs increased, successive DCSPERs became convinced that more than 50,000 enlisted women (6.4 percent) in an Army of 780,000 would adversely affect missions and readiness. But neither studies nor tests proved this supposition, and the political appointees in the Pentagon would not curtail the enlistment of women because unemployment was high, women needed jobs, and the politicians needed women's votes. Clearly, some Army leaders wanted to stuff the expansion genie back in the bottle and control the composition of the Army. Secretary of the Army Alexander, for one, would not let them do it. In 1977, he directed that expansion goals be doubled in order to reach a strength of almost 100,000 women by FY 1983. In 1981, however, the Reagan administration directed that the Army, as it had requested, "pause" in the pursuit of these goals at 65,000 enlisted women and 7,200 women officers. This allowed the Army staff to halt the rapid rate of increase and to announce in 1983 new goals of 70,700 enlisted women and 12,900 officers for FY 1988.

By early 1978, the expansion and changes in law, regulation, and policy had almost eliminated everything that was distinctively WAC. With the abolition of the WAC detachments and staff advisers, the communications system was gone. The loss of the officer corps ended close command supervision and many morale-building factors. New policies changed the composition of the Corps: women remained on duty

after they became pregnant or became mothers; women no longer had to spend a year gaining experience on duty in CONUS before they went overseas. The WAC expansion steering committee had diffused the influence of the director of the Corps, and, in 1975, Congress had extracted a commitment from the secretary of the Army to concur in the dissolution of the Corps and the office of the director and in other statutory changes. The admittance of women into ROTC and the U.S. Military Academy eliminated the WAC officer procurement programs. The opening of basic training battalions for women at other Army training centers ended the unique function of the WAC Center and School which was absorbed by the training division at Fort McClellan.

The WAC had little left other than its traditions, pride in its achievements, and its Pallas Athene insignia. Without any support on the Army staff and no General Marshall, Eisenhower, or Abrams to come to its rescue, the Corps was doomed. In April 1978, the Army discontinued the Office of the Director, WAC, and reassigned the incumbent and her staff. In October, the WAC as a separate corps of the Army was disestablished, and the women removed the Pallas Athene insignia that had proclaimed their identity and individuality.

After all was said and done, it remained unclear whether the success of the expansion had destroyed the Corps or whether, by 1978, the Corps stood in the way of progress and had to go. Women in the Army are no longer described as segregated or identified as WACs; they are known simply as women in the Army. The loss of a woman general officer to advise the Army staff on women's matters and to serve as a spokeswoman and role model for women was, to many, a significant error, though one that could be reversed if a future secretary of the Army desired to do so.

During its thirty-six years, the WAC was the means of entry for women into the rank and file of the Army. It created a tradition of dedicated service, high standards, and loyal teamwork in every command. Its directors, officers, NCOs, and enlisted women had a spirit of mutual esteem, cooperation, and affection for each other that grew as the Corps did, and, as long as they and their successors live, that spirit will be preserved. Because of their effort and dedicated duty, the future may someday include a woman as chief of staff or secretary of the Army.