Chapter
IV
The Korean War Era
In the early morning hours
of 25 June 1950, the army of Communist North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel
and invaded South Korea. The Communists ignored an appeal from the United
Nations for a cease-fire; the U.N. Security Council appointed the President
of the United States as its executive agent to restore peace in Korea with
the assistance of other U.N. members; and President Harry S. Truman immediately
appointed his senior military officer in the Far East, General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, as commander in chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC).
During July and August, the North Korean
Army drove the U.N. forces down the peninsula. The drive was checked before Pusan,
the southernmost port in Korea. By September, General MacArthur had gathered sufficient
troop strength and firepower to drive the invaders back up the peninsula to the
Manchurian border. In late November, the U.N. forces stopped at the Yalu. The
Chinese Red Army crossed over and with the North Koreans mounted a strong offensive
that resulted in their recapturing territory down to and south of the 38th Parallel
in January 1951. A U.N. counteroffensive stopped the drive, but the entry of the
Chinese into the war removed any hope for a quick U.N. victory. The United States
and other U.N. members had to prepare to fight a longer war than they had anticipated.
Congress had already passed the laws
necessary to mobilize U.S. forces as part of the U.N. effort. In December 1950,
as the Chinese streamed south, President Truman had issued a much-delayed proclamation
that a state of emergency existed.1
By the end of January 1951, the Communist forces had been pushed back to the
38th Parallel. In April, Truman relieved MacArthur as CINCUNC and named General
Matthew B. Ridgway as the new commander. The combatants soon reached a stalemate.
In July, peace negotiations were begun at Kaesong. In August, they were broken
off, and, in October, they were resumed, at Panmunjom. An armistice was
signed on 27 July 1953.
[89]
CHART 2- ARMY STAFF, ORGANIZATION, 1946
Source: WD Circular No. 138, 14
May 46.
The Army had completed a major reorganization
just before the Korean War began. Under the new plan, the Office of the Director,
Personnel and Administration (D/PAD), was retitled the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-1 (ACofS, G-1), and given the manpower control function formerly
under the director of organization and training, whose office was eliminated.
The Office of the Director, Plans and Operations, retitled Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-3 (ACofS, G-3), retained responsibility for mobilization planning
and training policies. Training supervision remained with the chief of the Army
Field Forces.2
The president and Congress had reacted
quickly to the crisis in Korea by mobilizing U.S. forces. The Army's authorized
strength increased from 630,000, when the war began, to 1,263,000 by 31 December
1950. Other measures were taken to sustain that strength:
-The president was authorized to extend
enlistment contracts involuntarily for men and women in all components and
services (PL 624, 81st Congress, 27 Jul 50).
[90]
CHART 2- ARMY STAFF, ORGANIZATION, 1950
Source: SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr. 50.
-The draft law was extended for one
year beginning 1 July 1950 (PL 599, 81st Congress, 30 Jun 50).
-The president was authorized
to order members of the Army Reserve and National Guard to active duty with
or without their consent in units or as individuals for a term not to exceed
21 months (PL 599, 81st Congress, 30 Jun 50).
The measure extending the draft had no
effect on the WAC because Congress had excluded women from registration and
induction. The measure extending enlistments, however, did affect them. It extended
for 12 months enlistments scheduled to expire before 9 July 1951. Coincidentally,
this date was exactly three years and one day after the first date when WACs
had been allowed to enlist in the Regular Army. Therefore, women who had competed
so fiercely to be "first" to enlist on 8 July 1948 were some of those
"caught" by the first of several involuntary extensions. The next
extension, ordered in July 1951, again stretched enlistments for 12 months,
until 1 July 1952; the last, ordered in April
[91]
1952, extended enlistments for 9 months,
until 1 July 1953. The last two extensions affected most of the WACs on active
duty, but no enlistment was extended involuntarily more than once.3
The third measure affected WAC reservists. They were recalled, voluntarily and
involuntarily, to serve on active duty during the war.
To maintain personnel strength at overseas
stations, the chief of staff used his regulatory authority to extend the length
of foreign service tours for six months, effective 31 August 1950. In January
1951, he again extended those tours for another six months. As a result, over
1,400 WAC officers and enlisted women had their foreign service tours lengthened-4
In November 1950, the president asked
Congress for a new draft law to replace the one that would expire on 30 June
1951. The proposal sparked a flurry of interest in registering and drafting
women. Colonel Hallaren had suggested such a measure in August. In a memorandum
to the G-1, General Brooks, she wrote: "This has been my theme song for
two years-the need for Selective Service for women (with national service) in
any future war effort. It will take a total emergency to put this through-and
it will take this to put a total emergency through." 5
Another advocate was the former director
of the WAVES, Capt. Mildred McAfee Horton. She favored drafting women in both
war and peacetime but would limit combat training and assignments to men. "It
was," she said, "more efficient to deal with one sex under combat
conditions."6
Millicent Carey McIntosh, the dean of women at Barnard College, recommended
that women register voluntarily for military service. The World War II head
of the Coast Guard's SPARS, Capt. Dorothy C. Stratton, urged compulsory registration
of women-the services would then know how many women would be available to them
for long-range planning purposes. The National Federation of Business and Professional
Women's Clubs supported drafting women. Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, head of
the Selective Service System, thought a draft of women "was possible."
Many, however, were opposed. Dr. Harold Taylor, president of Sarah Lawrence
College, felt that drafting women would "threaten our whole social structure."7
Vivien Kellems, a well-known industrialist from Connecticut, thought the patriotism
of women would bring adequate numbers of volunteers. "As to the draft
of women, I say no, it won't be necessary." 8
[92]
In any event, such measures were not
enacted. An annex to the Army's Mobilization Plan (AMP) outlined the steps to
be taken to increase WAC strength in the event of war or national emergency.
Under the plan, the assistant chief of staff, G-3, would estimate the number
of WACs needed after M-Day (Mobilization Day) for assignment to each of the
CONUS armies and the overseas theaters of war. The estimates would be passed
to the G-1 to be translated into a WAC recruiting objective for the Army Recruiting
Service and to the chief of Army Field Forces to increase basic, officer candidate,
and specialist training facilities at the WAC Training Center. "Discharge
on marriage"-marriage as an accepted reason to request and obtain an early
discharge would no longer be an option for WAC officers and enlisted women.
The training center would temporarily increase its housing and classroom capacities
by double-decking beds in the barracks and initiating a twoshift schedule of
classes. Additional WAC cadre and instructors would be obtained through recall
of WAC reservists. A new WAC training center would be opened if necessary.9
The Korean War brought about implementation
of the WAC section of the mobilization plan. Pending development of a longer-range
plan, the chief of staff approved a DWAC proposal to increase WAC enlisted strength
from 8,000 to 10,000 by 31 December. Additional WAC recruiters were sent to
the field with a new monthly objective-638, up from 324. On 25 August, the Army
suspended discharge on marriage for WAC officers and enlisted personnel.10
While the interim measures were being
taken, Colonel Hallaren developed a long-range expansion plan, which the chief
of staff approved in January 1951. The plan called for 1,000 WAC officers and
12,000 enlisted women by 30 June 1951, and 1,900 and 30,000, respectively, by
30 June 1952. To meet the strength goal for 30 June 1951, the WAC, with 240
WAC recruiters authorized, increased its recruiting goal from 638 a month to
840. To house and provide basic training for the projected increased numbers
of recruits, without establishing another training center, the WAC discontinued
the Typing and Administration Course at the WAC Training Center in mid-November
1950. Graduates of WAC basic training who were scheduled to attend the course
were diverted to similar courses at male training centers.11
[93]
The action to extend enlistment contracts
and overseas tours did not immediately increase the Army's strength. In September
1950, for the first time since January 1949, men were drafted into the Army.
But the new draftees could not be considered in the trained strength numbers
until January 1951, after they had completed a minimum of sixteen weeks' combat
training. To obtain the trained personnel it needed immediately, n July the
Army had appealed to enlisted reservists, men and women, to voluntarily return
to active duty for one year or until the emergency ended. The initial call had
been for antiaircraft gunners, mechanics, radio Operators, X-ray technicians,
translators, and stenographers. Within a few weeks, however, enlisted volunteers
in any MOS were accepted. Also, reserve lieutenants and captains in any MOS
were asked to return voluntarily to active duty. 12
The call for volunteers did not bring
in the great numbers needed, and he Army was forced to order reservists to serve
on active duty involuntarily for not more than twenty-one months. In addition
to providing troops for Korea, the United States also had to maintain and increase
its forces in Europe to deter further Soviet encroachment there. In early august,
the Army ordered 62,000 enlisted reservists to report on active duty in September
and October. Reservists assigned to units that participated in regular drill
sessions were exempt from recall. The exemption paused public protest. Inactive
reservists charged that the Army was punishing them for not participating actively
in the reserve program. army spokesmen denied the charge; the active Army reserve
units constituted the trained defense force that would be needed if the Korean
War Broadened into World War III. Despite the Army's explanations, Congress
called for an investigation, and in late October, to satisfy Congress, he Army
discontinued the involuntary recall of enlisted reservists based m the anticipated
input from the draft.13
Initially, women in the Army (WAC, Army
Nurse Corps, and Women's Medical Specialist Corps) were not included in the
involuntary recall actions. By mid-August, however, Colonel Hallaren had recognized
;he need for additional women to fill future requirements. On 25 August, :he
G-1, Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, who had replaced General Paul on l January 1949,
approved her request to prepare, with the chiefs of the army Nurse Corps and
Women's Medical Specialist Corps, a combined plan for women. The chief of staff
approved their plan on 21 September. But, since involuntary recall of enlisted
reservists was ended in October, :he plan affected primarily the officers of
those corps.14
[94]
To carry out the recall plan, the commanders
of the CONUS armies received monthly quotas for reserve officers and selected
those to be recalled. The quotas were filled first with volunteers, then with
women from inactive units (not receiving drill pay) who were single and had
no dependents, and, in last priority, married women without dependents. Women
with children or dependents under eighteen were not involuntarily recalled.
Nurses, dietitians, or therapists who held key administrative or teaching positions
or whose departure "would jeopardize the health of the community in which
employed" were not recalled. During fiscal year (FY) 1951 (1 July 1950-30
June 1951), 67 WAC officers and 1,526 enlisted women were voluntarily recalled
on active duty; 175 WAC officers were involuntarily recalled. 15
Though not subject to the draft, active
duty and reserve WACs were subject to every other mobilization measure. The
involuntary recall of reserve officers in 1951 marked the first time women were
summoned on active duty without their consent. Technically, they had consented
to recall by voluntarily joining the Army Reserve, an action that plainly carried
an active duty commitment in the event of war or national emergency. Nonetheless,
for women, it was a "first" worthy of note.
The controversy over mobilization practices
led the Department of Defense to examine its personnel plans and policies. One
study group was assigned to determine whether women were being underutilized.
On 12 October, the group issued its report, "A Study of the Maximum Utilization
of Military Womanpower." It recommended that the services formulate a
joint policy for the expanded employment of military women and that they study
the effect of applying policies for men to women or to mixed groups. The report
proposed research into the participation of women in the armed services; the
development of mechanical aptitude tests for women; the development of functional
clothing and safety devices for women; and the recruiting practices and positions
that the services assigned to military and civilian women.16
The services were not pleased with the
report. The assistant secretary of the Air Force stated that the Air Force mission
had to guide its utilization of women. The Air Force had studied its mobilization
requirements for women and had appointed a panel, led by famed flier Jacqueline
Cochran, to conduct a study of utilization of the WAF. The secretaries of the
Navy and Army recommended that, before any policy statements or research programs
were initiated, an interservice committee of
[95]
senior women officers draft a department-wide
policy on the utilization of women. The committee should also study the proposed
research projects and make recommendations concerning them.17
The chairman of the DOD Personnel Policy
Board agreed with the commendation, and, in February 1951, directed each of
the services to elect a senior woman officer for the committee. Lt. Col. Kathleen
McClure, deputy director of the WAF, was appointed chairman of the study group.18
Originally classified "secret,"
the 200-page report was completed on 9 April 1951 and was signed by each member
of the group. The conclusions reached by the panel were similar to the attitudes
expressed by their service chiefs on the October 1950 study. They joined the
men in rejecting the assistance offered by the DOD Personnel Policy Board in
what hey considered their services' internal policies. The women directors had
jealously guarded their role as experts on matters affecting military women.
They recommended that no action be taken on the recommendations in the October
study. They further concluded that existing laws, regulations, policies, and
directives concerning women did not adversely effect their utilization by the
military services: "since the Services are working continuously on a refinement
of these criteria and are constantly -valuating their utilization of military
womanpower in terms of occupational studies and experience, no further clarifying
policy or directives . . . are needed to assure efficient utilization of military
womanpower."19
The DOD Personnel Policy Board accepted the report without comment.
While the women officers were formulating
their report, Margaret Mase Smith, now a member of the Senate, asked for the
plans for utilizing women in the event of total mobilization and for an estimate
of .he extent to which women would replace men. Under Secretary of the Navy
Dan A. Kimball stated that, under total mobilization, women could replace up
to 15 percent of the Navy officers and 12 percent of the :misted men and up
to 7 percent of Marine Corps officers and enlisted men. Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert replied :hat women could replace approximately
10 percent of its men. Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson reported
that the Army would provide for the "replacement of male personnel by WAC's
to the maximum extent." This would, he said, require some form of involuntary
[96]
induction for women. "In this connection,
there is presently being processed within the Department of the Army, a draft
bill to make Standby Selective Service Legislation applicable to women as well
as to men in time of full mobilization."20
The draft bill referred to by Secretary Johnson did not get far. The DOD Personnel
Policy Board failed to show any interest in the proposal, and General Brooks,
the G-1, shelved it.21
Beginning in 1948, the Organized Reserve
Corps (ORC) had welcomed WAC members into the various established units and
branches. In fact, WAC staff advisers reported that "the demand for WAC
reservists exceeds the supply."22
And, while WAC participation rose from zero in June 1948 to 4,281 in 1950, it
was far short of the 20,000 ORC spaces the Army had hoped the WAC would fi11.23
The Korean War recall programs revealed
weaknesses in the readiness of the ORC-outdated personnel rosters, incomplete
training and qualification records, physically unqualified personnel. Reservists
failed to notify their units when they moved, enrolled in college, or voluntarily
returned to active duty. Complicating matters for the WAC, women reservists
also failed to report marriages, changes in name, births of children, or the
addition of other dependents. And compounding the problems for the entire Army,
annual physical exams for officers had been discontinued in February 1947 for
lack of funds.
In October 1950, to correct these problems,
which affected each of the services, George C. Marshall, now secretary of defense,
directed that the armed forces screen their reserve personnel records and correct
them; reject any unfit reservists; and code the availability status, in days,
for each member. In the latter process, each eligible reservist, male or female,
was placed in a mobilization category representing the number of days that the
reservist had between notification of recall and reporting for active duty.
The category, or amount of time given, was based on the reservist's occupation,
complexity of personal affairs, number of dependents, and physical status. Two
years later the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 abolished this cumbersome system
and assigned readiness catego-
[97]
ries to units rather than individuals.
This law also redesignated the Organized Reserve Corps as the United States
Army Reserve (USAR).24
As a result of the Korean mobilization
experience, the USAR changed enlistment and reenlistment qualifications for
WAC reservists to coincide as closely as possible with those for Regular Army
WAC personnel. Few changes, however, were made in utilization or training policies
for the reservists. Screening, discharge regulations, and recall programs reduced
the number of WAC reservists from 4,281 on 30 June 1950 to 2,524 on 30 June
1951.25
On 9 January 1951, General Brooks advised
Colonel Hallaren and the chief of the Military Personnel Procurement Services
Division (MPPSD) that Colonel Hallaren's plan had been accepted and that the
WAC target strength for 30 June 1952 was 30,000 enlisted women-2 percent of
the 1.5 million-man Army authorized by Congress. The WAC goal for 30 June 1951
remained at 17,000 enlisted women .26
As of 1 January, however, the WAC had
only 8,674 women on duty; the short-term goal of 10,000, set in August, had
not been reached. WAC strength had to double in six months to meet the new goal.
The number of WAC recruiters was increased from 90 to 240; a shorter, two-year
enlistment period was added; and recruit application procedures were streamlined.
For the first time since 1945, the Army purchased advertising time on radio
and television for WAC recruiting and funded the publication of additional promotional
literature and posters. Colonel Hallaren also recommended a joint male-female
recruiting campaign to spur enlistments. "The WAC objective will not be
reached," she warned, "until every . . . procurement speech made by
Army personnel includes the need for both men and women . . . and until publicity
pictures include women and men." 27
However, the Army's recruiting theme for 1951, "The Mark of a Man,"
was already under way and did not lend itself to including women. Nonetheless,
several recruiting posters were produced showing men and women serving together.
The chief of the MPPSD recommended that
controlled input (i.e., a quota given each CONUS army) into the WAC Training
Center be abandoned so that a recruiter would not be limited to the weekly quota
and could send as many enlistees as possible after their applications had been
approved. Upon the recommendation of the new WAC Training
[98]
Center commander, Lt. Col. Ruby E. Herman,
Colonel Hallaren vetoed this idea because the center did not have barracks space
to "store" new recruits until their training began. Colonel Hallaren,
however, did agree to reconsider the idea if the WAC recruiting objective were
to be greatly increased in the next six months; and the training center was
alerted to plan for this contingency.
With exceptional performance by the
WAC recruiters, from the start of the war to 30 June 1951, WAC strength increased
by a little over 60 percent. Enlisted strength, however, was still a little
over 6,000 short of the goal of 17,000. During the period from 30 June to 31
December 1950, 3,603 enlisted women had entered the Corps (including 1,140 recalled
reservists); between January and June 1951, 3,443 had entered (including 385
recalled .reservists). Total WAC strength on 30 June was 11,932.28
WAC recruiting appeared to be repeating
the pattern that had emerged during World War II. At the outbreak of the war,
women had rushed to enlist, but as the war wore on, enlistments fell off. There
were, however, contributing factors. Between January and June 1951, the new
recruiters and promotional brochures trickled slowly into the recruiting stations.
And, once on duty, the new recruiters, untrained and inexperienced, had to learn
their sales techniques on the job. Finally, the large number of high school
graduates who usually were ready to enlist in May and June simply did not materialize.
Army enlistments, male and female, declined during these months. (See Table
4. )
| |
Jan |
Feb |
Mar |
Apr |
May |
Jun |
| WAC Enlistments |
694 |
614 |
733 |
543 |
415 |
444 |
| Male Enlistments |
35,327 |
27,355 |
23,710 |
16,587 |
10,058 |
10,829 |
Source: Strength of the Army Report
(STM-30), 31 Dec 53.
Despite recruiting problems, the overall
strength in each of the women's services had increased impressively during fiscal
year 1951. (See Table 5.)
The increase interested Anna M. Rosenberg,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel. She believed it showed
great potential for increasing military womenpower.
[99]
Women know that they have a stake in
this nation. During World War II, the women exercised the right to serve on
equal terms with men as they volunteered in large numbers in the WAC, the WAVES,
the SPARS, the Women Marines, the Nursing Services, and Medical Specialists
Corps. Now with an acute shortage in manpower, women again have the opportunity
of serving. They will not be found wanting.29
| Service |
30 June 1950 |
30 June 1951 |
| WAC |
6,551 |
10,883 |
| WAVES |
2,746 |
5,268 |
| WAF |
3,782 |
7,514 |
| Women Marines |
535 |
2,002 |
| Total |
13,614 |
25,667 |
Source: Semi-Annual Report of the
Secretary of Defense, Jan 1-Jun 30, 1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), p. 22.
Mrs. Rosenberg set out to obtain 72,000
more servicewomen and began by asking Congress to remove the 2 percent ceiling
on the strength of women in the regular forces. Congress complied, suspending
the ceiling until 31 July 1954 (PL 51, 82d Congress, 1st session, 19 Jun 51).
Next, she presided over the first meeting of the Defense Advisory Committee
on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) on 18 September 1951 and asked its members
to spearhead the recruiting campaign. They agreed and, with the directors of
the women's services and staff officers in the Department of Defense and the
three services, developed a "Unified Recruiting Plan" to begin on
11 November 1951.
The basic work of the campaign began
in committee members' home communities. Those on the committee who were college
presidents invited service recruiters to their campuses to talk to students
about a military career after graduation. Presidents of women's clubs asked
their chapter members to invite recruiters to speak to audiences in civic, church,
or school organizations. The journalists, broadcasters, and publishers among
the group used their media to tell women about the need for and the benefits
of service life for women; Helen Hayes and Irene Dunne, noted stage and screen
actresses, gave interviews on the need for women in the armed forces. Some women
convinced the governors of their states to issue proclamations on the need for
women in the services. Others pushed members of Congress to approve a commemorative
stamp honoring women in the services, and, on 11 September 1952, President Truman
[100]
presided over the first-day-of-issue
ceremony at the White House.
President Truman had officially opened
the recruiting campaign by announcing it in his annual Armistice Day speech
delivered by radio on 11 November 1951. He told his listeners: "There are
now 40,000 women on active duty in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. In
the next seven months we hope at least 72,000 more will volunteer for service.
Our Armed Forces need these women. They need them badly. They need them to undertake
every type of work except duty in actual combat formations." 30
Detachments of servicewomen buttressed
the initial effort as they marched in Armistice Day parades in New York City,
Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, and other cities. Throughout the year, nationally
known people assisted the Department of Defense in promoting the campaign. Generals,
admirals, and high-ranking civilian government officials publicly praised the
contributions of military women and described the need for them. The National
Advertising Council prepared and distributed thousands of newspaper ads, outdoor
advertising signs, bumper stickers, and fact sheets to over 1,500 newspapers,
magazines, and other media outlets as a public service to enhance the recruiting
campaign. The theme was "Share Service for Freedom."
To reach the goal set by Mrs. Rosenberg,
the WAC had to recruit 20,000 women by June 1952. The Army increased the WAC
recruiting objective to 2,400 a month and increased the number of WAC recruiters
to 486. Statistically, each recruiter had to enlist 5.2 recruits a month to
achieve that goal. Colonel Hallaren, in a move agreed to by Colonel Herman,
relinquished controlled input of trainees at the WAC Training Center to eliminate
a factor the recruiters said was an obstacle to their success. Other changes
at the center included a switch to the committee system of instruction in October
1951 and introduction of two-level training in March 1952.
The women's basic training program,
like the men's, had been reduced in length in October 1950 from 13 to 8 weeks.
Until October 1951, unit cadre conducted all basic training courses, but under
the committee system, officers and NCOs from the office of the S-3, WAC Training
Center, conducted 35 percent of the training to free the cadre for other duties.
With two-level training, a basic training company would begin one class as soon
as one or two platoons filled and would begin another when the other platoons
filled the company a week later.31
[101]
In November 1951, Mrs. Rosenberg visited
the troops in Korea and Japan. Upon returning, she announced, "A WAC unit
of 600 members will be sent to fill jobs at the United States Eighth Army supply
base in Pusan, Korea." 32
In other years such an announcement of opportunity for foreign service duty
would have created `a flood of applicants for WAC enlistment at recruiting stations.
But, a month later, Colonel Hallaren was forced to tell newsmen that "the
lag in recruiting" forced the Army to postpone, indefinitely, assignment
of a WAC unit to Korea.33
Colonel Hallaren's words provided an
early indication that all was not going well with the Unified Recruiting Campaign.
Despite increased publicity, advertising, and recruiters, WAC recruitment for
FY 1952 did not equal that achieved during FY 1951-7,046 enlisted women and
423 commissioned and warrant officers. In FY 1952, the Corps gained only 3,933
enlisted women and 330 officers; attrition, however, doubled .34
After discharge on marriage had been
discontinued in all services in August 1950, losses resulting from pregnancy
climbed sharply, exceeding even the high rate anticipated under wartime conditions.
Women were using discharge on pregnancy to break their enlistment contracts
in order to establish households with their husbands, or, sometimes, to leave
the service when they became dissatisfied. WAC leaders reasoned that the pregnancy
rate would climb higher if discharge on marriage were not reinstated, and it
appeared to be a benign action since truce talks had begun. Discharge on marriage
was reinstated on 20 July 1951 for enlisted women in all services and much later,
on 18 September 1953, for women officers. Unfortunately, when the decision was
made to reinstate discharge on marriage for enlisted women, no one foresaw that
a Unified Recruiting Campaign would begin in November 1951.
[By percentage of total WAC losses]
| Discharge on: |
FY 1950 |
FY 1951 |
FY 1952 |
FY 1953 |
FY 1954 |
| Marriage |
26.9 |
9.3 |
34.9 |
27.6 |
16.6 |
| Pregnancy |
18.9 |
39.5 |
23.9 |
19.0 |
14.6 |
| Total |
45.8 |
48.8 |
58.8 |
46.6 |
31.2 |
Source: Losses of Enlisted Women by
Cause, Strength of the Army Report (STM-30), for the years shown.
[102]
Thus, while the unified campaign was
in progress during FY 1952, the WAC experienced high rates of losses on marriage
and pregnancy. Those losses, with the poor recruiting results, had a severe
effect on the strength of the Corps. (See Tables 6 and 7.)
| Service |
30 June 1950 |
30 June 1951 |
Increase or Decrease |
| WAC |
11,932 |
11,456 |
-476 |
| WAVES |
6,074 |
8,167 |
+2,113 |
| WAF |
8,001 |
11,891 |
+3,890 |
| Women Marines |
2,065 |
2,462 |
+397 |
| Total |
28,072 |
33,996 |
+5924 |
Source: Selected Manpower Statistics,
Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, 30 Jun 56, p. 41.
Early in the recruiting campaign, Mrs.
Rosenberg discovered that the service recruiters lacked marketing information
for their campaigns. Hence, in 1952 she directed that a comprehensive attitude
survey be conducted to discover women's reasons for enlisting and reenlisting.
Some of the findings concerning the WACs were informative:
-Four out of every ten newly enlisted
women said they entered the WAC to receive training in a skill (38 percent);
to travel (19 percent); to serve their country (18 percent); to get away from
an unsatisfactory job or home situation (10 percent).
-Of a group of 980, 30 percent said
they intended to reenlist and 24 percent were undecided. Of the 30 percent who
said they intended to reenlist, 63 percent desired an overseas assignment.
-The most frequent reasons given for
not reenlisting were marriage or pending marriage; dissatisfaction with military
job, promotion, or pay; desire to obtain more civilian education or training;
dissatisfaction with lack of acceptance of women or their perceived reputation.
-Sixty-two percent of the women felt
men and women were treated equally by the Army; 27 percent felt women were treated
better; 11 percent thought men were treated better.
-Older enlisted women in NCO grades
who held supervisory jobs or jobs requiring initiative, originality, or responsibility
were most likely to reenlist.35
[103]
The studies, conducted in 1952 and 1953,
provided information that would be of future value to enlistment and reenlistment
planners for the WAC and the other women's services.
Colonel Hallaren had her own thoughts
about why the WAC recruitment effort had failed during 1952. At the Personnel
Officers Conference at the Pentagon in December 1952 as her term as director
of the WAC drew to a close, she said that the Unified Recruiting Campaign "could
hardly be considered an unqualified success." She attributed the failure
of recruitment to "inexperience of women recruiters; parental objection;
poor reputation of service women; and competition with civilian industry."
In addition, she blamed competition with the Air Force.36
She also offered some constructive suggestions
to improve WAC recruiting. She recommended that enlisted recruiters be replaced
on a "one WAC officer for two enlisted women basis." She observed
that the average enlisted recruiter did not have the schooling, the background,
or the pay to be a supersalesman and compete "with high powered civilian
procurement agencies" or with women in the Air Force who somehow received
promotions faster than the WACs. "It is no reflection on a WAC corporal
that she has a difficult time selling a career in the Army when the WAF she
recruited last year comes home with three stripes while she still has two."
37
Colonel Hallaren believed that parental objections to women joining the WAC
were frequently based on "war stories" about WACs. When traced to
their sources, the stories proved to be invented or embellished beyond recognition.
To help eliminate these myths and stories, she suggested that accurate information
could improve the recruiting problem. "If representative high school students,
teachers, and parents were invited to visit the WAC units in their areas, familiarity
would breed content." 38
Like many Army officers concerned with
recruiting, Colonel Hallaren disliked the joint Army-Air Force recruiting system.
Under it, shared office space put recruiters in direct day-to-day competition
in a single place where they could scrutinize each other's prospects and listen
to each other's sales techniques. The Army could not compete with the "wild
blue yonder" image, the glamour of the Air Force. As the 1950s progressed
WAF recruiters increasingly outsold their WAC counterparts, even though WAC
entry requirements seemed easier. The WAC would accept women for a two-year
rather than a three- or four-year enlistment; women with General Educational
Development (GED) certificates in-
[104]
| ANNA M. ROSENBERG,
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Personnel (1950-1953). |
|
GENERAL J. LAWTON
COLLINS, Army Chief of Staff (1949-1953). |
stead of high school diplomas; and women
with slightly lower intelligence test scores.39
Colonel Hallaren opposed adopting the
WAF standard of accepting only women who scored in the top two (of four) mental
aptitude categories. The WAC accepted women in the top of the third category,
slightly below the median in intelligence. The director was a staunch supporter
of the concept of "quality before quantity," but she saw no reason
to enlist women who were overqualified for the jobs they would be doing. She
recommended that greater emphasis be placed on good character and an unblemished
record of deportment. Women with a very high intellect would, she felt, become
bored and discontented in many jobs available to them in the Army.
We cannot go along with raising the
AFWST [Armed Forces Women's Selection Test] score to the 65th percentile. There
are jobs to be done in the clerical, medical, food service, and other fields,
in the Air Force as well as the Army,
[105]
which [would bore] an individual with
a high IQ . . . into non-reenlistment. Chew jobs must be done. In an emergency
we would have many such assignments.40
WAC recruitment had been successful
early in the Korean War; then accessions declined. After July 1951, the unpopularity
of the war, the dart of truce talks, the competition with the other women's
services for recruits, and public apathy combined to cut WAC enlistments in
half. the Unified Recruiting Campaign, begun with such high hopes in November
1951, proved unsuccessful as that fiscal year drew to a close in tune 1952.
Fiscal year 1953 was equally unsuccessful. Recruitment of males also dropped,
from 238,000 in FY 1951 to 155,000 in FY 1953. army strength was maintained
through the draft (1.5 million men) and recall from the reserve components (288,000
reservists and guardsmen).41
The war in Korea reinforced the change
in the mission of U.S. military forces around the world from occupation to defense
against invasion. No one knew what the Russians would do while the United States
was preoccupied by the Korean War. According to one historian, James F. Schnabel,
"The United States believed Russia to be the real aggressor in Korea, in
spirit if not in fact, and effective measures to halt the aggression night provoke
total war . . . . The determinant for Korea was, then as always, 'What will
Russia do? 42
In addition to forces fighting in Korea, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) obligations required ;he maintenance and reinforcement of Western defenses
in Europe, while ether treaty commitments required the defense of Japan and
the Ryukyus. During FY 1951, the United States sent twelve additional combat
divisions to Korea, Japan, and Okinawa and four to Germany.
WAC strength overseas fluctuated with
the Korean War. At the start A the conflict, approximately 20 percent of WAC
strength was overseas; ;hat percentage increased during the second year, then
fell after the war ended. (See Table 8. )
In Japan, WAC strength increased rapidly
after the war began. In July 1950, the WAC had two detachments, at Tokyo and
at Yokohama; by mid-1951, there were six; and by the end of December 1953, there
were Zine.43
A WAC unit was also established at Fort Buckner on the island )f Okinawa in
1951.
[106]
| |
1950 |
1951 |
1952 |
1953 |
1954 |
| Far East |
626 |
2,604 |
1,791 |
1,764 |
976 |
| Europe |
632 |
933 |
1,356 |
1,130 |
994 |
| Australia |
84 |
81 |
139 |
143 |
74 |
| Caribbean |
91 |
98 |
89 |
89 |
1 |
| Total |
1,433 |
3,716 |
3,375 |
3,126 |
2,045 |
Source: Strength of the Army Report
(STM-30), for 30 June of each year noted.
The women in these units, both officers
and enlisted, were assigned primarily to administrative, communications, medical,
and intelligence duties. They worked at Far East Command headquarters and other
commands in Tokyo, at regional commands throughout Japan, and at general and
station hospitals in Japan and Okinawa.
In the first year of the war, the shortage
of personnel in some specialties was critical. Overseas, women who held one
essential MOS were often retrained in an even more urgently needed MOS-telephone
and teletype operators, cashiers, motor vehicle operators, mechanics, and medical
corpsmen. Without complaint, the WACs did their best at whatever work needed
to be done. At the May 1951 WAC Staff Advisers Conference, Lt. Col. F. Marie
Clark, the adviser for the Far East, reported: "As a result of the Korean
situation, WACs in the Far East Command are being efficiently utilized in assignments
heretofore believed by some could only be performed by male personnel .... With
few exceptions, WACs arriving subsequent to June 1950 have been and are being
utilized in positions either to replace or release a man to a combat element."
44
One landmark in the utilization of medical
WACs occurred in the Army hospitals in Japan. As a matter of necessity, WACs
had been assigned as wardmasters, a supervisory role traditionally the province
of male medical NCOs. The medical WACs also learned specialized skills by assisting
in the care of paraplegics, victims of frostbite, and patients with broken or
injured limbs, hepatitis, and other injuries and illnesses. The Chief, Army
Nurse Corps, Col. Mary G. Phillips, praised their work. "We have found
wherever we have WAC technicians in our hospitals that, on the whole, they are
doing a wonderful job. There are, however, too few of them. Many, after putting
in long hours of work in their assigned duty, volunteered their services for
extra duty or visited the
[107]
patients after working hours to take
care of personal needs such as letter writing, post exchange purchases, etc.
"45
By the spring of 1951, while over 300'Army
nurses were in Korea at field, station, evacuation, and mobile Army surgical
hospitals, WACs waited expectantly for a detachment of their own to be formed
for service there. Months passed, but, even though more and more WACs were requisitioned
for duty in Japan and Okinawa, no detachments were requested for Korea. During
the WAC Staff Advisers Conference in day, the G-1, Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks,
said, "I just came back from Korea and I believe there is a real requirement
over there for women in uniform-WACs and WAVES." 46
His words swept through the Corps, gut no detachments were assigned. In August,
Lt. Gen. Anthony G. McAuliffe succeeded General Brooks as G-1; still no WAC
detachments were assigned. A year later, in August 1952, General Mark W. Clark,
then commander in chief of the United Nations Command and Far East Zommand,
asked General McAuliffe whether women could be assigned to Korea. The
G-1 replied that policy allowed it, but that WAC recruiting, was poor-no further
WAC units could be sent to the Far East. Thus, even though individual WACs would
serve in Korea on special assignments, the door was closed to the establishment
of a WAC unit in Korea. 47
Despite the fact that no WAC units were
assigned to Korea, contact was established with the Corps' counterpart in the
Republic of Korea ROK) Army. Its women's corps had formed rapidly in 1950 around
a nucleus of policewomen trained for service in the Korean National Constabulary
in 1946 by a former WAC captain, Alice A. Parrish, who, in 1948, rejoined the
WAC and remained in the Regular Army until retirement. Contact during the war
strengthened the tie and led to the assignment of a senior WAC officer as U.S.
military adviser to the ROK Army WAC in 1956; the position was not discontinued
until 1974.48
Ending the war in Korea became a major
issue in the 1952 presidential campaign. In November, Dwight D. Eisenhower was
elected; in January 1953, he was inaugurated. In March, Joseph Stalin died;
he was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev. Negotiations at Panmunjom accelerated.
In
[108]
July, an armistice was signed. No massive
demobilization followed the end of the war in Korea. By December 1952, most
of the recalled reservists had been released from active duty and had been replaced
by draftees or Regular Army personnel. Draft calls had already fallen from a
monthly high of 87,000 in January 1951 to 26,000 in July 1953. At the time the
armistice was signed, the Army had only 1.5 million men and women on active
duty. No demobilization plan was needed-the men and women left the Army as their
terms of enlistment ended or as they were released to the Army Reserve or the
National Guard to complete the balance of their obligated federal service. Congress
rewarded Korean veterans as it had veterans from World War II-educational benefits,
home loans, mustering-out pay, reemployment rights. Those who had served in
the combat zone had received hazardous duty (combat) pay and deferment from
federal income taxes on that money.
By the end of 1952, Col. Mary A. Hallaren
had completed almost six years as director of the WAC. She had led the effort
to obtain Regular Army and Reserve status for WACs. She had directed the procedures
for assimilating WACs into the regular and reserve components between 1948 and
1950; supervised the revival of WAC recruiting and the opening of the WAC Training
Center; and led the Corps through most of the Korean War. After leaving the
directorship, she served on active duty for another seven years before retiring
in 1960 at age 53.49
At Colonel Hallaren's retirement, Col. Mary Louise Milligan, then the director
of the WAC, summarized: "She had symbolized the highest traits of character
and service which I am certain General Marshall visualized when he planned for
American women to serve in our Army. It was due to her outstanding leadership
and service that our organization was made a permanent part of the Regular and
Reserve forces of our Army."50
Before her tour as director ended, Colonel
Hallaren gave the G-1, General McAuliffe, a resume on each of tile Regular Army
lieutenant colonels eligible to replace her. The list was considered by Secretary
of
[109]
the Army Frank Pace, Jr., Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Fred Korth, and Army
Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins. Although there were nineteen eligible lieutenant
colonels, seniority was an important consideration in filling statutory positions,
and it was almost certain that Charlee L. Kelly, Cora M. Foster, Elizabeth C.
Smith, Dr Irene O. Galloway would be chosen. On 9 December 1952, Secretary Pace
announced the selection of Irene O. Galloway to be director of the WAC.51
Quiet-spoken and more conservative than
her predecessor, Irene Otillia Galloway had a strong personality and a reputation
for sincerity and skilled performance of duty. She had graduated with the second
WAAC OCS class, September 1942, and had served at WAAC headquarters at the Pentagon;
at Headquarters, Army Service Forces; and with the G-1 Career Management Group.
From June 1948 to October 1952 she was assigned as WAC Staff Adviser, U.S. Army
in Europe. In November, she was selected to replace the commander of the WAC
Training Center, who was resigning her commission to get married.52
Colonel Galloway reported to Fort Lee on 24 November 1952 and within two weeks
was notified she had been selected to be the new WAC director. On 3 January
1953, in Secretary Pace's office, she was sworn in as the director of the WAC
and promoted to temporary colonel.53
The position of deputy director had
officially been vacant since September 1952 when Colonel Milligan left for
Germany to relieve Colonel Galloway. Lt. Col. Charlee L. Kelly had performed
the duties without being appointed to the position by Colonel Hallaren, who
wanted her successor to be free to select her own deputy. Colonel Galloway selected
Lt. Col. Emily C. Gorman, then the WAC staff adviser at Headquarters, Second
Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland; she was sworn in by the adjutant general,
Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, on 3 January 1953.54
Other positions in the Office of the
Director, WAC, were also filled: Maj. Rebecca S. Parks became the executive
officer; Maj. Catherine J. Lyons, WAC career management officer, and the only
holdover from Colonel Hallaren's staff, Maj. Elizabeth P. Hoisington, became
the technical information officer.55
[110]
Colonel Galloway assumed her duties
in 1953, a year of many changes in national and world affairs. The status of
women was also changing. President Eisenhower appointed Oveta Culp Hobby to
his cabinet as the secretary of the newly established Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. Mary Pillsbury Lord was appointed as a U.S. representative
on the U.N. Economic and Social Council. Clare Booth Luce, a congresswoman from
Connecticut, became the first woman appointed ambassador to a major nation-Italy.
Elizabeth II, who had succeeded to the throne in 1952, was crowned Queen of
England and the British Empire on 2 June 1953, and, in September, Mrs. Vijaya
Pandit of India was elected president of the United Nations General Assembly.
There were also changes in the other
women's services. The Women Marines, with over 2,500 women on active duty, celebrated
their tenth anniversary in February 1953 and welcomed a new director, Col. Julia
E. Hamblet. Over fifty enlisted WAVES were assigned to sea duty for the first
time in 1953; they served on ships of the Military Sea Transportation Service.
Capt. Louise K. Wilde replaced Capt. Joy Bright Hancock as director of the WAVES-official
title, Assistant to the Chief of Naval Personnel for Women-on 1 June 1953. The
Air Force selected its second ex-WAVE officer to be director of the WAF, Col.
Phyllis D. S. Gray, who replaced Col. Mary Jo Shelley on 1 January 1954. Col.
Ruby F. Bryant had been appointed chief of the Army Nurse Corps in 1951 and
would serve until 1955. And in March 1953, 1st Lt. Fae M. Adams became the first
woman physician appointed to the Regular Army Medical Corps. 55
After the Korean armistice, the United
States had no time to be complacent. In August, the Soviet Union detonated a
hydrogen bomb, ending the United States' monopoly over nuclear power. The nature
of East-West friction changed. Scientific and technological competition intensified.
Weapons and weapon systems became more sophisticated. Skilled technicians became
more necessary. Standing armies grew.
Such changes also affected the WAC,
but responding was difficult. With the draft providing the requisite number
of men, Congress cut recruiting budgets. The FY 1953 budget limited those expenses
to half that spent in FY 1952. The WAC, dependent on recruiting, saw its publicity
funds cut and half of its recruiters reassigned to nonrecruiting duties.
The WAC, like the other women's services,
was now a permanent part of a large, continuing peacetime military establishment.
Improved administration and reduced costs were now the goals.
[111]
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