-
Chapter
VII
-
- Management and Image
As each new WAC director took up her
duties, she continued her predecessors' work-publicizing the WAC, burnishing
the WAC image, and vitalizing WAC programs. After World War II, WAC visibility
had fallen so sharply that the general public believed that, like price controls
and rationing, the WAC had gone out of existence. The directors turned to public
relations to increase public awareness of the WAC and to inspire high standards
among members of the Corps. In addition, each successive director had to develop
new programs that adapted to changing situations as well as to continue old
programs that had proved successful. And in choosing each successive director,
the secretary of the Army, the chief of staff, and the G-1 searched for a woman
who would succeed as an executive, as a role model for the women, and as a spokeswoman
for a career that neither the public nor the Army had fully accepted.
With these factors in mind, in late
1956, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker selected Lt. Col. Mary Louise
Milligan to succeed Colonel Galloway as the fifth director of the WAC.1
A veteran of World War II and of the fight for Regular as well as Reserve status
for the WAC, Colonel Milligan had served in the field, both in the United States
and overseas, and in the Pentagon, as a member of the office of the G-1 and
as deputy director of the WAC. On 3 January 1957, she took the oath of office
in Secretary Brucker's office. The secretary pinned one silver eagle on her
shoulder; her mother, Alice G. Milligan, pinned on the other.
Like her predecessors, Colonel Milligan
chose her deputy and the officers to serve in her immediate office. 2
The outgoing deputy, Lt. Col. Emily C. Gorman, whose tour had ended, was reassigned
to Headquarters, Continental Army Command. Lt. Col. Anne Eloise Sweeney, then
staff adviser at Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army, at the Presidio of San Francisco,
was chosen to replace her. Colonel Sweeney was also sworn
[157]
COL. MARY LOUISE MILLIGAN
sworn in as Director, WAC, by Maj. Gen. Herbert M. Jones, The Adjutant
General, DA. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker looks on, 3 January 1957.
in on 3 January; Lt. Gen. Donald P.
Booth, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER), swore in the new deputy director.3
In the early months of her tour as director,
Colonel Milligan described her goals, "to build up the WAC, . . . to have
women used by the Army in a wider variety of jobs, . . . and to sell the Corps
not only to potential recruits but to mothers and fathers as well." 4
These goals were inexorably entwined, and their attainment required leadership,
energy, and skill in public relations. In her civilian life and military duties,
Colonel Milli-
[158]
gan had gained experience in public
relations. She was an accomplished speaker and had a keen sense of the appropriate-the
right word and action at the right time. An officer who knew her well said of
her: "She could come off the parade ground when the temperature was in
the nineties and look cool and immaculate. She could step off a cross-country
plane without one wrinkle in her skirt." 5
In an era when the Air Force's popularity was exceeding the Army's at recruiting
stations, the Women's Army Corps needed a Mary Louise Milligan.
Colonel Milligan followed several avenues
in improving the WAC image. On trips to WAC units across the United States,
in Europe, and in the Far East, she communicated a sense of pride to the women-in
WAC history and in their individual contributions to the history of the Corps,
its traditions, and its heritage. She charged commanders and enlisted cadre
to be exemplary models for the women and to teach respect for the reputation
of the Corps and pride in work, personal behavior, and appearance. She directed
WAC unit commanders and WAC staff advisers to work together. She encouraged
the advisers to work with her office staff to eliminate obstacles that impeded
women's careers and diminished their satisfaction with the service. The WAC
staff advisers monitored the performance of the WAC detachment commanders to
ensure that they exercised good judgment and maturity in managing the women.
Those who lost the women's respect or otherwise failed their responsibilities
were summarily relieved from their command duties. Later, in December 1958,
to fill an information gap about personnel matters, uniforms, and WAC news,
Colonel Milligan initiated a monthly memorandum to the WAC staff advisers; they,
in turn, passed the information along to WAC units and personnel in their commands.
She also reinstituted the annual WAC staff advisers conference, the last of
which had been held in 1955.6
Colonel Milligan and her staff saw to
it that all newsworthy and special events within the Corps were publicized.
One such event was the assignment, in 1957, of a dozen enlisted women to the
first Missile Master unit at Fort Meade. Another was the promotion of WACs to
the newly authorized enlisted grades of E-8 and E-9. In 1959, Carolyn H. James,
assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, Colorado Springs, became
the first WAC promoted to master sergeant (or first sergeant), E-8; in 1960,
she was the first WAC promoted to sergeant
[159]
RETIREMENT CEREMONY FOR SGT. MAJ.
CAROLYN H. JAMES AND SGT. 1ST
CL. MAE E. JUDY, Fort McClellan,
April 1965.
major, E-9. Also publicized in 1959
was the addition of the college enlistment option to the self-enhancement programs.
Sgt. 1st Cl. Ellen B. Steel was the first enlisted woman to attend college under
that option. Colonel Milligan's presence at events also generated favorable
press releases for the WAC. In 1958, she represented the women's services at
the dedication of the American Chapel, St. Paul's Cathedral, London; in 1961,
she represented the Corps at the Women's Conference of the NATO Countries, Copenhagen.7
Such publicity was aimed at potential
recruits. The Army's recruiting function was vested in the adjutant general
(TAG), and within that office's Military Personnel Procurement Division was
the WAC Recruiting Branch. The chief of that branch was a lieutenant colonel
personally selected by the WAC director. The branch chief was responsible for
preparing plans and advising TAG divisions and the Army staff on WAC enlistment,
reenlistment, and officer procurement matters. Colonel Milligan retained in
this position the officer who had been assigned since 1952.
[160]
| LT. COL. HATTILU
WHITE ADDISON, Chief, WAC Recruiting Branch, TAGO, DA, 1952-1958. |
|
LT. COL. HELEN
HART CORTHAY, Chief, WAC Recruiting Branch, TAGO, DA, 1958-1962. |
Lt. Col. Hattilu White Addison combined
initiative and efficiency with flamboyance in carrying out her duties. Well
known throughout the Corps, Colonel Addison always carried a flowing, white
chiffon kerchief on her left wrist when not in uniform. It was a public-relations
image maker that she continued to use even after she retired. Colonel Milligan
coordinated her public relations activities with Colonel Addison and Colonel
Addison's successor, Lt. Col. Helen Hart Corthay, to ensure a senior WAC presence
at important functions.8
Responsibility for recruit and officer
procurement advertising also lay with TAG. The Recruiting Publicity Branch,
also within the Military Personnel Procurement Division, developed brochures,
posters, film clips, and radio and TV spots in conjunction with whatever major
advertising agency had won the current Army contract for this work. A WAC major
or captain was assigned to the branch to coordinate work on WAC publicity projects.
[161]
One of the director's primary responsibilities
regarding the WAC image was women's uniforms. After the taupe uniform was introduced
in 1951, WACs and women in the Army Medical Department wore the same uniforms.
Thereafter, the chiefs of the corps (WAC, Army Nurse Corps, Army Medical Specialist
Corps) collaborated on the design and regulations for the proper wear of the
women's uniform. Because the taupe uniform was generally disliked for its color,
style, and fit, the women chiefs pushed for a change; and, in March 1956, the
Army Uniform Board approved development of a new uniform style and a change
in color from taupe to Army green. The men had changed from olive drab to Army
green earlier that year. After months of consultation with heads of some of
the most famous women's fashion houses in New York City and with the Quartermaster
Corps' uniform experts, the women chiefs agreed upon the designs for winter
and summer uniforms. The secretary of the Army approved the new designs in February
1957, and in March 1959, after two years in development and testing, the Army
issued the summer cotton-and-dacron green cord uniform. In 1960, it issued the
women's winter Army green service uniform. Officers purchased their uniforms;
enlisted women received an initial free issue and thereafter received a monthly
clothing allowance to replace worn items.9
The women liked the style and color of their new uniforms, and it was generally
agreed that the new uniforms improved the women's appearance.
As a result of the increased attention
given to its public image after World War II, the Corps suffered few ignominious
incidents like the one that occurred in 1946-the court-martial of Capt. Kathleen
Nash Durant, her husband, and several others in Germany for the theft of the
royal jewels of the House of Hesse from Kronberg Castle in Frankfurt. Most of
the jewels, valued at over a million dollars, were recovered, and Durant was
found guilty of larceny, dishonorably discharged, and sentenced to serve five
years at hard labor at the Federal Reformatory for Women in Alderson, West Virginia.
She was paroled on good behavior in 1949.10
An important part of the director's
duties involved proposed legislation. She worked with members of Congress by
providing information on WAC matters and by helping draft legislation affecting
the Corps.
[162]
One long-standing WAC need had concerned
each director since 1944-a law to give women active duty credit for the months
they spent in the WAAC between July 1942 and 30 September 1943. No such provision
had been included in the bill that made the WAC part of the Army of the United
States in 1943.11
After the WAC achieved permanent status in 1948, obtaining this credit became
critical because it would increase a woman's service longevity, and longevity
affected pay, promotion, and retirement. Requests for such legislation by Colonel
Hobby and Colonel Boyce had been denied because the War Department considered
the WAAC a civilian organization. Colonel Hallaren and Colonel Galloway had
succeeded in getting the remedial legislation introduced, but the bills had
died in committee. In 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson helped the
cause when he accepted the view that WAAC time should count as active duty.
Thereafter, he included this action in his legislative packages, but Congress
continued to defeat the actions. Two bills granting WAAC credit failed in the
84th Congress; four, in the 85th Congress.12
Bills designed to rectify the situation
did not reach the committeehearing stage until 1959. After the bills introduced
in 1957 and 1958 died with the adjournment of the 85th Congress, Colonel Milligan
and Col. Emma J. Riley, Director, Women in the Air Force, began another campaign
for such legislation, raising the issue within the Department of Defense and
calling on the members of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
(DACOWITS) for assistance. The WAF joined in the effort because the WAF had
its origins in the WAAC and many of its women would benefit. In 1959, another
bill, H.R. 3321, was introduced by Congressman Paul J. Kilday of Texas. Scheduled
for a hearing before Subcommittee 3, House Armed Services Committee, the bill
would make WAAC service count as active duty if a woman had also served in the
WAC, WAF, or one of the other women's services after 1943. It did not allow
back pay or promotion rights for the service gained, but it did provide the
longevity credit. Colonel Riley and Colonel Milligan appeared before the subcommittee
on 23 March. One of their most compelling points was the inequity created because
women in the Navy (WAVES, SPARS, and Women Marines) had received active duty
credit for their wartime service as reservists on active duty. The subcommittee
reported the bill favorably to the full committee which, in turn, unanimously
recommended its passage. The bill was passed in the House on 15 June and in
the Senate on 29 July. President Eisenhower signed it on 7 August.13
Approximately 1,400 women on active duty in the WAC
[163]
and WAF gained additional active duty
credit as a result of the legislation. The law allowed thirty-three WAC reserve
officers to remain on extended active duty to achieve retired status and fifty-three
reserve officers to remain on inactive status to earn credits for retirement.
Women with no further military service after the WAAC would have to wait until
1980 for a decision that would give them active military credit for their WAAC
service.14
After the campaign to obtain WAAC credit,
Colonel Milligan and her staff turned to other inequities. In 1954, Congress
had passed the Reserve Officers Personnel Act (ROPA) to equalize career opportunities
and conditions for regular and reserve officers in the three services. Each
service retained its own system of regulations and implementation policies for
the promotion and retention of officers, but, effective I July 1955, ROPA required
that each service apply its system to all officers regardless of status. Retirement,
however, differed-reserve officers who had completed twenty years on active
duty would be mandatorily retired unless a board selected them for retention
beyond twenty years.15
The retirement provisions of ROPA adversely
affected the careers of many WAC reserve officers. Their career patterns differed
from men's: WAC officers still could not advance beyond the grade of lieutenant
colonel, and, as of 30 June 1955, 66 percent of WAC officers on active duty
were reservists.16
The restriction on promotion curtailed the length of time WAC reserve officers
could spend on duty-either extended active duty or inactive reserve status.
Since the women could not be promoted above lieutenant colonel, openings at
that level and at lower grades were, of necessity, more restricted than for
male officers. With promotional restrictions, time-in-grade pressures on WAC
officers became unduly restrictive. Women who could not be promoted above lieutenant
colonel could not complete 28 or 30 years on duty as men promoted to colonel
or brigadier general could. And that problem was compounded since it affected
the lower grades.
Because of the scope of ROPA, Congress
realized that the act would require amendment and set a date of 2 July 1960
for any needed changes. Colonel Milligan prepared amendments to adjust the provisions
detrimental to the careers of WAC reserve officers. Her proposed amendments,
accepted by Congress and the president, allowed:
-WAC reserve officers to be considered
for promotion through the grade of major whether or not a vacancy existed in
the unit's manning documents.
[164]
-WAC majors and below to remain on duty
to complete twenty-five years of service and lieutenant colonels to complete
twenty-eight years of service provided they were otherwise eligible for retention.17
WAC reserve officers thus became less
confined by the time-in-grade and promotion-or-passed-over-and-out restrictions
of the original act.
With the passage of the ROPA Amendments
Act on 30 June 1960, Colonel Milligan successfully completed her agenda for
congressional action. Her legislative and public relations efforts to improve
recruiting and retention were bearing fruit. WAC strength had increased by 2,000
between 1957 and 1960; first-term enlistments had increased; and the overall
reenlistment rate had remained steady. New WAC units were established at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona (April 1959), and Fort Shafter, Hawaii (December 1959). Those
statistics had also been influenced by another area of effort-the campaign to
increase the number of MOSS open to women.
A 1957 book entitled Womanpower reinforced
Colonel Milligan's belief that WAC strength and job variety could and should
be increased. The book stressed the increasing importance of women in the labor
force and in labor politics. It noted that a slightly higher number of women
than men had entered the labor force between 1950 and 1956, and it predicted
that this trend would continue. Employers, the book advised, needed to recognize
that the life-style of many women was changing-women were raising their families
while pursuing full-time careers, a distinct change from the 1930s and 1940s.
Employers should capitalize on the change and eliminate gender-labeling in the
hiring, assignment, promotion, and pay of their workers. The book did not influence
the Army to begin eliminating the regulations that prevented WACs from combining
marriage, family, and career, but, to many, it did introduce the ideas that
led to identifying Army jobs that could be done by either men or women as interchangeable.18
Other social issues also influenced
the future of the WAC. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Americans increasingly recognized
the justice of the civil rights movement. Both the legislative and judicial
branches of the federal government acted to ensure blacks equal rights under
the Constitution-the right to vote and equal access to schools and other public
facilities. Practices established in the 1940s in the WAC had become
[165]
accepted throughout society and had
returned in an expanded form to the WAC.
During the same years, space exploration
took on the character of a national endeavor. Research spawned by the "space
race" produced technological advances year after year. The new technology
was quickly absorbed into industry, business, education, government, and the
military services. To the Army, it brought new weapons, transportation, communications,
and logistical systems, and a requirement for more complex training, administration,
and management. In this atmosphere, Colonel Milligan began her campaign to expand
the role of the WAC.
In 1957, the director asked the deputy
chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER) to conduct a study to identify additional
MOSS that women could perform in peacetime and during periods of mobilization.
After World War II, men replaced the women who had learned to repair and operate
machines used in the medical, personnel, maintenance, logistics, and communications
fields. By 1957, few WACs operated a machine heavier than a teletypewriter or
a 1 1/2-ton truck. Space technology, however, had introduced miniaturization,
electronics, and lighter weight equipment to other segments of the economy,
and Colonel Milligan knew that most WACs, not just the exceptionally strong,
could manage almost any piece of machinery. The DCSPER and the Army Personnel
and Training Research Advisory Committee approved the study and assigned it
to a research team at the Adjutant General's Office (TAGO).
The resultant 1958 study identified
116 MOSS out of 400 that WACs could not perform because the jobs involved
combat weapons or a combat environment, isolated duty posts, extraordinary physical
strength and stamina (i.e., frequent requirements to lift fifty or more pounds),
assignment to a post where housing could not be provided at a low additional
cost, or duties culturally unsuitable for women (i.e., mortuary attendant, vermin
exterminator, quarry worker). The research team divided the balance of the MOSS
into three groups based on Army needs and the restrictions on employment of
women. Group I consisted of 134 MOSs that women could fill in 75 percent of
the cases where the Army called for such occupational skills; group II, 76 MOSS
in which women could fill from 11 to 74 percent of the positions; and group
III, 67 MOSS in which women could fill from 1 to 10 percent of the positions.
The team concluded that WACs should not be restricted to 2 percent of Regular
Army strength. In a 700,000-man Army, the WACs could fill 25 percent (175,000)
of the enlisted spaces; in a mobilization-size Army of 3,200,000, they could
fill 23.4 percent (748,800). A TAG study in 1942 had concluded that women could
fill approximately 19 percent of the 7.7 million positions in the Army-almost
1.5 million positions.19
[166]
The research team then turned to related
studies. A battery of electronic, electrical, and mechanical aptitude tests
was given to 1,412 high school students (742 women, 670 men); the results showed
that 55 percent of the women could qualify for training in electronics, 27 percent
in general maintenance, and 14 percent in mechanical maintenance. The team concluded
that women scored lower than the men in these areas because the men had had
more training in the use of shop tools, equipment repair, and mechanical and
motor principles. Women, however, could quickly develop skills in these areas
when mobilization requirements demanded.20
The team also visited two Army service
schools that taught courses requiring electronics, electrical, and mechanical
aptitudes-the Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the Southeastern
Signal School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The team examined curricula, entry qualifications,
strength and lifting requirements, attrition, uniform and clothing requirements,
assignments upon graduation, and career patterns. As a result, the team recommended
an experiment in which women would be trained and assigned in four MOSS-Fixed
Station Attendant (MOS 270), Field Radio Repairman (MOS 296), Manual Central
Office Repairman (MOS 311), and Teletype Equipment Repairman (MOS 341).21
In April 1960, Colonel Milligan reported
to the members of DACOWITS that 250 enlisted women would be selected to participate
in the experiment recommended by the research team. "We believe,"
she said, "that this research will contribute substantially to the broader
utilization of womanpower in the Army in peacetime as well as in war."
22
Unfortunately, the number of WACs involved dropped sharply-except for twenty
positions in MOS 270 series, the Army's training requirements in the four MOSS
had been filled for FY 1961. Women were selected,
[167]
trained, and assigned to those MOS 270
series jobs. Their progress was tracked for a year; afterwards the team reported:
"The conclusion seems reasonable that no serious administrative or situational
factors preclude assignment of women to electronics MOS."23
As the research team worked on its final
report, Colonel Milligan submitted, to the DCSPER, a list of recommended additions
to MOSS on the WAC lists:
-forty-nine MOSS in the electronics,
electrical, radio, and general maintenance and repair areas (WAC reservists'
mobilization list);
-nine MOSS in the scientific and professional
area (WAC active duty list);
-four bandsmen MOSS (WAC active duty
list);
-thirteen group I MOSS, among them,
orthopedic specialist, light truck driver, TV production specialist, flight
simulator specialist, and food inspection specialist (WAC active duty list).
The DCSPER concurred and added the new
MOSS to the WAC lists in July 1961.24
Obtaining authorization only partially
accomplished the task of moving enlisted women into the new MOSS. Commanders
had to identify such positions on their manning documents and then submit personnel
requisitions for WACs in the MOSS. When requirements for women showed up in
Army personnel reports, women would be trained in the new MOSS. The Army distributed
its available training spaces during the Enlisted MOS Requirement Conferences
(known as the White Book Conferences) held in September and April. The ODWAC
prepared an annual estimate of WAC training requirements based on attrition
reports, recruiting and reenlistment records, and housing information provided
by WAC staff advisers. The men's training requirements were derived from the
Inventory and Projection of Army Strength Report (CSGPA-45), called the 45 Report.
It contained a consolidated inventory of actual, authorized, and projected strength
by MOS, sex, and grade. The report, however, did not contain accurate statistics
for women (officers or enlisted) because commanders in the field did not code
their manning documents appropriately. For example, on 30 June 1961, the 45
Report showed only 1,200 author-
[168]
ized spaces for enlisted women worldwide;
over 8,500 enlisted women were actually serving on active duty.25
The problem stemmed from the Table of
Distribution (TD) system that had been introduced in the Army in 1946. Procedure
required personnel officers to code a position that was or could be filled by
an enlisted woman with an "A"; an enlisted man, an "E";
a male commissioned officer, an "O"; a WAC commissioned officer, an
"L"; male warrant officer, a "W"; and a WAC warrant officer,
a "V." A requisition to obtain a replacement for an incumbent leaving
a job had to match the requirements shown on the TD by grade, MOS, sex, and,
until 1951, race.26
If the TD had not been annotated for a WAC, then a requisition could not be
forwarded for one.
As a result of problems inherent in
the replacement system, as well as misuse and abuse of the system, TAG assignment
officers had problems assigning women on completion of school training or a
tour of duty. After filling all requisitions coded "A" that had come
in, TAG assigned women to "E" spaces, provided the women had the proper
MOS and grade. If a command rejected the substitution, another command was tried
and then another. If an authorized position could not be found within a reasonable
time, TAG assigned the WACs in overstrength to commands as replacements for
future losses in their MOSS. As a last resort, TAG assigned WAC graduates of
a service school to a command that urgently needed personnel and could give
them on-the-job training in a different MOS. Such commands later tried to place
the women in their formal school-trained MOS as vacancies became available.
Because the inspector general gave low ratings to commands that did not use
personnel in their school-trained MOS, it was to a commander's advantage to
have as many personnel as possible working in their school-trained MOS. This
pressure helped the WACs move into suitable positions.
Most other efforts to correct abuses
in the replacement system came to naught. The DCSPER wrote letters to commanders
about errors and advised them of the proper procedure for annotating their manning
documents and requisitions. The WAC director and the WAC staff advisers visited
commanders and personnel officers to explain the impact of their failure to
designate spaces on manning documents for WAC officers and enlisted women-it
affected training, housing, assignments, and promotions. Commanders sympathized
with the director and her staff advisers,
[169]
promised to correct the situation, but
seldom did. They had their own problems. Manpower had been reduced and personnel
spaces cut to lower the Army's payroll costs. By designating their spaces "fill
by men," commanders, in effect, had two chances to fill their requisitions.
If the process resulted in an overstrength, they used another report to declare
their WACs surplus (i.e., available for reassignment). Since TAG had no requisitions
for them, the women remained where they were. The commander, however, had balanced
his books and was eligible to submit requisitions for men.27
The WAC had no recourse except to live with the system, understanding that it
benefited the great majority and hurt only the WAC-less than 2 percent of Army
strength.
Despite the TD problem, Colonel Milligan
could count some progress in opening new opportunities for women. She had succeeded
in adding forty-nine MOSS to the WAC reservists mobilization list and twenty-six
to the active duty lists. She hoped that later it would be easy to move the
new Reserve mobilization MOS list over to the active duty list. And because
the civil rights movement had forced elimination of racial coding on TDs, the
possibility of eliminating gender coding existed as well.
During World War II, after women had
demonstrated that they could perform military jobs efficiently, most Army career
men had yielded and acknowledged that the WACs were of value to the Army. Still,
many of the men had expected the WACs to go home after the war; the Army would
again become all male and do its work without the help of women. But things
were never again the same in the Army.
Despite the changes in society and in
the Army, the attitude among some men in 1942 that women did not belong in the
Army was still there in 1962. Sociologists thought the cause a matter of territorial
prerogative-the Army was men's ground, and women had no right to be on it. After
the WAC had gained entrance in the Regular Army and Reserve in 1948, the problem
of acceptance merely took on a new face. The women were no longer temporary
help; they were now permanent employees who competed for assignments, schools,
and favorable ratings. Some men, however, still viewed WACs as interlopers or
as unfair competition in an arena that was meant to be theirs alone. This attitude
was a shock to the newly enlisted and appointed women who expected instant acceptance
from the moment they joined the Army. The Army had said it needed them.
[170]
To help the women understand the problem
and to gain acceptance, detachment commanders and senior WAC cadre insisted
that the women dress correctly, behave properly in public and private, and become
efficient in their duties. They conducted recreation, sports, and education
programs to develop esprit de corps. And they provided counseling and guidance,
which required a great deal of common sense and patience because most of the
enlisted women were between nineteen and twenty-one and were still learning
to manage adult responsibilities and relationships.
Lack of acceptance was only one of the
disappointments the women experienced. Disappointments also stemmed from other
frustrations of Army life-the lack of privacy, poor housing, few overseas assignments,
little money, and slow promotions. To compensate for the deficiencies, many
WACs concentrated on improving their education, socializing, or pursuing a hobby.
Promotion disappointment was one of
the hardest things for enlisted women to accept. Many supervisors found it difficult
to explain to a woman why she had not been promoted, and, as a result, she drew
her own conclusions-usually that the supervisor had picked another woman because
she was prettier or that he had picked a man just because he was a man. When
a male soldier was not promoted and a WAC was, he assumed that the supervisor
picked the woman because she was pretty and was a woman. Feuds started this
way. WAC detachment commanders, therefore, followed promotions closely, talked
with the women's supervisors, discovered any negative factors, and assisted
the women in making improvements so that they could earn promotion the next
time.
Frequently, women were not promoted
because they lacked supervisory experience. Even ambitious women who had no
trouble learning their work and improving their MOS skills had trouble getting
a leadership position. When the majority of workers were men, supervisors were
reluctant to make an enlisted woman the chief. In a predominantly male environment,
men felt demeaned reporting to a woman. Men who might have accepted the situation
often protested or showed hostility because their peers expected it. Some enlisted
women rejected a leadership role when it was given to them because of the problems
it created. Only the strongest could cope daily with verbal barbs, deliberate
desultory performance, and frequent challenges to their authority. Imperturbable,
confident, and good-humored women had the most success in vanquishing harassers
and climbing the supervisory ladder. After 1960, improvements in the enlisted
personnel management system-such as the addition of MOS testing, centralized
promotions, and commander evaluations-eliminated some promotion problems for
women. Little change occurred, however, in men's attitudes toward women supervisors.
By the end of her first tour as director
of the WAC, Colonel Milligan had improved WAC utilization, management, and image.
Some policies
[171]
COL. MARY LOUISE MILLIGAN
receives congratulations upon her reappointment as Director, WAC, from
the deputy director, Lt. Col. Lucile G. Odbert, as Colonel Milligan's mother,
Mrs. George V. Milligan, proudly watches, 3 January 1961.
and procedures designed to manage men
had been revised to benefit women in the Army. Through her initiative, she had
expanded WAC training requirements, schooling, and assignment opportunities
and had successfully pushed to amend the laws that deprived women of service
credit and benefits. She had also initiated a news memorandum and reinstituted
the staff adviser conferences. Overall, the WAC was resolving its problems and
presenting a positive image to the public.
In October 1960, Secretary of the Army
Brucker surprised the Corps by announcing that he would reappoint Colonel Milligan
to serve as director for another two years, until she became eligible for retirement
on
[172]
31 July 1962.28
The reappointment ceremony was held on 3 January 1961 in the secretary's office.
After reappointment, Colonel Milligan
made a few personnel changes. The deputy director's four-year term had expired.
Colonel Sweeney was reassigned to the position of WAC Staff Adviser, Headquarters,
U.S. Army, Europe, replacing Lt. Col. Nora Gray Springfield, a lawyer, who went
to the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army at the Pentagon. For
her new deputy, Colonel Milligan selected Lt. Col. Lucile G. Odbert, then Commander,
WAC Center, and Commandant, WAC School. Lt. Col. Sue Lynch replaced Colonel
Odbert at Fort McClellan.29
On 20 January 1961, a new president
was inaugurated in a ceremony on the steps of the U.S. Capitol. For their third
appearance in an inaugural parade, the members of the 14th Army Band (WAC) from
Fort McClellan wore the Army's new women's dress blue uniforms, modified for
band members. Their appearance on TV gave the WAC worldwide publicity.
The term of a new president, John F.
Kennedy, had begun peacefully enough. But strife soon followed. At home, a renewed
and more aggressive civil rights movement challenged discriminatory laws and
practices in the southern states. Abroad, the Bay of Pigs fiasco brought increased
tension with Cuba. In Southeast Asia, Communist expansion threatened Thailand,
Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. The United States supported anti-Communist
leaders in Thailand and South Vietnam by providing them with military supplies
and with military personnel to train their armed forces. In Geneva, the United
States supported Laos diplomatically as Laotian leaders sought and obtained
"neutral country status," a status it was to lose in 1964. But, at
the time, such problems were overshadowed by a series of confrontations between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the late spring and early summer
of 1961, the Russians threatened to use their power to unify East and West Berlin
in violation of the four-power agreements on the city dating from World War
II. On 25 July 1961, President Kennedy responded to these threats by promising
to protect West Berlin and West Germany from invasion. He asked for and received
from Congress authority to increase the size of the U.S. armed forces and $2.5
billion to accomplish the increase. Congress authorized him to double draft
calls, order Reserve and National Guard units and
[173]
THE 14TH ARMY BAND (WAC) marches
in President Kennedy's inaugural parade, 20 January 1961.
personnel to active duty, extend military
enlistments and appointments, and defer retirements and resignations.30
On the morning of 13 August, East Germany
closed its border with West Berlin. Within a week, the East Germans had constructed
a wall along that border. President Kennedy alerted 100 U.S. Army Reserve units
and 46,500 individual reservists for recall and proceeded with an orderly buildup
of U. S. military strength. Before the end of August, the Army extended for
four months active duty enlistments that expired after 1 October 1961 and before
30 June 1962. Active duty tours of reserve officers were extended for up to
one year; foreign service tours, for up to six months; enlistments of Ready
Reserve personnel, for one year. Voluntary resignations and retirements of officers
and warrant officers were suspended.31
[174]
By and large, the public arid Congress
supported President Kennedy's actions, and the buildup continued throughout
1961. The tempo of activity at the Pentagon increased as action officers carried
out instructions issued by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary
of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., both of whom had been appointed in January
1961. The Army had a new deputy chief of staff for personnel matters, Lt. Gen.
Russell L. Vittrup, who had replaced Lt. Gen. James F. Collins on 1 April 1961.
Tension increased as the partial mobilization continued into the fall, but President
Kennedy did not declare a state of emergency that would have activated full
mobilization. Action officers at the Pentagon, however, reviewed and updated
contingency plans in case a more serious commitment of U.S. forces in Europe
was ordered.
Colonel Milligan reviewed the WAC annex
to the overall mobilization plan with her staff. Assuming that WAC strength
would increase as it had in other crises, Colonel Milligan obtained from the
WAC Center commander and the staff advisers up-to-date information on housing
in WAC units, training capacity and resources, and assignment information. She
told her staff that she would not request any exceptions for WACs during the
buildup and that she would maintain peacetime standards for entry and retention.
And while she did not suspend the rule permitting discharge on marriage for
fear that such an action would hinder recruiting, she did support a change in
regulations that allowed commanders to retain an enlisted women for ninety days
beyond her designated discharge date, provided time was needed to obtain or
train a replacement. (The delay provision would remain in the regulation until
discharge on marriage was discontinued in 1966.) Colonel Milligan did not initiate
a similar delay provision for officers, because regulations already required
them to serve two years before they could request discharge on marriage. Such
policies preserved the principle of allowing women to leave the service when
they married while preventing abrupt personnel losses.32
Under the partial mobilization, WACs
were included in every buildup action the Army took. Directives extending enlistments
and foreign service tours applied to men and women on active duty and in the
Army Reserve. Of the 100 reserve units recalled to active duty in October 1961,
16 included WACs-approximately 50 women, 5 of whom were officers. They belonged
to support units, such as hospitals, civil affairs groups, logistical commands,
and quartermaster or signal battalions. Upon reporting to their mobilization
station, the enlisted women were attached to the local WAC detachment for quarters
and rations, but they remained under the operational control of their reserve
unit. Recalled WAC officers
[175]
served with their reserve units on active
duty. None of the units with recalled women was assigned to an overseas station.33
In the two years preceding the buildup,
WAC strength had taken a decisively upward swing. Though the surge could, in
part, be attributed to the innovations resulting from the work of the Womble
Committee, a new enlistment option both for men and women also inspired many
enlistments and reenlistments. In 1958, when the Military Personnel Procurement
Division, TAG, proposed the Army Career Group Option, Colonel Milligan had enthusiastically
endorsed it for WAC recruitment. It offered women a choice of seven career fields
and the guarantee of formal schooling or on-the-job training that led to award
of an MOS needed by the Army. The exact MOS was not guaranteed, only the career
field, which might hold as many as a dozen different MOSS. The applicant had
to be a high school graduate or hold a GED certificate, pass a physical examination,
and score well above average in the aptitude area that dominated her chosen
career field and above average in two other areas. Women already in service
could reenlist under this option if they were grade E-4 or below.34
The new option brought excellent results.
Between 1959 and 1961, it attracted from 700 to 1,000 additional enlistees annually.
It contributed to raising the reenlistment rate for "first termers"
from 36.5 percent during FY 1959 to 40.5 percent during FY 1961. WAC strength
climbed from 7,853 on 30 June 1958 to 9,369 on 30 June 1961.35
Another unexpected surge occurred in
WAC recruiting between January and June 1961. In those months, 1,742 recruits
arrived at the WAC training battalion versus 1,402 for the same period the previous
year; on 31 August 1961, the training battalion had a record 1,052 recruits
in contrast to its earlier peak of 800 the previous year. Filled to overflowing,
the battalion was forced to borrow bed space, instructors, platoon sergeants,
cooks, and clerical personnel from other units. The increase in enlistments
was not confined to the WAC. Enlistments rose in all services.
The historian at the WAC Center wrote,
"The influx was attributed to the tense situation in Berlin, a rise in
unemployment, socio-economic patterns in the United States and a surge of patriotism
following the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in January 1961."
36
[176]
At the end of July 1961, Colonel Milligan
was forced to consider imposing a ceiling on WAC recruiting to control the overcrowded
situation at the WAC Center. She discussed the question with her staff; Colonel
Lynch, commander of WAC Center; and Lt. Col. Helen H. Corthay, chief of WAC
Recruiting in TAG. Colonel Corthay knew from long experience working with Army
recruiters that they would resent a ceiling. In past years they had found it
extremely difficult to obtain enough WACs; now, in 1961, it had suddenly become
easy. As an alternative, Colonel Corthay proposed that WAC enlistment standards
be raised-higher qualifying scores on enlistment tests and elimination of acceptance
of a GED in lieu of high school diploma. Her solution would produce a higher
quality recruit, reduce enlistments, and, consequently, eliminate overcrowding
at the training battalion.37
Colonel Milligan weighed the advantages
and disadvantages of imposing a ceiling or raising standards. Although she wanted
high-quality recruits, she did not want to raise enlistment standards so high
that recruiters would be unable to achieve their objectives in low-yield months
(e.g., December, April, May). She decided that imposition of a ceiling, though
objectionable to recruiters, provided the quickest and most easily reversible
way of eliminating the overcrowding. If the Berlin situation worsened, full
mobilization would cancel the ceiling, and the increase in WACs would be accommodated
by the opening of another training center. Meanwhile, a ceiling could be quickly
imposed, raised, lowered, or eliminated; a change in the enlistment qualifications,
however, required lengthy staff procedures. On 18 August 1961, recruiters received
a message announcing mandatory WAC enlistment ceilings by month for each Army
area.38
Soon after the Berlin Crisis developed,
General Vittrup, DCSPER, asked the director if she wanted to increase the Corps'
authorized enlisted strength. The figure had not been changed since 1954, when
enlisted strength had been set at 8,000. Colonel Milligan proposed a 15 percent
increase in WAC enlisted strength, to 9,200, to match the 15 percent overall
increase in Army strength, from 875,000 to 1 million, directed by President
Kennedy that summer. In suggesting this modest increase, the director told the
DCSPER that she favored a growth pattern that could be achieved under current
WAC enlistment standards. She recommended that the major commanders be asked
to indicate how many more enlisted women they could utilize, house, and offer
career-enhancing opportunities. General Vittrup agreed and sent a message to
the commanders asking those questions. He reminded them that increases in WAC
strength
[177]
would be counted against their overall
total authorization for enlisted personnel.39
The director's staff tabulated the commanders'
replies and prepared a plan to distribute additional women. The commanders requested
2,072 more enlisted women-1,293 who could be accommodated within current housing
and space requirements and another 779 more for whom new WAC detachments and
personnel allocations would be required. In her report, Colonel Milligan noted
that 75 percent of the requests were for WACs with administrative MOSS (clerical,
finance, supply, data processing, etc.); 12 percent for WACs with medical care
and treatment MOSS; and 13 percent for WACs with intelligence, communications,
food service, or graphics MOSS. Six percent were for grades E-6 and above. She
noted the areas in which WAC housing was poor and those in which commanders
had promised to modernize or rehabilitate buildings. General Vittrup forwarded
the director's recommendations to the chief of staff, General George H. Decker,
who approved a 1,300-woman increase in the Corps' enlisted strength and a 100-woman
increase in its commissioned officer strength, effective 30 June 1962. (See
Table 16) No change was made in the authorization for WAC warrant officers;
it remained at 39. New WAC detachments were authorized at Fort Rucker, Alabama
(activated September 1962); Yuma Test Station, Arizona (March 1963); and White
Sands, New Mexico (May 1962).40
| Command |
Spaces |
| U. S. Army, Europe |
150 |
| U. S. Continental Army Command (to be distributed to
Army area commands) |
395 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, DA |
50 |
| Research & Development, DA |
60 |
| Transients, Trainees, Patients, and Students |
645 |
| Total |
1,300 |
Source: Staff Study, DWAC to DCSPER,
Nov 61, sub: Recommended Distribution of Additional WAC Spaces, and Memo, DCSPER
(Programs Division) to CofS, 19 Dee 61, sub: Increased WAC Enlisted Strength,
ODWAC Ref File, Build-up Actions (1961-2), CMH.
[178]
In April 1962, tension subsided in Europe;
fear of war lessened; and the Army was able to release its recalled reserve
units and personnel from active duty by mid-1962. Further alerts and personnel
actions affecting active duty personnel were canceled. During the crisis, WAC
strength reached its highest post-World War II point with a total strength of
11,113.41
In 1961, as the regular forces were
being expanded and reservists were being called up, Secretary of Defense McNamara
had begun to transform the structure of the Army and the other military services
by applying organizational principles drawn from his experience in industry.
He began by consolidating common functions and giving them to one service or
agency to control-the single manager concept. For example, the Defense Supply
Agency was created to centralize the purchase and distribution of food, uniforms,
gas and oil products, medical and automotive supplies for the armed services.
The Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated and centralized certain military
intelligence operations. The Defense Language Institute controlled foreign language
training for military and civilian personnel.42
At the secretary's direction, the Army
developed a reorganization plan, known as Project 80, that followed the new
concepts. Under the plan, the Army discontinued the offices of the chiefs of
most of the technical services in 1962 and transferred their functions to the
Defense Supply Agency or to one of two new commands-the U.S. Army Materiel Command
and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. The Army created the Office of
Personnel Operations (OPO) with two major directorates-the Officer Personnel
Directorate (OPD) and the Enlisted Personnel Directorate (EPD). The new organizations
relieved the DCSPER and TAG of many day-to-day operational jobs but not of responsibility
for policy functions, which remained with them. Recruitment and reenlistment
functions moved from TAG to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command under the Continental
Army Command (CONARC); two years later, the Army Recruiting Command would become
a separate agency reporting directly to the chief of staff of the Army. Control
of most service schools passed from the chiefs of the technical and administrative
services to the commander of CONARC, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Up to this point,
CONARC had supervised the
[179]
curricula and instruction at WAC School
while WAC Center exercised command over it, funded its operations, and provided
its manpower spaces. Under the reorganization, CONARC controlled the school's
curricula, instruction, doctrine, policy, funds, and manpower spaces. The commander
of the WAC Center, however, retained the title of commandant and continued to
administer the school .43
A few months after the Project 80 study
group began its work, two members of the committee visited the Office of the
Director, WAC, to review its mission, status, and administrative procedures.
Colonel Milligan was on a staff visit to WAC units. Her staff explained that
their functions were operational, that the director had no command jurisdiction,
and that her function was purely advisory, with the exception of WAC officer
career management over which she exercised control. The deputy director, Colonel
Odbert, told the group that although the director's close association with the
DCSPER was an advantage in many ways, the director needed more visible evidence
of her assignment to the chief of staff. Colonel Odbert pointed out that the
assignment "in practice" was "overlooked." She faulted the
lack of an "established regular procedure" for informing the chief
of staff. She suggested that if the director's office were "more closely
tied in with OCS [Office of the Chief of Staff], as well as assigned on paper,
there would undoubtedly be closer coordination by other staff agencies . . .
particularly in planning, both current and [for] mobilization."44
Toward partial achievement of this goal,
Colonel Odbert recommended that the director be made a member of the General
Staff Council, a high-level decision-making body. The study group rejected her
proposal. Under Project 80, only one major change affected ODWAC: the WAC Career
Branch was transferred, along with other career branches, to the Officer Personnel
Directorate of the Office of Personnel Operations. The director lost direct
control over the career branch, but the director of OPO and OPD encouraged close
coordination between ODWAC and the WAC Career Branch on matters of policy and
assignment of key field grade officers. On the whole, the director's office
had come through a major organizational upheaval with no significant loss.45
CHART 3- ORGANIZATION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, APRIL 1963
[180]
A general upheaval, however, continued
in the months that followed. Shortly after the reorganization, the WAC staff
adviser at CONARC informed the director that a plan was being discussed to consolidate
all administrative schools at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and, thus, to
eliminate duplicate training facilities.46
The Adjutant General's School and the Army Finance School had moved there in
1951. Among the schools proposed for relocation were the Army Information School,
the Civil Affairs School, the Army Management School, the Military Police School,
and the WAC School. Colonel Lynch, Commander, WAC Center, and Commandant, WAC
School, strongly opposed the move and emphasized that the WAC School was "much
more than a facility for teaching clerical skills and providing advanced training
for a few officers." She wrote that "the School is the place where
WAC doctrine is studied and disseminated, where WACs are branch oriented and
where there is a nucleus for expansion in case of mobilization."47
These arguments and the complexity and cost of the proposed merger dissuaded
CONARC from making the change.48
Amid the many other changes, however,
Colonel Milligan thought she saw a chance to win some colonels' spaces for her
Corps. In 1961, a study emerged from ODCSPER, entitled "Positions that
may be Staffed by Colonels, WAC," which enclosed an earlier (1958) study
she herself had submitted on the subject. In her study, she had recommended
that the secretary of the Army order the officer promotion boards to select
three WAC officers annually for promotion to temporary colonel until a total
of fifteen was reached. She supported her proposal with a 1956 decision by the
judge advocate general stating, "Promotion of WAC officers to the grade
of temporary colonel is not prohibited or limited by the Women's Armed Services
Integration Act of 1948."
The JAG, however, had added that the
number could be limited by the total number of colonels authorized under the
Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 and by Army budgetary or policy considerations.
Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, then DCSPER, had not been convinced that the law
was subject to such a policy interpretation, and he had sent it to the DCSPER
Directorate of Manpower Management for reexamination. The study had remained
there until 1961, when the new DCSPER, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, arrived
.49
[181]
The DCSPER study contained new proposals.
In lieu of fifteen WAC colonels, it recommended three-the director, the commander
of WAC Center and commandant of the WAC School, and the WAC staff adviser to
U.S. Army, Europe. It further recommended that the Directorate for Military
Personnel Management assess the impact of promoting WACs to colonel on officer
career development, morale, the Army Nurse Corps, the other women's services,
and the promotion of male lieutenant colonels. General Vittrup approved these
recommendations, which led to a new study.
In June 1962, Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), recommended Lt. Col. Hortense
M. Boutell, Chief, Programs Branch, DCSLOG, who supervised a $1.5 billion budget
on logistical operations and maintenance programs, for promotion to temporary
colonel. She had graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
was a member of the Logistics Career Specialization Program, and had been a
logistics staff officer at joint and Army staff level since 1950. General Vittrup
returned the request, explaining that it was Army policy that the director of
the WAC would occupy the one colonel's space authorized the Corps. The DCSLOG
realized that without the DCSPER's support it would be futile to send his request
further up the chain of command.50
In 1962, the members of DACOWITS again
raised the issue of women officers' promotions. They recommended to Secretary
McNamara that all promotion and retirement restrictions on women officers be
eliminated by modifying the legislation then being proposed to change the Officer
Personnel Act of 1947. That legislation had been developed by a triservice committee,
chaired by General Charles L. Bolte, U.S. Army (Retired), and known as the Bolte
Committee. Asked for his views on the DACOWITS recommendation, General Vittrup
replied in a memorandum that the Bolte Committee had examined the Women's Armed
Services Integration Act of 1948 and had concluded that Congress had intended
the WAC and other women's services to be limited to one temporary colonel each.
He noted that he had discussed the matter with the WAC director, "who quite
understandably does not concur." As a result of this memorandum, the secretary
of defense disapproved the DACOWITS recommendation. This did not, however, close
the issue.51
[182]
The members of DACOWITS tried a new
tactic. They sent their request for a change in the law on the promotion and
retirement of women officers to the President's Commission on the Status of
Women, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. President Kennedy had established the commission
in December 1961 to examine federal laws and policies that might discriminate
against women.52
At the commission's request, on 7 November 1962, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Carlisle P. Runge, accompanied by Mrs. Donald Quarles, chairwoman of DACOWITS,
and Lt. Col. Kathryn J. Royster, executive secretary of DACOWITS, traveled to
Hyde Park, New York, to brief the commission. Mr. Runge defended his department's
decision not to seek a change in the law regarding women officers; Mrs. Quarles
and Colonel Royster argued for the requested legislation. A few days later,
the commission unanimously approved a resolution recommending the change and
sent it to President Kennedy.53
On 10 July, Secretary McNamara wrote Mrs. Roosevelt, "In response to the
adoption of the resolution, the Administration has approved the recommended
action and the Department of Defense will now take the necessary steps to modify
the proposed legislation." 54
When the Bolte legislation was revised, it included a provision that removed
career restrictions on women officers.
The Bolte proposals now appeared to
be the Corps' best hope of expanding officer promotion programs; but they were
not a sure solution. From the moment the legislation was unveiled, some of its
provisions aroused bitter controversy-a single promotion list, an up-or-out
policy for some officers, a new formula for computing the number of authorized
general (flag) officers, and use of the "best qualified" promotion
method. The services disagreed among themselves on so many provisions that the
Bolte legislation was not introduced in Congress for several years.55
As a result, hope for more WAC colonels waned.
Despite the setbacks regarding promotions,
the last months of Colonel Milligan's tenure were marked by personal changes
and professional successes. In November 1961, she married Elmer E. Rasmuson
of Anchorage, Alaska, and formally announced she would retire on 31 July 1962.
The only WAC director to marry while in office, Colonel Milligan changed her
name to Rasmuson immediately after her marriage.56
[183]
TORCHLIGHT PARADE, WAC CENTER, FORT
MCCLELLAN, 14 May 1964.
Before leaving, however, Colonel Rasmuson
launched another initiative designed to resolve a WAC assignment problem. Existing
policy allowed WACs to be assigned to positions in service-type (noncombat)
Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units or in Table of Distribution
(TD) units. Because all TDs had noncombat missions, fixed locations, and a gender
coding system, the Army primarily assigned WACs to TD units. Few women went
to TOE units because even the service-type units had contingency plans for combat
duty. In addition, no code was provided by which TOE commanders could designate
spaces for WACs and thus requisition them. Nonetheless, TOE commanders had accepted
WACs offered by TAG Assignment Division to fill noncombat MOSs in units not
highly vulnerable to early deployment. In January 1962, when a proposed regulation
on preparing TOE manning documents was being circulated for comment in the Pentagon,
Colonel Rasmuson seized the opportunity to recommend that a code be added to
designate spaces that could be filled interchangeably by either a man or a woman-commissioned,
warrant, or enlisted. Her suggestion was approved and the revised
[184]
COL. MARY LOUISE MILLIGAN
RASMUSON and Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
DA, at her retirement at Fort McClellan, 31 July 1962.
regulation, published in June 1964,
included this provision .57
Although the code did not induce TOE commanders to designate many spaces for
WACs or to requisition them properly, the action laid the groundwork for establishing
an enforceable, interchangeable system in both TOE and TD manning documents
later on.
[185]
On 14 May 1962, the WAC was twenty years
old, and WACs around the world celebrated the event. In Washington, Colonel
Rasmuson presided over ceremonies honoring General Marshall and Congresswoman
Edith Nourse Rogers, then joined the former directors Westray Boyce Leslie,
Mary A. Hallaren, and Irene O. Galloway in hosting an anniversary reception
at Fort Myer. The next day, President Kennedy received Colonel Rasmuson, the
former directors, and director-designate Lt. Col. Emily C. Gorman at the White
House to congratulate them on the anniversary.58
At WAC Center, a torchlight parade, which had become traditional, wound its
way from the training battalion area to the Hilltop Service Club where the trainees
enjoyed a birthday cake and a talent show. The WAC Officers Association hosted
a reception at the Fort McClellan officers club.
On 31 July 1962, Colonel Rasmuson's
retirement ceremony was held at the WAC Center. General Vittrup, DCSPER, attended
and presented her second award of the Legion of Merit and a scroll for distinguished
service from Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker.59
In five and a half years as director,
Colonel Rasmuson had accomplished most of the things she wanted to do. WAC strength
had increased from 8,300, on 31 January 1957, to 11,100. The Army had opened
twenty-six new MOSs for active duty enlisted women and fifty for WAC reservists.
The Bolte legislation, under revision, included a provision to eliminate WAC
officer promotion restrictions. Congress had granted active duty credit for
WAAC time to women with further military service, and it had corrected inequities
for WAC reserve officers. Colonel Rasmuson's public relations efforts had enhanced
the WAC image and helped convince the public and Army men of the value of the
WAC service. Within the Corps, morale and appearance had improved with issue
of the modern Army green uniform. But even as Colonel Rasmuson left office,
it was evident that new situations on the horizon would precipitate challenges
in WAC management and manpower for the incoming director.
[186]
Endnotes
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