Chapter IV:
Where Is The Enemy
The ease with which American forces
landed and established themselves on Okinawa gave rise to widespread speculation
as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Army. The most optimistic view was that
the enemy had been strategically outguessed and had prepared for the Americans
at some other island, such as Formosa. Or, if Okinawa was not to be another
Kiska, there was the possibility that the Marine diversion in the south had
drawn the Japanese forces to that area. While the real attack forces approached
by a roundabout route, covered by an early morning fog and artificial smoke,
the approach of the diversion troops had been in full view of the enemy. Again,
the Japanese might be conserving their strength for a bold counterattack as
soon as American forces should be irrevocably committed to the beaches; but
the time for such a counterattack came and went and still the enemy gave no
sign.
The truth was, as the Americans were
soon to discover, that the enemy was indeed on Okinawa in great strength, and
that he had a well-thought-out plan for meeting the invasion.1
The task of defending the Ryukyus was
entrusted to the Japanese 32d Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima.2
General Ushijima had assumed command in August 1944, relieving Lt. Gen. Masao
Watanabe who had activated the 32d Army in the preceding April. On assuming
command, General Ushijima and his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Isamu Cho, had reorganized
the staff of the Army, replacing the incumbents with bright young officers
from Imperial Headquarters. As reconstituted, the staff was distinguished by
its youth, low rank, and ability. Col. Hiromichi Yahara, the only holdover from
the old staff, was retained as senior staff officer in charge of operations.
[84]
General Ushijima, according to the members
of his staff, was a calm and very capable officer who inspired confidence among
his troops. He had commanded an infantry group in Burma early in the war and
came to his new assignment from the position of Commandant of the Japanese Military
Academy at Zama. General Cho was a hard-driving, aggressive officer who had
occupied high staff positions with the troops in China, Malaya, and Burma and
had come to Okinawa from the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Department in
Tokyo. Colonel Yahara enjoyed the reputation of being a brilliant tactician,
conservative and calculating in his decisions. The combination of Ushijima's
mature judgment, Cho's supple mind and aggressive energy, and the shrewd discernment
of Yahara gave the 32d Army a balanced and impressively able high command
3
Prior to the activation of the 32d
Army on 1 April 1944, Okinawa had been defended by a small and poorly trained
garrison force. In June, before the American landings in the Marianas, the Japanese
planned to reinforce the garrison with nine infantry and three artillery battalions.4
The first reinforcement to reach Okinawa was the 44th Independent Mixed
Brigade, which arrived late in June. The 9th Division landed on
the island in July and was followed in August by the 62d Division and
the 24th Division. Artillery, supporting troops, and service elements
arrived during the summer and fall of 1944.
The Japanese plans for the defense of
the Ryukyus were disrupted when the veteran 9th Division left Okinawa
for Formosa early in December, as part of the stream of reinforcements started
toward the Philippines after the invasion of Leyte. It was intended to replace
the division, but shortage of shipping made this impossible. Of the remaining
combat units, the 62d Division was considered by the commanding general
and his staff to be the best in the 32d Army. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Takeo
Fujioka, the division was formed from the 63d and 64th Brigades,
each consisting of four independent infantry battalions which had fought in
China since 1938. It lacked divisional artillery but by April 1945 had been
brought up to a strength of about 14,000 by the addition of two independent
infantry battalions and a number of Boeitai (Okinawa Home Guards).
[85]
JAPANESE COMMANDERS on Okinawa (photographed early in February 1945).
In center: (1) Admiral Minoru Ota, (2) Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushijima, (3) Lt.
Gen. Isamu Cho, (4) Col. Hitoshi Kanayama, (5) Col. Kikuji Hongo, and (6)
Col. Hiromichi Yahara.
[86]
As finally organized, each of the independent
infantry battalions was composed of five rifle companies, a machine gun company,
and an infantry gun company, with a total battalion strength of approximately
1,200 men. (See Chart V.)
Unlike the 62d Division, the
24th was a triangular division, consisting of the 22d, 32d,
and 89th Infantry Regiments and the 42d Field Artillery Regiment;
it had never seen combat. In January 1945 each of the infantry regiments had
incorporated 300 Okinawan conscripts into its ranks and had been reorganized.
After the reorganization a regiment consisted of three battalions of three rifle
companies each, with each company reduced from 290 to 180 men. The total strength
of the division, including Okinawans, was more than 15,000.
The 44th Independent Mixed Brigade
consisted of the 2d Infantry Unit and the 15th Independent Mixed
Regiment and had a strength of about 5,000 men. The brigade had lost most
of its original personnel by American submarine action while en route to Okinawa
in June 1944, and it had been reconstructed around a nucleus of 600 survivors.
The latter, plus replacements from Kyushu and conscripted Okinawans, were reorganized
into the 2d Infantry Unit, of approximately regimental strength but without
a full complement of weapons and equipment. The 15th Independent Mixed Regiment
was flown to Okinawa at the end of June 1944 and assigned to the brigade. In
addition to its three battalions of infantry, it had engineering troops and
an antitank company; by the addition of native conscripts and Boeitai
it had been brought by April 1945 to a strength of almost 2,800 men.
To add to the three major combat infantry
units, General Ushijima in February 1945 converted seven sea-raiding battalions,
formed to man suicide boats, into independent battalions for duty as infantry
troops to fill the serious shortage resulting from the withdrawal of the 9th
Division. These battalions had a strength of approximately 600 men each and
were divided among the major infantry commands. Counting these additions there
was a total of thirty-one battalions of infantry on Okinawa, of which thirty
were in the southern part.
Independent artillery units constituted
an important part of the reinforcements sent to Okinawa. Two regiments of 150-mm.
howitzers, one regiment of 75-mm. and 120-mm. guns, and one heavy artillery
battalion of 150-mm- guns were on the island by the end of 1944 to supplement
the organic divisional artillery and infantry cannon. For the first time in
the Pacific war, Japanese artillery was under a unified command; all artillery
units, with the exception of divisional artillery, were under the control of
the 5th Artillery Command. Most of the personnel of the command, which numbered
3,200, had served in other cam-
[87]
Organization of the Japanese 62d Division in Okinawa
Source: Tenth Army G-2 Intelligence Monograph Ryukyus Campaign, Part I,
Sec. B, p. 20
[88]
paigns and had been with their units
for three or four years. They were well trained by Japanese standards and were
considered among the best artillerymen in the Japanese Army.
About 10,000 naval personnel were organized
into the Okinawa Naval Base Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Minoru
Ota, which had control of all naval establishments and activities in the Ryukyus.
The unit was largely concentrated on Oroku Peninsula and just before the American
landings was reorganized as a ground combat force for the defense of the peninsula.
Only about 200 of the Force, however, had had more than superficial training
in ground combat.
Other important units on Okinawa included
the 27th Tank Regiment of about 750 men, 4 independent machine gun battalions
totaling over 1,600 men, an independent mortar regiment of 600 men, 2 light
mortar battalions comprising 1,200 men, 4 antiaircraft artillery battalions
totaling 2,000 men, 3 machine cannon battalions with 1,000 men, and 3 independent
antitank battalions and 4 independent antitank companies totaling about 1,600
men. There were also from 22,000 to 23,000 service troops of various kinds.
At the time of the American landings
on Okinawa, about 20,000 Boeitai had been mobilized by the Japanese
for duty as labor and service troops. Though these men were for the most part
not armed, they performed valuable services as ammunition and supply carriers
at the front lines and also engaged in numerous front-line and rear-area construction
and other duties. Some eventually saw combat. The Boeitai are not to
be confused with the Okinawan conscripts and reservists who were called up and
assimilated into the regular army just as were the Japanese in the home islands.
The first group of Boeitai was assembled in June 1944 to work on the
construction of airfields, but the general mobilization of natives into "National
Home Defense Units" was not ordered until January 1945, after the departure
of the 9th Division. About 17,000 Okinawans between the ages of seventeen
and forty-five were drafted to serve as Boeitai. In addition, about 750
male students of the middle schools, fourteen years of age and over, were organized
into Blood and Iron for the Emperor Duty Units and trained for guerilla warfare.
Further drafts of Boeitai were made at various times during the battle.
In addition to the Boeitai a large number of Okinawan civilians were
conscripted into the Japanese forces either to increase the strength of existing
units or to organize new units. While the actual number of Okinawans serving
with the 32d Army has not been determined, available evidence indicates that
they represented a large proportion of the total,
[89]
JAPANESE WEAPONS
50-mm. Grenade Discharger
|
Hand Grenade
|
320-mm. (Spigot) Mortar Shell
|
Satchel Charge
|
[90]
increasing the Japanese strength by
perhaps as much as one-third or more.5
When the Americans invaded Okinawa,
the total strength of the 32d Army amounted to more than 100,000 men,
including the 20,000 Boeitai draftees and an unknown number of conscripted
Okinawans. The army proper totaled 77,000, consisting of 39,000 Japanese troops
in infantry combat units and 38,000 in special troops, artillery, and service
units. (For the troop list of the 32d Army, see Appendix B.)
Weapons of the 32d Army
The armament of the Japanese on Okinawa
was characterized by a high proportion of artillery, mortar, antiaircraft, and
automatic weapons in relation to infantry strength. Their supply of automatic
weapons and mortars was generally in excess of authorized allotments; much of
this excess resulted from the distribution of an accumulation of such weapons
intended for shipment to the Philippines and elsewhere but prevented by the
shortage of shipping and the course of war from leaving the island. The Japanese
also had an abundant supply of ammunition, mines, hand grenades, and satchel
charges.6
On Okinawa the Japanese possessed artillery
in greater quantity, size, and variety than had been available to them in any
previous Pacific campaign. Utilizing naval coastal guns, they were able to concentrate
a total of 287 guns and howitzers of 70-mm. or larger caliber for the defense
of the island. Of this total, sixty-nine pieces could be classified as medium
artillery, including fifty-two 150-mm. howitzers and twelve 150-mm- guns. The
smaller pieces included 170 guns and howitzers of calibers of 70- and 75-mm.
In addition, seventy-two 75-mm. antiaircraft guns and fifty-four 20-mm. machine
cannon were available for use in ground missions.
The principal mortar strength of the
32d Army was represented by ninety-six 81-mm. mortars of the two light
mortar battalions. The Japanese also possessed, in greater numbers than had
previously been encountered, the large 320-mm. mortars, commonly called spigot
mortars; the 1st Artillery Mortar Regiment, reputed to be the only one
of its kind in the Japanese Army, was armed with twenty-four of these. Standard
equipment of the ground combat units of the army included about 1,100 50-mm,
grenade dischargers (knee mortars).
[91]
To counter American tank strength, the
Japanese relied, among other things, on an unusually large number of antitank
guns, especially the 47-mm. type. The independent antitank units had a total
of fifty-two 47-mm. antitank guns, while twenty-seven 37-mm. antitank guns were
distributed among the other units of the Army. The entire Japanese tank
force, however, consisted of only fourteen medium and thirteen light tanks,
the heaviest weapon of which was the 57-mm. gun mounted on the medium tanks.
The 32d Army relied heavily
on a great number of automatic weapons, well emplaced and plentifully supplied
with ammunition. Its units possessed a total of 333 heavy and 1,208 light machine
guns. In the course of the battle many more were taken from tanks being used
as pillboxes and from wrecked airplanes. The 62d Division alone wielded
nearly half the automatic weapons of the 32d Army and was by far its
most potent unit.
The active formulation of a defense
plan for the Ryukyus dates from the American capture of the Marianas in June
and July 1944. The first plan for the ground defense of the Ryukyus was established
in a 32d Army directive of 19 July 1944. This document outlined a plan
to destroy the Americans at the water's edge; that failing, to "annihilate"
them from previously constructed positions, embodying a fortified defense in
depth. In accordance with this directive, construction of cave and underground
positions began in the summer of 1944. The command on Okinawa was convinced
that the situation was urgent and informed the troops that "the Empire
is determined to fight a show-down battle with an all-out effort for the preservation
of national unity when the enemy advances to the Nansei Shoto." 7
In instructions issued in August 32d Army Headquarters stated:
The enemy counteroffensive has become
increasingly severe and they have infiltrated into our central Pacific defense
area and are now boldly aiming toward the Nansei Shoto. Should we be unable
to defend the Nansei Shoto, the mainland and the southern frontier would become
isolated. Thus, the execution of the present war would be extremely difficult
and would become a life-and-death problem for our nation. 8
In the early part of 1945 important
changes were made in the original defense plan. It was decided not to attempt
the destruction of the invading
[92]
forces at the beaches, but to have the
32d Army offer a strong resistance around a central fortified position;
a decisive land battle would be avoided until the Kamikaze planes and
the Japanese fleet should destroy the American warships and transports. The
general character of the final plan reflected the critical situation that faced
General Ushijima with the departure of the 9th Division for Formosa
and with the fading of prospects for reinforcements. He had to alter his plans
to fit his resources, so depleted by now that he had to mobilize virtually the
entire civilian population of the island.
The Japanese high command was determined
to hold Okinawa and planned to employ the major portion of the Empire's remaining
air strength as well as a large portion of its fleet in an attack on the American
sea forces. The Japanese hoped to isolate and weaken the invading ground forces
by destroying the American naval units and support shipping lying off Okinawa.
To accomplish this, they relied chiefly on bomb-laden planes guided to their
targets by suicide pilots, members of the Japanese Navy's Special Attack
Corps known as the Kamikaze (Divine Wind) Corps. This desperate
measure was expected to equalize the uneven ground battle by cutting off the
Americans from supplies and reinforcements. It would enable the 32d Army
to drive the invaders into the sea.
Despite the hopes of the Japanese high
command, planning of the 32d Army for the defense of Okinawa proceeded
on the assumption that it was impossible to defeat the enemy and that .the most
that could be done was to deny him the use of the island for as long a period
as possible and inflict the maximum number of casualties.9
Acting on this assumption, General Ushijima drew his forces together into the
southern part of Okinawa and, from the strongly fortified positions around Shuri,
prepared to make his stand there as costly to the enemy as possible. He would
not go out to meet the invaders; he would wait for them to come to him, and
force them to fight on his own terms. The 32d Army artillery was instructed
not to fire on the invading ships and landing forces, in order to avoid revealing
its positions and exposing them to the devastating naval gunfire of the Americans.
Units were not to oppose landings in their sectors until enough enemy troops
had been brought ashore to render escape by sea impossible. The 32d Army
planned to defend only the southern third of Okinawa strongly. The principal
defenses would be established in the rugged ground north of Naha, Shuri, and
Yonabaru. Landings north of this line would not be opposed; south of it the
Americans would be met on the beaches.
[93]
Wherever the Americans landed, they
would eventually come up against the Shuri defenses, where the main battle would
be fought.10
The Japanese estimate of American plans
was very accurate. The enemy expected the Americans to land across the Hagushi
beaches on the west coast, with from six to ten divisions, and to strike out
for the Yontan and Kadena airfields. He anticipated that American landing forces
would form large beachheads of 2-division strength each, hold within these perimeters
until sufficient supplies were unloaded to permit a strong attack, and then
advance behind massed tanks and concentrated artillery fire. The Japanese estimated
that it would take the Americans about ten days to launch their attack against
the main Shuri defenses. They believed that the Americans intended to draw the
main Japanese force into the Shuri lines so that a not too costly secondary
landing could be effected with perhaps one division on the east coast somewhere
south of Shuri, near Minatoga.11
The 32d Army disposed its available
troops in accordance with its general plan of defense and its estimate of the
enemy's capabilities. Only two battalions of the 2d Infantry Unit were
left in the north to defend not only the Motobu Peninsula but also Ie Shima,
where they destroyed the island's airfield.12
The only force stationed in the area immediately behind the Hagushi beaches
was the 1st Specially Established Regiment, Boeitai, which was ordered to fight
a delaying action and then, after destroying the two airfields in the sector,
to retreat.13
The 62d Division manned the defensive belt across the island north of
the Naha Shuri-Yonabaru line. Its 63d Brigade was to absorb the shock
of the American attack southward at the narrow waist of the island between Chatan
and Toguchi, while the main line of resistance was established from Uchitomari
to Tsuwa north of the Shuri defenses. Deployed to support the 63d, the
64th Brigade was dug in to fight in the successive positions around
Shuri. Artillery attached to the 62d Division was emplaced in direct
support on the west side of the line.14
(See Map No. VI.)
[94]
Having selected the Shuri area as their
main battle position, the Japanese with shrewdness and great industry organized
the ground for a strong defense. The main zone of defense was planned as a series
of concentric positions adapted to the contours of the area. Caves, emplacements,
blockhouses, and pillboxes were built into the hills and escarpments, connected
by elaborate underground tunnels and skillfully camouflaged; many of the burial
tombs were fortified. The Japanese took full advantage of the terrain to organize
defensive areas and strong points that were mutually supporting, and they fortified
the reverse as well as the forward slopes of hills. Artillery and mortars were
emplaced in the caves and thoroughly integrated into the general scheme of defensive
fires.15
To meet the threat of landings in the
south, the 32d Army stationed the 24th Division in defensive
positions covering the Minatoga beaches and extending across the southern end
of the island.16
The 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was moved to the Chinen Peninsula
and was ordered to cooperate with the 24th Division in repelling any
landings in the area. Artillery was registered on the Minatoga beaches, and
some of the 320-mm. mortars were moved to this sector.17
During the long period of planning the
Imperial General Staff and the 32d Army were constantly concerned with
fixing the probable date of the American invasion; each changed its view several
times and on occasion they were not in agreement. It was during and after the
invasion of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, in the summer of 1944, that the Japanese
first expected an immediate invasion of Okinawa and, accordingly, began to pour
troops into the island. But after the invasion of the Palaus and Leyte in September
and October 1944 the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo considered it unlikely
that sufficient American troops would be immediately available for another major
operation.18
During the Philippines operations at the end of 1944 the Imperial General Staff
in Tokyo was in doubt as to whether the next blow would fall on the south China
coast or on Formosa,19
although the command of the 32d Army was still convinced that Okinawa
would be invaded and pushed forward preparations for its defense.20
[95]
Again, at the beginning of 1945 the
Imperial General Staff was uncertain whether the next American attack would
be against Formosa or Okinawa. By the end of February, as a result of the invasion
of Iwo Jima, which pointed to the American strategy of cutting off the Japanese
home islands from the mainland and the Indies, the Japanese concluded that Formosa
would be bypassed and that Okinawa would be the next target.21
Their aerial reconnaissance and intelligence reports revealed an increase in
west-bound American shipping to the Philippines and the Marianas during the
latter part of February--an increase that swelled to large proportions early
in March; this seemed a clear indication of the imminence of another American
operation.22
When the invasion fleet appeared off Iwo Jima, it was considered by some to
be a feint for the invasion of Okinawa.23
With the Iwo Jima battle in progress and submarine activity increasing around
the Ryukyus, it was taken for granted that the invasion of Okinawa would soon
follow, on or about 1 April 1945 24
As one of the last steps in preparing
for the expected struggle, the Japanese command on Okinawa on 21 March ordered
all air, shipping, and rear-echelon units to "prepare for ground combat."
On 27 March, the day after the American invasion of the Keramas, 32d Army
advised its units that "the enemy is planning to land his main strength
tomorrow, the 28th, on the western coast of southern Okinawa, in particular
in the Yontan-Kadena sector." 25
When the American forces invaded Okinawa, a few days later than had been predicted,
the 32d Army adhered strictly to its plan of offering little resistance
until the invaders should come up against their outposts at the Shuri line.
The Japanese Combined Fleet Commander, meanwhile, prepared to execute his plan,
delayed by Task Force 58's foray into the Inland Sea in March, to destroy the
American fleet by air and surface action. Before many days had passed, the enemy
was to react to the invasion with a fury never before encountered.
The American command was aware of the
likelihood of formidable attacks by both air and sea on the assault forces.
Okinawa was close to the Japanese home-
[96]
land, where the remaining strength of
the enemy's naval and air forces was concentrated. To meet the expected air
offensive from the near-by fields of Kyushu. Shanghai, and Formosa, the Americans
relied upon Task Force 58, the Tenth Army's Tactical Air Force, the guns of
the fleet and supply ships, the British task force, and land-based antiaircraft
artillery. To ensure early warning of Japanese raids, the Navy established around
Okinawa a ring of picket stations, manned by destroyers and destroyer-type vessels,
to which gunboats (LCS) and later LSM(R) types were added to give increased
fire power. These stations were all less than 100 miles from Zampa Point, the
peninsula just north of the Marine beaches; some, were only a few miles off
the coasts of the island. Combat air patrols were maintained day and night over
the picket stations, which could also call for aid from the routine combat air
patrol of from 48 to 120 planes aloft during the daytime, orbiting in depth
in a circle around Okinawa. Task Force 58, deployed just to the east of Okinawa,
with its own picket group of from 6 to 8 destroyers, kept 13 carriers (7 CV
and 6 CVL) on duty from 23 March to 27 April and a smaller number thereafter.
Until 27 April from 14 to 18 converted carriers (CVE's) were in the area at
all times, and until 20 April British Task Force 57, with 4 large and 6 converted
carriers, remained off the Sakishima Islands to protect the southern flank.
Two Marine Fighter Groups were installed and operating at Yontan and Kadena
airfields by 9 April, and other Marine and Army Air Groups were added later.
All assault antiaircraft artillery of the XXIV Corps was ashore by the night
of 4 April, and that of III Amphibious Corps by 12 April. Japanese airmen were
to find these combined defenses formidable.26
Enemy air opposition had been relatively
light during the first few days after the landings. On 6 April the expected
air reaction materialized with a fierce attack of 400 planes which had flown
down from Kyushu to drive the invaders from Okinawa. The raids' began at dawn,
and by noon Task Force 58 had shot down seven possible suicide planes. Throughout
the afternoon the battle increased in intensity. Patrol and picket ships, which
throughout the operation proved an irresistible attraction to enemy planes,
were a favorite target. Japanese planes also appeared from time to time over
the Hagushi beaches and transport area and were taken under fire by the ship
and shore
[97]
KAMIKAZE ATTACKS resulted in many hits, more near
misses. U. S. S. Sangamon (above) was just missed but was hit in
a later attack. Another near miss (below) sent U. S. battleship Missouri's
gunners scurrying from upper turret while those in Turret 9 looked to see
what was going on.
[98]
batteries. On such occasions the raider,
ringed with bright streams of tracer bullets from automatic weapons, would streak
across a sky filled with black puffs of smoke from hundreds of bursting shells,
and in the course of seconds would plunge into the sea in a geyser of water
and smoke, or crash into a ship with an even greater explosion of smoke and
flame. Directed against such raiders, friendly fire killed four Americans and
wounded thirty-four others in the XXIV Corps zone, ignited an ammunition dump
near Kadena, destroyed an oil barge, and in the late afternoon shot down two
American planes over the beaches. Some ships also suffered damage and casualties
from friendly fire. Twenty-two of twenty-four suicide crashes were successful,
sinking two destroyers, a mine sweeper, two ammunition ships, and an LST. A
ship rescuing survivors from the lost LST was itself struck by a suicide plane
soon after but was not seriously damaged. The attack cost the Japanese about
300 planes; 65 were splashed by fliers from the Essex alone. Unloading
continued on the Hagushi beaches almost without pause, and the American fleet,
although it had taken severe blows, was still intact.27
On the night of 6-7 April the Japanese
fleet came out for the planned surface attack on the American sea forces. An
American submarine lying off Kyushu reported the movement of the Japanese warships,
and forty planes of Task Force 58 began a far-flung search at dawn on 7 April.
At 0822 a plane from the Essex sighted the enemy force, which consisted of the
battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi, and eight destroyers,
in the East China Sea on a course toward Okinawa. Task Force 58, which had started
northeastward at 0400 that morning in order to close with the enemy, launched
its planes at a point estimated to be 240 miles from the enemy fleet. The. first
attacks through heavy but inaccurate antiaircraft fire scored at least eight
torpedo and five bomb hits on the Yamato, the Yahagi, and three
of the destroyers. Subsequent attacks succeeded in sinking the Yamato,
the Yahagi, and four destroyers; one destroyer was seriously damaged
and one left burning. Task Force 58 lost only 10 planes out of the 386 that
participated. Okinawa was now safe from surface attack.28
While the strike on the Yamato
was in progress, Task Force 58 was busy warding off enemy air attacks and in
the course of the day shot down fifty-four planes. A suicide plane dropped its
bomb from a height of fifty feet onto the Hancock's flight deck, then itself
plowed through a group of planes aft. Although
[99]
SINKING OF THE YAMATO, last of Japan's super-battleships, was accomplished
by Task Force 58 before the Yamato had ever fired her main batteries
in World War II. With her escorts near by, she went up in a blast of smoke
and flame.
[100]
seriously damaged, the carrier landed
her own planes when they returned at i63o. British Task Force 57 was able to
keep the airfields of Sakishima largely inoperative during the Japanese air
and sea offensive of 6-7 April.29
The enemy continued during April to
deliver periodic heavy air attacks. Daytime raids were generally staged against
Task Force 58, the picket ships, and shipping beyond the range of land-based
antiaircraft artillery. At night, when the supply ships shrouded themselves
in artificial fog as raiders approached, the enemy usually struck Yontan and
Kadena airfields, with the Hagushi beaches a secondary target. Most of these
raids were made between 2100 and 2300, and 0200 and 0400. The Japanese, clever
at deception, sometimes shelled one of the airfields with their artillery, leading
the Americans to expect an attack at that point, and then followed with an air
raid on the other field. On occasion enemy planes would follow American planes
in at dusk, circle the fields with their lights on, and then bomb and strafe
the runways and storage areas.30
Task Force 58 was heavily engaged on
it April, and near misses by four suicide planes sent the carrier Enterprise
to Ulithi for repairs. On the next day the main weight of the attack shifted
to the picket ships and the Hagushi anchorage. Seventeen Allied ships were hit
and two sunk. The destroyer M. L. Abele was sent to the bottom when hit by both
a suicide plane and a Baka bomb; the latter was a potentially dangerous but
not often successful piloted, rocket-driven projectile launched by a twin-engined
bomber. Again on 25-16 April, despite strikes by Task Force 58 against Kyushu
airfields, Japanese airplanes appeared in strength at Okinawa. On the 16th a
Kamikaze plane crashed the Intrepid's flight deck, and other
suicide planes damaged 10 ships and sank a destroyer; 270 enemy planes were
shot from the air and many more destroyed on the ground. Eventful days, too,
were 22, 27, and 28 April. On the last of these, starting at 1400, a force of
200 Japanese planes attacked Okinawa in 44 raids. Several American ships were
damaged, but 118 of the attacking planes were destroyed. The hospital ship Comfort,
although following hospital procedure, was crashed by a suicide plane 50 miles
south of Okinawa. The Comfort's casualty list was 63, of whom 29 were
killed and 1 missing.31
American planes too had struck hard.
During the month the XXI Bomber Command had hit Japan with 15,712 tons of bombs;
36 percent of the tonnage
[101]
had been dropped on Kyushu airfields
in support of the Okinawa operation, 29 percent on the Japanese aircraft industry,
and 34 percent on other Japanese urban industrial areas. Formosa was being struck
from the Philippines.
During the period 26 March-30 April,
20 American ships were sunk and 157 damaged by enemy action. Suicide attacks
accounted for the sinking of 14 ships and the damaging of 90, while other air
attacks damaged 47 ships and sank 1. Two of the largest carriers-the Hancock
and the Enterprise-one CVL, the San Jacinto, and the British
carrier Intrepid sustained serious damage from suicide planes. Picket
ships suffered especially heavy attrition, and as quickly as land-based radar
could be installed on Okinawa and neighboring islands the number of picket stations
was reduced. Five picket stations remained after completion of radar installations
at Hedo Point on 21 April and in Ie Shima on 23 April. Although the seizure
of the Kerama Islands had substantially reduced this threat, suicide boats continued
to be active on a small scale, particularly in the Naha and Yonabaru areas at
night. Up to 30 April suicide boats sank one ship and damaged six. Navy casualties
were heavy; during April they totaled 956 killed, 2,650 wounded, and 897 missing
in action.32
For their part, the Japanese had lost
up to 30 April more than 1,100 planes in the battle to Allied naval forces alone,
and many more to land-based antiaircraft artillery and planes of the Tactical
Air Force. Not only had the task force led by the Yamato been defeated
and for the most part sunk, but a considerable number of other Japanese combatant
and auxiliary vessels had also been sunk or damaged.
More important, the Japanese plan to
destroy or drive off the fleet and isolate the troops, thus winning the battle
for Okinawa, had been frustrated. Instead, the Japanese on the island were completely
cut off and isolated from their near-by homeland. The invading warships and
transports remained and, despite the weight of the blows delivered against them,
continued to pour supplies into Okinawa and to keep the lanes open for fresh
supplies from the other side of the Pacific Ocean. Thus American ground troops
could work their way inland with the assurance of an unbroken supply line.33
[102]
page created 10 December 2001
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