Chapter X:
QUADRANT - Shaping the Patterns: August 1943
As the QUADRANT Conference drew near, General Marshall and his staff were
convinced of the need for a showdown with the British. Once before-in July
1942-Marshall had led a move for a showdown. Then he had had to yield on a
cross-Channel operation and accept TORCH instead. A series of
opportunistic moves had followed in the Mediterranean-moves the U.S.
staff sought to parallel with limited offensive actions in the Pacific.
Marshall had fought to keep the Mediterranean commitments limited while he
struggled to keep the BOLERO idea alive and the war against Japan
progressing. But there was always the danger that the two limited
wars-one in the Pacific, the other in the Mediterranean-would become
all-out wars or absorb so much that little would be left for a major
offensive in northwest Europe. The Army planners now feared that the
Mediterranean trend had already gone so far as to be well-nigh
irreversible. There were also signs, as Marshall was aware, of increasing
restlessness among Navy planners, anxious to get on with the Pacific war,
over his European strategy. At hand was an acceptable plan for
concentration in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation-Plan
OVERLORD. The time for
a final decision on European strategy therefore appeared to Marshall to
have arrived. But would the President now support him, and, if so, would
they be able to convince the Prime Minister and his staff?
Staff Planning
and the President's
Position
Part of the answer was soon to come. General Marshall, on the eve of his
departure for Quebec, met with the President at the White House to
discuss the line of action to be followed at QUADRANT. At this meeting on
9 August, the President observed that the planners were "always
conservative and saw all the difficulties," and that more could usually be
accomplished than they would admit. Between OVERLORD and post-HUSKY
operations in the Mediterranean (now called PRICELESS), he assured the
Army Chief of Staff that he was insistent on OVERLORD. But he felt that
more could be done in the Mediterranean than was currently proposed by the
U. S. planners. Pointing to the scheduled departure of seasoned troops from
the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom, he agreed that the seven
battle-tested
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divisions be provided for OVERLORD. He proposed, however, that seven fresh
divisions be dispatched from the United States for PRICELESS. At the same
time the President assured Marshall that he did not wish to have anything
to do with an operation into the Balkans nor did he even intend to agree
to a British expedition in that area that would cost the United States
vital resources such as ships and landing craft necessary for other
operations. He was in favor of securing a position in Italy to the north
of Rome and taking Sardinia and Corsica, thereby posing a serious threat
to southern France.
General Marshall replied that the United States "had strained programmed
resources well to the limit" in the agreements already reached regarding
OVERLORD and PRICELESS. While the movement of three divisions from
PRICELESS forces to OVERLORD could be undertaken without a loss in troop
lift and with some advantage in equipping the French, beyond this point
movements to OVERLORD of veteran units would cost the United States part
of its troop lift. Marshall feared that the proposed movement from the
United States to PRICELESS would result in a corresponding reduction for
OVERLORD. He promised the President, however, that he would have a
critical review made of the logistical factors involved. In a humorous
vein, the President remarked that he did not like Marshall's use of the
word "critical" since he wanted help in carrying out his idea rather than
obstacles placed in the way.1
The Army planners that same day presented a report on the logistical implications of reinforcing PRICELESS.2 It indicated that, on the basis of
optimistic predictions of available personnel lift in the Atlantic, it
would be possible, by 1 May 1944, to build up in the United Kingdom the
force of 1,300,000 U.S. troops provided for in TRIDENT estimates and, in
addition, to lift approximately 100,000 more either to the United Kingdom
or to some other theater.3 Recent troop lists prepared by the European
Theater of Operations, however, called for over 1,400,000 U.S. troops by I
May 1944 to make up balanced striking forces for the Combined Bomber
Offensive (POINTBLANK) and OVERLORD. If the TRIDENT estimates of 1,300,000
were adhered to, and if the optimistic shipping estimates for the
Atlantic proved correct, the Army planners admitted that seven U.S.
divisions could be lifted to North Africa by the middle of 1944 without
affecting the availability of divisions for OVERLORD as set at TRIDENT.
But, the planners pointed out, the utilization of personnel shipping to
lift troops to the Mediterranean before June 1944 would not contribute as
much to striking a direct decisive blow at the European Axis as the
employment of the same shipping to insure a well-balanced force in the
United Kingdom. They observed, moreover, that it was the opinion of
General Eisenhower and of the JCS that the force
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currently committed to the Mediterranean (less the seven divisions
scheduled for transfer to the United Kingdom) would be adequate to achieve
the desired objective of occupying Italy to a line north of Rome, seizing
Sardinia and Corsica, and making a diversionary effort against France from
the Mediterranean. The addition of seven divisions to General Eisenhower's
forces in the Mediterranean would make a total of thirty-one divisions
available in that area, as compared with twenty-nine for the main effort,
OVERLORD. The Army planners therefore called for the full troop lift of
1,400,000 to be allocated to OVERLORD and POINTBLANK.4
At the session of the JCS at noon on 10 August, shortly before a
scheduled conference of the JCS with the President, General Marshall
reported the President's inclination to furnish seven new divisions from
the United States to replace the seven veteran divisions scheduled for
transfer to the United Kingdom. Arguing that this reinforcement of
PRICELESS would occur at the expense of the build-up for OVERLORD, he
emphasized that, even if the seven additional divisions were provided,
they could not arrive in the Mediterranean before June 1944. The
President, he went on, should be informed of General Eisenhower's report
that he had sufficient resources to conduct the proposed operations in
Italy. The President should also be apprised that an additional force of
seven divisions would in reality constitute an expeditionary force
available for use in the Balkans. General Marshall felt that the President
was opposed to operations in the Balkans, and particularly to U.S. troop
participation in them, on the ground that they represented an uneconomical
use of shipping and also because of the political implications involved.
In rallying the JCS against the Presidential proposal, General Marshall
was supported by Admiral King, who was particularly fearful lest the
provision of shipping for seven new divisions to the Mediterranean
seriously curtail planned Pacific operations.5
Meanwhile-at one o'clock that same afternoon-Secretary of War Stimson, who
had recently returned from the United Kingdom, conferred with the
President at the White House. That very morning, he had decided to present
his conclusions to the President in writing. So serious did he consider
the action he was about to recommend decisions that would affect
Marshall's position in the Washington high command-that he called Marshall
in to let him read what he was going to say, in case Marshall had any
vital objections. Stimson recorded the reaction of the Army Chief of Staff
in his diary entry for that day: "He said he had none but he did not want
to have it appear that I had consulted him about it. I told him that for
that very reason I had signed the paper before I showed it to him or
anyone else." Stimson also recorded that the conference that followed at
the White House was "one of the most satisfactory" he had ever had with
the President.
In the course of the conversation he produced his letter of conclusions.
In it Stimson reasoned:
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We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to
grips with our German enemy under a British commander. His Prime Minister
and his Chief of Imperial Staff are frankly at variance with such a
proposal. The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque still hang too
heavily over the imagination of these leaders of his government. Though
they have rendered lip service to the operation, their hearts are not in
it and it will require more independence, more faith, and more vigor than
it is reasonable to expect we can find in any British commander to
overcome the natural difficulties of such an operation carried on in such
an atmosphere of his government.
Stimson went on to point out that the difference between the Americans and
the British was "a vital difference of faith." The U.S. staff believed
that only by massing the great vigor and might of the two countries under
overwhelming mastery of the air could Germany be defeated. The British
theory was that Germany would be beaten by a "series of attritions" in the
Mediterranean and the Balkans. The USSR, to which both the United States
and Great Britain were pledged to open a second front, would not be fooled
by "pinprick warfare"-a special danger in the light of postwar problems.
Stimson concluded his letter:
I believe therefore that the time has come for you to decide that your
government must assume the responsibility of leadership in this great
final movement of the European war which is now confront- 'in us. We
cannot afford to confer again g and close with a lip tribute to BOLERO
which we have tried twice and failed to carry out . . . . Nearly two years
ago the British offered us this command. I think that now it should be
accepted-if necessary, insisted on.
Finally the time had come to put ". . . our most commanding soldier in
charge of this critical operation at this critical time." Lincoln had had
to fumble by trial and error until he discovered the right man. Wilson had
to choose a relatively unknown. But Roosevelt was far more fortunate. He
had General Marshall, who
. . . already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and
as a broadminded and skillful administrator. This was shown by the
suggestion of him on the part of the British for this very post a year and
a half ago. I believe that he is the man who most surely can now by his
character and skill furnish the military leadership which is necessary to
bring our two nations together in confident joint action in this great
operation. No one knows better than I the loss in the problems of
organization and world-wide strategy centered in Washington which such a
solution would cause, but I see no other alternative to which we can turn
in the great effort which confronts us.
The President, Stimson noted, "read it [the letter] through with very
apparent interest,, approving each step after step and saying finally that
I had announced the conclusions which he had just come to himself."
6
Later on 10 August the JCS joined the Secretary and the President at the
White House to discuss the coming conference with the British at Quebec.7
At this meeting the President reported that, from his conversations with
the Secretary of War, he had learned that the
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Prime Minister currently favored operations against the Balkans but was
opposed to an operation against Sardinia. The Secretary of War qualified
this statement, pointing out that Mr. Churchill had disclaimed any wish
to land troops in the Balkans, but had indicated that the Allies could
make notable gains in that area if the Balkan peoples were given more
supplies. The Secretary of War affirmed that the British Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, wished the Allies to invade the Balkans. To
this the President added that the British Foreign Office did not wish the
Balkans to come under Soviet influence, and therefore the British wished
"to get to the Balkans first." He himself did not follow the logic of the
British thinking on the Balkans. He did not believe, he stated, that the
USSR desired to take over the Balkan states but rather that the USSR
wished to "establish kinship with other Slavic people." He assured the
U.S. military leaders that he himself was opposed to Balkan operations. In
arguing against a Balkan operation the President reasoned along the lines
of the view that had been emphasized by General Marshall and General
Handy on the undesirability of basing hopes for victory on political
imponderables. He declared that it was "unwise to plan military strategy
based on a gamble as to political results."
8
In recommending against the President's proposal for replacing the seven
trained divisions to be taken from the Mediterranean with seven from the
United States, General Marshall and Admiral King repeated the arguments
they had advanced at the meeting of the JCS earlier in the day. On the
basis of the War Department study he had made, General Marshall reported
that the seven new divisions could be transported to North Africa by the
end of June 1944 and the planned build-up for OVERLORD could still be
executed. But he emphasized General Eisenhower's belief that even without
the seven divisions to be sent to the United Kingdom he would still have a
sufficient force to conduct the projected operations in Italy, capture
Sardinia and Corsica, and have fourteen divisions available for an
invasion of southern France in co-ordination with OVERLORD. Dispatching an
extra seven divisions to the Mediterranean, Marshall argued, would meet
the desires of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, invite their use in an invasion
of the Balkans, and so extend the Mediterranean operations as to have a
harmful effect on the main effort from the United Kingdom. Following the
presentation of these arguments, the President announced that he would
advocate leaving General Eisenhower with his current build-up, less the
seven divisions earmarked for transfer to the United Kingdom.
Turning to the basic question in grand strategy, Admiral King suggested to
the President that, if the British insisted upon abandoning OVERLORD or
postponing OVERLORD indefinitely, the United States should abandon the
project. The President replied with the optimistic view that the United
States itself could, if necessary, carry out the cross-Channel operation.
He felt certain that the British would make the necessary bases available
to the United States for the operation. General Marshall ob-
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jected to the President's suggestion on the ground that fifteen British
divisions were already available in the United Kingdom. In no other place
in the world, he maintained, could fifteen divisions be put into an
operation without entailing great transportation and supply problems. The
President affirmed his wish for the preponderance of U.S. forces in
OVERLORD from the first day of the assault in order to be able to justify
the choice of an American commander for the operation. In line with the
emphasis that had been placed by Washington military planners on the
wastage in the Allied war effort resulting from past divergences from the
main plot, General Marshall cautioned the President against subsequent
changes in basic decisions. He was prepared to accept only minor
diversions from the main plan-and those only when absolutely necessary.
It was especially important to avoid such dislocation of the American war
effort as had resulted earlier from the change from BOLERO to TORCH.
Marshall reminded the President that every such shift in plans resulted
in changes in production, loading of convoys, and other phases of U.S. war
mobilization, which "reached as far back as the Middle West in the United
States."
9
The U.S. leaders left the meeting of 10 August agreed to insist on the
continuation of the current build-up for the cross-Channel operation from
the United Kingdom and on carrying Out OVERLORD as the main U.S.-U.K.
effort. The JCS now had the President behind them in their plans for
Europe.10 When they
had touched on strategy and planning differences in the war against Japan,
the JCS had urged the President to try to persuade the Prime Minister to
put full British support behind the projected Burma operations-operations
to which the President had already agreed on 26 July.11
Stimson has recorded the delight of the U.S. staff with the "clear and
definite" stand of the President on the conduct of the war against
Germany, marking the full acceptance by the Commander in Chief of the
military policy for which Stimson and Marshall had been fighting.12 The
ranks of the American high command appeared closed as never before.
Cheered as the staff was, the question remained whether the President and
his military advisers could see the agreed policy through in the
conference with the British.
[216]
The Conferees Assemble
After the completion of their preparations, the U.S. military delegation
left for Quebec. In preparing for the meetings with the British, American
military planners as well as their chiefs had carefully studied British
preparations, representation, and techniques in negotiations at past
conferences and had taken steps to match them.13
At Quebec, amid the quaint 18th century charm of the French city, the
military staffs were quartered and held their meetings in the impressive
Château Frontenac overlooking the St. Lawrence River. The President and
Prime Minister made their headquarters at the old fortress known as The
Citadel, close by the historic Plains of Abraham, and currently the summer
seat of the Governor General of Canada. Special ramps had been installed
for the President's use, and the two plenary sessions of the conference
were held here for his convenience. As the delegations assembled, the news
from the war fronts-especially of the war against Germany-was definitely
encouraging. Reports of Italian peace moves were persistent. In Sicily the
campaign was in its final stages, and by 17 August-early in the
conference-Sicily was entirely in Allied hands. On the Eastern Front the
Russians had seized the initiative and had begun to drive the Germans back
to their homeland. The Combined Bomber Offensive had finally gotten under
way in earnest. In the war on the U-boats in the Atlantic, the tide that
had turned in the spring of 1943 was running even more strongly in Allied
favor. American intelligence estimates on the eve of the conference
predicted that the German war against Allied shipping would continue, but
with diminishing effect; that the Germans would try, during 1943, to
improve their defensive position in the USSR, and to impair Soviet
offensive capabilities by attrition; and that the Germans would stand on
the strategic defensive on all fronts during 1944, yielding outlying
territories only under compulsion. The estimates held that Germany would
resist as long as there was any hope of a negotiated peace.14
In Alaska, U.S. troops had occupied Kiska, and the Japanese had finally
withdrawn from the Aleutians. General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific
forces were ready to advance on Salamaua in New Guinea and South Pacific
forces were driving ahead on the island of New Georgia. Only in the CBI
had the front remained more or less stationary. U.S. intelligence
estimates on the Pacific and Far East situation held that Japan would
probably remain on the strategic defensive unless convinced that an
attack by the USSR was imminent or that
[217]
CHATEAU FRONTENAC, OVERLOOKING THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER, scene of QUADRANT
Conference, August 1943.
[218]
TOP MILITARY PLANNERS AT QUEBEC. From left: Maj. Gen Thomas T. Handy,
Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Mai. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, and Vice Adm.
Russell Willson.
major operations were to be launched by the Allies in China. Serious
reverses for the Allies in the Pacific or for the Soviet Union in Europe
might also lead to a shift by Japan to the offensive.15
American and British planners arrived on the scene to lay the groundwork
for the conference a few days before the principals began-their
sessions.16 Then in the eleven-day period of the conference between 14 and
24 August 1943, the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff met
for a full-dress debate on Allied strategy in the war. Present among the
American delegation to assist General Marshall were General Handy, the
Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, and General Wedemeyer, the Army planner,
and a considerable number of other Washington Army planners delegated for
duties on the planning and working staff level.17
[219]
The Prime Minister brought to the conference a full staff complement,
including such special assistants as General Morgan (COSSAC), Brigadier
Wingate, and Maj. Gen. A. W. S. Mallaby, General Wavell's Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations, who had flown in from India.18 Churchill arrived at
Quebec on to August, then journeyed to Hyde Park for a brief visit with
the President, returning to Quebec on 15 August. The President did not
arrive at Quebec until the 17th-three days after the Combined Chiefs had
begun their sessions.
Debating the Issues in the War
Against Germany
The Arguments
In the discussions at QUADRANT between the staffs on the war against
Germany, the U.S. Joint Chiefs sought a final resolution of the question
whether the main effort was to be made from the United Kingdom or in the
Mediterranean.19 In the process, they sought agreement on the relationship
between operations in the two areas. As usual in the conferences with the
British in mid-war, General Marshall served as the principal American
spokesman on European strategy. In part this was recognition of his strong
convictions and his talents in advocacy and military diplomacy. In part it
was acceptance of the view that the American concept of European strategy
was essentially that of the U.S. Army and its defense in debate with the
British should properly be conducted by the War Department spokesman. As
already suggested, Marshall was convinced that a final choice between the
basic alternatives of cross-Channel versus Mediterranean now had to be
made. He was prepared and willing to risk a showdown with the British at
this point-the consequences of which he fully realized. He made clear to
his colleagues that
. . . we must go into this argument in the spirit of winning. If, after
fighting it out on that basis, the President and Prime Minister decided
that the Mediterranean strategy should be adopted, he wished that the
decision be made firm in order that definite plans could be made with
reasonable expectation of their being carried out.20
As it had previously decided, the American delegation immediately
presented its proposal that OVERLORD be given overriding priority over
other operations in the European theater.21
Sir Alan Brooke replied for the British Chiefs of Staff that the British
were in complete agreement with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that OVERLORD
should be the major U.S.-U.K. offensive for 1944. Nevertheless, he went on
to stress forcefully the necessity of achieving the three main conditions
on which the success of the OVERLORD plan was based: (1) the
[220]
reduction in German fighter strength; (2) the restriction of German
strength in France and the Low Countries and of German ability to bring in
reinforcements during the first two months; and (3) the solution of the
problem of beach maintenance. To create a situation favorable to a
successful OVERLORD was the main British aim of Allied operations in
Italy. The desired Allied, vis-à-vis enemy, strength, Brooke emphasized,
could be attained by operations in Italy to contain the maximum German
forces and by air action from the most suitable Italian bases to reduce
German fighter forces. In this connection Sir Charles Portal argued the
advantages of gaining the northern Italian airfields.22 Not too
surprisingly, the British soon turned the discussion to the much-debated
question of the seven divisions. If the seven divisions were withdrawn
from the Mediterranean, the British Chiefs argued, the Americans and
British would run risks in the Mediterranean that might preclude or
jeopardize success in OVERLORD. On the basis of this reasoning, Sir Alan
Brooke concluded, therefore, that the decision sought by the U.S. Joint
Chiefs between OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean would be "too
binding."
23
In reply, General Marshall questioned whether the necessary conditions for
OVERLORD could be brought about only by increasing Allied strength in the
Mediterranean. If Italian resistance proved to be weak, he agreed, the
Allies ought to seize as much of Italy as possible. While it would be
better if the Allies held the northern airfields of
Italy, he believed that almost as much could be accomplished from the
Florence area. In his opinion, a successful OVERLORD could be insured
only by giving it an overriding priority. Unless OVERLORD were given that
priority, the operation might never be launched. Unless the seven
divisions from the Mediterranean were dispatched and the necessary means
were concentrated for OVERLORD, OVERLORD would at best become a
"subsidiary operation." A delay in such decisions not only would hinder
the OVERLORD build-up but also would have repercussions on Pacific
operations. Marshall again emphasized, this time to the combined staffs,
that any exchange of troops contrary to TRIDENT agreements "would absorb
shipping" and upset supply arrangements "as far back as the Mississippi
River." Unless OVERLORD were given an overriding priority, General
Marshall went on, the entire U.S.-U.K. strategic concept would have to be
revised. In that event, the United States and the United Kingdom would
have to rely on air bombardment alone to defeat Germany, and only a
reinforced U.S. Army corps for an "opportunistic" cross-Channel
operation might well be left in the United Kingdom. Although the Combined
Bomber Offensive had accomplished great results, the final outcome of that
operation-and the very possibility of an opportunistic cross-Channel
undertaking - remained "speculative." Such a recasting of strategy, he
pointed out to the British, might lead to a possible reorientation of
American offensive efforts toward the Pacific.24
The British position, as could be expected, was not inflexible. On 16 Au-
[221]
MEMBERS OF U.S. AND BRITISH STAFFS CONFERRING, Quebec, 23 August 1943.
Seated around the table from left foreground: vice Adm. Lord Louis
Mountbatten, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Alan Brooke, Sir Charles Portal, Sir
John Dill, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Brigadier Harold Redman, Comdr.
R. D. Coleridge, Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, General Arnold, General
Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy, Admiral King, and Capt. F. B. Royal.
gust, General Marshall informed his American colleagues that Churchill had
told him the previous evening "that he had changed his mind over OVERLORD
and that we should use every opportunity to further that operation."
Marshall had taken the opportunity to tell the Prime Minister that he
could not agree to the logic of supporting the main effort by withdrawing
strength from it to reinforce the effort in Italy. In Marshall's view,
the British approach to OVERLORD was by "indirection."
25
To counter the British reservations and qualifications, the JCS on 16
August accepted for presentation to the CCS proposals submitted by General
Handy. Handy called for the acceptance by the CCS of the TRIDENT decision
for OVERLORD-including the definite allotment of forces for it-and of the
American proposal of overriding priority for OVERLORD, without
reservations or conditions. The JCS decided to withhold
[222]
the second part of General Handy's proposals-alternative recommendations
for a radical reversal in U.S. strategic policy -calling for the
abandonment Of OVERLORD and placing the main effort in the Mediterranean,
in the event the British Chiefs of Staff refused to back OVERLORD
wholeheartedly. On this "Mediterranean alternative" scheme, foreshadowed
in General Hull's analysis a month earlier, the JCS were noncommittal.26
At the same time, the JCS decided immediately to inform the President, who
had not yet arrived at the conference, of the emerging divergences in
British and American staff views and especially of their concern over
apparent reservations of the British on OVERLORD. General Handy was
delegated to fly to Washington at once.27
On 17 August the President arrived in Quebec to lend his support to
OVERLORD. By that time-after three days of staff debate-it was already
clear that a compromise was in the making and that the U.S. staff would
have to accept something less than "overriding priority" for the
operation.28
In arguing his case before the President and CCS in plenary session,
Churchill declared that he had not favored SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 Or ROUNDUP
in 1943, but he "strongly favored" OVERLORD for 1944.
29
His objections to the earlier operations, he stated, had been removed. He
wished all to understand, nevertheless, that the implementation of the
OVERLORD plan depended on the fulfillment of certain conditions. One of
these conditions was that no more than twelve mobile German divisions were
to be in northern France at the time the operation was mounted. Another
was that the United States and the United Kingdom had attained definite
superiority over the German fighter forces at the time of the assault. He
urged that the OVERLORD plan be subject to revision by the CCS in the
event that the German strength exceeded the twelve mobile divisions. He
also suggested that the Allies keep a "second string to their bow" in the
guise of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER-the invasion of
Norway, long a favorite project of his.30
Churchill and General Marshall agreed that an increase in the initial
assault force would greatly strengthen the OVERLORD undertaking. The Prime
[223]
Minister called for an addition of at least 25 percent strength. General
Marshall pointed out that actually there would be four and one half
divisions in the assault rather than the force of three divisions
suggested at the TRIDENT Conference. The President seized the
opportunity to express his desire, already stated to the JCS, to speed
the shipment of U.S. troops to the United Kingdom. General Marshall
repeated that the matter was being studied. At the same time, he
emphasized to the conferees that the greatest limiting factor on all the
prospective Anglo-American operations was the shortage of landing craft.
Had landing craft been available, Marshall pointed out, the
Anglo-American forces could have already made an entry into Italy.
31
Turning to Mediterranean operations, the British and U.S. military leaders
sought to speed the elimination of Italy from the war and decide the
course of action to be taken after the prospective landings in Italy.
Keeping abreast of current plans of General Eisenhower's staff for two
amphibious assaults to be launched early in September- BAYTOWN (across the
Strait of Messina) and AVALANCHE (into Salerno Bay)-they took steps to
expedite negotiations on Italian peace feelers.32 On the delicate question
of how far to go in Italy, the Prime Minister assured the conferees that
he was not committed to an advance beyond the Ancona-Pisa line.33
All were agreed on the desirability of capitalizing on the Italian fields
as far north as they became available and thereby extending the range of
the Combined Bomber Offensive.34
The Prime Minister indicated his hesitancy in placing Anglo-American
divisions in southern France as a diversion for OVERLORD and said that he
doubted that the French divisions would be capable of undertaking such an
operation. Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were two routes by which
such a diversion might be achieved: a drive west from Italy, if the Allied
forces had been able to advance far enough north, and an amphibious
operation against southern France. Such a diversion in southern France,
he also maintained, would depend on what the German reactions had been.
Troops would be landed in southern France only if the Germans had been
compelled to withdraw a number of their divisions from that area. In the
light of these conditions, the Prime Minister suggested an alternative
plan he termed "air-nourished guerrilla warfare" in southern France. This
proposal envisaged flying in supplies for French guerrillas at a
rendezvous point in the mountains thirty miles inland from the southern
French coast. The President went even further and voiced the belief that
guerrilla operations could be conducted in south-central France as well
as in the Maritime Alps.35
[224]
As for operations in the Balkans, the President indicated his desire to
have the Balkan divisions that the Allies had trained, particularly the
Greeks and Yugoslavs, operate in their own countries. He expressed the
belief that it would be advantageous if these Balkan divisions would
follow-up and harass the Germans, should the latter decide to withdraw
from the Balkans to the line of the Danube. The Prime Minister suggested
that commando forces could also operate in support of the guerrillas on
the Dalmatian coast. Neither the British nor the American leaders
expressed an interest in offensive land operations by the United States
and Great Britain in the Balkans.36
A persistent note pervaded the discussion of the American delegates-the
fear of draining strength and means away from the cross-Channel operation
and the consequent desire to restrict Mediterranean operations. How to
keep the war in the Mediterranean a limited one contributing to OVERLORD
and early victory over Germany was the problem. In any event, whatever
measures were undertaken to eliminate Italy, establish bases on the
mainland, seize Sardinia and Corsica, and launch an operation in southern
France in conjunction with OVERLORD, should be carried out with the forces
allotted at TRIDENT. To such limits the British raised objections. They
argued strongly the need for more leeway in allocating resources in order
to insure the success of the Mediterranean operations-all the more
important now to pave the way for OVERLORD. Hence, they saw great danger
in accepting rigid commitments for the Mediterranean-a straight jacket likely to
jeopardize the Allied cause in the whole European-Mediterranean area.
Staff differences on the question of Mediterranean commitments were
themselves symptomatic of more basic and lingering divergences in
European strategy-on the role of preparatory operations and the timing of
the main blow. Back of these divergences lay the even more fundamental
differences in approach to strategy-the claims of waging attritional
warfare versus those of concentration in a selected area. Though a
definitive reconciliation of strategic methods and theories might be
beyond the scope of the staffs assembled in conference, the practical
issue on which the larger divergences came to settle-the question of
Mediterranean commitments for the following year posed a problem for
immediate compromise.
Plan RANKIN
In the course of discussing operations in the European-Mediterranean area,
British and American military leaders also considered the possibility of
an emergency return to the Continent. For this a new plan was at hand-Plan
RANKIN. Prepared by General Morgan's COSSAC staff, it provided for an
emergency return to the Continent in the winter of 1943-44, or early
spring of 1944 before the target date for OVERLORD.37 Just as OVERLORD
represented
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the culmination of the thinking on decisive cross-Channel operations that
had been embodied in ROUNDUP and ROUNDHAMMER, so RANKIN signified a new
version of the SLEDGEHAMMER concept of an opportunistic operation. Added
weight was given to the urgency of this planning in view of the
President's expressed interest in it at QUADRANT and particularly in the
light of his expressed desire at the conference that the "United Nations
troops . . . be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians."
38
Plan RANKIN set forth three contingencies for the emergency return: Case
A: a substantial weakening of German resistance; Case B: a withdrawal of
the German forces from occupied countries; or Case C: unconditional German
surrender.39 The COSSAC planners considered that any of these three
contingencies might evolve from the continuation of such encouraging
developments as the German reverses on the Eastern Front, the growing
threat to Germany in Italy and the Balkans, the setback to the German
submarine campaign, and the increasing Allied air offensive. The COSSAC
planners shaped their proposals for the emergency operations on the
considerable alteration of the Allied strategic situation in the European-Mediterranean
area since the incorporation of the SLEDGEHAMMER concept into the War
Department BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan in the spring of 1942.
In Case A of Plan RANKIN the COSSAC planners set as the objective a lodgment on the Continent from which
the U.S. and British forces could complete the defeat of Germany. The
assault area was to be the same as that for OVERLORD-the Cotentin-Caen
sector of northwestern France. If there was a sufficient disintegration
in morale and strength of the German armed forces, an operation against
organized opposition could be undertaken in January or February 1944 to
capture the Cotentin Peninsula. Alternatively, a modified OVERLORD would
be put into effect in March or April 1944. In either case, the COSSAC
planners believed, the port of Cherbourg would have to be captured within
the first forty-eight hours to provide adequate maintenance. In Case A of
Plan RANKIN, as in OVERLORD, diversionary operations in the Pas-de-Calais
area, and from the Mediterranean would probably be necessary.
In Case B of Plan RANKIN the COSSAC planners also called for a lodgment
on the Continent from which the Allies could complete the defeat of
Germany. The first place of entry for the main Allied forces in this event
was to be Cherbourg.
In Case B, moreover, substantial Allied forces were
to be sent from the Mediterranean to occupy the ports of Marseille and
Toulon and move northward as required.
In Case C Of RANKIN the COSSAC planners stated that the object was to
occupy as quickly as possible areas from which the Allies could enforce
the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by their governments on
Germany. Under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander,
France, Belgium, and the Rhine Valley from the Swiss frontier to Duesseldorf were to be under
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the control of the U.S. forces, with British representation in the
liberated countries; Holland, Denmark, Norway, and northwest Germany from
the Ruhr Valley to Luebeck were to compose an area under the control of
the British forces, with American representation in the liberated
countries.
The COSSAC planners concluded that the forces allotted for OVERLORD should
also be considered available for RANKIN. In all three of the contingencies
they emphasized the importance of rehabilitating the liberated countries.
They therefore recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom
lay down policies to govern the establishment of military governments in
enemy territory to be occupied by Allied troops and of national
administrations in the liberated Allied territories. Nuclei of combined
Anglo-American civil affairs staffs in London for Germany and for each
Allied and friendly country within the sphere of the Supreme Allied
Commander should be established.40
In discussing RANKIN, Sir Alan Brooke stated the hope of the British
Chiefs that fewer forces might be used for occupation purposes than set
forth in the plan. Admiral Leahy replied that the JCS shared this view.
The U.S. Joint Chiefs recommended that RANKIN be approved in principle and
that it be continuously reviewed.
41
The CCS approved these suggestions, noting that, in line with the plan,
the U.S. Joint Chiefs would appoint a commanding general, staff, and
headquarters for the U.S. Army group in the United Kingdom.42
Compromises and Agreements
The operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe,
approved by the CCS, the President, and the Prime Minister at QUADRANT,
represented another compromise of British and American views on strategy.
The conferees agreed that Operation OVERLORD was to be the main
Anglo-American effort in Europe with a target date of 1 May 1944, approved
the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, and authorized
him to proceed with preparations. Because of differences in British and
American views of the relationship between OVERLORD and Mediterranean
operations, the U.S. delegation had to yield on its desire for overriding
priority for OVERLORD and accept a compromise statement that, in the event
of a shortage of resources, avail-' able means were to be disposed and
utilized with the "main object" of insuring the success Of OVERLORD.43
The American delegation also accepted, as 3n added qualification to its
original proposal that operations in the Mediterranean area be conducted
with the forces allotted at TRIDENT, the clause upheld by the British
representatives-"except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff."
44
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The same proviso was attached by the British to the planned return of the
seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD,
though Marshall had fought hard for a decision without strings. The
conferees also accepted the British proposal that in the event OVERLORD
could not be executed, JUPITER should be considered as an alternative and
called for plans to be developed and kept up to date for such an
operation. All agreed that the Combined Bomber Offensive (POINTBLANK) was
to remain in the "highest strategic priority" and was to. be extended from
all suitable bases-particularly from Italy and the Mediterranean -as a
prerequisite for OVERLORD.
As for Mediterranean operations, the conferees agreed on the basic
outlines of the three phases of operations in Italy that the JCS had
suggested in their proposals to the CCS before QUADRANT. The first phase,
as accepted at QUADRANT, called for the elimination of Italy from the war
and the establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if possible,
farther north.45 For the moment at least, these general objectives in
Italy represented a meeting ground between the aims of the Americans and
the desires of the British.
The second phase involved, as the JCS had recommended, the seizure of
Sardinia and Corsica. In this connection the delegates decided to request
General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive
activities on the islands in order to facilitate entry
into them. This action stemmed largely from the American staff's urging,
especially for Sardinia. The JCS had themselves been persuaded to make
this proposal to the CCS by Generals Marshall, Handy, and Wedemeyer in
the course of staff discussions during the conference. In the meeting of
the JCS on 19 August 1943, Generals Marshall, Handy, and Wedemeyer had
argued that, in view of the shortage of landing craft available to General
Eisenhower, and in the light of the opportunity to test the effectiveness
of the Office of Strategic Services organization, "fifth column activity"
should be undertaken by the OSS on Sardinia.46
In the third phase of operations in Italy, the conferees accepted the JCS
provision for maintaining constant pressure on German forces in northern
Italy and creating conditions favorable for the eventual entry of Allied
forces, including most of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force, into
southern France. Also in keeping with the American proposal, offensive
operations against southern France were to establish a lodgment in the
Toulon-Marseille area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion
in connection with
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OVERLORD. Omitted, however, was the qualifying phrase, "with available
Mediterranean forces" that the JCS had sought.47 In line with the
proposals of the President and Prime Minister, it was agreed that "air
nourished guerrilla operations" in the southern Alps would be conducted if
feasible.48 Also approved was the rearmament of French units up to and
including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943. As a result of the
deliberations at the conference, the CCS sent a directive to General
Eisenhower calling for his appreciation and outline plan on operations in
southern France, to be submitted to the CCS by 1 November 1943.49 In the
preparation of the plan, Eisenhower was to consult with the Supreme
Commander of the cross-Channel operations (whoever might be appointed) or
his chief of staff so that his planning could be correlated with the
requirements of OVERLORD.
With little debate, the delegations at QUADRANT rejected the idea of
offensive ground operations by the United States and the United Kingdom in
the Balkan area. Operations in that area were to be limited to supplying
Balkan guerrillas by air and sea, minor commando raids, and bombing of
strategic objectives. In keeping with the by then long familiar concern of
the JCS for safeguarding the lines of communications in the Mediterranean,
appropriate Allied forces were to be deployed in northwest Africa so long
as the possibility of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula remained.
From the military point of view, the time was not considered right for
Turkey to enter the war, but the United States and Great Britain were to
continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as they could spare and the
Turks could absorb.50
Further measures were to be undertaken in the Atlantic to strengthen
operations against the U-boats. Especially attractive was the
possibility of using the Azores as a base for intensified sea and air
operations and for the development of an air-ferry route.51
During the discussions, the British had indicated that negotiations over
the Azores with the Portuguese Government, undertaken by the British
Foreign Office in consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff, were
approaching a conclusion. The Portuguese had agreed to the entry of a
small British force into the Azores on 8 October (Operation ALACRITY. The
U.S. delegation was assured by the British Chiefs of Staff that, upon
gaining entry into the Azores, the British would seek to make arrangements
for U.S. aircraft to use the airfields in the Azores as a base of
operations and in transit.52
Finally, on the President-Prime Minister level, a significant agreement
was reached at Quebec on the question of
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command for the projected coalition effort in the European-Mediterranean
area. Earlier, the two leaders had agreed that, since the United States
had the African command, it was but fair that the commander of the
cross-Channel operation be British. With Presidential agreement, Churchill
had gone so far as to nominate General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
Staff, for the post and early in 1943 had so informed him. The logic of
events, however, now compelled a change. Churchill has since recorded:
. . . as the year advanced and the immense plan of the invasion began to
take shape, I became increasingly impressed with the very great
preponderance of American troops that would be employed after the original
landing with equal numbers had been successful, and now at Quebec, I
myself took the initiative of proposing to the President that an American
commander should be appointed for the expedition to France. He was
gratified at this suggestion, and I dare say his mind had been moving that
way.53
As already observed, the President's mind indeed had been moving in that
direction. An American officer, they therefore agreed, would command
OVERLORD, and a British commander would take over in the Mediterranean,
the time for the change to depend upon progress in the war. The way was
thus cleared, as Stimson had strongly urged before the conference, for an
American leader to take over the command of the cross Channel operation.
Whether that prize would fall to Marshall-as Stimson had hoped-or whether
Marshall, like his British counterpart, would be passed over by the force
of circumstances, remained to be seen.
Discussion on the War Against Japan
The British had originally intended to bypass the war against Japan at
QUADRANT, but consideration of it consumed as much time and effort as it
had at Casablanca and TRIDENT. Fear that the Pacific conflict might
degenerate into a long war of attrition or stalemate made the United
States anxious to spell out the future course and timing of operations.
British reluctance to commit Allied resources too heavily in the Pacific
until after the Germans collapsed was understandable, but could not
withstand the growing American pressure for accelerated action. Two basic
questions demanded consideration: selection of the main line of approach
to the Japanese homeland and Great Britain's role in the Pacific after
Germany was defeated. Exploration of these vital problems at QUADRANT
brought to light areas of Anglo-American disagreement that would require
still further examination.
As usual in the midwar international conferences, Admiral King took the
lead in presenting the U.S. case for the Pacific war-an acknowledgment by
the Army of the Navy's primary interest in the Pacific. Nevertheless, in
backing the case for the Pacific position, Marshall was not unmindful of
the Army's interests. Ever conscious of the need to link Pacific and
European strategy, he sought, insofar as possible, to safeguard the plans
and projects of Generals MacArthur and Stilwell for their respective
theaters.
The Search for a Long-Range Plan
The basis for discussion of the Pacific war at QUADRANT was the over-all
plan
[230]
SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY L. STIMSON AND GENERAL MARSHALL at Château
Frontenac, 23 August 1943.
produced by members of the Combined Planning Staffs on the eve of the
conference.54 The initial reaction of the JCS to this combined effort had
been unenthusiastic, for they agreed generally that it overlooked many
possible elements that might shorten the conflict.55 The American Chiefs'
distaste for any plan that might prolong the war until 1947 or 1948 was
keynoted by King and Marshall in the second meeting of the CCS at Quebec.
King told the Combined Chiefs that the current lack of means in the
Pacific to carry out operations directed toward Rabaul CARTWHEEL) was
occasioned by Allied failure to consider the war against the enemy powers
as a whole. Reverting to the mathematical approach of which he was
evidently quite fond, he declared that if 15 percent of all Allied
resources were now deployed against Japan, then an increase to 20 percent,
or just 5 percent, would make one-third more resources available. The
resulting decrease in resources available in the European war would amount
to a mere 6 percent of the total. King and Leahy both thought it was most
important to plan how to transfer the bulk of Allied forces from Europe
to the Pacific-Far East once Germany was defeated. Marshall then went on
to point out that not only were all operations in the Pacific related to
those in Burma, but also affirmed that it was
. . . essential to link Pacific and European strategy. Movements of ships
from the Mediterranean must take place in the next few days if operations
from India were not to be delayed, and a decision must be taken. It was
important that no time should be lost in agreeing on a general plan for
the defeat of Japan since the collapse of Germany would impose the problem
of partial demobilization and a growing impatience would ensue throughout
the United States for the rapid defeat of Japan.56
Since the British would be faced with an even greater demand for
demobilization as a result of their long participation in the war,
Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff were perfectly amenable to the
early completion of a general plan for the war against Japan. They
realized that the future role of Great Britain in the struggle would
vitally affect British demobilization, particularly that of the ground
forces. Since British land forces would probably be substantially de-
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creased after the defeat of Germany, the British desired to base their
main contribution to the war against Japan on air and naval units. They
hoped that Japan might be defeated by sea and air attack alone, but they
agreed with the Americans that, for planning purposes, an invasion by land
forces should be assumed as ultimately necessary.57
Using the proposed over-all plan as a basis, staff planners moved to
define for the consideration of the CCS the points at issue and those on
which the Americans and British agreed. American planners condemned the
proposed schedule of operations in the Pacific as being too slow and
suggested that the tempo be pitched to defeat Japan within twelve months
of the fall of Germany. Although their British counterparts agreed on
acceleration, they would not accept the twelve-month limit. Both staffs
felt that the reorientation of forces toward the Pacific should be started
about four to six months before the fall of Germany. They also agreed on
an American advance toward Japan via the Central and Southwest Pacific
and possibly the Northwest Pacific, and on a British drive via the Strait
of Malacca and South China Sea, together with the development of a U.S.
line of supply to China through Burma.58
Perhaps the sharpest difference of opinion between the British and U.S.
planners revolved around the sequence and timing of the operations to take
south Burma and Singapore. The Americans believed that south Burma should
be cleared right after north Burma and visualized a target date of
November 1944 for tile beginning of south Burma operations. The British,
on the other hand, maintained that after the seizure of north Burma,
south Burma should be bypassed until November 1946 and that an effort to
take Singapore should be made in 1945.59 Wedemeyer
advised the JCS that tile long period of inactivity between the close of
north Burma operations (May 1944) and the initiation of the Singapore
campaign (March 1945) would result in too great a time lag. Furthermore,
operations in south Burma would provide more direct aid to China.60
The conflicting views between the two staffs were further complicated by
Churchill. He sided with the United States in disapproving a Singapore
expedition in 1945, since he did not think that the period from May 1944
to March 1945 should be a time of inaction. Instead, he wanted a move to
take the northwestern tip of Sumatra-his favorite Far Eastern operation,
which he pictured as the TORCH of the Indian Ocean and possibly of as
great strategic significance as the Dardanelles operation of 1915. The
Prime Minister received little comfort from the President in this
direction, for Roosevelt looked at the problem from another angle:
The position occupied by the Japanese might be compared to a slice of pie,
with Japan at the apex, and with the island barrier forming the outside
crust. One side of the piece of pie passed through Burma, the other led
down to the Solomons. He
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quite saw the advantages of an attack on Sumatra, but he doubted whether
there were sufficient resources to allow of both the opening of the Burma
Road and the attack on Sumatra. He would rather see all resources
concentrated on the Burma Road, which represented the shortest line
through China to Japan. He favored attacks which would aim at hitting the
edge of the pie as near to the apex as possible, rather than attacks which
nibbled at the crust.
61
The JCS were willing to forego any definite decision on the south
Burma-Singapore question until the next conference, but pressed for the
acceptance of the twelve-month target date. In support of their belief in
a shorter war, they presented an AAF plan for the defeat of Japan, based
upon the use of the new very long range (VLR) bomber-the B-29
Super fortress-which was due to become available in quantity in 1944. The
1,500-mile tactical radius of this new weapon would allow it to reach most
of the important targets in Japan proper, if it operated from bases in the Changsha area in China, and its bomb load of ten tons would permit greater
destruction to be inflicted by each plane. Since the Air plan was so
recent that even the U.S. staff had not had a chance to study it
carefully, the CCS referred it to the Combined Staff Planners for close
consideration. In as much as use of Chinese air bases was part of the plan,
the JCS recommended that the TRIDENT decisions regarding China's
importance as an ally be reaffirmed and the capacity of air route to China
be expanded. In the meantime, studies could be made of the possibility of
operations at Moulmein in
Burma and on the Kra Isthmus of the Malay Peninsula to isolate Rangoon-the
gateway to north Burma and the Burma Road-and to facilitate the capture of
Singapore. As to the Pacific, they urged that the U.S. plan for operations
in 1943-44 be accepted in toto.62
The British met the American proposals more than halfway. Since Japan
depended so heavily upon airpower, naval strength, and shipping to
maintain its position, the CCS decided that greater emphasis should be
placed upon attrition and that greater use should be made of the Allied
air forces for this purpose. Through the build-up of the air route to
China, the employment of lightly equipped, air-supported jungle troops,
and the use of special equipment such as HABAKKUKS and artificial harbors,
increased advantages might accrue to the Allies.63 The British accepted
the twelve-month target date for future planning, but on the condition
that the reorientation of forces toward the Pacific
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should proceed as soon as the German situation, in the opinion of the CCS,
would so allow. Forces for the operations in the Pacific would be
provided by the United States and those for the prospective operations in
the Southeast Asia area by the British, except for special types available
only to the United States. In the Pacific, as customary at the
conferences, the U.S. schedule of operations was approved. Operations in
north Burma would be carried out in February 1944, but the need for the
amphibious landings at Akyab and Ramree would be investigated further. The
CCS directed that studies be made on the south Burma-Singapore and
Malaya-Sumatra operations. They also decided to examine fully the
possibilities of developing the air route to China on a scale that would
permit the use of the bombers and transports available after the defeat of
Germany.64
The anxiety of the British to assure themselves of a proper place in the
later stages of the war-an issue that led to heated staff discussion-was
assuaged by assigning to the Combined planners the task of investigating
further operations in which the British would play the major role.
Evidently the Prime Minister was well satisfied that any doubts regarding
Britain's desire to share in the final defeat of Japan had been
effectively removed at QUADRANT-65
To the Americans, however, the perplexing problem of how and where to use
the British naval and air forces in an area where bases were few and
logistical difficulties many required answers that, at the moment, they
felt in no position to provide.66
Although only certain features of the over-all plan were adopted by the
CCS, there were several developments of especial significance. The
acceptance of the twelve-month target date promised to shorten the war and
to alter radically the timing and possibly the sequence of forthcoming
operations. Similarly, the free hand given to the United States in the
Pacific to conduct Southwest and Central Pacific offensives simultaneously
promised to move the war into higher gear. The main portions of the
over-all plan agreed upon by the CCS were essentially the short-term
phases indicating immediate directions without committing the Allies to
any definite ultimate roads. The relative importance of the different
approaches to Japan-land, sea, and air-and the selection of the main line
of offense for an invasion of Japan, if this should prove necessary, had
not been considered. It remained to be seen whether this inability to
determine conclusively where the weight of the Allied drive should be
placed and which operations should be held as subsidiary foreshadowed the
same prolonged deliberations on Pacific strategy as had marked the
planning of European strategy.
Pacific and Far Eastern Operations
1943-44
The American decision to open up a new line of advance in the Central
Pacific with the Gilberts-Marshalls operations in the fall and winter of
1943-44 was received by the British without protest. This increase of
pressure upon the
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Japanese from the east, which would utilize the expanding U.S. naval
forces profitably, made a favorable impression upon Churchill, who
disliked the idea of fighting difficult land campaigns in Burma and China.
Nevertheless, the British Chiefs at first did question the necessity for
pressing forward in the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific with
equal vigor and suggested that the New Guinea phase be limited to a
holding operation, while the main effort took place through the mandated
islands. Thus, they observed, resources might be released for OVERLORD.67
Admiral King attacked this proposal at once, holding that if there were
resources that could be spared from the Southwest Pacific, they should be
sent to the Central Pacific. He stated that he himself considered both
advances essential, and Marshall pointed out to the British that the
troops and resources for the New Guinea operations were already in or en
route to the theater.68 The British did not press the point further.
Since the British seemed to have no other objections to the American plan,
the CCS approved the U.S. proposals to proceed successively through the
Gilberts, Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, and the Palaus to the Marianas in
1943-44. Consideration was also to be given to operations against Paramushiro in the Kurils. In the Southwest Pacific, eastern New Guinea as
far as Wewak, the Admiralty Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago were to
be seized. As foreshadowed before the conference, Rabaul was to be
neutralized rather than captured.
69 With these operations accomplished, a
further move westward along the New Guinea coast to the Vogelkop Peninsula
was to be made in step-by-step, airborne-waterborne advances.70 The
decision to neutralize Rabaul marked the first official pronouncement of
a policy of bypassing strong centers of resistance and foreshadowed the
gradual replacement of the earlier conservative step-by-step method of
operations in the Pacific.
In the CBI, the long wrangle over the importance of China and the value of
capturing all of Burma came in for a full show of attention. The British
appeared perfectly willing to carry out the north Burma campaign, but
balked at the need for next clearing south Burma and were disinclined to
go through with the amphibious landings at Akyab and Ramree. In fact, on
several occasions the Prime Minister flatly opposed any commitment to
conduct the latter and warned his Chiefs of Staff against taking any
decision that he might later have to overrule.71
The JCS and the President had agreed before the conference that the Burma
campaign should not be delayed, and Roosevelt had even gone so far as to
mention the substitution of American resources and ships and possibly two
U.S. divisions, should the British seek to withhold forces and supplies
for use in their Mediterranean ventures.72 Marshall and
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King had then been particularly disturbed by the unilateral action taken
by the British in the form of their "stand-fast order" preventing the
scheduled departure of resources from the Mediterranean to the CBI. At
the conference the JCS exerted considerable pressure on their British
colleagues in support of the land campaign to take all of Burma. They
pointed out the necessity of support for China, which ultimately would
provide the necessary facilities for the huge air forces to be released
for use against Japan after the defeat of Germany. To Marshall there
appeared to be four issues to be decided: (1) the value of Chinese troops
to future operations; (2) the likelihood that the existing Chinese
Government might fall if there were no sustaining action; (3) the
possible Japanese reaction to heavy air attacks; and (4) the need for a
port on the China coast. The road to China would not be opened, he felt,
by a Sumatra operation, but only through the capture of all of Burma,
including Akyab and Ramree.73
The British were not convinced that the reconquest of south Burma was a
prerequisite to assisting China, since they believed that the air route
could be developed to the degree that it could supply most of the numerous
Allied air forces that would become available for the CBI after Germany's
defeat. Marshall agreed that, in view of the great difficulties of
undertaking ground operations in the CBI, full advantage should be taken
of the Allied air superiority. In the matter of Akyab and Ramree operations, however, the British were reluctant to make any decisions.74
In the face of this indisposition on the part of the British Chiefs, the
intransigence of the Prime Minister, and the lack of Presidential
enthusiasm for Akyab and Ramree operations, Marshall admitted to the JCS
that he himself considered the plan for the landings unrealistic, since
the British seemed unable to produce enough efficient troops to ensure
success. The possibility of withdrawing some of the better-led Indian
divisions from the Mediterranean was considered by the JCS, but the
shipping implications for OVERLORD and the Pacific made such a move of
doubtful value.75
Nature took a hand in the fate of Burma operations at this juncture, for Auchinleck reported that severe floods in Assam might force the
cancellation of either the Ledo or the Imphal advance, and perhaps both.
Even without the interference of nature, the limited capacity and
inefficient operation of the Assam railroad promised to make difficult
logistical support of the land campaigns in Burma. The strains on the
Assam line of communications spurred the CCS decision to expand the
railway capacity, and to lay gasoline pipelines between Calcutta and
Kunming.76
The possibility of tonnage deficiencies in Assam led the British Chiefs of
Staff to suggest that a policy decision be made on the priority of
resources for undertakings in the CBI. They felt that the priority system
should not be a rigid one. Nevertheless, they favored putting the
[236]
GENERAL ARNOLD WITH LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN, Quebec conference, 20
August 1943.
main stress on north Burma operations, so necessary to establish land
communications with and to improve and secure the air route to China.
This primary emphasis on north Burma operations would serve as a guide
for the supreme commander of the Southeast Asia Command -still to be
appointed-. The commander would, of course, also have to keep in mind the
importance of long-range development of the Assam line of
communications, so fundamental for all CBI undertakings. Although the JCS
recognized that the proposed priority might affect adversely the supply
delivery to China over the Hump, they accepted the British
recommendations.77
Logistical difficulties involved in supporting both the air effort and the
projected ground offensive in China, which the TRIDENT decisions had
failed to appraise adequately, had to be faced more realistically at
QUADRANT. Despite British and Chinese preference for more emphasis on the
air build-up, the end result was an apparent reversal of the priorities
set up at TRIDENT. After the enthusiasm for the Chennault air plan that
had been so manifest at TRIDENT, this volte-face seemed to be a major
change in policy in the CBI. How strictly the reversal would be adhered to
in the future remained a matter of conjecture, for although the
unimpressive showing made by the air forces in China during the summer may
have influenced the President to give the Stilwell-Marshall-Stimson school
a chance to demonstrate the efficacy of a ground approach to aiding China,
he gave no clear indication that he had completely abandoned his
predilection for the Chennault plan.
The Southeast Asia Command
Extensive negotiations after TRIDENT between the British and Americans
over the organization and leadership of the Southeast Asia Command had
brought no solution to this vexing problem, although they served to
underline the
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points of issue.78 To stave off another postponement of the campaign in
Burma, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had tried, without success, to secure a
settlement of the command problem before the conference convened.79
The opportunity to discuss the problems face to face allowed the leaders
on both sides to modify their positions and seek satisfactory compromises.
Marshall, after a meeting with Churchill, admitted to the JCS that the
Prime Minister had some ground for complaint on the absence of
information from SWPA. In fact, to remedy the situation Marshall consented
to the Prime Minister's having a personal representative on General
MacArthur's staff. The Chief of Staff did not desire a similar situation
in reverse to arise in the proposed southeast Asia command, but felt that
a more moderate version of the MacArthur headquarters might be
established that would avoid its defects and yet still be acceptable to
the British. Changes were suggested that brought British proposals for a
command closer to the Eisenhower pattern, while allowing operational
control to remain under the British.
80
The British in turn dropped their brief for Sir Sholto Douglas and finally
proposed Lord Louis Mountbatten, then British Chief of Combined
Operations, for the post. Churchill found the President and General
Marshall "very keen" on Mountbatten's appointment. His record and
personality bespoke the kind of young, energetic, and offensive-minded
leader that the Burma operations would require.81
The most difficult administrative feature of the Southeast Asia Command
concerned the appointment of Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.
The intricate Sino-American command system, which already had Stilwell
serving as chief of staff to the Generalissimo, commander of U.S. Army
forces in the CBI, and lend-lease administrator, required delicate
handling. His responsibilities to the Generalissimo and the JCS were now
to be complicated further by a responsibility to Mountbatten and the
British Chiefs of Staff.82
As Stilwell himself expressed it:
The command setup is a Chinese puzzle with Wavell, Auk [Auchinleck],
Mountbatten, Peanut [Chiang Kai-shek], Alexander and me interwoven and
mixed beyond recognition.83
This complex situation came about because the Allies recognized that
Chiang would not permit Chinese forces to serve directly under British
command and that the only way to ensure Chinese co-operation in the north
Burma campaign would be to make Stilwell the middleman or point of
contact and liaison. As Deputy Supreme Commander, he would control the
Chinese forces engaged in the operations and co-ordinate the efforts of
the Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces so that they could also play their
parts
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in Burma. Integration of forces and fulfillment of his varied
responsibilities would give Stilwell a task hard to perform successfully,
but in view of the already entangled command setup, it appeared to the
Americans to offer the only practicable solution. With some doubt and
hesitation over the ability of Stilwell to cope with the added duty, the
British accepted the American proposals.84
Geographically, the Southeast Asia Command would embrace Ceylon, Burma,
Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra, all but the first then under Japanese
dominion. Under Mountbatten and Stilwell would be British commanders in
chief of the ground, naval, and air forces. The Supreme Commander would
have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, since
his administrative and logistic support must be based upon India. The
Viceroy of India had authority to settle any question of priorities, but
Mountbatten could appeal the Viceroy's decisions to the British Chiefs.
General jurisdiction over strategy in SEAC and the allocation of U.S. and
British resources of all kinds between China and SEAC would remain under
the CCS, but the British Chiefs of Staff would exercise operational
jurisdiction and would be the executive agent for transmitting all
instructions to the Supreme Commander. To provide for exchange of
information and intelligence co-ordination in India and in SEAC, a
Combined Liaison Committee would be established in New Delhi.85
Having resolved the Anglo-American differences, the ticklish question of
presenting the combined agreement to the
Generalissimo as a proposal rather than as an accomplished fact required
the utmost tact and diplomacy. Since Thailand originally had been
included in the China theater, its transfer to SEAC would have to be
explained to Chiang gracefully in order to prevent any Chinese loss of
face. Colonel Roberts of the Operations Division suggested that Dr. Soong
would be the ideal intermediary to break the news. To emphasize the
importance attached by the United States to the need for full Chinese
cooperation with SEAL in the coming campaign, Marshall personally took
Soong aside, after the CCS had informed him in general terms of their
proposals, and underlined the necessity for Soong to convince the
Generalissimo of the importance of the arrangement.86
If Chiang would accept the boundaries of SEAC and co-operate with
Mountbatten and Stilwell, the prospect for successful Burma operations
appeared bright. Besides Mountbatten, the British had brought with them
Brigadier Wingate, leader of the daring British raid behind the Japanese
lines of communications in Burma earlier in 1943. Wingate's imaginative
and aggressive spirit captured first the favor of the Prime Minister and
later the enthusiastic support of Marshall and the other American leaders.87
Wingate explained to the CCS the tactical employment of his long-range
jungle troops, which operated behind
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the enemy's main forces disrupting communications and conducting
guerrilla activities until the main advance could reach them. The British
now proposed to organize six brigades of lightly equipped, mobile,
air-supported troops similar to the Wingate groups. The plans for the
units would be elastic and open to alteration in the light of the enemy
reaction.88
Marshall was convinced that Wingate was a "best bet" and suggested that
the United States might add a long-range column of its own to work under
him in order to encourage the Chinese to act more favorably toward the
project.89
Injection of new blood into the Burma operation held forth a possibility
that the campaign might actually be launched during the coming dry season,
and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were ready to help make the possibility a
reality in any way that they could. First, however, would come the task of
eliminating the attitudes in India-Burma that had produced nothing but
delays and excuses during the previous months. New leadership would make
little progress until the old attitudes had been supplanted.
Emerging Strategic Patterns
By the close of QUADRANT, War Department planners could point to
encouraging signs of progress in planning against Japan as well as
against Germany. A mere surface appraisal of the record of accomplishments
at the conference in regard to the Japanese would have been misleading.
More or less perfunctory approval by the British of the American
1943-44 plan of operations in the Pacific, long overdue establishment of SEAC, lack of decision on subsequent operations in southeast Asia and
China after north Burma, de-emphasis of the Chennault air plan after a
short trial period, and failure of the CCS to evolve a long-range plan by
no means told the whole story. Several essentially new features had
entered the planning picture. Paramount among these was what might be
called the new urgency-the recognition that the war on all fronts must be
pushed forward faster, lest a stalemate develop and home morale bog down.
This gathering momentum was manifested at QUADRANT in the fixing of the
twelve-month target date for the defeat of Japan once Germany was beaten.
The target date for ending the European conflict-October 1944-embodied in
the OVERLORD plan accepted at QUADRANT, gave promise of clarifying one of
the basic unknowns in over-all strategic planning against Japan
-timing-and thus introduced a controlling objective hitherto lacking in
that planning. Secondly, the evident intention of the British to get
north Burma operations under way was demonstrated by the appointments of
Mountbatten and Wingate. For the first time there was confidence that
Burma operations would be launched. Going further, the British had served
clear notice of their desire for an eventual "full and fair place in the
war against Japan"-to borrow Churchill's phrase.90 In the third place, the
American drive to improve the Assam line of communications and to expand
the air route to China gave promise of a vastly increased operational
effort both in Burma and in China.
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Lastly, the projected introduction of a new weapon, the B-29, bade fair to
revolutionize strategic concepts on the approach to Japan. As ranges of
strategic weapons increased and distances shrank, bold new plans for
shortening the war might be formulated and carried out. The promise of
increased activity in the Pacific and the CBI, coupled with the
prospective employment of fast aircraft carriers and very long range
bombers,
made the outlook for the war against
Japan decidedly more encouraging. Emphasis on the strategic offensive
against Japan, signalled by the U.S. staff first at Casablanca and then at
TRIDENT, was thus confirmed all the more strongly at Quebec, and at least
some of the components for an eventual strategic synthesis for
defeating Japan appeared to be taking more positive form.
Perhaps the single greatest failure of the conference in respect to ,the
war against Japan, from the viewpoint of the Army planners, was the
inability to evolve a long-range strategic pattern. Aside from the
twelve-month theory, an agreed blueprint on the "how," "when," and "where"
of the ultimate defeat of Japan had still not been formulated. The
question of whether to rely on bombardment and blockade or the invasion
of Japan proper was left open. Selection of the main route was also
postponed. That the Army welcomed whatever new plans and "modern and
untried" methods of warfare-revolving about carriers, B-29's, the new
policy of neutralization, and inventions and techniques still in the
experimental stage-that might keep the Pacific war progressing without
absorbing Army troops and resources needed for defeating Germany is
obvious. But there could be no
certainty over whether the newly emerging strategic elements for speeding
the Pacific offensive would eventually sup plant the need of an over-all
plan against Japan or, in the absence of such a plan in the long run, might
not themselves add to the "suction pump" pressures of the dynamic war in
the Pacific.
Though there might still be reason after QUADRANT for Army planners to
question whether planning in the war against Japan had been linked firmly
enough to European strategy and whether strong enough barriers had beer
erected to keep the Pacific conflict a limited war, there appeared to be a
more solid basis for believing that the trend to the Mediterranean was
finally coming under control. Hitherto, that trend lead been one of the
most important keys to grand strategy-threatening, in the opinion of the
American staff, not only any major cross-Channel operation but Burma and
Pacific undertakings as well,
The U.S. staff had come to Quebec seriously disturbed by the British
"stand fast" order in the Mediterranean and by the likely effect of
Presidential overtures and British predilections for postponing the
departure of the seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United
Kingdom.91 To keep the Mediterranean war a limited one contributory to
the success of OVERLORD and early victory over Germany was the
fundamental aim of the American staff. By the close of QUADRANT the Army
planners could point to
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a number of steps taken to realize this goal.
In the strategic synthesis emerging from QUADRANT provision was made for
drawing together a major cross-Channel operation, the Mediterranean
undertakings, and an extended Combined Bomber Offensive from the
Mediterranean as well as the United Kingdom, and weaving them into an
over-all scheme for defeating the Western Axis Powers. The new synthesis
seemed to contain the formula-for which the War Department staff had been
searching since the diversion from BOLERO-ROUNDUP to the Mediterranean
in TORCH-that would retain the primacy of the cross-Channel operation
from the United Kingdom, define the role of subsequent Mediterranean
operations in relation to that main effort, and use to the fullest extent
the potentialities of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
The War Department staff could take comfort that the new synthesis was
developing to a considerable extent in line with their thinking. They
could point to the fact that the central element in the new strategic
pattern about which the other factors were woven was Operation OVERLORD.
The adoption of that plan marked an important milestone in the campaign
that had been waged by the American staff since General Marshall had taken
the BOLERO-ROUNDUP proposals to London in April 1942. After long debate
and many decisions and revisions on the highest levels, the United States
and Great Britain had at last agreed upon an outline of a plan for
concentrating forces for a major cross-Channel operation for the early and
decisive defeat of Germany. Steps had been taken, moreover, to tie
together the
Mediterranean and OVERLORD operations in order to create favorable
conditions for launching and supporting OVERLORD. The stress by British
and U.S. leaders on central and western Mediterranean operations in
support of OVERLORD and their disavowal of interest in offensive ground
efforts in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean seemed to be added
proof of their firm resolve to make the main effort against the Axis
citadel from the United Kingdom in the spring of 1944. Limits in the form
of compromise agreements-qualified as they were-had been set on
priorities, magnitudes, and timing for operations in the
European-Mediterranean area. Along with authorization for the definite
allocation of forces in the approved cross-Channel operation-twenty-nine
divisions for target date 1 May 1944 -went, therefore, definite
restrictions on future Mediterranean advances. The pattern of strategy
agreed upon at Quebec pointed the way more clearly than before to the
final halting of the diversionary trend from BOLERO to the Mediterranean
that had begun with TORCH.
In retrospect, QUADRANT was a critical conference in the evolution of Anglo-American strategy in the war against Germany. If Casablanca
represented for U.S. strategists initiation in planning for the offensive
phase of coalition warfare, and TRIDENT a halfway mark, QUADRANT was the
beginning of the final stretch. The results showed that the American staff
had made marked progress in preparing and presenting its case and was
mastering the art of military diplomacy. Most encouraging from the Army
point of view was the fact that at this conference the President had held
through and backed his Army Chief of
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Staff on European strategy, enabling the Americans to present a united
front to the British. In Army terms the Allies, at the crossroads in
European strategy, had chosen correctly. The choice gave promise of
realizing the basic objectives of Marshall and his staff in the conflict
with Germany-a decisive war waged with a minimum of loss, expense, and
time.
Nevertheless, the compromises adopted and the lingering debate over
European Mediterranean strategy in the following year indicate that, in
the final analysis, negotiations at Quebec fell short of the final
showdown desired by Marshall and his staff. Subsequent events would show
that the Mediterranean issue was still far from permanently settled. Not
only were the questions of advance in Italy and of eastern Mediterranean
operations to rise again, but firm agreement on prospectively one of the
most important links
between the European and Mediterranean theaters-a southern France
operation-still had to be reached. Aside from the need to put
Anglo-American (and French) undertakings against Germany into final form,
moreover, the conceptions of the Russians on Allied planning for
concluding the war in Europe remained to be heard and the Western pattern
of operations somehow had to be coupled with the Soviet effort to crush
Germany. These problems and their solutions still lay in the future. For
the Army staff after QUADRANT the immediate question was whether the
outcome of the fight General Marshall had led at Quebec would prove
successful and the British would follow through all the more important now
since the Russian bear, long impatient for the "second front" in Europe,
was beginning to grumble again.
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Endnotes
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