Chapter XI:
"The Mediterranean Again": August - November 1943
Behind the developments at Quebec, a significant transition in
Anglo-American strategic planning in the war against Germany was in
process. By the summer of 1943 U.S. manpower and production were coming
into full play and lending weight to the American position-now,
finally, a united front. On the other hand, the British were reaching
the peak of their mobilization. The weight of the two partners in the
war against Germany was coming into more equal balance. As a result, the
strategic thinking and planning of the British had now to be adapted to
American notions even as the Americans had been learning to adjust their
ideas, planning, and negotiating techniques to those of their ally. The
conglomerate pattern worked out at Quebec was one reflection of the
shift in military weight. On the surface, at least, it appeared to offer
a synthesis in which British and U.S. strategic ideas might be able to
exist in reasonable harmony.
Though there was cause for optimism on the part of the Army
strategic planners after Quebec, they also had grounds for caution. On
the one hand, there was reason to hope that the period of sparring with
the British in and out of the international conferences over the
cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue might finally be over. OVERLORD had
been accepted and steps taken to keep the Mediterranean advance limited
and linked to it. On the other hand, past experience of General Marshall
and his staff with the Mediterranean "suction pump" gave them pause.
Large forces already deployed to the Mediterranean had tended to
generate a strategy of their own-a strategy of opportunism, of
sufficient logic and appeal to more than match American staff efforts to
counter or dilute it. The Army planners, therefore, in the months
following Quebec watched to see whether the agreements at the conference
to make OVERLORD "top of the bill" would prove firm enough and the
barriers erected to contain the Mediterranean advance strong enough.
What appeared to the Army planners to be warning signals on the planning
horizon were not long in coming-signs that made them seriously question
whether the national policies and war aims of Great Britain and the
United States in the war against Germany had actually found a lasting
meeting ground in the strategic settlement reached at Quebec.
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Invasion of Italy
At the conclusion of QUADRANT, U.S. Army planners were anxiously awaiting
the outcome of the Combined Bomber Offensive, the conflict on the Eastern
Front, and the prospective invasion of Italy. Upon the success of these
operations depended in large degree the creation of the prerequisite
conditions for OVERLORD as defined at QUADRANT.1 Operations in Italy, in
the immediate offing, held forth the promise not only of gaining a
foothold on the European continent and eliminating Italy from the war but
also of containing a maximum number of German divisions and of furnishing valuable bases for extending the air offensive against Germany and her
allies. Army planners were much encouraged by the progress made at
QUADRANT in weaving prospective operations against Italy with various
other undertakings in the European-Mediterranean area into a single pattern
to assure the success of OVERLORD. According to QUADRANT agreement, the
Mediterranean theater was henceforth to yield to the needs of the
cross-Channel operation for manpower and resources. With the prospective
invasion of Italy, a new offensive phase in the war against the European
Axis seemed to be opening simultaneously with the halting of the
diversionary trend to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Army planners, as a
result of their experience of the past year, kept a sharp lookout lest the
attractions and demands of undertakings against the so called soft
underbelly of Europe jeopardize the dominance of the cross-Channel
operation.
Planning for the elimination of Italy revealed the increasing influence of
the field commander and his staff in strategic planning and conduct of
operations in midwar, when Allied troops were coming to grips with the
enemy and the tempo of operations was quickening. Events were catching up
with plans, and even passing them, and the big theater headquarters staff
on the spot was performing various operational functions earlier rendered
by the Washington headquarters. It will be remembered that, failing to
reach precise agreements on post-Sicily Mediterranean strategy at the
TRIDENT and Algiers Conferences in the spring of 1943, the Allied chiefs
had instructed General Eisenhower to mount operations designed to force
Italy out of the war. The Allied Force Headquarters had proceeded to
prepare a number of preliminary plans, but final plans and decisions had
to await the outcome of HUSKY. Toward the end of June, General
Eisenhower had informed the CCS of his intention, following a successful
HUSKY, either to invade Calabria (Operation BUTTRESS) and then, if
necessary, to enter near Crotone (Operation GOBLET), or to occupy Sardinia
(Operation BRIMSTONE. Preferring BUTTRESS, he felt it necessary to
undertake that invasion with enough force to occupy the heel and advance
as far north as Naples. On 16 July the CCS had approved General
Eisenhower's strategic concept and, following General Marshall's lead,
expressed interest in the possibilities of a direct amphibious
undertaking against Naples.
By 10 August, General Eisenhower had reached a decision to invade
Italy
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in early September with attacks to be launched against Calabria and the
Salerno area. The fall of Mussolini, the speed-up in the Sicilian
campaign, and increasing signs that Italy was ready to sue for peace
helped convince Allied planners that an invasion in the Naples area had
good prospects for success. The decisive argument in favor of Salerno
(Operation AVALANCHE) was that the Allies could not land farther north,
largely because such objectives were beyond the effective range of
single-motor fighters operating from Sicily. A landing in the Salerno area
would put the Allies as close to Rome as possible and in a position to
capture the port of Naples, a most valuable asset for the supply of their
forces on the mainland.
On 16 August General Eisenhower announced his decision to launch Operation
BAYTOWN across the Strait of Messina against the toe of Italy between. 1
and 4 September and to assault the Salerno area on 9 September.
Announcement of the cancellation of BUTTRESS soon followed.2
Since a ten-day interval between the two assaults would greatly
alleviate the shortage in landing craft, permitting the use of at least
some in both operations, his staff strove to make the first of the
assaults as early as possible. On the 17th, the day the Sicily Campaign
closed, General. Eisenhower's headquarters confirmed the plan to have
BAYTOWN precede AVALANCHE by the maximum possible interval.3
BAYTOWN, planned as a predominantly British undertaking, was to be mounted
from northeastern Sicily and to employ two divisions of the British Eighth
Army (commanded by General Montgomery) in the assault. Striking at Reggio
and nearby airfields, the forces were to sweep north to link up with one
wing of AVALANCHE and also move toward the east to effect a junction with
other British units to be landed near Taranto. AVALANCHE, the major
assault on the mainland, was to be launched from Sicily and North Africa
by the U.S. Fifth Army (commanded by Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark), using the
U.S. VI Corps and the British 10 Corps.4
On 3 September General Montgomery's Eighth Army began its crossing of the
Strait of Messina. The Allied invasion of continental Europe had become an
accomplished fact. On the same day an armistice was signed at Cassibile,
near Syracuse, Sicily, by General W. B. Smith for General Eisenhower and
Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Castellano for Marshal Badoglio. Public announcement
came five days later. The military terms of the unconditional
surrender-the so-called short armistice terms-included the cessation of
hostilities, the transfer of the Italian Fleet to Allied control, and the
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denial of facilities to the Germans.5 The timing of the announcement was
complicated by the fact that originally an American airborne division was
to land near Rome at the time the surrender was announced in order to
seize the airfields and to deal with the two German armored divisions that
had been massed there to aid the Italians. On 2 September-in a
communication prepared by the President, the Prime Minister, and General
Marshall-General Eisenhower was informed of the Allied chiefs' approval of
his decision to go on with AVALANCHE and to land the airborne division
near Rome.6 The latter part of the plan was abandoned at the eleventh
hour, however, because the Germans, who since the fall of Mussolini on 25
July had been rushing reinforcements into north Italy, had already
invested the airfields, and Italian co-operation with the Allies at that
time was still not certain.
The collapse of Italian resistance came more quickly than the
Germans had expected. Since the end of the Tunisia Campaign, there had
been indications
of the possible defection of Italy from the Axis. In late August Hitler
had his staff prepare a plan (called ACHSE) for that eventuality. Under
this plan all Italian units except those still loyal to the Axis and
willing to fight were to be disarmed. German forces in the south would be
withdrawn to Rome and would then become a part of Field Marshal Rommel's
command in northern Italy. The Germans had no firm plan at this point to
defend all of Italy since they did not think it feasible without Italian
aid. Instead, they believed that the northern Apennines along the
Pisa-Arezzo-Ancona line would be the major defense line. The decision to
hold as much of Italy as possible was made after the Allied landings.7
On g September AVALANCHE was launched with the U.S. Fifth Army initiating
the attack. At Salerno the Fifth Army was composed of the British 10
Corps; and the U.S. VI Corps, comprising the 36th and 45th Infantry
Divisions and soon to be reinforced by the 82d Airborne, and the 3d and
34th Infantry Divisions. Planning for AVALANCHE had been complicated
because the operation was mounted from widely separated ports in Sicily
and North Africa and shipping and landing craft had to be transferred
from the BAYTOWN operation.
Although most of the planning for AVALANCHE was done in the theater
and on the basis of forces already trained and available there, Army
planners in Washington had continued to exercise their usual function of
helping the theater commander strengthen his buildup for the operation.
Using the yard-
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sticks provided by the QUADRANT decisions and commitments, they measured
the requests of General Eisenhower's theater headquarters staff against
the needs of OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive. Thus, in the
process of maintaining the delicate balance necessary in the over-all
theater adjustment of resources and strength, the Army planners at times
acceded to, at times opposed specific requests. They did not satisfy fully
Eisenhower's needs in service units and replacements for P-38 groups.8 As
a rule, they opposed requests for the augmentation of USAAF bombers, on
the grounds that such bombers would have to be diverted from the Combined
Bomber Offensive based in the United Kingdom and that the diversion would
result in a departure from accepted European strategy. When temporary
retention of bombers in the Mediterranean promised no undue delay to the
CBO-Eisenhower's request for three Wellington night bomber squadrons to
remain in his theater for a month before they were returned to the United
Kingdom, for example-the Army planners expressed their agreement.9 On the
question of additional divisions for the Italian operation, the War
Department took the view that the cargo shipping requirements for any
divisions that might be sent could not be permitted to cut into the
OVERLORD build-up.10
AVALANCHE was not a big amphibious operation-not as big as TORCH, or
HUSKY, Or OVERLORD, or ANVIL-DRAGOON -against southern France in the
summer Of 1944-but it involved a fair size force that had become eight
divisions by the time it reached Naples and joined up with the British
Eighth Army. The Army planners in Washington were encouraged by the quick
fall of Foggia (evacuated on 25 September) and the promise of the Allies
soon being able to use its air bases to complement the Combined Bomber
Offensive from the United Kingdom.11 For the planners, establishment of
such an "aerial Second Front" had been a primary objective and a major
premise in the justification of an Italian campaign. On 1 October General
Clark's forces entered Naples. The Germans fell back to the Volturno River
and the formidable defensive positions of the so-called Winter and Gustav
Lines.
The campaign in Italy thereafter developed into some of the fiercest and
most difficult fighting in the war as the Allied forces sought doggedly to
push their advance northward toward Rome against these defensive barriers,
stubborn enemy resistance, and difficult terrain and weather conditions.
In Italy, following the landing at Salerno, the U.S. Fifth Army initiated
the longest single campaign for a U.S. Army in World War II.12 In the
final analysis,
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the Italian campaign was to become, as General Eisenhower later phrased
it, "distinctly a subsidiary operation" in the war against Germany.13 But
well into 1944 the issue of the extent of the Allied advance in Italy was
to figure in Allied strategic discussions as a troublesome question in the
lingering carry-over of the old cross-Channel versus Mediterranean debate.
Rome Versus Rhodes
The surrender of Italy led to renewed British pressure for further
operations in the Mediterranean. Undertakings in the Mediterranean,
particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, seemed to be as inviting to
the British as they were disquieting to the U.S. military planners.
American Army planners, believing that the over-all strategy for the
defeat of the Axis in Europe accepted at QUADRANT had definitely
oriented Allied operations northward and westward from the Mediterranean
upon the collapse of Italy, began to fear that the strategic pattern
would be upset. All land, sea, and air operations undertaken
thenceforth, in their opinion, must directly support the cross-Channel
effort; unwarranted diversions from the main objective must be avoided.
The first mission assigned
at QUADRANT to General Eisenhower as Allied Commander-elimination of Italy
-had been accomplished; his second major task-to contain a maximum number
of German forces in the Mediterranean-had to be carried out so far as
possible with forces already available in the area. Eastern Mediterranean
operations, the planners believed, in particular were likely to prove to
be a vacuum that would draw off vital strength. They recognized British
strategic responsibility for such operations based on the Middle East but
held that those undertakings should be restricted to forces available in
that area. Just as they sought to avoid an overemphasis of eastern
Mediterranean ventures, so in a choice between allocating critical
resources to the western Mediterranean or to OVERLORD they put their
weight behind OVERLORD.14 In effect, the post-QUADRANT position of the War
Department and the JCS was only a refinement of the basic American wish to
remain uninvolved in the eastern Mediterranean and to be faithful to the
OVERLORD-western Mediterranean pattern outlined at the conference.
Largely with this in mind, the War Department soon after QUADRANT
proceeded to put into effect plans to scale down the U.S. effort in the
Middle East -other than in aid to the USSR. At the beginning of September
it dissolved the USAFICA (U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa) command and
incorporated its area with USAFIME (U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East),
relieving Brig. Gen.
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Earl S. Hoag as commander of USAFICA and appointing a new commander, Maj.
Gen. Ralph Royce, to succeed General Brereton in USAFIME.15 These
steps followed closely on the heels of the consolidation by the AAF of
units of the Ninth Air Force (in the Middle East) with the Twelfth in
the Mediterranean and its decision a little later to reconstitute the
Ninth under General Brereton in the United Kingdom-ending its period of
service in the Mediterranean.16
Royce arrived in the theater on 10 September and reported his new command
in effect five days later. War Department instructions to Royce emphasized
British strategic responsibility in the area, but, unlike the previous
instructions to U.S. commanders in the area, they called for a reduction
of aid to the British to a minimum. Royce was also ordered to keep the
number of his troops low so that the manpower of the U.S. Army might be
employed "more directly" against the enemy.17 Events were soon to show that these unilateral actions to scale down the
American effort in the Middle East were not enough to dampen British
enthusiasm for Mediterranean - especially eastern Mediterranean-ventures.
A round of debate on Mediterranean operations opened almost immediately
upon the invasion of Italy. On the same day that AVALANCHE was launched-9
September 1943-the Prime Minister, who had returned to Washington after
the Quebec conference, sent for General Marshall.18 He showed Marshall a
statement of his views on courses of action in the European-Mediterranean
area following anticipated successes in Italy and indicated that he
intended to present the memorandum to the President that day. Mr.
Churchill's idea was that he and the President should hold a special
meeting with the CCS later in the day to take stock of the new over-all
situation presented by the collapse of Italy, and, in the process, discuss
points raised in the memorandum. No decisions, he added, were to be
expected. Considering it desirable for the JCS to meet before the session
with the President and Prime Minister and the British military advisers,
General Marshall had copies of the Prime Minister's note sent to the other
joint Chiefs as well as to the American planners.
In his statement the Prime Minister pointed out that, on the assumption
the Allies would gain the Italian Fleet, the British fleet that had
hitherto contained it would be released for service elsewhere. Substantial
British naval power
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therefore could be added to the prosecution of the war against Japan. It
was his understanding that all were agreed that, following a decisive
victory in the Naples area, the Allied armies would advance northward up
the Italian Peninsula until they encountered the main German position.19 He proposed consideration of various possible Mediterranean
operations-Corsica, Sardinia, Balkans, Rhodes, and so forth-on the
assumption that the current "battle for Naples and Rome" would be
successful and the Germans would retreat to the line of the Apennines or
the Po. Churchill hoped that by the end of 1943, at the latest, the Allied
force would be confronting the main German line in Italy in full strength.
For the 1944 campaign, the Allies should be "chary of advancing northward
beyond the narrow part of the Italian Peninsula." By the spring of 1944,
strengthened by a fortified line that would have been constructed in the
meantime by the Allies-a line to be manned in part by Italian troops-a
portion of the Allied troops could be diverted for action elsewhere,
either to the west or to the east. He wished it understood that "there can
be no question of whittling down OVERLORD," but he stressed the importance
of the Balkan situation and expressed the belief that sufficient use was
not being made of the forces in the Middle East. When the defensive line
across northern Italy had been established, it might be possible to spare
some of the Allied forces assigned to the Mediterranean theater "to
emphasize a movement north and northeastward from the Dalmatian ports."
Analyzing these proposals for General Marshall, the Operations Division
agreed that, on the whole, the strategy proposed was sound. It took as its
guidepost the fundamental assumption supported by Army planners before and
during QUADRANT that the overriding aim of projected operations in the
European-Mediterranean area was the success of OVERLORD.20 Agreeing with
the Prime Minister that the best possible use be made of the Italian Navy
and merchant marine, the Army planners suggested that the critical problem
of maintaining them be studied by the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy
Department. They agreed, too, that after a decisive victory in the Naples
area, the British-American forces should move northwards until they came
against the main German position and certainly far enough to secure
suitable air bases to complement the Combined Bomber Offensive. To employ
Italian divisions as front-line combat troops, as suggested by the Prime
Minister, seemed more questionable. They should be of great value,
however, for garrison duty in southern Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia and for
administrative tasks ill the rear areas, thereby releasing Allied troops.
As soon as the Allied forces had reached the main German position, a
strong defensive line should be established to protect, for the time
being, the prospective air bases in central Italy. Allied resources should
be able to cope successfully with enemy counterattacks; Allied air
capabilities, in particular, should preclude large-scale
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or decisive enemy action. Any diversion of German strength to the Italian
theater, moreover, would indirectly contribute to the success of OVERLORD.
Going further, the Operations Division expressed the Army's
continuing reluctance to become involved in eastern Mediterranean
operations. It called for close examination of any suggestion to divert
Allied troops eastward or westward of Italy: "The diversion of any major
forces to the eastward should be resisted unless it can be conclusively
shown that such action contributes to the success of OVERLORD."21
It agreed that careful study must be given to the possibility of
supplementing the means agreed upon at QUADRANT for supplies to the
guerrilla forces in the Balkans. To use British-American forces, as the
Prime Minister had suggested, "to emphasize a movement
north-northeastward from Dalmatian ports" was, however, "a dangerous
diversionary idea" and should be resisted. Operations against Sardinia
and Corsica should be executed with the resources available in the area.
The planners agreed that those islands could be easily captured and felt
their seizure would facilitate operations against southern France. While
the Operations Division stated that it had not as yet been informed of
the plans of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (the British commander in
chief in the Middle East) for Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands,
it recommended that any operations against those islands should be
carried out only with resources available in the Middle East. The sum of
such actions in the Mediterranean would best in- . sure the most
effective and timely employment of the combined resources and the
strategic areas becoming available to the Allies, and would hasten the
defeat of Germany.22
At the special JCS meeting held shortly before the session with the
two political leaders on 9 September, the Joint Chiefs expressed doubts
and reservations concerning the Prime Minister's proposals for the
Mediterranean. Admiral King pointed out that the Prime Minister had said
that he looked east and west, but that when the Prime Minister looked
west all he saw was Sardinia and Corsica. The Prime Minister evidently
had overlooked the probability of a German withdrawal behind the Alps
and a consequent landing by French forces on the coast of southern
France in support Of OVERLORD. General Marshall upheld the views of the
Army planners. In particular, he emphasized that, from the Army point of
view, the Prime Minister's statement about an advance north and
northeastward from the Dalmatian ports "did not look so good. "23
The discussion, continued at the White House with the Prime Minister, the
President, and the British Chiefs of Staff, was in reality a brief
postlude to QUADRANT.24 Steps were discussed for the conversion of Italy
into an active agent in the war against Germany and for the best use of
Italian resources and forces against the common enemy. At this meeting the
President agreed with the Prime Minister that the Allied armies should
advance as far north as
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possible in Italy and then dig in, using whatever Italian forces might be
available for defensive operations. Operations in the Balkans, he
maintained, would be "largely a matter of opportunity," and the Allied
forces should be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity that
presented itself. The President, too, looked for great benefits to be
secured from the use of the Italian Fleet and elements of the British
fleet released from operations in the war against the Western Axis Powers.
In line with a suggestion made by the Prime Minister, the various
Mediterranean preparations were referred to the Combined Staff for further
examination.
On 10 September the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to the
President and Prime Minister that they were in agreement with the
general conception of subsequent operations in Italy.25 They called for
an exploration of the possibility of using Italian naval units for
transport purposes in the Mediterranean area. Great importance should be
attached to the Balkan situation, and every effort should then be made
to augment by sea the supplies being sent by air to the patriot forces.
Admiral Leahy and General Marshall agreed with Sir John Dill in
expressing the hope that it would be possible to use Dalmatian coast
ports to supply Balkan forces without seizing the ports by amphibious
operations. Responsibility for support of the Balkan guerrillas was to
remain, the CCS agreed, with the Commander in Chief, Middle East,
working in closest co-operation with General Eisenhower. They approved
the action then being taken by the Commander in Chief, Middle East, with
respect to Rhodes and other islands in the Dodecanese. The Office of
Strategic Services and the corresponding British agency had already been
directed to try their hand in Sardinia. The combined military chiefs
agreed with the Prime Minister that French forces should, if possible,
be used for the capture of Corsica.
The British and U.S. military staffs seemed, therefore, to be in
substantial agreement on Mediterranean operations. Differences in point
of view between the Prime Minister and the JCS on the operations,
revealed in the go-round in Washington following the AVALANCHE landings,
did not come to a head at once, since no new decisions were thought to
be immediately necessary. The basic agreements of QUADRANT in the war
against the European Axis still appeared to be firm. In accord with the
accepted Allied planning for the western Mediterranean, Sardinia and
Corsica soon fell into Allied hands. The Italians in Sardinia handed
over the island to U.S. troops, and by 18 September the occupation was
complete. By 5 October German troops had evacuated Corsica, and French
troops arriving from Algiers took control.
Reaction to events in the eastern Mediterranean in late summer and
early fall of 1943 made the apparent agreement between the American and
British staffs, however, seem illusory. The specific issue arose in
connection with operations against Rhodes and other islands in the
Dodecanese. The Dodecanese Islands had been largely garrisoned by
Italian troops, and the surrender of Italy offered the possibility of
easy capture by the Allies. Plans and
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preparations for the capture of Rhodes had been in the making in the
Middle East Command for several months but, up to the collapse of Italy,
General Wilson's plans for action in the Dodecanese had necessarily been
held in abeyance. On 9 September, swiftly upon Italy's surrender,
Churchill cabled from Washington to General Wilson "This is the time to
play high. Improvise and dare."26 On the night of
9 September, Major Lord Jellicoe landed by parachute with a small mission on Rhodes to try to
bring about a quick surrender of the island. Unfortunately, the Italians
were unable to overcome the Germans on the island, and Jellicoe had to
make a hasty departure. Within the next few days, small forces dispatched
by Wilson to Kos, Samos, and Leros quickly won them.27 It soon became
apparent that the Italian forces had no desire for further fighting. If
the Allies were to hold the islands, they would have to provide
garrisons, and these could come only from the Allied forces then locked
in a bitter struggle in Italy. American policy on the eastern
Mediterranean was crystallized in response to the insistence of the
British Chiefs of Staff, and of the Prime Minister in particular, that support be provided for the islands.28 The Prime Minister
had long been impressed with the strategic value of gaining control of the
Aegean. The surrender of Italy appeared to him to have given the Allies an
excellent opportunity to do just that at small cost. To command the Aegean
might yield a rich harvest in stimulating Balkan resistance, obtaining the
participation of Turkey, and gaining a short-cut sea route to the USSR.
The key to all this was Rhodes and its airfields. In his view, moreover;
the campaign in Italy could not be viewed separately from events in the
Aegean. Early in October he declared to the President:
I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are
militarily and politically united, and that really it is one theatre with
which we have to deal.29
On 3 October the British Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS of their
agreement with the view of the (British) Commander in Chief, Middle East,
on the desirability of capturing Rhodes.30 General Wilson had declared in
late September that the seizure of Rhodes would be necessary to insure
Allied positions in islands already occupied in the eastern Mediterranean.
31 To capture Rhodes,
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he had maintained, would break the outer ring of the defenses of the
Balkans, jeopardize enemy positions in Crete, and provide a base for
effective action against enemy sea communications throughout the Aegean.
The latter effort, in conjunction with bombing from the heel of Italy
against land communications, might, furthermore, force the enemy to
withdraw from Greece. The British Chiefs of Staff informed their American
colleagues that they were especially anxious to avoid a withdrawal from
Kos and Leros, and this could be done only by seizing Rhodes. They wished
the Middle East commander to consult with AFHQ in preparing the plan for
action.
In the next two days General Eisenhower called the attention of the
CCS and the War Department to the implications for his theater of an
operation against Rhodes and sought the advice of the Washington Army
headquarters. To General Marshall he stated his wish to insure that his
planning for the winter campaign in Italy would dovetail with the larger
projects in view in Washington.32 He was anxious to have enough assets
to carry out undertakings to support OVERLORD effectively. In
particular, he sought the Chief of Staff's views on the Middle East
problems, which were constantly recurring. While he recognized that
those problems were to a considerable extent bound up with his own, he
wished to avoid being drawn into any "mere diversion" involving
relatively unimportant and "unrelated" objectives. It was General
Eisenhower's personal
view that the greatest possible assistance he could give OVERLORD would be
to conduct a vigorous fall and winter campaign and capture the Po Valley
33 From the Po Valley, he reasoned, the Allied forces could threaten and
actually stage diversionary operations in southern France. To the CCS
General Eisenhower reported that if an aggressive policy were pursued in
the Aegean, his theater would be asked to undertake air and sea
commitments that it might not be able to afford.34 He drew attention to
the difficult problems facing him on the mainland of Italy and his
especial need for the air forces available. Any significant diversion of
strength would, in his opinion, jeopardize the success of the Italian
operation.
War Department planners backed General Eisenhower's point of view and
reaffirmed strongly the American position on remaining uninvolved in
eastern Mediterranean operations.35 They advanced a number of arguments
against the Rhodes operation. Events had already overtaken the British
plan, since the reoccupation of Kos by the Germans, then in progress, had
in effect deprived prospective operations against Rhodes
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of the only airfield from which fighter planes could operate effectively.
The Middle East was not able to furnish the forces and resources either
for launching or for maintaining an Aegean operation. Additional forces
would necessarily, therefore, have to come from those urgently needed for
Italy. The Italian situation did not warrant, in their opinion, the
assumption that air resources or even the two LST's (landing ship, tank)
required by the Middle East plans could be transferred to the eastern
Mediterranean for the Aegean operation. To divert these resources in
support of a "strategically unimportant secondary operation" could only
result in jeopardizing the Italian campaign. The planners also feared that
the British were visualizing a continued increase in the size of the
eastern Mediterranean operations. The Rhodes operation could be viewed
only as the beginning of an endless chain of demands for additional forces
that would finally result in the eastern Mediterranean drawing off "all
the available United Nations resources." The occupation of Rhodes could,
moreover, be considered merely as a preliminary step toward a series of
operations in the eastern Mediterranean leading to the Balkan mainland. To
initiate these moves would be to invite a violent counterattack by the
Germans, and the Allies would then find themselves confronted with the
necessity of conducting another major operation in the Mediterranean under
far less favorable conditions than those under which the current
operations were taking place.
The War Department planners concluded that continued operations in the
eastern Mediterranean, weighed in the light of the Allied commitments, re-
sources, and the approved strategy for 1944, were therefore unacceptable
to the United States.36 If, despite these arguments, further action was to
take place in the eastern Mediterranean, it must be held to a minimum. The
planners recommended to the Chief of Staff that undertakings in the
eastern Mediterranean be delayed until such time as they could be of help
to the other European operations in the accepted strategic pattern. If the
British Chiefs of Staff, however, adhered to their decision to conduct
Aegean operations in October 1943, the JCS should disapprove the
initiation of any operations that would require forces beyond those
currently assigned to the Middle East.
In early October the JCS debated the issue.37 General McNarney advanced a
somewhat different line of argument from that of the War Department
planners. The Deputy Chief of Staff called attention to the fact that
General Wilson apparently had about 3,000 planes and a very large land
force then idle. This strength should be used if possible. In McNarney's
opinion, the JCS could not take exception to the British view of the
strategic significance of Rhodes. If the Allies remained inactive in the
Aegean, moreover, the Germans would withdraw troops for use on other
fronts. But, McNarney added, the removal of forces from General
Eisenhower's theater for such operations in the Aegean could be done
only with General Eisenhower's concurrence, and the United States would
then give such added assistance as
[256]
it could. - If resources could be found to make operations against Rhodes
possible, he was, therefore, in favor of such action.
To Admiral Leahy, the Middle East was "entirely a British
proposition." But, since the British wished to withdraw certain
resources from the North African theater, the United States would
thereby become involved in the operations in the Middle East. The JCS
had given their approval to operations in the Middle East, and could not
withdraw it. At the same time Leahy did not feel that the JCS could
permit the British "unilaterally" to take resources from General
Eisenhower's theater.38 He too feared lest such operations develop into a
major campaign in which the United States would find itself involved.
At this point General Marshall suggested a compromise solution that
would safeguard the agreed strategic pattern of QUADRANT and General
Eisenhower's interests in the Italian campaign, and at the same time
respect British strategic responsibility in the Middle East.39
He recommended that such assistance be given to the Middle East Command
as in General Eisenhower's view could be spared from the Italian
campaign. The JCS accepted Marshall's proposal. They further agreed to
announce to the British Chiefs of Staff that they could not approve of
directing General Eisenhower to provide for the Middle East Command any
forces or equipment that, in his opinion, were needed for his Italian
campaign.40
The views of the JCS, forwarded to the British Chiefs of Staff, were
almost immediately confirmed by the President. On 7 October he informed
the Prime Minister that he was opposed to any diversion of strength
that, in the Allied Force Commander's opinion, was necessary during the
current critical phase of the Italian campaign. He did not wish to force
on General Eisenhower diversions that might limit the prospects of
reaching a secure line north of Rome. There was no objection, however,
to Eisenhower's supplying assistance he believed could be spared. The
President added his dissent to any diversion of forces or equipment that
would jeopardize OVERLORD. At his request, the War Department relayed
his conclusions to General Eisenhower.
41
Disappointed but not discouraged, the Prime Minister took a new tack. He
urged the President to permit him to arrange a meeting between the Prime
Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff on the one hand, and General
Marshall or the President's personal representative and General Eisenhower
on the other, at the latter's headquarters, to discuss the Rhodes
operation. The American stand, however, remained firm-no undue pressure
should be exerted on the Allied Commander in the midst of his
[257]
critical campaign. Advising against such a conference, the War Department
declared that the question was whether the Allies were to advance to
positions north of Rome or to enter into a Balkan campaign, starting with
"the southern tip."42 Hopkins
informed the Prime Minister by transatlantic telephone, in the midst of
an apparently bitter exchange over Dodecanese operations, that there was
no chance of General Marshall's being sent to such a meeting and that
the CCS could deal with recommendations for new moves .43
Washington and London agreed to await General Eisenhower's recommendations
for action after weighing the British and American points of view.44 These
came quickly. On 9 October the whole problem of eastern Mediterranean and
Italian operations was threshed out at a conference at La Marsa in Tunis
between General Eisenhower, his commanders in chief, and the Commander in
Chief, Middle East.45 The case for Rhodes was weakened by receipt of
reports that Hitler intended to reinforce his army in Italy and fight a
major battle south of Rome. The conferees soon concluded that the
British-American resources in the Mediterranean-particularly landing
craft and air strength were not large enough to undertake the
capture of Rhodes and at the same time to attain the immediate objectives
in Italy. The minimum line that had to be reached at the earliest possible
date to stabilize the Allied position in Italy, they agreed, was a secure
position north of Rome. To attain that goal, a full concentration of
Allied resources was necessary. A choice therefore had to be made "between
Rhodes and Rome." Confronted with that choice, the commanders in the field
were unanimous in their conclusion that Allied efforts had to be
concentrated on the Italian campaign. They therefore recommended that the
Rhodes operation be postponed until favorable weather and available forces
gave the operation a reasonable chance of success and that the CCS
reexamine the situation in the Aegean after the capture of Rome.
In Washington, the Army planners enthusiastically received the
Mediterranean commanders' decisions.46 On 15 October the U.S. and
British Chiefs of Staff also approved the recommendations.47 The operation
against Rhodes would be postponed, but the question was to be re-examined
after the capture of Rome. Acknowledging that the situation had been
considerably altered by the German intention to reinforce southern Italy
and fight a battle before Rome, the Prime Minister reluctantly concluded
that he had to submit and accept the decision, "painful" as it was .48
[258]
retrospect, Churchill has written that this decision caused him ". . . one
of the sharpest pangs I suffered in the war . . ." He has explained: "When
so many grave issues were pending, I could not risk any jar in my personal
relations with the President." Nevertheless, he could not avoid the
conclusion-even years after the close of hostilities-that as a result of
the American staff's "pedantic" enforcement of its views at this point, a
great opportunity had been lost.49 As it turned out, the Germans quickly
completed their reconquest of the Dodecanese, but it took the Allies eight
more months to capture Rome.
The Balkans and Turkey
The apparent resolution in mid-October of the debate over the Rhodes
operation did not dispel the Army's fears that continued British pressure
for Mediterranean-and particularly for east Mediterranean-ventures would
pose a serious threat to QUADRANT decisions. The Army planners felt that
they had to be alert to counter such pressure and prepare to defend the
American position in subsequent meetings with the British. As one Army
planner on duty with the British joint planners in the United Kingdom had
written back to his colleagues in the War Department during the debate
over Rhodes, "The Prime Minister is interested in the Mediterranean]
again, and the Eastern Mediterranean] too. The Planners [in the U.K.] have
been loyal to QUADRANT but their
hands may be forced. We had better make damn complete studies and establish our position."50 With this end in view, in late October and early
November the War Department planners restudied and restated their position
on Mediterranean operations.
The specter of Balkan operations produced a reaffirmation of the planners'
basic view of major operations and American involvement in that area. They
continued to argue that a major offensive in the Balkans would require
maneuvering of large forces in an area where it would be virtually
impossible to maintain them because of logistical difficulties. It would
necessitate the longest lines of communications of any projected
operations in the Mediterranean theater, a theater already at the end of a
long communications line. There were three main routes into the Balkans:
one, across which the enemy then stood in force, extended from the head of
the Adriatic through northern Yugoslavia toward Austria and Hungary;
another extended from Salonika along the narrow and rugged Vardar River
valley through eastern Yugoslavia to the Dan-
[259]
ube near Belgrade; the third reached from Istanbul through Thrace westward
via Sofia and Hungary. Use of Salonika or Istanbul as a base for a Balkan
invasion would have extended the Allied line of communications into the
Mediterranean approximately 900 and 1,500 miles respectively. Terrain,
meteorological conditions, and lack of internal communications would make
such operations most difficult. In the familiar vein of War Department
studies, the planners maintained that such operations would involve the
United States in a war of attrition-costly and drawn-out. Such
undertakings would, it followed, postpone final decisions in the war
against Germany and hence in the war against Japan. They concluded,
therefore, that from a military point of view the Balkans were unsuitable
for major operations against Germany.
The War Department planners looked for ways and means of keeping
subsequent action in the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean area within the
accepted basic pattern of operations. They recommended playing on German
sensitivity in the Aegean and in the Balkans by a resourceful use of
feints and deception in order to assist OVERLORD. Middle East forces
should be constantly on the alert to capitalize on any opportunities
that might arise in the Aegean should the German position in the
Mediterranean weaken. In keeping with the QUADRANT decisions, Allied
strategy in the Balkans should continue, they concluded, to be the
acceleration of supply to the Balkan guerrillas, air attacks upon vital
economic centers, land and sea raids against the coast, and, if
possible, minor actions by commandos. In the final analysis, the Allied
strategy would be best served if Germany continued to hold the Balkans,
provided it were forced to garrison them heavily and pay a high price in
troops and matériel.51
War Department apprehensions about the Balkans were shared by the
Germans, but for different reasons. The Germans intended to defend the
Balkans; they could not afford to do otherwise. The area provided oil,
bauxite, copper, and other resources that Germany required to sustain
its war machine. During the summer and fall of 1943 the Germans feared
that the Allies would invade the Balkans as well as Italy and had
steadily reinforced both regions. German forces in the Balkans had
increased from ten and a half divisions to sixteen in the three-month
period from 15 July to 15 October, while those in Italy had climbed from
six and a half to nineteen and a half divisions.52
In early October Hitler issued directives to the Balkan and Italian
commands. In his opinion, the Allies would make their main effort either
from south-
[260]
ern Italy in the direction of Albania-Montenegro-southern Croatia Or from
central Italy, once the Allies captured it, toward northern Croatia and
Istria. He intended to defend both the Balkans and Italy and to prevent
the Allies from enlarging their foothold in southern Italy. To restrict
Allied expansion in the south, Germany would defend the Italian Peninsula
along the so-called Gustav Line from Gaeta to Ortona and the Balkan
Peninsula down to the Peloponnesus.53 Thus, the determination of the
German leaders to make a stand as far away from the homeland as possible
led to the development of a strong protective crust for the "soft
underbelly" by October 1943. The Allied threat in the Mediterranean was
to be contained.
While the Germans were bolstering their defenses in the Balkans, the War
Department planners were concerned over the closely related problem of
Turkey. The Army planners had long recognized the advantages of Turkey's
becoming an active participant in the war and of thus securing the use of
its air bases for operations against the Balkans-projects close to the
heart of the Prime Minister. But, as usual, they were anxious about the
price and proper timing of that entry. As the Axis thrust eastward had
been blunted and Anglo-American agreements were reached on OVERLORD, the
American military planners had increasingly doubted the practicability of
weaning Turkey from neutrality. In fact, when the crisis on the Soviet
front passed in the summer of 1943, the planners called for a change in
Anglo-American policy toward Turkey from
conciliation and cajoling to sternness.54 Emphasizing the priority of
OVERLORD
and the ineffectiveness to date of the sizable economic aid and
considerable British military commitment to bring Turkey into the war,
they called for a reduction in aid to Turkey.55
The JWPC went so far as to suggest that such a recommendation might
serve to dampen British interest in the eastern Mediterranean. Token
aid, they held, should be furnished to Turkey in return for benevolent
neutrality.56
At QUADRANT the British planners had themselves pointed to the marked
"cooling off" of Turkey's attitude in recent
[261]
months, and stated that they hoped soon to have airfields in Italy from
which to bomb Ploesti and communications in the Balkans, eliminating the
need for Turkish airfields.57 General Marshall and the JCS had supported
the policy of reduced aid, and the British Chiefs of Staff had agreed that
from a military point of view the time was not ripe for Turkey to enter on
the Allied side and that supplies should be "slowed to a trickle, "58
To secure the benevolent neutrality of Turkey the CCS, the President,
and the Prime Minister had approved at Quebec a policy of supplying such
equipment "as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb."59
In the late months of 1943 the British once more raised the issue of
active Turkish participation in the war, this time in conjunction with the
possibility of securing Turkish help for operations in the Aegean against
Rhodes and the Dodecanese and of gaining a shorter sea route, via the
Dardanelles, for delivering supplies to the USSR. Intent on the cross-Channel
undertaking, the American planners seriously doubted that the time was
right for Turkey's entry. They argued that assistance required by the
neutral power in the eastern Mediterranean must not in any case
prejudice planned operations in Europe. By early November the U.S.
military position on the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean region was being
crystallized in this mold
on the joint level for presentation to the President and the British.60
Mediterranean Build-up Versus
OVERLORD
Requirements of the Italian
Campaign
While the U.S. planners felt it necessary in the fall of 1943 to prepare
the American case against major involvement in the Balkan-eastern
Mediterranean area, they were also viewing with some alarm-on both Army
and joint levels-the British attitude toward the withdrawal of Allied
resources from the Italian campaign for the build-up in the United
Kingdom. The British position merely confirmed the suspicion that the
British goal was increased emphasis on the Mediterranean and that the
OVERLORD pattern would be upset. Sympathetic as the Washington military
planners were with the needs of the Allied commander in the bitter
conflict on the Italian mainland, they nevertheless felt that the major
part of the strategic objectives in the Mediterranean had already been
attained. General Eisenhower should, in their opinion, be supported as
strongly as possible, but not at the expense of OVERLORD. The time had
come for Allied undertakings to be oriented definitely northward and
westward.
[262]
In late October the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that if the
campaign in Italy led to a reverse or even to a stalemate, OVERLORD would
inevitably have to be postponed. In the light of Allied naval and air
superiority, the Washington military planners could not agree that the
Italian campaign was very likely to result in a reverse or even a
stalemate. Even if either of these events did occur, they could not agree
that OVERLORD would have to be postponed. By knocking Italy out of the
war, gaining control of the Italian Fleet, acquiring air bases in Italy,
and occupying Sardinia and Sicily, the United States and the United
Kingdom had already achieved their basic strategic objectives in the
Mediterranean, and had achieved them earlier than anticipated. To take any
action that would jeopardize OVERLORD, the primary effort, merely to
insure an Allied advance farther on the Italian mainland would, in the
planners' opinion, be militarily unsound. In the long run, a German
counteroffensive might even enable General Eisenhower's forces to contain
a maximum number of divisions and lead to the greatest possible attrition
of the enemy's forces. In mid-November these conclusions were approved on
the American joint level.61
While the Washington planners were preparing the American case for
continued subordination of the Italian campaign to OVERLORD, General Marshall
was arguing in a similar vein with the Prime Minister. In late October the
Prime Minister informed General Marshall, via Field Marshall Dill,
"Naturally I feel in my marrow the withdrawal of our 50th and 51st
Divisions, our best, from the very edge of the battle of Rome in the
interests of distant OVERLORD. We are carrying out our contract, but I
pray God it does not cost us dear."62 General Marshall assured the Prime
Minister that he realized General Eisenhower's difficulties.63 In fact,
Washington headquarters was even then examining with General Morgan (COSSAC)
the possibilities of meeting General Eisenhower's immediate
problem-landing craft. But Marshall observed that, in the Washington view,
General Eisenhower had adequate troops to fight in Italy without undue
risks and that, as General Eisenhower himself had pointed out, the more
Germans he could contain in Italy, the better were the chances of
OVERLORD.
The potential cost to OVERLORD of a strong Allied bid to advance to Rome
and farther north in the face of the determined German resistance also led
the Washington staff to view with reservations the planning of General
Eisenhower's staff for the fall and winter offensive in Italy. The
Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, had expressed the belief
that nothing would
[263]
help OVERLORD so much as the early establishment of the Allied forces in
the Po Valley.64 Once in the Po Valley, the force would be ready to stage
a sharp diversionary action in southern France and thereafter in the
Balkans, a threat that would draw off German reserves from OVERLORD. The
Allied theater staff recommended that certain resources, therefore, be
retained in the Mediterranean as long as possible. In studying these
recommendations, the Army planners in Washington agreed with the JSSC
conclusion that to specify the Po Valley as a strategic objective would
imply that sufficient forces should be provided by the CCS.65 On the
ground that the Po Valley objective might be obtained only at the expense
of OVERLORD, the JSSC and the Army planners, therefore, opposed it. At the
close of October the JCS informally approved these recommendations.
66
Nevertheless, in the light of Eisenhower's serious view of his immediate
needs, Washington headquarters was willing to make some compromises. In
early November the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff took the
position that holding the sixty LST's in the Mediterranean, as General
Eisenhower had requested for his operations, would not materially affect
OVERLORD.67 The American planners proposed and the CCS accepted-after discussion with the
theater headquarters-that he be allowed to retain the LST's until 15
December 1943.68 The Army staff, though aware of the QUADRANT decision to
all but strip the Mediterranean of amphibious lift, felt that the effect
on OVERLORD of this temporary retention would be minor, but that to
conduct additional major Operations in Italy beyond those then planned by
the Allied Force Headquarters would not be possible without at least
postponing, and probably abandoning, OVERLORD.69 Undoubtedly, Admiral
King's announcement on 5 November that an increase of LST's, LCI (L)'s
(landing craft, infantry, large), and LCT's (landing craft, tank) over and
above scheduled allotments for OVERLORD would be sent in the coming
months to the United Kingdom provided further reassurance for the Army
Staff.70
"A Question of Manpower"
Back of the War Department planners' insistence in the fall of 1943 on the para-
[264]
mountcy of OVERLORD lay their concern over the limits of U.S. armed
strength. Despite the measures adopted by the Army to hold the troop
basis to a minimum, it had again become necessary for the War
Department-this time not long after QUADRANT-to defend its requirements
before Congressional committees. In September General McNarney had
appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in support of the
7,700,000-men army.71 Speaking in general but illuminating terms, he
based the Army case upon strategic requirements, logistics, and the
timing of operations. The American policy of defeating Germany first and
building up a powerful air force at the temporary expense of the ground
combat units had proved sound, he maintained, but it remained as
imperative as ever to mobilize and train a strong ground force to
complement the air strength. The Army had chosen to win air mastery
first because of greater American aircraft production capabilities and
the enemy's preponderance in divisions. Despite heavy losses resulting
from Allied air and ground activity, however, the enemy had been able to
maintain and even expand its armies by drastic economies in manpower.
This meant, McNarney declared, that the United States not only must
continue to inflict damage on the foe but also must strive to speed up
its pace. The Deputy Chief of Staff went on to state that, since the
Army had established stations all over the world, the problems of
logistics must also be weighed in conjunction with strategic
considerations. To supply and maintain the far-flung chain of bases and
to keep combat units in action required large increases in the numbers
of service troops. These requirements would be further expanded as the
enemy's perimeter shrank and American lines of communications grew
longer. Fortunately, the shipping situation had improved, and there were
now brighter prospects for transporting larger amounts of men and
supplies overseas.
Turning to the third factor bearing on the size of the army, the
timing of operations, McNarney asserted that, when an operation was set
up, military personnel needed to carry it out successfully had to be
inducted, trained, equipped, transported, and deployed in a specified
area at a designated time. The Army staff had carefully studied the
strategic requirements, logistics, and the timing of operations before
drawing up the troop basis and General Marshall felt very strongly that
the 7,700,000-man army was the minimum that could do the job. Any
reduction in this total, McNarney warned in closing, would require a
change in the strategic commitments of the United States.72
The struggle for acceptance of the Army estimates and the intimation
that a 7,700,000-man force would be the limit of Congressional support
prompted Marshall to instruct all theater commanders to survey their
rear echelon establishments with a view to trimming requirements. "It is
no longer entirely a question of shipping," he informed them, "basically
it is now a question of manpower."73
Despite the favorable developments of the summer in the Russo-German
campaign and the increasing success of the
[265]
Combined Bomber Offensive, G-3 advised Marshall to defer final decision on
the Army manpower ceiling until the spring of 1944.74 The Operations
Division felt, however, that the 7,700,000 figure was an acceptable one,
especially since the War Department's economy program had worked out so
well. As General Tansey, Chief of the Division's Logistics Group, saw it,
this total would be wholly consistent with the U.S. manpower, production,
and shipping capabilities, as well as with over-all strategy.75 The
President's approval of the JCS recommendations for a 7,700,000-man army
and over-all armed strength of 11,264,000 for 1944 (including 320,000
women) came in November 1943. It marked the reduction of ultimate Army
strength to the level recommended by the Maddocks Committee report of June
1943-a figure henceforth to be accepted in joint mobilization planning.
The ceiling of 7,700,000 was to remain the authorized limit of Army
expansion down to the end of the war in Europe in May 1945.
76
The Strategic Pattern and the
Deployment Trend
In the light of the manpower situation, the need to keep planned
deployment and agreed strategy in balance appeared to the Army staff to
be more urgent than ever. Commitments of U.S. forces for major
operations to end the war in Europe had been entered into at QUADRANT;
Mediterranean operations were to be limited to forces already available
in the area. Significant variations in the deployment of strength and
allocation of means from accepted decisions in the war against the
Western Axis Powers not only might endanger the over-all European
pattern but also might jeopardize the availability of strength
eventually needed to defeat Japan. Each division dispatched overseas
would draw in its wake a train of vital shipping and supplies. War
Department planners, therefore, sought to distribute manpower and
resources carefully, trying as always to weigh the "necessary" against
the "desirable" and to maintain the ever delicate balance of vital
strength among the diverse theaters and operations. Even on the basis of
the most careful -calculations, OVERLORD did not seem to contain enough
strength to promise a sufficiently wide margin for success. A suggestion
by the British Chiefs of Staff and COSSAC after QUADRANT on the
desirability of increasing the striking force for the OVERLORD assault
by one division was causing a desperate, widespread search by the
British and American Chiefs of Staff for the necessary landing craft.77
By the beginning of November 1943, twenty-eight of the existing total of
ninety U.S. divisions were deployed overseas.78 Seven divisions were in
the Euro-
[266]
pean theater and eight in the Mediterranean- a total of only two more
divisions than the thirteen in the Pacific areas.79 Of the total of 262
air groups, 119 were then overseas, with 39 in the European, 37 in the
Mediterranean, and the remainder scattered in the Western Hemisphere,
Pacific, and Asiatic areas.80
The bulk of the existing ground and air strength-62 divisions and 143 air
groups-was thus still in the continental United States. By the close of
1944 the division strength was to amount, according to the Victory Program
Troop Basis approved in October 1943, to 105 divisions (a total never
actually reached in World War II).
81 During 1944, according to the current
estimates, nineteen U.S. divisions would have to be made available for
OVERLORD by 1 May, and by the end of the year the United States build-up
in the United Kingdom was to rise to forty-seven divisions.82 In view of world-wide demands and accepted ceilings and limits on manpower, the
necessity of husbanding and concentrating strength to meet the heavy
ground and air demands for OVERLORD and the follow-up on the Continent and
still have enough forces left over for a strategic reserve and for
defeating Japan was henceforth to be a constant concern to the War
Department planners.
Intent as the Washington Army staff was in the late months of 1943 on
building up strength in the United Kingdom -a movement that steadily
increased after its resumption in May and its confirmation at Quebec-the
War Department yielded to some departures from QUADRANT decisions and
estimates on deployment of U.S. forces to the Mediterranean.83 Aside from
agreeing to the temporary retention of landing ships in the western
Mediterranean, the War Department also approved General Eisenhower's
urgent request for two additional U.S. infantry divisions. These
reinforcements, he felt, would promote the success of the later operation
in northwest Europe. The two divisions (the 85th and the 88th), which the
War Department agreed to deploy before 1 January 1944, were intended to
help offset the loss of the three British and four U.S. veteran divisions
that were to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for
OVERLORD in accordance with TRIDENT arid QUADRANT decisions.
84
[267]
The intertheater shift of the four U.S. divisions (1st and 9th
Infantry, 2d Armored, and 82d Airborne) was scheduled to be completed
before the close of the year. It began with the transfer of the 1st
Infantry Division in early November 1943.85
The War Department also deviated from QUADRANT estimates in backing
the dispatch of additional air groups to the Mediterranean for the
build-up of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force. This new strategic air
force-proposed by General Arnold in the early fall of 1943 and supported
by General Marshall-was to capitalize on the air bases that would become
available in Italy and thereby complement the Combined Bomber Offensive
from the United Kingdom. Arguing against a tendency to employ heavy
bombers locally, Marshall particularly stressed the importance of
arranging for the movement of four-engine bombers from one theater to
another as necessary. In the AAF plan, the buildup of the Fifteenth Air
Force was to be based partly on units from the Twelfth Air Force then in
the Mediterranean and partly on air groups in the United States then
scheduled for the build-up of the Eighth Air Force in the United
Kingdom. In October the JCS and CCS approved the AAF proposal and the
Fifteenth Air Force was established, effective 1 November 1943.86
The War Department and the AAF thereupon began to carry out the plan for
building up the Fifteenth Air Force. The new force was to consist of
twenty-one heavy bombardment groups, seven long-range fighter groups, and
one reconnaissance group and was to reach full strength by the end of
March 1944. The initial strength and equipment of the Fifteenth were to be
derived from the Twelfth Air Force. AAF headquarters had planned to divert
three B-24 groups from allotments to the United Kingdom for shipment to
the Mediterranean in each of the three months from November through
January 1944. The first of the three groups did not, however, reach the
theater until mid-December 1943. In addition, the War Department
authorized the constitution and activation by the end of January 1944 of
four heavy
[268]
bombardment wings, two air depot groups, and three air service
groups.87
With these exceptions-designed directly or indirectly to aid OVERLORD the
War Department continued its policy of holding the line for the build-up
in the United Kingdom. In early November it resisted such suggestions as
the British proposal to retain one armored and one airborne division in
the Mediterranean and AFHQ's bid for additional divisions.88
Thus the Washington staffs labored in
the fall of 1943 to keep OVERLORD "top of the bill" and to balance Allied
resources in the European-Mediterranean area in accordance with QUADRANT
decisions. Though British proposals for new Mediterranean undertakings and
for added support to agreed-upon undertakings in the Mediterranean had on
the whole thus far been successfully countered, there was no assurance
that increased pressure for such ventures would riot result in upsetting
the over-all strategic pattern agreed upon at Quebec. Washington's concern
for maintenance of the integrity of the QUADRANT pattern became all the
greater, therefore, in the late fall of 1943, in the face of divergent
British and American proposals for command arrangements in the war against
Germany.
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Endnotes
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