EVERY step in the extension of legislative control increased the importance of administrative organization. Existing agencies were strengthened and new ones developed, until, finally, a radical reorganization of the colonial constitutions was demanded, which could only be accomplished by the action of Parliament itself.

     In the shaping of administrative policy the personal action of King William and Queen Anne seems, on the whole, a factor of minor importance. William III. was much absorbed in the politics of continental Europe, and had little time for colonial affairs, though his influence was in general exerted to uphold the royal prerogative. He consented reluctantly to triennial parliaments at home, and he opposed the triennial election of assemblies in America. In one instance, when Parliament attempted to organize a council of trade under its own control, the king exerted himself to defeat the project.¹ Queen Anne’s policy was still more largely

that of her ministers, though her colonial appointments were sometimes influenced by personal preferences. William Penn was a man of experience in such matters, and he wrote to his secretary in 1703 warning him not to submit even to royal orders when at variance with law, adding, “Queens never read, as well as Kings, what they sign; they are signed upon the credit of committees or secretaries.”¹

     In general, then, the colonial policy of the crown was the policy of its official advisers. Matters of importance were determined by the Privy Council, composed, for practical purposes, of the king’s ministers of state. Details were managed by individual ministers, by subordinate officials, or by administrative committees or boards. Government by homogeneous party ministries was not yet established, and the ministries were usually composite, including both Whigs and Tories, so that one of the secretaries of state might be a Tory and the other a Whig. Generally, one party or the other had a preponderance, but sometimes the attempt was made to keep an even balance. In the minds of party politicians colonial politics took a subordinate place, and it could rarely be said that any particular ministry had its own distinctive colonial policy. In the main, the ministries of this period seem to have accepted the traditions of colonial administration as they found them.

     The ministers most steadily concerned with colonial affairs were the two secretaries of state, with whom the colonial governors were expected to correspond. At first there was no definite assignment of colonial business to either one of them, but during the reign of William III. one secretary usually, at any given time, gave special attention to colonial correspondence. Two of these secretaries were the Duke of Shrewsbury, a Whig, and the Earl of Nottingham, a Tory, both statesmen of great prominence and influence.

     During the reign of Anne, and afterwards, American affairs were regularly transacted by the secretary of state for the southern department, an office held, during by far the larger part of that reign, by prominent Tories. Harley, Earl of Oxford, served for three years, and St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, during his service of about four years, took a considerable interest in American affairs. None of these ministers can, however, be credited with such an influence in the development of colonial policy as has been ascribed to Clarendon and Shaftesbury during the reign of Charles II.

     The most important work in colonial administration was done by executive boards, some of which were restricted to specific departments of colonial administration: thus the commissioners of customs were specially charged with the enforcement of the navigation acts; and the commissioners of admiralty transacted a considerable amount of

colonial business, especially in time of war. Much the most important executive boards, however, were the Committee of the Privy Council on Trade and Plantations, and its successor, the Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, or, more briefly, the Board of Trade.

     In 1689 the old Committee of Trade and Plantations, instituted during the reign of Charles II., was reorganized by a new commission, still composed of the leading ministers of state, many of whom had been in the service of Charles II., and who were, in general, disposed to adhere to the colonial policies of that reign. This committee shaped in large mensure the constitutional adjustments in the colonies after the revolution; and the navigation act of 1696 was in full harmony with their views. Among the merchants, however, there was a strong feeling that the government was not adequately protecting their interests, and in the parliamentary session of 1695-1696 it was proposed to organize a new board whose members should be nominated by Parliament. The attempt failed, and in May, 1696, the king himself organized the Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations. The new board was not a mere committee of the Privy Council, for, though the chief ministers of state were ex officio members, they were not expected to give regular attendance; the real work was generally done, as was intended, by a small group of non-ministerial members. In the first commission the number of such members

was eight, including John Locke, who had been long and prominently associated with colonial affairs, and William Blathwayte, who had been secretary of the Committee of Trade during the later years of its history.¹

     The work of the new board was similar to that of the old committee; they were expected first of all to guard the commercial interests of the mother-country; colonial trade and government were to be closely investigated, and means were to be devised for guiding colonial enterprise in channels beneficial to the mother-country. During the earlier years of its history the Board of Trade carried on investigations with energy, reporting from time to time to the king, and occasionally also to the houses of parliament; their reports or “representations” contained statements of fact, and also proposed new lines of policy, legislative as well as administrative. They draughted the instructions to the royal governors, suggesting from time to time desirable changes; they made nominations to fill vacancies in the colonial service, and were entitled to receive regular reports from the various royal governments. Colonial legislation and the administration of justice and finance were also carefully supervised. In performing their functions they were entitled to the

legal advice of the king’s counsel, and could compel the attendance of witnesses.

     Their actual authority, however, was comparatively slight. In matters of real importance, they could make “representations,” not final decisions; they could nominate officers, but not appoint them; they could remonstrate with delinquent governors, but could not finally remove or control them. Under these circumstances, the real influence of the board depended on maintaining vital relations with the leading ministers, especially the secretaries of state. During the period of William and Anne, the board undoubtedly influenced to a considerable extent the policy of the government, but even then many important recommendations were not carried out.¹

     Some administrative supervision was also exercised by the House of Commons and the House of Lords through formal inquiries, and by recommendations to the executive authorities. Two instances of intervention by the House of Lords during this period are noteworthy. After the passage of the navigation act of 1696, courts of admiralty were established in the colonies by the king soon after they had been recommended by the House of Lords. In 1706 the peers called upon the queen to protect the dissenters of South Carolina from a provincial law requiring an ecclesiastical test for membership

in the assembly, and a royal order was issued accordingly. The revolution of 1689 had greatly strengthened the parliamentary element in the constitution, and the proposed formation of a council of commerce to be nominated by Parliament shows a tendency to encroach even upon the field of naturally executive functions.¹

     An important method of control during this period was the supervision of colonial legislation. In the royal governments the right of the crown to disallow provincial laws had been recognized from the outset; but fifty years elapsed after the revocation of the Virginia charter before another royal province was fully organized on the continent. In the mean time a large number of charters had been issued to proprietary and self-governing colonies without any provision for a royal veto; but in 1681 the Pennsylvania charter showed the development of an imperialistic conception by requiring even that proprietary province to submit its legislation for royal approval. During the reign of James II., imperial control of legislation was carried to a violent extreme by the abolition of assemblies in the new royal provinces, and it was not until after the revolution that the royal veto became a normal factor in the colonial system. By 1692 the right of disallowance existed in the five royal provinces of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, and Virginia, and in the proprietary

province of Pennsylvania. In 1702 New Jersey became a royal government and was subjected to the same restriction. Attempts were made to apply the principle in other colonies also: Rhode Island laws were sent over for examination; in 1705 a Connecticut law banishing Quakers was disallowed; and in 1706 a royal order in council annulled two South Carolina statutes. The legality of the royal orders in these cases was doubtful, and the right to veto Connecticut laws was subsequently disclaimed by the law-officers of the crown; but the earlier action is important as showing the general trend of colonial policy.¹

     The rules regarding the exercise of the royal veto were not the same in all the colonies. Under the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania charters, the action of the crown had to be declared within a limited period. In the royal provinces, generally, it might be declared at any time. Colonial laws sent over by the governors were examined by the Board of Trade, which frequently took the advice of the attorney and solicitor general. Acts disapproved by the board were ordinarily repealed by the Privy Council.²

     During the decade immediately following the English revolution the prerogative of disallowance was vigorously exercised. In Massachusetts an

elective assembly found itself obliged for the first time to accept the constitutional limitations of a royal province. Public sentiment in the colony demanded the retention, so far as possible, of usages which had developed during the era of self-government. On the other hand, the home government desired to limit closely the concessions granted in the new charter, and to bring colonial institutions into harmony with imperial policy and English law. This conflict is well illustrated by the action of the home government on the legislation of 1692, the first enacted under the new charter, including a number of what may be called fundamental statutes. One was a law continuing in general terms the local laws of the colony; another provided for the organization of a judicial system; and a third took the form of a bill of rights. These and twelve others were disallowed by the crown in 1695, sometimes for lack of definiteness and sometimes because of supposed encroachment on the rights of the crown or conflict with the laws of England. During the next five years the struggle continued. The general court made some unsuccessful efforts to adjust their measures to the views of the Board of Trade, but there was no year of legislation from 1692 to 1699 in which one or more acts were not ultimately disallowed. In the end, a practical adjustment seems to have been reached and disallowance became less frequent.¹

     The treatment of New York was somewhat like that of Massachusetts, but less drastic. The first assembly passed, in 1691, a general declaration of constitutional rights and privileges, which was disallowed in 1697 on the recommendation of the Board of Trade, one reason being that undue privileges were given to the assembly. In the first year of Queen Anne, six New York acts were disallowed almost immediately after their passage, and several others were vetoed during the later years of the reign.¹

     In Pennsylvania the proprietary government was severely criticised for its failure to transmit laws for approval, but during the early years of Queen Anne a large number of acts were received by the Board of Trade. About fifty of these, covering a wide range of subjects, were disallowed by order in council in 1706, though Penn congratulated himself that many others had received the royal approval. In Virginia and Maryland, also, a number of acts were disallowed.²

     The reasons assigned for disallowance vary widely. In general, however, the prerogative was used to keep the legislation of the colony in harmony with somewhat conservative views of the royal prerogative; with the English common law; with the statutes

applicable to the colonies; and, lastly, with British economic interests. To a certain extent the right of disallowance was evaded, as, for example, by the passage of temporary laws, but this practice was forbidden by royal instructions. Indeed, one striking result of the experience of the Board of Trade with objectionable statutes was the gradual increase, in the governor’s instructions, of articles forbidding his approval of certain kinds of laws. Some acts could only be passed with a so-called suspending clause postponing enforcement until the law had been approved by the crown.¹

     The harmony of English and colonial law depended very much in practice on the maintenance of some system of judicial control. During the reign of William III. this control was extended partly by the creation of new courts in America, acting under royal commissions and including within their jurisdiction chartered colonies as well as the royal governments. The piracy courts organized under the act of 1700 have already been noted. Soon after the passage of the navigation act of 1696 courts of admiralty were instituted in order to secure a stricter enforcement of the laws of trade than could be expected from the colonial courts and juries. Admiralty judges were appointed for various colonies or groups of colonies,

some of whom were men of strongly imperial views, notably Robert Quarry, one of the first appointed in the middle colonies. The new courts were exceedingly unpopular; their trial of cases without juries was offensive, and they were also charged with encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the common-law courts. Notwithstanding the colonial opposition, the new policy was maintained.¹

     The home government also sought to control the administration of justice by securing to individuals in the colonies the right of appeal to the Privy Council. This right was not specifically provided for in the earlier charters, but it appears in the Duke of York’s patent of 1664 and in Penn’s charter of 1681. Like the royal veto, it first assumed importance in the closing years of the seventeenth century.² The instructions to the royal governors insisted upon the allowance of appeals to the Privy Council, and the proprietary colonies were sharply criticised for refusing to permit them. The right was asserted even in colonies where it was not specifically secured by charter. During the reign of William III., the Privy Council, after being informed that their right of appeal had been denied by a Connecticut court, declared that it was “the inherent right” of the crown “to receive and determine appeals”

from all the colonies in America. In later years several Rhode Island and Connecticut cases were heard on appeal by the Privy Council. There was some difficulty in enforcing this right even in the royal provinces, and some provincial statutes were disallowed for failure to secure it fully.¹

     During this period special provision was made for the trial of governors guilty of misconduct in office. In 1699 an act of Parliament was passed, declaring that colonial governors who had hitherto considered themselves legally accountable neither in their provinces nor at home, might be tried in the Court of King’s Bench.²

     These measures of administrative control brought out more sharply the abnormal position of the chartered colonies. Their legal exemption from control in most matters made it difficult for the crown to exercise even that authority to which it was fairly entitled. Especially was this true in the self-governing colonies, where every department of government was controlled by the people themselves. Governors chosen from year to year served more zealously the people who elected them than a distant authority whose control was somewhat fitful. It was thought also that the irregularities and exceptional

privileges of the chartered colonies tended to demoralize the people of the royal governments. There was consequently almost constant agitation on the part of the official party in America and England for the resumption or regulation of the charters.¹

     During King William’s War special emphasis was laid upon consolidation for military purposes. The royal governors of Massachusetts and New York were authorized to command the militia in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and the Jerseys, but these commissions were vigorously resisted; and the crown finally accepted a compromise which asserted in substance, simply the right to exact certain quotas of men when needed for the common defence, authorizing command of the militia as a whole only in case of threatened invasion. In 1696 the Board of Trade recommended the appointment of a captaingeneral with the right to command the militia of all the colonies; but the war ended without the project being carried fully into effect, though a step was taken in that direction by the commission to the Earl of Bellomont in 1697. Bellomont was made governor in each of the three royal provinces of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York, and was also given the command of the militia in Connecticut and Rhode Island. This was not, however, a real consolidation of provinces, for each province retained its distinct administration, and there were still three

assemblies to be reckoned with. The combination proved unwieldy and soon fell apart, but the policy was not wholly abandoned. During the first third of the eighteenth century the two royal governments of New England had the same governor; and the governors of New York also held commissions for New Jersey.¹

     The need of consolidation and union was recognized by many serious students of colonial problems. William Penn submitted, about 1697, his famous proposal for a colonial congress consisting of representatives from each province; and a little later Robert Livingston, of New York, proposed the consolidation of the colonies into three provinces, and a meeting of commissioners from each province at Albany to provide for the common defence. For projects of this kind, however, the colonists in general were not yet ready.²

     During this period royal control of the proprietary governors was somewhat strengthened. The navigation act of 1696 required that proprietary governors should be approved by the crown, and after some delay the rule was enforced. The Board of Trade also insisted that security should be given for their observance of the navigation acts. Thus the proprietary governors became in a measure royal officers. Such regulations could not, however, be

enforced upon the annually elected governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island.¹

     The most ardent advocates of imperial control could be content only with the final overthrow of all the chartered governments. In 1691 Governor Nicholson expressed his hope that “their Majesties will send their own Governors to all the colonies,” and royal agents like Randolph and Quarry made similar recommendations. Finally, the policy was definitely adopted by the Board of Trade.²

     Of all the proprietary colonies, the most vulnerable were the Jerseys, in which the rights of government had never any foundation in strict law.³ On the eve of the revolution the proprietors agreed to surrender them to the crown, and the Jerseys were included in the “greater New England” of 1688. After the revolution the proprietors of East and West Jersey resumed their governments, but they were weakened, not merely by the hostile criticism of royal officers, but by dissatisfaction among the colonists. In 1702 the rights of government were again surrendered; the transfer was now accepted, and in the same year Governor Cornbury, of New

York, received his commission as the first royal governor of the reunited province of New Jersey.¹

     Elsewhere chartered privileges were more vigorously defended. During the early years of William III. there was some uncertainty as to the right of the crown to appoint governors in chartered colonies without a judicial abrogation of the charter. Chief-Justice Holt gave his opinion, in 1690, that the king might do so in case of “necessity,” and a royal government was accordingly inaugurated in Maryland.² A similar course was taken in 1692 when Governor Fletcher received a royal commission as governor of Pennsylvania, but Penn was determined not to submit to action which seemed to him illegal. He sent his warning to Fletcher, and encouraged his followers in the province to keep up a kind of passive resistance. The result was his restoration, in 1694, to the exercise of his proprietary rights, although the attacks on his government continued. Rhode Island and Connecticut were severely criticised by the royal governors for tolerating irregularities of various kinds, and it was proposed during Queen Anne’s reign to send royal governors to each of these colonies, at least during the war; but though the attorney-general and the

solicitor-general gave a favorable opinion, the proposition came to nothing.¹

     The same lawyers declared, in 1706, that two recent acts of the South Carolina assembly, if definitely approved by the proprietors, constituted a forfeiture of the charter, which might be annulled by judicial proceedings. Though the acts were annulled, the attack on the charter was dropped, partly because some of the proprietors were peers of the realm, whose privileges had to be cautiously handled.²

     After several years of discussion, the Board of Trade having become convinced that legislation was necessary, prepared, in 1701, careful reports to the king and the House of Commons, reciting all the familiar charges against the chartered governments, and recommending that all the charters “should be resumed to the Crown.” They added their belief that “this cannot otherwise be well effected than by the legislative power of this kingdom.” A bill was accordingly introduced into the House of Lords for the revocation of the colonial charters and the institution of royal governments in their place; but the bill, though read twice, was never passed. Immediately after the accession of Queen Anne the proposal was renewed by the board, but without result. In 1706 a bill was introduced in the House of Commons “for the better Regulation”

of the charter governments, and after the Tory ministry came into power, in 1710, the problem was again seriously considered, especially by St. John, as secretary for the southern department.¹

     It is difficult to explain wholly the failure of these attempts in the face of such vigorous recommendations from the Board of Trade. In some instances, the demands of other public business seem to have prevented action; apparently even among English ministers there was some scepticism as to the desirability of the policy. The colonists themselves, through their agents, vigorously resisted the proposed measures, and were able to bring some strong influences to bear against them. This was particularly true of Penn, who for a time also acted as agent for Rhode Island. In the winter of 1704-1705, he wrote that by his interest alone he had been able to prevent “a scheme drawn to new model the colonies.” The high spirit which characterized him at his best, comes out in another letter urging his secretary, Logan, to defend the rights of the province against encroachments: “I desire you to pluck up that English and Christian courage, to not suffer yourselves to be thus treated and put upon.”

     Yet Penn himself was so much harassed by opposition in the province and by his financial troubles

that he was prepared to surrender his government on condition of obtaining satisfactory compensation for himself and some safeguards for his fellow-Quakers in the colony. In February, 1712, the Board of Trade recommended the acceptance of such an offer, and a bill for that purpose was introduced in the House of Commons. The bill failed, however, and Penn’s heirs finally determined to hold the government.¹

     The net result of twenty years’ warfare on the colonial charters was, therefore, comparatively slight. The royal province of New Jersey had taken the place of two proprietary governments, but those of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the Carolinas remained, together with the self-governing colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island.

     Notwithstanding the limitations and failures of the imperialist movement, important results were accomplished: the legislative control of Parliament over the colonies was largely extended; provincial legislation was subjected to serious restraints; a system of appeals to the crown was organized; and new courts were instituted independent of local control. Thus the great majority of the American colonists were brought under the control of a provincial system which thirty years before had been distinctly exceptional.