Map facing page 44: The American Colonies about 1710

The burden of defence was not adequately supported, since neither England nor the colonies wished to bear the whole. Expeditions, both local and imperial, were mismanaged and fraught with difficulty. The position of England after the Revolution demanded a strong imperial policy; but this conflicted with the ideas of representative government and limited monarchy brought in by the new regime.

     The position of English and French in North America in 1689 was such that the attempt to arrange it by a series of treaties of neutrality was predestined to failure. Towards the end of 1686, the representatives of the two countries had met at Whitehall and formally agreed to preserve peace and good correspondence upon the lands and seas of America. Neither of the parties would violate the territories of the other in America or the West Indies no matter whether peace or war reigned in Europe¹. It was soon evident that such a truce would be observed only so long as it coincided with the inclinations of both parties. On the one hand, France did not scruple to attack the Indian allies of England; on the other, the French Indians did not hesitate to raid English territory². Moreover, the perennial source of dispute was still open. In Hudson’s Bay, both nations had some ground for claiming a share in occupation and trade. The territory had been discovered by Englishmen, and trading settlements planted later, with several forts, as the headquarters of the Hudson’s Bay Company. France however had sent traders to the region before English merchants had appeared on the scene, and with this claim of priority in trade, though not in discovery, established the Company of the North which captured in 1686 three of the four English forts, thus gaining

a large part of the fur trade¹. But apart from this disputed area where Louis’s subjects were boasting that they would shortly take both New York and New England², the French policy was everywhere aggressive—on the west down the Mississippi, following the exploration of La Salle to Louisiana in 1682-3; on the north-east from Acadia into Maine, on the north among the Indian tribes between Canada, New York and New England; on sea, in the fisheries of Newfoundland; and in the West Indies, in the divided island of St Kitts, half French, half English. The fact that complaints of non-observance of the truce came chiefly from the English side is explainable not by a higher morality in the observance of treaties by England, but by the naturally aggressive policy of France, due partly to her situation on the American continent, but also to her ideas of colonial organization and empire. This fact is illustrated by the length of the struggle between the small population of French Canada, and the English settlers in America, numbering about twenty times as many (the population of New York alone was in 1689 half as great again as the whole population of Canada); but scattered and not organized for defence. The lack of aggressiveness shewn by British colonists needs no further proof than is given by the story of the war begun at this time, in which their inability to organize their greater force is clearly evident; whilst in French Canada the more compact body of settlers some 12,000 in number, included thirty-two companies of regulars³; and even though their ranks were reduced to 1400 under Denonville such a body formed a compact defensive and offensive force, the like of which was notably absent in New England. The English Indians, on the other hand, were keen to fight, and were fretting at the restriction placed on them by their European allies. Randolph, writing at the beginning of 1689, stated that there were 1000 Indians and more, ready to loose on the French when tidings of war should come. He added also, with too sanguine expectation, that ships and men were at hand to drive the French out of the continent⁴.

     In April, William informed the colonies of his intention to declare war on France, and within a few days forwarded news of the actual declaration¹. Among the reasons cited in this document appear the colonial grievances. Although, not long before, the French took licences from the English governor of Newfoundland, to fish there, with payment of tribute, yet in recent years their encroachments on the territory and fisheries of that island were more like the invasion of an enemy than the permitted entry of a friendly nation. The actions too of the French king in invading the English West Indian Islands, especially St Kitts, and in possessing himself of English property in New York and Hudson’s Bay, were actions not becoming even an enemy; and yet Louis at that time was soliciting a treaty of neutrality for the American dependencies of both powers. Finally, the declaration proceeded, the seizure of English ships by French privateers, the prohibition of English goods by order or by restrictive duties these were sufficient evidence of the French intention to destroy the trade and navigation upon which the wealth and security of England depended². On these grounds, the war with France began. For the purpose of carrying on a successful campaign in America, the Lords of Trade immediately met and submitted recommendations for the conduct of the war³. They suggested the despatch of ships to disturb the Newfoundland fisheries; the appointment of a new governor over a united dominion of New England, New York and New Jersey; and instructions for the proprietary governments to be put in a fit state of defence; urging throughout the necessity for the colonies to take the offensive. The effect which these recommendations had upon the English war policy shews only too well that the Lords of Trade were but an advisory body, with power to suggest but not to carry out.

     The revolution had disorganized arrangements for defence in the colonies. In April, the Massachusetts Council of Safety had sent an officer to take command at Pemaquid, the outpost against French and Indians, far up north on the coast of Maine, with orders to withdraw some of the forces. At his appearance, Andros’ garrison of 150 men deserted, with the exception of about 30, who were refused admission and marched away. The two officers in command were seized, but the people of Pemaquid refused to let both go, and kept the junior, a Lieutenant Weems, insisting that he was no papist and should be commander. ‘He had not full command, but acted as adviser, the soldiers doing what they pleased.’ By August, the Indians found out the state of the garrison, and a party of some 300 Abenakis attacked the fort, there being at that time about 16 men, with plenty of ammunition. After a day’s siege, Weems surrendered for the sake of his garrison to the jubilant Indians, all well-armed with ‘new French fuzees, waistbelts and cutlasses, grey and black hats on their heads, and some with coloured wigs.’ They looked on this success as but a beginning; and boasted that they would have all the country by-and-by¹. About the same time, the Indians were making constant raids on homesteads in the Piscataqua country, destroying many families². Randolph in September sent a list of raids up to date, and the list is a formidable one³. The advantage of Indian support, however, worked both ways. Canada was still shaken by the Iroquois descent on La Chine, near Montreal, in the previous autumn, a raid described by Parkman as the most frightful massacre in Canadian history⁴. Moreover, when Count Frontenac, the popular governor of Canada, determined to signalize his return

after seven years’ absence, by the conquest of New York, the Five Nations of the Iroquois were a main cause for the failure of that scheme. They had been authorized to carry on war as allies of England soon after the declaration of war¹, and Frontenac preparing for his great expedition, was met by the news that the fort called by his name on the northern shore of Lake Ontario had been destroyed by Corlaer’s Indian allies².

     The fall of Andros had put heart into the French Indians. The tightening control he was beginning to achieve over them, by means of trade and defences, relaxed on his arrest; and the French did not miss the opportunity, the more when Frontenac’s return in place of Denonville substituted aggression for diplomacy, Massachusetts was harassed by the Indians near Port Royal and Penobscot, supplied with French ammunition; and any attempts to guard against these raids were rendered difficult by means of the wide rivers of northern New England, which the raiders crossed in portable canoes, thus defying pursuit. Among the Five Nations themselves, French influence had apparently some effect. The Onondagas shewed hostility in one of the frequent sporadic massacres, and the French were credibly reported to be the chief promoters of this³; whilst English trade in that quarter suffered correspondingly, the whole beaver trade being threatened by the disaffection⁴. With this situation the revolutionary governments were not best fitted to deal. At Boston, it was found difficult to raise any force. ‘The news of war has caused great alarm, for we have no head to command us in case of attack, everyone being Captain⁵.’ In addition, no public treasury was found in New England upon the revolution, and the stores of ammunition very inconsiderable⁶. At New York, Leisler raised about fifty men in the fort, and made a battery, stockades, and other defences ‘out of the material we provided, and just as we had ordered it,’ complains one of the council⁷; whilst the Mohawks from Albany

were given new coats and laced hats, ‘and seem to promise not to help our enemies against us¹.’

     But the revolution, which in Massachusetts lost Pemaquid, did not go unpunished in New York. Senectady, the outpost of Albany and of the whole colony, had embraced the faction engendered in New York. Government was in disorder, defence in chaos. On the 9th of February 1690, the gates were open and undefended, even unwatched. When the town was asleep, a party of some 200 French and Indians descended on it, killing 60 of the inhabitants, capturing others and burning a great part of the town to the ground². Leisler from New York and Livingston from Albany, regarding the event from different standpoints, described the massacre. The revolutionary leader³ blamed his New England neighbours for withdrawing their garrisons from the town and refusing to share expenses of defence. Livingston⁴ set the blame of unreadiness on the people ‘so bigoted to Leisler.’ The Maquas faithfully pursued the raiders, says Leisler; after three days’ persuasion induced them to start, adds Livingston. But however the blame be divided, the sack of Senectady does not add credit to the pages of New York history. Moreover Senectady did not stand alone. It was followed by the loss of Newichewarnock and Salmon Falls, both of which places were taken with ease; ‘not a man in the principal fortifications. They beat us, and took a third more than their own number. At the first volley, forty of our men ran away, and but for the bad light, the rest had been cut off⁵.’ ‘The loss must be attributed chiefly to our own deadly security, and the enemy’s treachery,’ says Bradstreet⁶.

     The people of Massachusetts and New York soon realized that they could not rest in inaction; and at the end of March Bradstreet writing home, stated that they had stirred up the

Maquas against the enemy, and were resolved on an expedition against Port Royal in Acadia,

it being the general opinion that the Indian war cannot be stopped, nor peace for England, without the removal of the French. Success will greatly encourage an attack on Canada, if the King will assist us with shipping and a speedy supply of ammunition, of which we have hardly enough to furnish the present expedition¹.

Boston took up the idea. Sir William Phips promised to raise 500 men, and the ships to transport them, and it was hoped that general enthusiasm was great enough to do away with any need for impressment. An immediate attack on Canada seems even to have been intended, had it not been for a great shortage of arms and ammunition. ‘If the King would provide two frigates, arms and ammunition, this would easily be accomplished, for the French have not above 3000 men, soldiers and others, in all Canada, and they are all dispersed².’ However, Boston continued to make active preparations for the lesser expedition³. This was in April. Phips set sail for Port Royal, which had played so great a part in crippling English commerce as to gain the title of the Dunkirk of America⁴: and early in May the expedition was successful, meeting with little resistance. ‘We cut down the cross, rifled the Church, pulled down the High Altar, and broke their images . . . kept gathering plunder all day . . . I reduced Acadia in three weeks,’ wrote Phips.⁵. But the merchants of Boston, thinking more of cost than of military achievement, were disappointed. Phips’ expedition was found wanting, when the cost proved to be £3000 more than the plunder⁶. To merchants and soldiers alike, plunder was no secondary object in these campaigns. The fall of Port Royal was moreover counterbalanced by reverses in Maine. In mid-May Casco was captured, and this loss represented more to Boston than did the gain of Port Royal. Defence had been in the hands of about 80 soldiers, so quartered in several garrisons that they could

not support each other. ‘The charter-government cares little for the Piscataqua country,’ wrote the late Attorney-general¹.

     While the Acadian expedition was thus successful, the New Englanders were making arrangements for the attack on Canada itself. On the 1st of May 1690, a meeting of commissioners from various colonies decided on a cooperative attack, the land forces being composed of 400 men from New York, 160 from Massachusetts, 135 from Connecticut, and 60 from Plymouth, with a less certain promise of 100 men from Maryland. The chief officers were to be appointed by the colonies in order proportionate to the numbers sent; and arrangements were further made to prevent this force being used for any other purpose, or being subjected unduly to the influence of any one colony². Boston agreed to send forces to the attack by sea, under Phips, and Leisler stated his intention of contributing two ships to this force, if they could possibly be obtained. Leisler, indeed, appears to have considerable responsibility in this plan of combined attack³. Letters from New England assert that the governor and deputy-governor of Boston were against the expedition, but the people announced that if they would not consent Massachusetts would declare for a general governor of New England⁴. In August, 1690, the expedition started. A force of about 2000 English and Indians, of which the Indians numbered some 1500, left Albany for Montreal, under the command of Colonel Winthrop, of Connecticut. Phips, with a slightly larger force, in 32 ships, set sail about the same time for Quebec. The attack was a complete failure. The land forces quarrelled, from various reasons. They were held up by lack of canoes and provisions, and after a small provocative raid and massacre, returned to Albany, where Leisler arrested Winthrop and imprisoned him until a mutiny of the troops compelled his release, Winthrop declaring that he would give no more assistance until a governor arrived⁵. Meanwhile, after a protracted voyage up the St Lawrence, the sea force arrived at Quebec, and Phips demanded surrender. Frontenac himself

gave the refusal, and compulsion was found to be impossible. According to Phips’ account¹, he landed a considerable party and scored a small success, but disease broke out in the fleet, and the expedition withdrew, cold weather speedily preventing any chance of success. Phips put his losses at 30 or less: the Paris gazette at 500; whilst Sloughter detailing the expedition estimated a loss of 1000 by sickness and shipwreck, ‘and not a blow struck for want of courage and conduct in the officers².’ The minister at Boston leaves on record the tale of a disgraceful flight to the ships, leaving cannon, drums and colours to the enemy³. Some of the vessels returned with half their crew, some with not one healthy man on board. The complaints of neglect with which the survivors were met at Boston have already been mentioned⁴. At New York there was fear of bloodshed, the men being so much abused that they refused to serve again. As a result of the failure, Massachusetts was saddled with a debt of from £40,000 to £50,000. ‘On leaving Quebec,’ says Phips, ‘I received several messages from Frenchmen of the best reputation, saying how uneasy they were under French administration, and how willing they would be to be under their Majesties⁵.’

     The abortive expedition to Quebec was the last offensive of the war. From this time forward, aggressive plans failed to produce even an attack on the French strongholds; and the whole energy of the colonists was confined to defensive operations and small skirmishes. Virginia was in constant alarm because of the French and Indian depredations. The system of defence in that colony consisted of four small guards of 14 men, each at one of the main river heads, where raids of Indians were likely to be presented⁶. Assistance in ammunition had been received from England since the revolution⁷; but Nicholson, who arrived as lieutenant-governor in 1690, was not satisfied with the defences of Virginia. ‘Some of the places

called forts do not deserve the name’; there was difficulty in maintaining the standard of discipline in the small river head stations¹, whilst the men were ill-armed because of poverty, and forts were too expensive to erect. The colony therefore appealed to the King for assistance in this direction, and also for a royal frigate². Moreover, Virginia was uneasy because of the disorder in New York, and begged an early settlement of that province³. Fears were not confined to Virginia. The President of Pennsylvania also wrote saying that the colonies could come to no agreement, as was necessary for defence, by reason of the condition of New York⁴. Pennsylvania however did not show determination to override the obstacle. Her inhabitants were without arms, and without permission to use them⁵, whilst in 1691 they were accused of declaring that they would not fight even if their country was invaded⁶. Such a declaration was hardly calculated to improve the cooperative spirit of defence.

     In March 1691, Colonel Sloughter, the new governor of New York, took over command of that disturbed province. His appointment had been made in September 1689, but he was unable to start until the following June. From June to December he waited for two companies of infantry which were being sent out to recruit the New York forces; and after a delay at Bermuda, he arrived at last in March of the following year, with his two companies, of which the roll of one shows 41 privates, the other 60, the usual complement of each being 100⁷. Sloughter soon set to work, and held a conference with the Five Nations⁸, who promised to carry on a vigorous war; but asked for guns and ships to attack Canada, and expressed surprise at the inaction of Virginia, Maryland and New England—a reproach constantly made by the Indian nations, and too often justified. Some of the Indians were feared to be unreliable, whilst Albany

was in a state of panic, there being not a hundred men in the town¹. Sloughter therefore proposed another offensive, by a joint attack on Canada, and submitted this scheme to the other colonies. In reply, Connecticut urged that it was too late in the season and that commissioners should be appointed; adding a complaint concerning the treatment of their men raised for the New York frigate in the previous expedition². Massachusetts, asserting its willingness as ever, protested that it had not the power to help³; and the last attack had certainly fallen heavily on Boston; it had resorted to the issue of paper money to meet the financial difficulty, and this paper was now at only 65 per cent. of its face value⁴. However Sloughter appealed again for help, asking this time for 150 men from each of the seven larger colonies. The New Englanders this time definitely refused, pleading a great shortage of stores⁵. The other colonies dallied with the request, until the project fell to the ground with the death of Sloughter in July of the same year as his appointment⁶. Thus New York again had the misfortune to be without a leader, while active preparations were proceeding at Montreal, apparently for a descent on that luckless colony. An expedition under Schuyler had left Albany in June, to meet this danger; but he was troubled with Indian desertion and with the failure of other Indians to appear as promised; and this attack achieved very little⁷. Another setback was given by the loss of a party of some 30 Indians of the Five Nations, engaged in a skirmish and cut off, to the consternation of the English Indians, always liable to waver, at an English reverse. New York was, in short, in very low water during the early months of 1692. Refusals of help arrived from Virginia, Maryland and New England, although Virginia sent £100⁸. Major Ingoldsby, the acting commander at New York, after urging the union of Connecticut

and New Jersey to that province to ensure more united action on this section of the defences¹, complained that he himself had received no pay, that the Albany fortifications were out of repair, the people discontented, the Indians weary of the war, and all out-settlements forsaken². When in September, Benjamin Fletcher, the new governor, arrived³, he found difficulties enough to try even his determination.

     Meanwhile, in spite of Boston’s decisive answer to Sloughter’s appeal, Phips was writing home, suggesting another attack on Canada⁴. He was in need of a good frigate, a considerable number of cannon and mortars, with large supplies of powder and small arms. If these could be sent from home, he would undertake to find ships and men to preserve Nova Scotia and reduce Canada. In September he enlarged his request to include a whole squadron; and two months later, in response to one of his many requests, Phips was commissioned Governor of Massachusetts, and Commander-in-Chief also of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the rest of New England, his command including all land and sea forces of those colonies and settlements⁵.

     It is difficult throughout such a spasmodic and disjointed war as that waged in the colonies under William III to find clear lines of demarcation. The only grouping which readily suggests itself is based on certain outstanding characters who influence the policy of different periods of the war, for good or ill. The period which ends with the arrival of Fletcher may therefore be called by Phips’ name. That rough, quarrelsome sailor had still an important part to play, but for the future he was overshadowed by his equally obstinate and more able contemporary, Fletcher. In one respect however all periods are alike during the war. Whoever the governor may be, or whatever the colony,

the question of defence is a problem, and a problem which no authority—government, governor or assembly—can solve, for the simple reason that willingness to act and ability to do so never coincide.

     As was invariably the custom of zealous colonial governors sent out from England, Fletcher signalized his arrival by a general denunciation¹. He found the inhabitants discouraged by the burden of Albany—they were ‘a divided, contentious, impoverished people.’ The royal frigate, H.M.S. Aldborough, was ‘a great expense to the King and no advantage to this place, having neither force to fight nor heels to run, and rides in harbour till she is worm-eaten.’ And while thus dissatisfied, Fletcher was receiving reports of recruits and ships sent out to Frontenac. He therefore marched a force of militia to the frontier, but feared that such feeble efforts could not long avert disaster. ‘It seems to me utterly impossible for this single province to support the war another year.’ In October however the Queen sent orders to New England, Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania to assist New York, deciding between themselves the quotas to be sent from each colony²; and in view of reports from Pennsylvania; a commission was issued the same month by which Fletcher was appointed governor of that colony in addition to his other command³. On news of this appointment Penn wrote to warn the new governor to walk warily in his proprietary colony; and indicated in part the reason for Fletcher’s appointment, by alluding with indignation to current rumours which stated that the French would be allowed to make their way into New England through the pacifist colony⁴.

     A further difficulty in the complicated problem of defence lay in New Hampshire, which was garrisoned from Massachusetts. Usher, the proprietary lieutenant-governor, appealed to Boston for a larger defending force, complaining that those men already sent out were not placed under the proper authorities, but under private persons who, while disaffected to himself, were yet

favourable to the claims of Massachusetts¹. At the same time, he could not raise money for their support²; so that Phips was able to make the obvious answer: ‘If you cannot support 60, you cannot 120,’ adding characteristically: ‘The King’s affairs shall not suffer by my being buzzed in the ears by evil-minded and prejudiced persons—with all respect to yourself and the Council³.’ However conclusive the logic of this answer, it did not solve the difficulty, and thus New Hampshire remained inadequately defended. The colony received stores from England, but constantly complained of the negligence of Massachusetts, asking to be joined to that province so that there could be no excuse for refusal of help⁴. In Rhode Island also, there was disagreement. Phips endeavoured to establish his commission over the militia, but the council refused to appear, and the president, although polite, evidently supported the majority⁵. At the same time, Massachusetts tried to put the burden of Pemaquid on the crown, in a petition urging the home government to bear the cost of this garrison; but the attempt failed⁶. Nevertheless, Phips, writing home in the spring of 1693, could give a satisfactory account of the colony. The fortifications of Pemaquid had been undertaken and completed, whilst other repairs were going forward; the enemy Indians had had a bad winter, through the destruction of their corn; Phips himself had built a 150-ton yacht to supersede the royal frigate for defence; the people were well satisfied, and would shew their loyalty if another attack on Canada were ordered⁷. It is moreover worthy of note that at the time when Massachusetts asked the crown to bear the cost of the Pemaquid garrison, they could yet afford to make numerous payments to agents and other supporters in England. In 1694, presents were voted, varying in amount from £25 to £250, some for duties and expenses of agency, others for offices not specified⁸. The loyalty

of the province, asserted thus buoyantly by Phips, was soon to be put to the test. In February 1693, royal intimation was sent to Phips and Fletcher that a squadron of 12 ships would reach New England in May or June from the West Indies, to refit, take reinforcements appointed by New England, and attack Canada. The assembly was urged to have everything ready, and the two governors to consult¹. In April this letter had not yet arrived.

     Meanwhile in New York Fletcher was toiling and grumbling as ever. The two companies, he complained, were under great discouragement, and four would be too few for the requirements of defence. Phips was rather a hindrance than a help, and Pennsylvania would neither fight themselves nor part with money to such as would do it for them². In February a successful expedition against the French and Indians followed the news of an enemy incursion near Senectady. Fletcher himself went with reinforcements, and Ingoldsby took the main command, with the result that after several light conflicts, the enemy beat a general retreat³, but were not pursued owing to the backwardness of the English Indians. New York however was highly delighted. ‘The like expedition was never seen in the province,’ and the Mayor and common council celebrated the occasion by a presentation to the governor⁴. During Fletcher’s absence, an appeal for help had been made by the council to the other colonies. Connecticut sent no answer; Pennsylvania good wishes, East Jersey £248 and a promise of more, thanks largely to the governor, Maryland some bills, two-thirds of which were protested⁵; the other colonies did not answer until too late. Thus Fletcher returned to take up his former role. The fort was dropping down; and even the buildings as well; arms were deficient; there were too few men; whilst the ‘governor of New England is a machine moved by a fanatical finger, the contempt of wise men, and the sport of fools⁶.’ In May Fletcher obtained the satisfaction and the additional anxiety of receiving command of the Connecticut militia in place of Phips⁷.

     As in America the War divides naturally into two periods, in the first of which Massachusetts under Phips played the leading part, and in the second, New York under Fletcher; so in the West Indies, the three governments take their turn to focus the importance of the war, partly because the islands are weak and cannot long sustain the strain of leadership. Thus for the first few years, the Leeward Islands under Codrington play the leading part, until, exhausted by their efforts, they hand on the guidance to Barbados, whose governor, James Kendall, is scarcely inferior in ability to Codrington; whilst from 1694 onwards, the interest of a barren war centres mainly in Jamaica, under Sir William Beeston.

     The declaration of war was followed by many accounts setting forth the bad condition of defence in the islands, and many proposals by which their strength might be increased. At St Kitts, the only island with a regular garrison, there were two companies of infantry, in extreme want of clothing and pay, the latter nearly six years in arrears¹; whilst the fort was not properly equipped, and several soldiers were too old and decrepit for duty². There was moreover great need for ships. Codrington had no frigate to guard the Leeward Islands against ‘pilfering pickerooners³’; and Stede of Barbados could complain that ‘the French continue to do what they please in these islands, and I have no man-of-war to prevent them⁴.’ The Irish Catholics were a further source of unrest. Barbados had prevented them gaining political power⁵; but since the offenders were mainly of the class of servants, this restriction did not amount to much⁶. In Montserrat the Irish outnumbered the English settlers by at least two to one, and they had been

disarmed¹. But the chief trouble was in St Kitts, where the proximity of the French greatly increased the danger from revolt.

     In July 1689 the fears of St Kitts were realized. ‘The bloody Papists and Irish assembled suddenly, and declaring themselves for King James, killed, burned and destroyed all that belonged to the Protestant interest²,’ gaining help, as was natural from their French neighbours; and it was soon evident that the dual occupation of the island created an impossible situation, which came to an end in the same month. The French mustered a fleet of eighteen sail, including six men-of-war, under the Governor of Martinique, anchored at Basseterre on July the 17th, and within two hours had forced the English into the fort, and devastated the southern end of the island³. The Irish rebels deserted en masse to the French⁴, and on the 22nd the siege of the fort began. ‘The French fired 970 odd cannon, and killed us a turkey, a dog, and three horses⁵.’ Lieutenant-Governor Hill held out for a fortnight, but was then compelled to surrender, through lack of supplies. His losses were apparently less than those of the besiegers. According to Stede, the Irish would have put all to the sword, but De Blenac, the French commander, would not allow such a massacre⁶. The garrison were allowed to embark for Nevis, where the soldiers at first refused to serve again until their arrears had been paid, but Codrington’s influence eventually prevailed⁷, Meanwhile Barbados had sent 800 men to Antigua, the headquarters of the Leeward Islands, to reinforce St Kitts, but they arrived too late to save that island. The next French attack fell on the small island of Barbuda, and here again the Irish were in evidence, but the attempt failed and nearly resulted in the loss of the

French ships. Nevis now decided to take no more risks with the Irish population, and transported them all to Jamaica¹. Montserrat followed suit, whilst from Antigua the Irish were also transported to those places where they can give us no trouble².’

     With the fall of St Kitts, a general air of uneasiness settled on the islands. Antigua suffered from attacks by the Indians, incited, according to Codrington, by the French; and half the inhabitants were on guard every night³. Anguilla, one of the smaller islands, fell and was retaken⁴. ‘Strange reports of King James’ success in Ireland’ were brought to the Leeward Islands by a provision ship, whose master declared that if he had known they were under King William he would have taken his beef to Martinique, and was promptly put under arrest by the vigilant Codrington. Nevis caused trouble by refusing to part with the fugitives from St Kitts, in spite of the governor’s orders, and the fact that there was no comfortable living for them in Nevis. Codrington therefore appointed Sir Timothy Thornhill, commander of the Barbados expeditionary force, to command the militia, subdue this insubordination, and send the needy refugees to Antigua. ‘Some fancy these colonies are independent states, and attribute to their little assemblies the power and authority of the Parliament of England,’ Codrington commented, and recommended their representation in that English Parliament⁵.

     In Barbados, Stede offered himself to raise £10,000 for the prosecution of the war, but the people expected all expenses from that source to be defrayed by the public revenue. They were however loyal and well affected, according to Stede. This island also suffered from French raiding vessels which recently took two Barbados ships before their very eyes⁶. An appeal for help came from Codrington, when he heard of a French

attack designed on Nevis; but the answer was not such as to satisfy.

     It is surprising that Barbados out of 1200 spare arms could only lend us 100 old matchlocks, and out of 1400 barrels of powder could only lend us twenty, and more so that out of 130 ships they could not spare us one¹.

In 1690 however a new factor appeared in the situation by the arrival of a squadron from England.

     The need for sending men-of-war to the West Indies had been early recognized at home; and immediately on the outbreak of war a squadron was destined for that purpose². In May, more detailed orders were given for eight ships to sail within a few weeks³. The usual delays had however arisen; and in November, further orders instructed Captain Wright, commanding the squadron, to take up the Duke of Bolton’s regiment, and proceed to the Leeward Islands, putting himself under the orders of Codrington⁴. In May 1690 the fleet arrived at Barbados. The new governor of that island, Colonel James Kendall, arrived with it; and his first dispatch is concerned with the state of the soldiers on board. ‘Never was a regiment so carelessly sent out or so extremely neglected; . . . a hundred odd men were landed very ill. . . . In ten days we clothed the whole regiment, which was naked before⁵.’ Kendall also hurried the fleet on its way, pointing out the need for haste to Wright, who appeared quite content to dally; and on the 26th the fleet sailed for the Leeward Islands. Codrington, welcoming the assistance in high hopes, found that the regiment numbered only 500 men, out of the 930 promised, and proceeded to criticize the stores sent with them. The small arms consisted of matchlocks and firelocks. ‘Both . . . are extraordinarily heavy. Antigua cannot use matchlocks; and the firelocks have bad locks, and are as likely to missfire as not⁶.’

     However, Codrington decided to make the best of his material, and speedily gained a success. Raising a force of 2500 men he retook St Kitts in June, and shipped away the French inhabitants in their turn to Hispaniola, St Martins, and St Domingo. About the same time St Eustatia, previously captured from the Dutch by France, was recaptured by Thornhill. These campaigns, successful as they were, were a considerable strain on the slender finances of the islands; and Codrington was compelled to support them out of his own purse¹. He planned on, however, asking help from Jamaica and Barbados for an attack on the larger French islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Barbados replied that no help could be spared². Jamaica remained silent³. As in the case of the American colonies, the islands bearing the brunt of the war now appealed to the home government for compulsory assistance from their neighbours, who refused to help voluntarily. Ten to twelve hundred men, they claimed, were needed from Barbados⁴. As a result of this the Lords of Trade instructed Kendall to send help as far as possible, even though he could not obtain the council’s consent to such assistance⁵; and this order, carried out as it was by the governor, smoothed the way to common action for the remaining campaigns of the war. It was indeed high time that some such arrangement was made. Codrington wrote home in November in a very discontented vein. The men of Nevis refused to stir until the plunder from St Kitts was divided. The captains challenged the major for shipping their companies without their consent. The colonel and the lieutenant-colonel disputed the wisdom of the plan, and the soldiers were unwilling to go. ‘It is the irrational obstinacy of the common people, fomented by some of the inferior discontented officers . . . . With the Barbadians the chief

officers are most at fault.’ One exception alone did Codrington make to his general denunciation. ‘Governor Kendall is a gentleman of such worth, honour, and loyalty that I am sure we shall be in accord in all things¹’—no slight tribute this, from one seventeenth century colonial governor to another.

     The year 1691 saw the attack on France in the West Indies. Codrington offered in February to organize the expedition against the French islands, if Kendall would send 500 men; or, to send the regiment and as many men as Barbados previously sent, if Kendall preferred to lead the attack. (‘He has three times as many men in his one Island, as I have in my four².’) Kendall replied that against Martinique he would help as far as he possibly could³. In February therefore, the expedition was launched. Codrington landed in Guadeloupe, instead of first making for Martinique, as Kendall appears to have wished, and devastated most of the island. But this was the extent of his success. His preparations for attacking the fort failed, apparently through Captain Wright’s action in drawing off the marines. The naval commander also, according to Codrington, allowed the French fleet to escape. ‘I was an eyewitness . . . and never saw such cowardice and treachery in any man as in Captain Wright⁴.’ The latter was even accused of firing at one of his own ships, as she attempted to pursue the French fleet⁵. Kendall was equally condemnatory of Wright. ‘The people here, and in the Leeward Islands are much incensed against him’; and although he refers to the ‘preposterous landing in Guadeloupe,’ the Governor of Barbados is still preparing to send a regiment to Codrington’s assistance. ‘Sickness and chance have so decreased our numbers that we can make no further attempt on any French island without English help,’ but the addition of three or four hundred men to the fleet would do mischief to the enemy⁶. On the other hand, Sir Timothy

Thornhill blames Codrington for the failure. ‘He ran off in distraction at midnight and now charges the Admiral with blame¹’; but as Thornhill’s previous reputation was not above suspicion, and as he was at this time hoping to succeed Codrington, if the latter was recalled², his evidence may be more than usually partisan.

     The strain of these attacks was too much for the thinly-populated Leeward Islands. There was very little money, and trade was mostly ‘by truck³.’ There were not as many men in all the islands as in Nevis alone two years before⁴, while this latter island had lost 1500 men by sickness⁵. St Kitts was in a sad state; there was great scarcity of provisions (‘the coarsest diet known among us has been welcome to me,’ writes Lieutenant-Governor Hill). Disease was rife; the companies seven years in arrears for pay; the fort as before ‘too slenderly equipped with stores of any kind.’ The people had no money and were consumed by much sickness⁶. And so Codrington could write in July 1691: ‘The Leeward Islands are worn out. . . . . The Governor of Barbados is the fittest to command all future expeditions. He has force sufficient to do great things⁷.’

     One great lesson Codrington had learnt from his two years’ experience, a lesson too easily forgotten in West Indian wars:

     All turns upon mastery of the sea. If we have it, our islands are safe, however thinly peopled; if the French have it, we cannot, after the recent mortality, raise men enough in all the islands to hold one of them⁸.

     In the West Indies, as in America, 1692 was a year of waiting. The Leeward Islands having decided that they could no longer take the offensive, the next move in the game came from home, by the despatch of a fleet under Sir Charles Wheler. The squadron commanded by Captain Wright, first ordered to return

to England in the autumn of 1690, had been retained by royal permission, first till the following January, then till further orders; and under Captain Wrenn, who succeeded the incompetent Wright, was still among the islands in 1692¹; but the arrival of a larger fleet under Wheler was the event to which the colonists looked forward for the relief of their position². Barbados was still in harmony with the Leeward Islands, and together they did what was possible to strengthen the fleet in the meantime³. Kendall was however not satisfied with the defences of his own government. Sickness was on board the ships, and the soldiers much reduced. The extent of the mortality is shewn by the fact that of the 800 men sent to the Leeward Islands originally for the reinforcement of St Kitts 100 only had returned, whilst further reductions were caused by the merchant ships, who were able to recruit their own strength from the worse paid crews of the men-of-war⁴. De Blenac, on the other hand had received considerable reinforcements at Martinique, so that the Leeward Islands would seem to be threatened⁵. Kendall’s greatest fear however was of the negroes. As for the French they were being resisted at sea with some success. The Governor of Barbados, relating how his frigate had chased and put to flight the enemy Mary Rose, was prompted in pride to remark: ‘No doubt de Blenac takes me for a very well-bred man; for his ships are no sooner seen on the coast than I send immediately to compliment them⁶.’ In the Leeward Islands, Codrington, busy in reorganizing the reduced forces under his control, has much to complain of. The soldiers in St Kitts were almost naked; and there was nothing to be procured there as garb a soldier ought to appear in⁷. The ‘Blues’—the Duke of Bolton’s regiment—had received a consignment of clothing which as usual Codrington found it necessary to criticize. It is ‘extremely good, but too heavy for the climate⁸.’

This simple complaint has behind it the main cause of wars and revolutions and all the tragedies of history—lack of understanding. Thus it was with England and her colonies.

     In February the long expected squadron arrived at Barbados, and was royally entertained by Kendall, who joined 900 men to the expedition¹. Intelligence was sent to Codrington and arrangements made for a junction of forces off Martinique, the goal of the first attack². After considerable discussion, it was decided to employ the Irish of Barbados, in consideration of their good conduct³; whilst another detail, also significant for the spirit of the times, was the appointment of an officer in charge of plunder⁴. After three months expectation and preparation, the great expedition sailed for Martinique. A council of war was held before St Pierre, and with amazing suddenness the whole scheme fizzled out; for there, a majority decided for withdrawal⁵, to the indignation of Kendall, and the consternation of Barbados⁶. Codrington had accompanied the detachment from the Leeward Islands, not in any official position but as an ordinary volunteer to encourage his men, who depended so much upon his presence, and he has given the reasons for this surprising failure⁷. The time of arrival he believed to be unfortunate, for great rains fell in May, and these were fatal to an army in the field; whilst the actual time allowed was too short. As it was, Wheler left the West Indies as late as he possibly could in accordance with his instructions. The French were given warning some time before the time planned, and were able to fortify; and finally, the forces from Europe were not strong enough. Thus at least three of the main causes of failure were due directly to neglect by the home authorities to lay their plans in accordance with the more obvious peculiarities and the more pressing needs of a West Indian campaign. Codrington concluded his dispatch by again insisting that the islands were incapable of defence, individually or collectively;

that England must always have a sea force there, and if possible a land army too. The ill-fated expedition had lost 800 men before Martinique, and had been further depleted by disease, communicated from the merchantships lying off Barbados¹, the extent of which losses appeared when the fleet arrived at Boston to carry out the second of its duties. Thus ended the English offensive in the West Indies. From this time, the war was purely defensive, here and in America.

     In the third period of the West Indian war, an indefinite and otherwise uninteresting period, Jamaica comes into prominence. Hitherto, while the Leeward Islands and Barbados were struggling to defeat the French, Jamaica had not played a notable part; but in 1694 a change came, and England’s latest acquisition in the West Indies focussed the importance of the war for its remaining three years. The island first came into prominence in 1692, through the great earthquake of May—an event great enough to startle Macaulay into introducing the West Indies for the first and last time into his history of the Revolution. The description of this catastrophe could hardly but be dramatic.

     In ten minutes it threw down all churches, dwelling houses and sugar-works in the Island. Two-thirds of Port Royal was swallowed up by the sea, all the forts and fortifications demolished, and great part of the inhabitants miserably knocked on the head or drowned. One of the men-of-war was sucked under and ruined; and to crown the calamity, a French landing party arrived to take advantage of the island’s misfortune. The settlers however stood to their guns, and captured or killed all but eighteen of the party, while the remaining frigate and a sloop tackled and burned the conveying ships². At home the distress of Jamaica was realized, but the Queen appealed to the people in spite of it to join in the great expedition under Wheler the following spring. The island replied that that was impossible, but that they would do their best meanwhile to harass the enemy³,

     In a memorandum surviving from the Governor of Martinique¹ plans are given for a French attack on Jamaica in 1693. The idea seemed to be that of settling the various fugitive French from the weak islands, especially St Kitts, in Jamaica, conducting the enterprise with five or six men-of-war and 2000 regular troops, who would sail under the English flag with a commission from James, and a proclamation of him as king. In a letter of almost the same date, Codrington gave warning of the danger², but for nearly a year all was quiet, except for the usual landing of French pickeroons, stealing negroes and property³. In May 1694 however, the attack was launched. An English merchant-skipper escaped with two companions from captivity at Petit Guavos, and with remarkable courage crossed to Jamaica in a small canoe, giving warning of the impending attack⁴. Beeston, now lieutenant-governor, immediately drew in the straggling population behind the fortifications⁵. On the 17th, the French landed in Cow Bay, and proceeded to devastate the island. Beeston, seeing that he would be hemmed in, appealed for a relieving force of at least six men-of-war, for the French, having gained command of the sea, would plunder all the outlying parts. He was right. For a month the French carried on their work of destruction.

     Some of the straggling people that were left behind they tortured, and in particular two they murdered in cold blood, some women they suffered the negroes to violate, some they dug out of their graves, so that more inhuman barbarities were never committed by Turk or infidel⁶.

The people of Jamaica held out however, and, after nearly six weeks of this ravaging, with occasional sharp assaults, succeeded in inflicting on the enemy a repulse which, though not in itself crushing, was yet enough for the plundering army of invaders; and on the 18th of July they re-embarked, leaving behind them

fifty sugar-works in ruins, and every living thing destroyed that they had met with on the plantations¹. At last the home government realized that a strong force must be sent to the West Indies, not a mere handful of recruits; and orders were given for the despatch of two regiments entire to Jamaica²; whilst preparations were made for an English expedition to attack Hispaniola³.

     The evidence about this expedition of 1695 is not perfect, but certain facts clearly emerge. In the first place, it sailed too late. Planned for October 1694, delays caused by Admiralty, Navy Board, Ordnance Office, Victualling Board, and Commissioner of Transport, postponed the actual departure until January⁴. The attack on the French islands was to receive the assistance of the Spanish governor of San Domingo; but relations with Spain were apt to be unfriendly throughout this period⁵, and there was a lack of harmony in this alliance⁶. The command of the sea forces was given to Admiral Wilmot, and that of the troops to Colonel Lillingston; and though both were placed under the orders of Beeston, this was not enough to prevent those fatal quarrels, which almost invariably resulted from such divided command. In spite of the fact that, according to Lillingston, the King especially urged them to work harmoniously, there were from the beginning continual disagreements, probably due more to Wilmot than to Lillingston⁷. The attack on Hispaniola failed, and in August the fleet arrived at Jamaica. Lillingston’s regiment, which formerly numbered about 1300, could now barely raise 300, of which the private soldiers accounted for little more than half⁸. Such was the result of a divided command, and a frantic rush for plunder, the sailors achieving the greater notoriety in this respect⁹. ‘The

Commander-in-Chief was charged with regarding his own private interest, that he encouraged his seamen on all occasions to act as pirates, a disgrace to Englishmen’; whilst Commodore Wilmot, who died on the homeward voyage, left £6000 in effects on board his own ship; and this treasure engaged his family in a long suit at law with another officer of the expedition¹. Apart from this greed for plunder, division of authority was, throughout, the curse of West Indian war policy, not only between rival commanders, but between commander and governor.

     If the governor offers to interpose, even the captain of a fireship (a poor fellow perhaps not taken half a year from before the mast) will write him such a hectoring, saucy letter that a man would throw up his command, rather than carry such insignificant marks of authority².

     Jamaica was by this time in worse plight than ever. The muster rolls in 1696 shewed a decline in one year from 2440 to 1390³. Men were leaving in large numbers, partly through the French depredations, partly owing to the practice of pressing for man-of-war and merchant-ship crews. Also ‘there came not from England necessaries enough to furnish the people’s wants, nor ships large enough to take away their produce⁴.’ No stores or provisions had arrived for the frigate although it had been stationed there for two years⁵.

Our privateers, seamen, and all our ordinary people are gone . . . this owing chiefly to men-of-war pressing continually; the fear of the French has carried away others, and many die by their coming here at this time of the year (October)⁶. . . . The sailors newly come are many of them dead; by continuing to arrive in the hot and sickly months⁷.

By January 1697, however, the island was in perfect health; but its trade continued to suffer severely. Most of the ships were taken, either coming or returning to the vast cost of

merchants’ and inhabitants¹; and the treasury was nearly £5000 in debt, owing to the war².

     The other West Indian islands contain little of importance in the last years of the war. The state of defence in Bermuda was brought to the notice of the King in 1696 by the Board of Trade; and an engineer was ordered to go from home to organize fortification there³. Apart from this, the English government interfered little in the lesser islands. In August 1693, Kendall gave up the governorship of Barbados, amid many compliments from that island; and, while grievances were inevitably claimed under his rule, the smallness of the list, and the nature of the charges themselves, revert rather to the governor’s credit than otherwise.

     He compelled every man (except Councillors) to serve in some troop or company, and not to leave it without the Captain’s permission. He imposed an oath of obedience to himself on all officers, on penalty of death. He suspended a councillor for refusing to cut down a wood on ground required for fortifications⁴.

Kendall is accused, in short, of depriving his subjects of some of their cherished independence, in order that the island may make a good show in defence. Barbados, shortly after, asked for a regiment to be stationed there, and the King inclined to grant this; whereupon the agents submitted that the island was too poor to bear the charge of transportation, or of free quarterage, chiefly owing to the £30,000 which was lost on the Martinique expedition; and they further suggested, as they continued to do at every opportunity, that the 4½ per cent. export duty should be used for this purpose⁵. The King however proposed a compromise. He would grant quarterage, if Barbados would bear the cost of transport. The agents, thanking the King for the first part of his proposal, threw themselves on the royal mercy for the rest⁶.

     In the Leeward Islands, the royal troops were in an unhappy

condition. Three-quarters of the regiment had perished, through war and disease, and their pay had not been cleared since 1692 (this is November 1694); whilst the officers were being given tallies payable three years from date, at 5 per cent. loss. The Lords of Trade therefore recommended 400 recruits for the government¹. Upon this, the agents for the Leeward Islands scored at the expense of Barbados, by a piece of sharp practice. They succeeded in having the Barbados reinforcements, five companies of 100 men each, sent by way of the Leeward Islands, whence Russell, Kendall’s successor in Barbados, was ordered to take them after two months, if they were not further required². Thus when the regiment finally reached Barbados, it had lost half its numbers by death and desertion³. Russell carried on Kendall’s policy, however, refusing relaxation in spite of obstacles⁴, but died in 1696; and the government reverted to one Bond, ‘an aged and crazy man⁵,’ not likely to disturb the uneventful course of affairs.

     The only remaining item of importance in the West Indies was the expedition under Admiral Nevill. An attack had been feared on Jamaica from a considerable French fleet, but it later appeared that this fleet was bound for Spanish treasure at Portobello⁶. A squadron was sent out under Nevill, chiefly to counter this threat but also to convoy merchantships sailing to the West Indies at this time; and arrived on the scene of action in April 1697⁷. Meanwhile, the French fleet passed the Leeward Islands⁸, and Barbados, where there were not seven rounds of powder in the fort⁹; and passed on to Petit Guavos. Nevill arrived ten days too late. He was outsailed by the French fleet returning with its treasure of captured Spanish plate; and took

only one ship, which proved to be worth £20,000¹. No sooner was Nevill gone, than the French privateers returned, ‘knowing,’ as Codrington said, ‘that I have but one bad sailing frigate, they insult us daily².’ Thus ends the last of the four futile expeditions to the West Indies. Of these, two had arrived at the wrong time, too late or with too short time for success; a third had failed, partly by reason of an incompetent commander, partly through divided command; and the fourth had combined all these faults³. Thus the Peace of Ryswick proclaimed in October 1697, descended on islands wearied by war and devastated by sickness. They could however claim, that in spite of infirmities, no ground had been lost.

     In June 1693, Admiral Wheler, having failed in the West Indies, arrived with his fleet at Boston. Sickness had spread on board, so that Massachusetts found it necessary to forbid all intercourse with her people; while Phips made arrangements for the care of the sailors⁴. The following month, Wheler sent home a dispatch in which he stated that in reply to his proposals for attack, the governor answered that no instructions had yet arrived and therefore no preparation had been made for an expedition against Canada. The force required Phips estimated at 4000 at least, and it should sail not later than the 1st of July, whilst at least four months would be required to obtain help from other colonies. Moreover, there were by this time but 650 men left from the two regiments sent from home; whilst not half the complement of the fleet was fit for duty, and of this half only one-third were seamen. The ships themselves were in good order, and provisions plentiful. Wheler therefore consulted Phips on the question of an isolated attack on Quebec or elsewhere⁵. The governor in reply dissuaded any

attack on Canada, and suggested Newfoundland as the only place worthy of an expedition. For Quebec, it was useless to attack with less than 4000 men¹. The admiral considered the proposal, and asked Phips for the assistance of 400 men. Phips replied that he could not allow them to be marched out of the colony without the assembly’s permission; and the assembly had been dissolved on the 15th of the month—that is, after Phips’ suggestion of an attack on Newfoundland. He also reminded Wheler that men were needed for an expedition against the Indians, and that sickness on board was dissuading recruits for the navy².

     Fletcher, on the other hand, hearing of Wheler’s arrival, sent one of his council to welcome the fleet, and to ascertain if he intended to attack Canada, that there might be time to make preparations³. This messenger met with so violent a reception from the Boston governor that one of the councillors felt in duty bound to excuse him: ‘Sir, you must pardon him his dog-days; he cannot help it⁴.’ In September, Wheler’s fleet, having no prospect of being able to accomplish anything, sailed for home. A few days previous, Phips had received a letter from William Blathwayt, the secretary to the Council of Trade, mentioning the proposed attack; but the King’s orders of February did not reach him until several days later⁵. Thus failed the only attempt to assist the colonies from home in an offensive movement.

     Of the land defences in Massachusetts Phips sent a good account. The Indians on the frontier had asked for an everlasting peace, and Massachusetts was therefore now better able to help the neighbouring colonies⁶. Thus wrote the governor. The opportunity came very soon, but within a week of his previous letter, Phips was refusing help to New York, protesting merely willingness⁷. His dependency, New Hampshire, was still in an unsettled state. Boston had withdrawn its garrison of 60 men, and, with Connecticut and Rhode Island, refused

to help any further. Usher had received and mounted some great guns sent from England, but was in urgent need of men; and suggested, as a remedy for such a situation, the appointment of a general governor over the New England colonies¹.

     Meanwhile Fletcher was vainly attempting to organize defence². Frontenac had received fresh stores and men; and the French were outbidding the English in presents to the Indians. Up to this time, they had not prevailed; but Fletcher was much afraid of the influence of French Jesuit missionaries among them. In one case, he offered to take a Jesuit priest, a prisoner of the Indians, in exchange for a ‘pretty Indian boy’; but he was not sanguine of the position in general, and feared that unless an expedition went against Canada the Indians would be lost³. He could also lament the naval defences of New York, still entrusted to the much-blamed frigate, the Aldborough, ‘a dull sailor.’ As for cooperation with other colonies, Fletcher found that they would pay no attention to the Queen’s letter. Pennsylvania was unwilling even to grant revenue for its own expenses, much less to help NewYork⁴. The inhabitants ‘deny the carnal sword, now will they dip their money in blood.’ Fletcher however succeeded in fixing a meeting of commissioners; but when the time came Phips refused to send, and none came from Pennsylvania or Maryland. Thanks to the influence of Andros, a Virginian delegate arrived; but those commissioners who were present refused to settle anything in the absence of such important representation. Fletcher also visited Connecticut to obtain help from there under his commission; but found little encouragement.

     They have separated from the Crown of England, not only from the Church, and allow no appeals from their courts, saying that not being permitted to vote for Members of Parliament they are not liable to their laws. . . . They refuse obedience to my commission, desire a suit at law, and will submit to a Quo Warranto.

The gentlemen of Connecticut too were wont to make much boast of their independence under the Charter; and Fletcher did not improve matters by kicking one of them downstairs¹. In Virginia, the House of Burgesses considered that Albany was no bulwark to their state, which was so much burdened by its own defence that they would spare no help to New York². ‘We are quite as much opposed to attempts of French and Indians³.’ Orders came from home in 1693 that Virginia and Maryland should send £500 and £250 respectively to New York; but the two states interpreted this retrospectively and counted former gifts of £600 and £300 as the required assistance⁴. In the case of Maryland, which frequently sent bills that were protested⁵, this gift may have been worth very little. In addition to these refusals of help, Fletcher had further grounds of complaint against New Jersey, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, that by evading the payment of duties there they were inducing the inhabitants of New York to migrate thither⁶.

     As the war progressed, the position of the Indians, on whom so much depended, became more and more uncertain. In July 1694 they were negotiating with Frontenac, asking for neutrality, which Fletcher feared the French would not allow, insisting on a full alliance. Frontenac was now receiving annual supplies from home, and threatened to lead in person an attack against Albany⁷. In June a massacre of English by French Indians took place at Oyster River, which stroke was considered to be of great advantage for the French because it broke off all talk of peace between English and French Indians⁸. By September however, the English Indians had been induced to sign treaties with the French as well as the English⁹.

     In August 1694, instructions from England fixed the actual quotas to be sent by colonies for the defence of New York—Massachusetts 350 men, Virginia 240, and others in proportion¹⁰.

A loophole for evasion was however given by the clause instructing the governor to take no greater quota from any colony than the proportion he demanded from other colonies¹. Thus the recalcitrance of one colony could and did endanger the whole scheme. Massachusetts in October declared themselves compelled to keep their men at home because of Indian raids to eastward². This refusal could no longer be attributed to Phips, for that blustering official had been recalled in the early part of the year, to answer charges against him³. No improvement was yet seen in New Hampshire, which would not vote money to finish fortifications begun.

     ‘The meaning is,’ Usher explained, ‘that if the King will keep New Hampshire as a separate province he must do it out of his own exchequer . . . . Let the King appoint a governor, and if they do not kill him outright, they will starve him to death before they give one penny to his subsistence⁴.’

     In November 1694, Fletcher wrote home in good spirits, saying that Albany was in better condition than ever before; and that the Five Nations, in spite of Frontenac’s hard pressure, refused to fight against England⁵. Thus 1695 was a quiet year; and the correspondence largely concerned with the quotas of men recently decided upon for New York. Virginia refused to send men, on the ground of poverty and the likeliness of Indian inroads⁶; but sent £500 instead⁷. In July the Virginians promised to send the quota fixed, on request from New York⁸, but in December they again declined the duty, and asked permission from England to be excused⁹. The King therefore ordered the present of money to be accepted as substitute¹⁰; and granted the same relaxation to Maryland¹¹, whose government had sent £200 in bills, saying that ‘the vast charge which already lies on us’ prevented further assistance, and moreover that New

York was no defence to them¹. They vaguely promised assistance of men when need should require, but with Virginia gained exemption. Connecticut also attempted to evade the burden, and after a long correspondence decided not to send until the other colonies did not.

     Fletcher had moreover difficulty in his own province of New York. The assembly refused to grant the sums he considered necessary for defence and were accordingly prorogued³; whilst the old Leislerite faction had gained serious strength by the charges preferred against the governor through Delanoy, a disciple of Jacob Leisler. This accuser made serious allegations of illegal proceedings, and suggested Fletcher’s recall, followed by the appointment of a general governor over the whole of Andros’ former territory⁴. Fletcher however does not appear greatly disturbed by these difficulties. Addressing his new assembly in April 1696, he declared that ‘the supplies sent by the King of men, guns and stores, and the orders to the colonies if obeyed will enable us to withstand all our enemies and live in happy security⁵.’ He therefore asked for a generous grant, and the appointment of a committee to supervise its use; but as usual was compelled to accept less than he demanded; whilst the quotas were still objected to. Connecticut complained that Fletcher had required its full proportion, while not taking the fixed numbers from other colonies⁶. They next stipulated for only four months service and other special conditions which Fletcher refused⁷. According to their own account however, Connecticut did help New York on occasion with men and money⁸. Pennsylvania and Rhode Island refused to send assistance⁹. Virginia could spare no men, but protested its loyalty with a present of £1000¹⁰. Maryland again petitioned the King for exemption, and awaited his answer before acting¹¹,

in spite of Governor Nicholson’s offer to advance the money himself: ‘As we have already paid more than £130 more than the contribution required, we are under no obligation.’ Thus Fletcher was obliged to resort to other expedients for defence, the more since the royal forces, increased from two to four companies in 1695, were much weakened. He therefore adopted the system of one-year recruiting with the inducements of special levy-money and an addition of 4d. a day to the King’s pay¹. By prompt action he succeeded in preventing a threatened French inroad in August; he set out for Albany, and rumours of an immense army led by him reached the enemy, who wasted no time in retreating². The Indians on both sides were busy the while. ‘They lie in wait on the frontier to kill or take any naked man, woman or child; . . . Our Indians act the same part with greater success in the French plantations³.’ The state of unrest among the English forces is shown by the fact that in May at Senectady the whole guard except one (16 men) deserted; and when pursued, five of these resisted until they were killed. Of the remainder taken and court-martialled one only was shot ‘owing to the shortage of men⁴.’ The New York agents claimed that their province had raised £30,000 for defence, whilst the other colonies between them had contributed but £3000; and suggested an active policy, either by an attack on Canada to root out the enemy, or at least by grant of £1000 for presents to Indians, a garrison of 1000 men on the frontier, and stone fortifications, with yearly supplies of stores⁵. Fletcher also asked for similar measures, and for a quick sailing frigate to supersede the present man-of-war. In October 1696 he had not received the stores required for 1695; whilst the French were receiving regular annual supplies. Albany was uneasy. Many of the inhabitants intended moving in a body to New York unless an aggressive policy was followed; and the Indians also were pressing for action, and would join if the other colonies combined for attack⁶.

     Throughout the rest of the mainland states, various expedients were necessary to defend the various colonies. Maryland organized the Indians on the frontier by placing them all under the Emperor of Piscattaway, and garrisoned the Potomac strongly¹. Even Pennsylvania took steps to confirm the friendship of its neighbouring Indians². The governor of New Jersey was enticing young men to enlist by appointing the favourite captains as recruiters. He wrote to Fletcher:

     I am ashamed and grieved that they are so awkward. They still object the exemption or non-compliance of the neighbouring colonies, nor will this ever be remedied unless the support of the frontiers reaches all North America. As it is, the remoter colonies are so many asylums³.

New Jersey youths were deserting to the southern colonies, and the governor could with difficulty wring promises from the male population to march to the frontier in case of attack. New Hampshire refused to support its garrisons. ‘If the King does not send early next spring 100 men for the place, I believe the French will be masters of it,’ said Usher⁴.

     In Massachusetts, the strong independent colony, the climax was reached in this year. Early in the year they had been driven to expedients to encourage the formation of companies for defence, and were offering head-money for captured Indians⁵. They arranged expeditions on a small scale⁶, and spent considerable sums on hired ships to strengthen the naval defences⁷. In September they were ‘in a very poor and distressed condition, . . . in danger unless a supply of warlike stores and ships of war of greater strength are sent⁸.’ And finally in December 1696, the proud colony came to Canossa:

     For a long time past we have languished under a wasting war, whereby our estates have been much destroyed, and many among

us captured or destroyed. . . . The charge of war has lain heavy on this province, Connecticut having contributed little, and Rhode Island and New Hampshire nothing at all, . . . but having drawn a considerable charge on us for their defence. We therefore implore your royal aid, humbly praying that the several governments may be jointly concerned in the prosecution of the war, and in supporting the charge thereof . . . with a garrison of soldiers at the charge of Your Majesty’s exchequer, . . . that you will take into consideration the reduction of Canada, the unhappy fountain from which issue all our miseries. . . . Thus in humble dependence on your favourable answer for the rescuing of a languishing province and preserving alive a people entirely devoted to your service, we prostrate ourselves at your feet.

This is the petition of Massachusetts to the King, signed not by a royal governor but by William Stoughton, one of the Revolutionary Council who overturned Andros’ rule, and by the council appointed, under the new charter, by the colony itself¹.

     The Peace of Ryswick came quietly in America. Rhode Island followed the example of Massachusetts and appealed to the King, as unable to bear the burden of its own defence². The latter colony in spite of its newly-found humility, appears to have been the best in strength of defences³. The Maryland militia was suffering from extreme poverty, and scarcity of arms and ammunition⁴. In New York, the four companies were much reduced; and 30 per cent. was being deducted from their pay to compensate for the nominal difference between English and New York monies, regardless of the difference in cost of living. ‘The officers can hardly live . . . and the soldiers have not pay enough to fill their bellies, which makes them very apt to desert’; and they had received hardly any clothing for five years⁵. Moreover, the Five Nations were still wavering. Fletcher did his best to confirm them in the English alliance, with his usual perception; entertaining the principal men, and driving them round New York magnificently in coach and six⁶. Fletcher, however, had

not been able to refute the charges against him¹, and was superseded by Lord Bellomont, advantage being taken of his recall to reunite the New England colonies and join them to New York. Thus with the Peace of Ryswick, William returned to the system of James, which he would in all probability have preferred throughout, had not the logic of the revolution decided otherwise.

     The difference between the conduct of the war on the parts of France and England is well expressed by Bishop Burnet².

The arbitrary frame of that government [France] made their King the master of the whole wealth of his people; and the war was managed on both sides between them and us with this visible difference, that every man who dealt with the French King was ruined by it; whereas among us every man grew rich by his dealings with the King; and it was not easy to see how this could be either prevented or punished.

     The Treaty of Ryswick included the colonial disputes in one comprehensive clause. All places captured or taken during the war—that is, after the declaration of war—were to be restored on both sides within six months. Commissioners were to be appointed to settle the disputed claims in Hudson’s Bay, where both English and French had scattered trading settlements³. Thus the close of the war left the situation as it was at the beginning, and mutual confidence far from being achieved.

     In 1697 there is news of a French company in formation to settle colonies between the 30th and 40th degrees of latitude, in the regions discovered by La Salle; and royal permission was gained for this area to be held as a fief from the crown⁴. There were also urgent appeals for expenditure on New France, for the development of its many productive potentialities in wine, salt, corn, shipbuilding, naval stores and fisheries⁵. French

restrictions were placed on foreign vessels entering their ports¹; whilst claims were set up to the Kennebec and St George River territories². In November, Bellomont wrote to Nicholson, saying that the French had obtained a foothold among the Dowaganha Indians behind Virginia, and suggesting efforts by the merchants of that colony to oust them—an easy task, considering the nearness of Virginia³. Livingston, too, writing from Albany, complained that the French were ‘making a considerable settlement at the mouth of Mississippi, and were endeavouring to encompass the English behind⁴.’ In Nova Scotia, also, the inevitable fishery quarrels were soon resumed⁵; as also in the coastal regions of New England, and that question was added to the list before the commissioners for Hudson’s Bay⁶. In 1699 again proposals were put before the French King urging the development of New France from the mouth of the St Lawrence to the English border; particularly to supplant the Dutch and English trade in provisions and timber⁷; and the report of the Navy Board states that the French were encroaching twelve leagues into the English territory—land good for naval stores⁸. In October French aggressiveness was conspicuous in the arrival of a new governor for Port Royal, with ships and men, and under orders, as he expressed it, ‘to hinder, conformable to the Treaty of Ryswick, all English vessels coming to fish in sight of the lands of this province’; and while laying down this intention, he proposed a treaty of neutrality in case of war. The Massachusetts council refused to sit with folded hands under such presumption. Neutrality, they replied, might be arranged, but the orders about fishing ‘are so far from being conformable to the Treaty of Ryswick that they are directly contrary to the Vth article⁹.’

     The Indians were moreover a constant source of disagreement. The Five Nations and the River Indians had decreased in numbers from 2800 to 1300 during the war¹; and the French policy was, according to Bellomont, to destroy all they could not debauch or inveigle. At the rate they had been destroyed during the war and since, he added, they would be extirpated in a few years². Frontenac sought at first to maintain that the Five Nations were not included in the peace treaty; but Bellomont neutralized this move by promising help to the Indians if attacked; and he also used Frontenac’s persistent refusal to give up his Indian prisoners to turn the scale in the English favour³. Meanwhile French missionaries and Jesuits continued their activity, and were still, spite of protests, allowed within the territories claimed by the English crown⁴. The Indians themselves Bellomont found to be much terrified because of their own diminution and because

the slender appearance we make on the frontier in the poorness of our forts and the weakness of our garrisons makes us contemptible in their eyes, whereas the French allure them by the good figure they make, and several good forts of stone, especially Cadaraqui, which Fletcher neglected to demolish when it was deserted two years ago⁵. . . . Some of the old crafty Sachems of the Five Nations have asked—whether they thought ’em such fools as to believe our King could protect ’em from the French, when he was not able to keep his soldiers in a condition as those in Canada are kept—who by the way are duly paid every Saturday in the year⁶.

     Bellomont was obliged to walk warily in these affairs; and he chose to ignore the murder of five Senecas by Western Indians under French influence, lest he should assume French sovereignty in their country, although he was convinced that the attack came in reality from Canada⁷. He especially urged on

England the building of a fort in the Onondaga country, and the sending of Christian missionaries among the Indians. ‘If both these desires are not complied with next summer, . . . I shall look on the Five Nations as lost from us irrevocably¹.’ Protestant ministers, however, were hard to recruit for this work. As for the fighting strength of the Indians, French influence had again made a notable alteration. ‘Formerly 100 of our Indians would have made 1000 of ’em [the Western Nations] run; but now they will fight on the square².’

     In 1700 the Indian situation became critical. In January and February came reports of ‘an ugly alarm of a general insurrection of all the Indians in all these Provinces, this April or sooner, which has mightily frightened the English³. A rumour was being spread by the French that King William had ordered all the Indians in the plantations to be disarmed, ‘in order to a total extirpation of them⁴’; and that Bellomont was prepared to carry out these orders by the use of poison⁵. The agents of Louis made much of the English disarmament order, concealing their own instructions which were to the same effect⁶. The colonies were now thoroughly alarmed. Massachusetts in fear provided for the levying and disciplining of soldiers, the erection of courts martial, the arrangement of transport, ammunition supplies, and a system of look-outs; and sought to conciliate the Indians, but did not neglect the while to prepare the militia, and arrange for assistance to be sent to the other colonies.

     We sat but nine days, and passed twelve Acts, which was such a despatch as was never known in this province. . . . But whether the sudden march of the forces I ordered to the frontier towns did not operate more effectually is a question,

wrote Bellomont⁷. Again in March further rumours appeared. Most of the Indians had accepted as a fact the English policy of extirpation; whilst the French were insinuating that ‘the Virgin Mary was a French lady, and Our Saviour a Frenchman, but the English are heretics, and it will be a meritorious service to kill Englishmen.’ The design was evidently to lie still until

English America believed in peace, and then to attack suddenly. How much of these rumours was based on fact is uncertain. Livingston at Albany believed the Five Nations to be innocent; whilst the Pennicooks sent to the governor and council ‘to vindicate themselves against the false reports of their designing an insurrection¹.’

     At home, the government shared the alarm. When the rumours were reported, a special meeting of the Board of Trade was called, with the attendance of the high officers of state; but this meeting could only recommend what ought to have been done throughout, namely the making up of arrears in the pay and clothing of the regular troops, and the completion of their nominal strength of 400, with a vote of £500 towards a fort at Onondaga, £800 for presents to the Indians, of which £100 should come from the home treasury, the remainder from the colonies². What help did come actually from home was hindered by difficulties raised in the ordnance office³.

     Bellomont meanwhile insisted on a fort being built at Cadaraqui. At Boston the council hesitated, but Bellomont stood firm, and had his way. He then held a conference with the Five Nations, who kept him waiting a fortnight before they could trust him sufficiently to join in a parley. They were even then sullen and out of humour; ‘but by degrees I brought ‘em to perfect food temper,’ and French messengers of discord arrived in vain⁴. Bellomont added in his report that if similar alarms were to be prevented for the future, the English should avoid such cases of harshness in their treatment of Indians as undoubtedly had often occurred, ‘which is not the way to propagate Christianity among them⁵.’ The danger if real was averted, and by the following year (1701) the Indians were ‘in admirable temper . . . firm in their obedience to his Majesty, and friendship to us,’ expressing loyalty to their ‘great lord and master, the King of England, called by us Corachkoe, by the Christians, William III.’ Thus when the French pressed for

neutrality among the Indians in case of the outbreak of war, the lieutenant-governor of New York would not hear of the proposal¹.

     These Indian alarms may of course have been entirely groundless. There were ample opportunities for such a panic, in the bad state of defence. Bellomont from his arrival threw great blame for neglect on Fletcher²; and some of the measures adopted by the latter were undoubtedly open to criticism, notably his system of granting land in vast quantities to a few holders, by which local defence was not made easy. ‘His large grants to single persons without due caution for improvement was not for your Majesty’s service, nor did it tend to the settlement of those parts’ wrote Bellomont; and the Lords Justices of England therefore gave orders that all legal methods should be put into practice for breaking and annulling these ‘exorbitant, irregular, and unconditional grants³.’ Whether or not Fletcher was chiefly to blame⁴, the state of defence in New York was bad. The troops were weak, needing 200 recruits; they went for two years with hardly any pay, except through the Governor’s [Bellomont] credit, which in 1699 he had strained so far that the victuallers were unwilling to trust him any further⁵. In February of that year, the Board of Trade indicated how low the numbers of the New York troops had fallen, by recommending the raising of 250-300 men to make up their full complement of 400⁶. ‘All the old loyalty of this province is extinguished,’ wrote the attorney-general of New York⁷. The soldiers themselves were in a miserable condition, ‘almost naked, and likely to perish by reason of their great arrears⁸.’ They

were ‘the swearingest and drunkennest ever known in the world. The officers are taking to keep publick-houses,’ and could not be broken of the habit which Bellomont was forced to condone during their days of extremity¹. The forts at Senectady and Albany were scandalously weak; at the latter place the state of the fortifications was such that the government dare not fire a gun upon them. The forts were more like pounds to impound cattle²; the soldiers in a shameful condition of exposure; and the inhabitants had declared their intention of deserting the town if war was declared³. Bellomont, with his customary zeal against everything which savoured of Fletcher’s influence, put the responsibility for Albany’s plight upon Livingston, whom he accused of ‘pinching an estate out of the poor soldiers’ bellies⁴.’ ‘ To be plain with you,’ he concluded, ‘I would not stay a week here, were it not that I have a mind to accomplish the designs I am upon,’—of securing the Five Nations, building a fort in the Onondaga country, and arranging for the supply of naval stores from New England⁵. During all these complaints the Board of Trade was sending out recommendations for repairs to be effected and paid for by the New York assembly, the other councils and assemblies to contribute⁶. The Lords Justices in 1699, noting the colonial demand for stores and the fact that necessary forts had not yet been built, inquired how the colonists could be compelled to furnish themselves with such stores and to make provision for their own safety⁷. The Board of Trade however decided to help the colonies and gave Bellomont power to draw on the treasury for sums up to £2000, for repair of fortifications and suchlike works⁸, writing also to the other governors ‘to excite them to contribute.’ The need for such a measure was shewn by the fact that in 1700 Bellomont, knowing the necessity for repairs, had spent some of his own money in providing stores, which, not being confirmed from home, left him some £100 to the bad.

Bellomont was further concerned with a scheme by which the lands granted in exorbitant quantity by Fletcher should be ‘parcelled out in unalienable plots to officers and soldiers after seven years service, with liberty to the grantee to quit the service. A small quit rent would be paid to the King, to whom alone the lands could be made over—lest the needy soldiers should in a few hours part with their property for a gallon of rum. By this means the country would gradually be peopled, and the frontier towards Canada strengthened. Had such a scheme been practised twenty years previously, ‘there had been this day a thousand families on the land granted to Dellius [one of the large landowners], which would have been a force sufficient to make a stand against all the French of Canada¹.’ This scheme was supported from home, but depended upon the speedy cancellation of Fletcher’s grants, which was a long-protracted process².

     The governor was no more hopeful of affairs in Boston than in New York. ‘There being now a peace, they have no remembrance of a war,’ is his lament³, not peculiar to the Puritans of Massachusetts, or to the year 1700. The fort at Boston was, according to Bellomont, the poorest he ever saw; and this being so the government was not likely to build forts in the more distant province of Maine, where there was urgent need⁴. In January 1701, instructions from home required Massachusetts to provide for its own defence, so that such a disgrace as the loss of Pemaquid should not be repeated⁵; in June, a supply of powder was sent from home, but with the proviso that this must not be taken as a precedent; since the colony was alone responsible for an adequate supply⁶. Massachusetts however, in welcoming this present, expressed the hope that it would extend to a further supply of stores of war; and again protested that they were unable to repair the forts of Pemaquid and New Hampshire⁷.

     In January 1701, a letter from the Board of Trade informed Bellomont of a detailed system of quotas to be sent to New York by the other colonies in time of war, and also recommended contributions from the neighbouring colonies to the fortifications on the northern frontier¹. The news of these instructions provoked the usual protests. In Virginia, the House of Burgesses

resolved nem. con. that the letter requiring £900 to New York frontiers has been obtained by false suggestions and misrepresentation . . . for the security of [New York’s] Indian trade; . . . that forts there will not help Virginia; our condition is such that we are not able to contribute £900 . . . . and the sending of men would be prejudicial to His Majesty’s interest at home, and would endanger the safety of this colony².

Governor Nicholson, with past experience in New York, tried to induce a more friendly attitude, but by October he was obliged to write to Nanfan, the lieutenant-governor of New York, that there was not the least ground to depend upon having any assistance in men from Virginia³.

     In Maryland, Governor Blakiston was disquieted at the reception given to the royal orders by the neighbouring colony. ‘If it should not be done in Virginia, I doubt it will make our Assembly here boggle, for they are glad to take hold of any example, when it is to save their money⁴; and he later decided that it was wiser not to call the assembly on the question, so unpromising was the colony’s attitude⁵. Pennsylvania took up the same position. According to Penn,

the negative of Virginia will render it more difficult everywhere, considering the dignity of that colony, and the vigour of the Commander-in-Chief to pursue advices from home. . . . Pennsylvania would not be prevailed with to think of any supply for the fort⁶.

Finally Massachusetts:

     The quota required from this province for the assistance of New York do’s much startle His Majesty’s subjects here, who apprehend themselves to live more open and in danger of an invasion than that province, and altogether as unable (if not more) than they to defend themselves without further assistance, and they humbly hope for His Majesty’s Royal Grace therein¹.

     Thus, upon the renewal of war in 1702, the old problems arose about its prosecution problems of policy, personnel and initiative—as they arose in the previous war. Moreover, the death of Bellomont in 1701 not only removed an able and energetic governor, but separated New York and New England again, each having henceforward its own governor². In one respect however, the situation was simplified: administration and defence were not in the anarchy of revolution, but in the hands of legal authority.

     In the West Indies also the interval after Ryswick was a period of unrest. In Jamaica, the French continued to land in the outlying parts after the peace³; in 1699 a quarrel arose between the English governor of the island and the French at Petit Guavos, who had received and acquitted one Kelly, a pirate, whom Beeston sought to punish; and complaints were also made that the French were making efforts to establish trade with Spanish America, to the detriment of Jamaica⁴. In St Kitts, the dual occupation was bound to lead to trouble; and the French ambassador did not wait long before complaining of spoils committed by the English on the French part of the island⁵. The English commissioners for settling the island refused to give up houses occupied by any Frenchmen in the English part before the war, and would not negotiate at all on

the matter¹. Also, French claims on St Lucia and Tobago caused much dispute. In St Lucia, the governor of Barbados was ordered to assert English rights². From a tactical position the island was too near Barbados to be lightly given up. Governor Grey therefore demanded the withdrawal of the French³, but was met with an indignant refusal, and the affair passed into diplomatic arrangements which were broken by the renewal of war. The French claim in Tobago was weaker, and the insistent assertion of English rights carried the day⁴.

     In the matter of defence, the greatest groanings now proceeded from Barbados, which had suffered greatly from ‘the long unhappy war and generous mortality.’ Many families were dead, and others reduced to great poverty, large tracts of land were waste which formerly made great production, and many plantations were utterly ruined⁵. In November 1699 the assembly dared not impose so great a tax as the fortifications required; necessary though they were⁶; and the following year it insisted that the 4½ per cent. export duty should be used for the purpose⁷. However, the Barbadians appear to have gained to some extend the sympathy of the home government, a year later. They had again asked for the employment of the 4 per cent. duty for defensive preparations, and although their request was refused, the Board of Trade added that ‘by their zeal the Barbadians deserve help.’ The help however does not materialize⁸.

     While Barbados thus received encouragement but not help, Jamaica gained help with discouragement. In 1701, it was decided to send stores to the island as demanded, ‘it being necessary,’ according to the Board of Trade, ‘that the plantations be assisted and supported from England in their defence,

which they will not be able otherwise to carry on¹.’ By the time the stores were actually sent however, the prevailing policy seems tinged with caution and suspicion, for the stores were to be strictly under the charge of Governor Selwyn, and were not to be used except in case of absolute necessity, or when the assembly should pay for them. ‘The inhabitants are able in good measure to provide for their own defence².’

     The Leeward Islands were deprived in December 1699 of their able governor Codrington³—unfortunately in the shadow of corruption, which few governors could resist. His death occurred just at the time when charges were being preferred against him at home. His son, also Christopher Codrington, scholar and soldier, was appointed to succeed him, but refused to set out until the arrears due to his father had been paid, and did not arrive until the end of 1700. Here also the home departments were attempting to avoid being squeezed, as they thought, by undeserving colonists. The ordnance office in this case said that £2000 of stores required for St Kitts, although in the opinion of the principal officers of ordnance absolutely necessary for defence, could not be supplied unless the office was reimbursed⁴. Meanwhile the islands were weak, and ‘none could hold out long, if an enemy should appear before them,’ said Colonel Fox, the deputy governor⁵. Codrington on his arrival feared the outbreak of war, and asked Barbados for the loan of a frigate to attack St Kitts, when the declaration should come. The frigate arrived, in bad condition; but Codrington had to be thankful for its arrival at all, since Governor Grey sent it on his own initiative after a request from his assembly that he would not do so⁶. Codrington also suggested that the two governments, Barbados and the Leeward Islands, should be united, since ‘Barbados has no inclination to serve or save these Islands, nor has one of them to help another⁷.’ As an example of the state of defence in Antigua, it was mentioned

that when in 1701 one Major Martin was murdered by the slaves, it transpired that ‘scarce a man could find a gun; and he that would had neither powder nor ball nor sword¹.’ The new governor also received discouragement in Montserrat, where he went to secure recruits for the attack on the French under Governor des Gennes in St Kitts, and found not three men willing to enlist². However Codrington, who bears some resemblance to Bellomont in his enthusiasm and determination, rejected a suggestion of West Indian neutrality, put forward by the French: ‘I told them that whenever they made me a visit I should not fail to give them a hearty welcome; and we should not think of another neutrality until we had forgotten the good effects of the last³.’ Writing again, with the renewal of war imminent upon England, Codrington made a boast destined to be not far short of fulfilment: ‘My will is made and my houses set in order. If I hear of war at midnight, I shall visit M. des Gennes at break of day⁴.

     The eight years of war, following the accession of William III, brought to light several important facts. The revolution in the colonies first of all resulted in a criminal neglect of defence; and thus the conclusion of hostilities brought only the preservation of that restless peace, the impossibility and illogicality of which were rapidly becoming obvious. Had an energetic and well-considered scheme of operations been carried out, it does not appear unlikely that the French could have been driven from their threatening strongholds. Certainly the actual policy pursued had a demoralizing effect. The war shewed moreover a lack of cooperation between the colonies, and the absence of that feeling of common interest which was only with difficulty excited nearly a century later. As a result, help was sent from England, but vaguely, and not as a matter of course, witness the caution to Massachusetts that they must not assume a precedent

from assistance in ammunition¹. Between these two stools, an adequate conduct of the war fell to the ground. The help sent was often bad, the delay generally considerable; whilst lack of knowledge resulted in the sending of unsuitable supplies. It may well be that mismanagement in colonial affairs was not proportionately greater than that in other departments, but this fact does not diminish the importance of that mismanagement.

     In a broader sense, however, it was also true that the English government was not aware of the real position in America, until its eyes were partially opened by the war with France, which forced the problem of defence upon public notice. The government had first to decide that it wished to preserve the American colonies—that is, it was compelled to think imperially, if only in a very rudimentary fashion. The next step was to decide what its own attitude to British America should be; where the burden of defence was to fall. Here the war brought no satisfactory settlement, for the government were totally unable to carry out a consistent and logical policy; and the decision implied was that England would assist in defence, rather than that it should be neglected, but that, on land at least, the colonies must take the initiative. The mother country would not. Thus the history of the war gives the impression of a struggle between the colonies and England, in which the colonies had the upper hand; for, could they only hold out in refusing to carry out their own defensive operations, England would eventually send supplies. Of course, looking back in the light of later events, it appears that the colonists should in reality have feared France to such an extent that they could not dare to offend the English government. But whilst the fear of France is constantly on their lips, it does not appear to have provoked desperate action. Thus, if the English minister saw the danger of French aggression, whilst the colonial leaders did not, the natural result was that England should send help, rather than waste time in debating what appeared to be a minor point of colonial constitutional policy. Moreover, the statesmen who could see this danger would also wish to prevent the American governments from neglecting their own duties and relying on

the protecting arm of England. Their representative opinion is shewn in the Report of the Council of Trade to the Lords justices in 1696¹.

     This report began by describing royal assistance to the colonies, especially the supply and maintenance of four companies of infantry at New York. The Queen’s orders concerning quotas, it proceeded, had evidently been carried out uncertainly and imperfectly. It was incredible that the governor of New York, in the midst of 40,000 English, should say that he had only the companies in the King’s pay that he could depend on for defence. The council’s conclusions were: first, that there was force enough in the colonies for defence; second, that the colonies must be united, for even an increased force could not secure more than Albany, and the French would then attack another point; third, that as the proprietary governments could not thus be united, a military captain-general must be appointed to receive quotas of men, and of money in the case of Quakers. Presents for Indians must be raised, and training given to their youths, ministers also being sent to preach Christianity to them. The report added that the colonies which protested the danger of attacks on their own borders were not in particularly good state of defence.

     This was all very good, but the council could make no provision for the one probable eventuality. The revolution had brought in, or strengthened, representative government, for which it stood in England; and the home government never seemed to allow in their war policy for the increased power of the assemblies. Occasional protests were sent against an assembly which claimed power over revenue and salaries, but in questions of raising men and money for the war, it appears that England still thought it sufficient to instruct the governor to provide what was necessary, whereas it generally happened that the governor could not do it. If then the assemblies could refuse to grant help to other colonies—and experience had shewn that they had done, and would do so-what did the government, as

advised by the Board of Trade, propose to do? This is the great problem of colonial policy, first clearly seen to emerge in the war, and continuing until it culminated in the separation. For, with the accession of William of Orange, the problem became a struggle of principle. The revolution brought in self-government in a far greater degree than was indicated by the policy of James II, the assemblies having now the power to refuse help to their neighbours. On the other hand, William’s accession introduced a determined struggle with France, which therefore required a strong aggressive and defensive policy in America. How could those two principles be reconciled? How could defence be organized without autocracy? In the West Indies, where sea-power greatly outweighed land policy, England bore the brunt of responsibility herself, and thus the problem never assumed menacing proportions. In America however it was a vital question. It was inaugurated by the accession of William III, and at his death there appeared no prospect of an adequate solution.

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