Dinsmore Documentation presents Classics of American Colonial History
Author: | Guttridge, G. H. |
Title: | The Colonial Policy of William III in America and the West Indies |
Citation: | London: Cambridge University Press, 1922 |
Subdivision: | Chapter IV |
HTML by Dinsmore Documentation * Added November 8, 2002 | |
<—Chapter III Table of Contents Chapter V—> |
99
CHAPTER IV THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF COLONIAL POLICY A conflict was now beginning between rising political entities and methods of government which to them savoured of tyranny. A general absence of understanding and public spirit on both sides threatened to embitter the conflict, and natural obstacles in the way of harmony were very great. (a) COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION Councils of Trade The revolution of 1689 did not disturb the English constitutional methods of carrying out colonial administration, but the new régime brought about noteworthy changes of personnel, which throw much light on the change of policy inaugurated by the Whig triumph in England. In Charles II’s reign, colonial affairs had been the concern of a Committee of the Privy Council for trade and plantations; and this same committee had shewn activity under James II, in dealing with the proprietary and charter colonies. William III continued this method. of administration by appointing a new committee, which he employed in commercial and colonial affairs until 1696. The Stuart dynasty had in the main continued to follow the advice given early in the century by one of its most famous servants: Let not the government of the Plantations depend upon too many Counsellors and Undertakers in the country that planteth but upon a temperate number; and let those be rather noblemen and gentlemen than merchants; for they look ever to the present gain1. Thus in 1685 the committee which signed the order for the proclamation of James II in New York consisted of fifteen members, all of them peers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury the High Officers of State, and an imposing group of statesmen, Rochester, Halifax, Clarendon, Arlington, Sunderland, Bath, Craven, Bridgwater and others, Jeffreys being a
100 later name of distinction on the committee. William on his accession carried on this system, but appointed a new committee, of which Halifax and Bath continued their membership, the total number being now twelve, and including, in addition to the High Officers and several other peers, the Bishop of London, Sir Henry Capel (a lawyer previously noted for his exclusionist principles, and a commissioner of the treasury), Henry Powle (Speaker of the Convention Parliament, and William’s most trusted adviser, a man of wide historical and legal reputation), and Edward Russell (the sailor who had served in earlier days under William, and was now treasurer of the navy)1. Thus the personnel of colonial administration was beginning to skew signs of progress towards a more specialized system. Any three of the body could form a quorum, and their meetings appear to have been frequent—often several times a week, though there were occasionally gaps of about a fortnight—and the mass of colonial business passed through their hands. This advisory committee however had to bear the brunt of trade losses resulting from the war, and in 1696 proposals were on foot in the House of Commons to establish a special board to supersede it. The King was opposed to the idea, but could not at first prevent the suggestion being carried forward. However by March 1696, the Commons’ bill was dropped, possibly by the indirect influence of the plot to assassinate the King. Reorganization of 1696 But in May a new board was created on similar lines by an Order in Council2. The president of this board was the Earl of Bridgwater, who had served on the old Privy Council committee under James II but who as a supporter of the revolution had also the confidence and friendship of William. The only other peer on the board was the Earl of Tankerville, a former Monmouth rebel and an active revolutionist, also a close friend of the King. The eight salaried members of the board included John Locke (secretary of the Council of Trade under Charles II, with personal interests in trade, and a writer on economic
101 questions of the day), John Pollexfen (one of the Lords of Trade in 1675, a man of great influence, and an advocate of the state regulation of industry), William Blathwayt (secretary to the old committee under William III), Abraham Hill (a member of the Royal Society), and John Methuen (the diplomatist). The successors of these men possessed for the main part similar qualifications. These eight members were paid £1000 a year, and bore the great part of colonial administration. The High Officers of State were authorized to attend when necessary and when other public services permitted1. Duties of the board To this board was entrusted a threefold duty: the care for trade and manufactures, for the employment of the poor, and for the colonies. It had, however, no definite control over the important decisions of government, the most notable deficiency being in the appointment of governors, which remained in the hands of the Secretary of State. When the administration of this board had become more lax—it remained efficient throughout the reign of Anne—the colonial governor could afford to defy the board appointed by the same authority as himself. It is indeed possible to exaggerate the importance of the change brought about in 1696. The most important result was one of those periodical bursts of energy which during the colonial period marked the whole series of committees and councils at their inception. There was plenty of work to be done, and a new and wisely chosen council was more likely to do it than a Privy Council committee which tended to fall into inattention and routine. Communication The new Board and its predecessors were alike dependent on poor means of communication. There being no mail boats, letters were sent in both directions by merchant ships; and, in addition to the risks of this informal method of transit, suffered from the indirect method of delivery, frequently being passed from hand to hand until they reached the addressee or were
102 lost in the process. Sometimes they lay at an agent’s house for long after their arrival across the sea. Thus the length of time for the passage of any letter varied from about two months to as much as two and a half years1. The important instructions to Phips, on which depended the entire success of Wheler’s expedition against Canada, were despatched in February 1693, but did not reach him till late in September of that year—too late to be of any use—in spite of the fact that Boston was on the direct route between England and the colonies. The more indirect routes took much longer time. Connecticut and Carolina suffered especially, receiving their letters by way of Boston (or New York) and Virginia respectively. These latter colonies were the best served, but even in their case, there are instances of letters being sent indirectly, with the consequent delay. Moreover, this difficulty of communication led to important constitutional difficulties. As will be seen later2, considerable importance in the friction between England and the colonies was attributable to the disputed questions of the right to allow appeals from colonial to English courts, the liability of customs officers to seek protection from England against legal proceedings in the colonies, and, more broadly, to the principle of restriction which was the core of the Navigation Laws. In each of these cases, it may readily be conceived that the disadvantages of bad communications and bad economic connection between the two continents were at least one main cause of the friction, and that the consequent quarrels were not entirely due to an American ambition to throw off the English connection as such. Inter-colonial communications too was not easy. It is not always clearly realized how far the colonies were separated from each other in the early colonial days, when settlements had not yet grown to cover whole states, and when the geographical situation—the direction of rivers, and the inlets of great bays—tended naturally to divide rather than to unite. With no supply of good roads, long-distance communication by land easily became impossible, and the usual method of travel from one colony to another was by sea. This fact has important bearings
103 on the attempted union of the colonies. A complete union was never suggested, and the difficulties even of a united New England can be seen when Bellomont, the general governor of that province, had considerable trouble in getting from New York to Boston1. (b) THE PERIOD OF PHIPS AND FLETCHER The provincial governors formed the main link between colonies and mother country; and it is therefore necessary, for an adequate consideration of the relations existing between the two, to consider in some detail the personalities and careers of the principal governors. As it happens, the chief colonies during this period changed their governors at about the same time, so that grouping is easy. The first period is that of Phips, Fletcher, Andros and Nicholson, governors respectively in Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and Maryland. Phips in Massachusetts Sir William Phips was at one time a ship’s carpenter, and his temperament was that of the sailor. He made several attempts to salve wrecked treasure-ships, and finally succeeding was knighted on his return to England. Then followed his appointment as Provost Marshal of New England. Soon after the revolution—during which he was in England—he was received into the Church at Boston, a necessary preliminary to the holding of office under that colony. After commanding the sea-forces in the expeditions of 1690 and 1691 to Port Royal and Quebec, he was appointed governor of Massachusetts by the King in March 16922. He does not appear to have been in general favour at his return to the colony after joining Mather in the negotiations for a new charter; and one writer from New England affirmed that Phips ‘hears from his people that there will be another governor shortly, so he will make his life as comfortable as he can3.’ His arrival found Boston in the midst of the memorable witchcraft scare, during which many unfortunate
104 persons were sent to death or imprisonment on charges of magical malpractices. Phips did not at first doubt the various accusations, and made special arrangements for the trial of suspects; but later in the year he began to question the truth of ever-increasing charges of witchcraft, and stopped all proceedings, receiving the royal commendation for so doing1. A striking characteristic of the new governor was an utter inability to work harmoniously with others of coordinate authority. With Fletcher at New York he kept up a constant feud. In 1693 the latter had occasion to send a messenger to Boston; but Phips received him with abuse, and expressed a wish to challenge his master to a duel, a contingency which Fletcher managed to evade. The messenger sent from New York to great Admiral Wheler had such a reception from Phips as to call forth an apology from one of the councillors present—an apology which was in itself a serious condemnation of one in Phips’ position2. The collector of customs in New England also complained of the governor’s conduct to him, alluding to one specific charge of hindrance which he preferred against Phips as ‘not the only occasion3.’ As for the officers of the navy, the governor was generally at loggerheads with them. Capt. Fairfax, of H.M.S. Conception, complained of neglect and uncivil conduct by Phips4; whilst Capt. Short, of H.M.S. Nonsuch, suffered more than this and was in part a cause of Phips’ recall. In such a chapter of acrimony it is difficult to assess the blame correctly, but the facts appear at any rate to condemn Phips more than Short. The governor accused the captain of unpunctuality in obeying his orders, and of not being in readiness to carry them out. He also obtained testimony from Short’s subordinates to drunkenness and cruelty on the captain’s parts. However, be these charges true or false, Phips went on board the Nonsuch, knocked Short down, and proceeded to thrash him with his cane, the captain, hampered by a previous wound, being unable adequately to return the governor’s addresses.
105 Having thus shown his authority, Phips suspended Short and appointed the gunner to the vacant command. Short, defended also by Captain Fairfax, attempted to justify himself1, but Phips was resolute, and put him on boardship to be taken home in confinement. The captain had however some supporters and succeeded in being taken to New Hampshire, where he was well received by the people, Usher the lieutenant-governor being absent2. Phips followed up the attack by sending the purser to demand Short’s surrender, but the opposite party in turn seized the purser. The governor now appeared on the scene himself, but was refused admittance by the President, and worked off his indignation by possessing himself of Short’s baggage which he took back with him. By this time Usher had returned and made objections to Phips’ interference, writing home to urge that a new governor should replace him in Massachusetts3. This quarrel between Phips and Usher was aggravated by disputes over the territory around the Piscataqua River, and the control of that river4; and by Phips making peace with the Eastern Indians without consulting New Hampshire5. In Rhode Island also Phips found opposition, this time in resistance to his commission over the Militia; and the inhabitants accused him of appointing officers against the will of the ‘Governor and Company6.’ About the same time, the Connecticut Militia command was transferred from Phips to Fletcher7. With the latter Phips was still in great disfavour, Fletcher alluding to his ‘unmannerly conduct,’ and speaking contemptuously of the ‘jargon in New England, and that machine their Governor.’ He also accused Phips of protecting one Gouverneur, a released Leislerite who had been stirring up faction in New York. Phips denied that the man in question had committed crime enough to be handed up for8. In January 1694, the Council of Trade decided, in view of
106 Short’s case and other charges against Phips1, to recommend his recall, that the charges might be answered; and on this recommendation the irascible governor was summoned home2. Some months however elapsed before these orders could be carried out, and in the meantime Phips embroiled himself with his own assembly in Boston, about the right to refuse admission to duly-elected members3. In 1695 he returned to England in bad health; and in June he died, before the charges against him could be established4. Joseph Dudley, proclaiming that during Phips’ tenure of office not a single good thing had been done, was silenced by mention of a peace with the Eastern Indians in 16935. Fletcher in New York Benjamin Fletcher, Phips’ contemporary in New York, was one of the many men in colonial history who, arriving from obscurity, played an important part in administration, and returned again to obscurity. His character is hard to gauge. The records and dispatches of his period of rule seem to shew a man of determination, with a constant purpose to maintain New York against French and Indians on the one hand, and against faction on the other. The arrival of Bellomont however, brings new impressions. The latter, whose word should command respect, accused Fletcher of neglect and corruption, of stirring up faction, and of a foolish land policy. The conclusion therefore appears to be that the governor was a man of strong character, tinged with the usual corruption of self interest, and suffering from a tendency to extremes in everything, doing well against the French, making big mistakes in policy. Fletcher’s predecessor in New York, arriving in March 1691, lived only long enough to see the execution of Leisler and his Lieutenant, and in July the position was again vacant. Major Ingoldsby, who had accompanied Sloughter, carried on the government as commander-in-chief, and prevented the colony returning to its previous anarchy. In September 1692, Fletcher
107 arrived, to the grief of Ingoldsby, who lamented the appointment on the ground that since he himself had received no pay, he would be obliged either to leave the place or starve, now that the government was taken from him1. The new governor’s report on his arrival was discouraging although the council and the House of Representatives of New York expressed gratitude to the King and Queen for the appointment of such a governor as Colonel Fletcher2. He found that the revenue much indebted, the burden of Albany being the chief grievance. (The cost of Albany to New York for the period from March 1691 to September 1692 was estimated at £10,8673.) ‘The people were divided, contentious, impoverished. . . . The two parties seem implacable and will so weaken each other that we may become a prey to our enemies1.’ In this connection Fletcher threw out an accusation against Phips, that he was ‘the bellows that blows up the dying embers of former discontents4.’ Fletcher’s chief work lay in the conduct of war with France, and the needs of defence brought him into intimate contact with the surrounding colonies. In 1692 the government of Pennsylvania was added to his command, by a step which seemed to indicate an attempt to increase royal control over the proprietaries. Penn, as was natural, protested. The government [of Pennsylvania] is inseparably my property. . . . I hope thou wilt tread softly in this affair. The discouragement of those who went thither in the faith of the Crown, and the decay of their trade (the return of ten years toiling in the wilderness) are my prevailing motives in writing to you5. Fletcher was proclaimed in the Quaker colony, and appointed William Markham, the former Secretary, as his lieutenant-governor. Penn however maintained his objections, complaining to the Queen and Privy Council of the inclusion of Pennsylvania in Fletcher’s commission6. Fletcher made counter-charges
108 against the Quakers, who had apparently been incited by Penn in a letter to oppose the royal commission1. At any rate the colony refused to grant Fletcher the measures for defence which he required2. In face of this difficulty, the Lords of Trade sought the opinion of the Law Officers, who decided that in certain exigencies the crown had a right to grant such a commission over a proprietary government, but that when these reasons failed or ceased, the rights of government belonged to Penn3. The Lords of Trade then summoned the Quaker to state what conditions he would fulfil if the proprietary government were restored to him. Penn agreed to go to his colony and take actual charge, transmit the royal orders, secure obedience to orders about the quotas for defence, continue the present lieutenant-governor, submit the government back to Fletcher if the royal orders should not be obeyed, execute certain of Fletcher’s laws passed in 1693, and subscribe a declaration of fidelity to the King and Queen. In the meantime Penn pointed out that the assembly had passed an act of submission to the royal government. The Lords of Trade therefore recommended the restoration of Penn to his proprietary rights of government, reserving to Fletcher only the right to demand eighty men and assistance in the defence of New York4. Fletcher’s commission over Pennsylvania was accordingly revoked, and the Quaker colony continued its prosperous course under private government5. In fourteen years from its settlement Philadelphia had become nearly equal to New York in trade and wealth, and yet, according to Fletcher, it was rather a hindrance than a help to its older neighbours6. In 1696 the assembly declared Penn’s former charter void, as too narrow, and drew up a bill to qualify themselves to make laws. This Bill, ‘drawing up a constitution and scheme of government for Pennsylvania,’ was endorsed: ‘Presented to Governor Markham by the Quakers, which they desired to purchase to be enacted for the sum of
109 £200 to be given as an assistance to New York1.’ Markham referred the whole question to Penn, and meanwhile was unable to assist Fletcher in the war2. Connecticut also had been a thorn in the flesh of the English governors since the revolution. Ingoldsby complained in 1691 that the colony was pretending to independence3, whilst an address of the freeholders in 1692 claimed that the elections, by which the present government in Connecticut was established, were illegal and contrary even to its former charter, whose resumption however had not been justified. The government so established was, they asserted, arbitrary and despotic, renouncing the laws of England. ‘The Throne is made a footstool, and the Crown a football for an usurping corporation4.’ According to Fletcher, Connecticut was ‘a sort of republic, and all the better sort are much dissatisfied, and wish to be united to New York5.’ There was also evidence of quarrels among the magistrates, with a consequent instability of justice6. In 1693 the complaints of New York were thus far answered that the command over the militia of Connecticut was transferred from Phips to Fletcher, who visiting the colony declared it to be a republic, enemies of the Church of England and of monarchs7, . . . separated from Church and Crown of England allowing no appeals from their courts, and no force to the laws of England. Some of the wisest have said that, not being permitted to vote for Members of Parliament, they are not liable to their laws8. They refused obedience to Fletcher’s commission over the militia, and he thereupon advised a writ of quo warranto to be made out against their charter: the irregularities being so great
110 that they would not defend it1. The affairs of Connecticut were however allowed to drift. Meanwhile Fletcher was finding opposition in New York. In February, 1693, when the Leislerites condemned to imprisonment had been released, one of their number, Abraham Gouverneur, suddenly roused the old faction against Fletcher2, and escaped arrest by betaking himself to Boston, whence Phips refused to give him up3, asserting that although Gouverneur had been to blame in abusing Fletcher, he had not done anything to warrant his being handed over to New York. The pro-Leisler party also succeeded in obtaining a bill to reverse Leisler’s attainder4. Another of their party Delanoy, then made extensive charges against the governor, of his ‘acts of squeezing money out of public and private purses,’ of corrupt appointments (‘he keeps a catalogue of the people who give him presents’), of encouragement to pirates, and of the selling of acts to the people. Moreover, Delanoy proceeded, he had offended the people by insinuations of his great interest and credit at Whitehall, which would baffle any complaints against his administration, ‘and this was backed by the grandeur of a coach and six horses (a pomp this place was as little used to as himself)5.’ Again in 1696, the son of Jacob Leisler joined Gouverneur in a denunciation of Fletcher, especially for his interference in elections6, and sought to justify the original revolution in New York. They were supported in their objections by Sir Henry Ashurst, the agent in England for Massachusetts7. The New York assembly was also in opposition. Fletcher’s urgent call for £4000 was met by a final offer of £1000, and the governor prorogued the assembly after vain remonstrance8. In 1696 the assembly could retaliate by bringing in a force bill, limiting the governor’s power to detach parties of men from the militia9.
111 In face of all these difficulties, the Council of Trade decided to investigate, and asked for evidence to be sent in, in support of the charges against Fletcher, and against Nicholson, who was also suffering from an epidemic of accusations1. Finding that in Fletcher’s case the charges had probably some foundation of truth, the Council of Trade took advantage of the excuse to recall Fletcher and carry out some new schemes of union which had recently been devised. (c) THE SOUTHERN COLONIES Andros in Virginia During the administrations of Fletcher in New York and Phips in Massachusetts, the affairs of Virginia were entrusted to Sir Edmund Andros. Andros, an aristocratic Protestant, had seen much service in the American colonies, first appointed by James, then Duke of York, to be governor of New York in 1674. The accession of his patron to the throne brought Andros a wider sphere of government in the union of New England, where he proved himself a capable administrator, if somewhat deficient in tact, and too much inclined to insist on the meticulous enforcement of a difficult and unpopular policy. The revolution drove him from this position, but the unsupported charges against him were dismissed by the Lords of Trade2, and in 1692 Andros was appointed governor of Virginia. The Old Dominion was quiet during William’s reign. The growth of towns was steadily resisted, and to this end the Virginians would have no fixed ports, to which goods must be taken for import or export3. Partly for this reason, a difficulty was found in carrying on the institutions of government. There was ‘a paucity of Councillors, and failure to attend4.’ In 1695, ten members of the House of Burgesses—the Virginian Lower House—were ordered into custody for default in attending the House5. In such circumstances, it is not remarkable that the
112 power of the governor was considerable and even steadily increasing, according to the opinion of a long, semi-official statement describing the condition of the colony in 1697[.]1 With the influence of the crown, and the offices of a colonial Pooh-Bah, the governor had in his own hands the bulk, of authority in Virginia2; for by his power of recommending and suspending Councillors, he could exercise control over that body; whilst the appointment of sheriffs, and the less crude methods of corruption, gave him great power in the Lower House. Taxation however was destined to give the assembly its great opportunity. That the governor was not supreme the failure of Andros to send the quotas requested by New York well shewed; although it is not unworthy of notice that Virginia gave more help than many of the other colonies, certainly more than Maryland. An event which emphasized the position of Virginia as the Royal Dominion was the foundation of the college which perpetuated the names of William and Mary. The scheme for erecting William and Mary College originated in 1691 through the efforts of James Blair, assisted by Nicholson, who at that time held the office of lieutenant-governor, prior to the arrival of Andros. The King made a grant of about £2000 from the crown treasury in Virginia, and appointed certain revenues to the new foundation, whilst Nicholson also, according to Blair, laid out £350 of his own money in the project. He was soon superseded however, ‘and another put in his place of a different spirit and temper3’—thus wrote Blair, probably blaming Andros unjustly through personal prejudice, for the latter governor appears to have taken much interest in the erection of the college4, which marked a notable advance from the time when, a generation previous, Governor Berkeley thanked God that the colony had no schools. In 1700, Virginia made the interesting experiment of receiving
113 and settling French Protestant refugees at Manikin Town a well-chosen spot not far from James City, but as the numbers of these settlers threatened to swell considerably, the council soon recommended that no more should be sent, as they were unable to tide over the winter without assistance from the Virginians1, whilst the ‘poverty and disability’ of the colony prevented that assistance from being very great. For the rest, Virginia during this period does not appear overflowing with that vigour generally associated with young communities. Nicholson sent home in 1701 an interesting dispatch, in which he lamented the state of the colony, and indicated a possible line of social exclusiveness not calculated to bring true prosperity to Virginia: Fit and proper persons for executing the several offices and employments therein, decrease. And I dare venture . . . to say that in twenty or thirty years time, if the Natives can’t be qualified, there will be few or none in the country capable of tolerably executing the several offices and employments: for there is little or no encouragement for men of any tolerable parts to come hither. Formerly there was good convenient land to be taken up, and there were widows had pretty good fortunes, which were encouragements. But now all or most of those good lands are taken up, and if there be any widows or maids of any fortune, the Natives for the most part get them: for they begin to have a sort of aversion to others, calling them strangers2. By this time, a new group of administrators had assumed the charge of American governments. Fletcher, Phips and Andros had gone. Bellomont had arrived as general governor of New England, and Blakiston had inaugurated a period of placid rule in Maryland. Nicholson forms the one link between the two periods, the eight years of war and the five years of peace. Copley and Nicholson in Maryland The revolution of 1689 among its many results effected the removal of Lord Baltimore from the government of his proprietary colony, by reason of the charges brought against him at that time. In Maryland as in Pennsylvania William decided that it was expedient to constitute government by the crown,
114 and Lionel Copley therefore arrived to supersede Baltimore, with a royal commission similar to that of other crown governors. Arrangements were made however by which Baltimore retained certain duties and privileges, wholly or in part1; and there now followed a prolonged quarrel between proprietor and assembly on the question of these rights. The assembly claimed that a certain one of the duties made over to the proprietor under the new scheme was levied for defence, and therefore should not go into a private purse, that henceforth fines of justice should go not to Baltimore but to the crown, and that the proprietor’s demand for ‘waifs, strays, wild horses, and wild hogs,’ was impossible in that province or in any other newly settled country. ‘By such a grant, Lord Baltimore would engross the whole stock of the country2.’ Governor Copley soon decided that there would be no peace and quiet in Maryland until Baltimore’s interest was redeemed by the crown3. Copley himself however would not appear the best officer to avoid friction in such a difficult position. In the short period of his rule, he involved himself in quarrels with the secretary of the colony, and with Randolph, the surveyor of customs, both of whom were, like himself, appointed by the crown4. The latter quarrel is but one of the instances in which two coordinate authorities in the English administration found themselves incapable by position or temperament of working in harmony. In this instance, Copley accuses Randolph of abusing the jurors who decided against him in official cases, calling them base, perjured and forsworn rogues, threatening them with the pillory and loss of their ears, and he also in public aspersed and bespattered and affronted the justices themselves, basely said by him to be picked and packed by me5. In September 1693, however, this discord was terminated by the death of Copley, and after a short period of rule under Andros, who had a dormant commission as commander-in-chief in case
115 of the death or absence of governor and lieutenant-governor1, the colony received as its new governor Francis Nicholson. Nicholson had been lieutenant-governor of New York in the administration of Andros under James II, and had like Andros been dispossessed of the office by the revolution. He was sent back to America in 1691 as lieutenant-governor of Virginia, and at the end of 1693 succeeded Copley as governor of Maryland2. Maryland in this reign had few notable events in its history, and its records, though voluminous, are concerned chiefly with minor constitutional disputes. These nevertheless shew clearly the trend of development in colonial status and aspiration. In 1695 an act was passed for erecting free schools, and was sent to England for confirmation. The attorney-general thereupon objected to it as containing words ‘which seem to establish the Great Charter of England in Maryland3,’ and the act was disallowed on that ground, and also because no power over the schools was reserved to the King4. The law was then altered to make the King supreme patron, with power of appointing some of the trustees, and it was decided that the schools be called by King William’s name5. The following year the Burgesses proposed the closing of the King’s offices during the sessions of their assembly, since clerks were obliged to go through the place of meeting to reach these offices. Governor Nicholson characterizing this suggestion as ‘an infringement of Magna Carta,’ threatened the Burgesses with dissolution, and proposed a compromise, and the better to incite the House to the observance thereof, his Excellency was pleased to present to Mr Speaker (for the perusal of the House) a sermon preached by the present Archbishop of Canterbury of doing good for posterity, and then told them he prorogued them till the 6th inst. (the next day)6. Another act of the Burgesses was to prefer charges against the late Governor Copley, of applying to his own use certain parts
116 of the revenue raised for munitions of war, and to demand that these moneys be refunded from his estate. The little storm passed however with the promise of future safeguards1. Another constitutional point raised by the colony was whether a priest could sit in the House of Burgesses, the importance of this case lying in the fact that the only ground for refusing admittance to the cleric in question was the inability of men in holy orders to sit in the English House of Commons. Again in 1697 the clerk to the assembly was arrested on the governor’s warrant, this act the house ‘conceived to be a great breach of privilege2,’ again applying English precedents, whilst in the same year the attorney-general had to protest against the opinion held in Maryland that all laws and statutes of England were in force where those of Maryland were silent3. It appears therefore from these incidents that, while there were in the colonies traces of a desire to escape those English fetters which had irked the pilgrims of earlier decades, there were yet signs that the new political entities were building themselves up on the traditions of the past. The divergence of thought, which was even at this time separating the colonies from the mother country, was based, not on the dissimilarity from the old of new states which had cut themselves off from it, but on a similarity of thought and of institutions which increased with the natural growth of the new states. In 1698 Nicholson was brought to face the usual accusations which arose against colonial governors. In his case the principal charges were that he intercepted letters, seized estates, granted special commissions to spiritual courts, and ‘established Annapolis in an inconvenient place4.’ These were followed by others, preferred by the same accuser, one Slye: that he made his chaplain walk bareheaded before him to church, that he kicked an assemblyman out of church during the Litany, that he received the Sacrament in military style; and usually made his chaplain wait from ten to twelve hours, so that morning prayer was often said in the evening. Then came charges of Popish
117 practices, charges against morality, and of avoiding expressions of loyalty to the King1. These accusations are of some interest in judging the sentiments of Marylanders at this time, but if the character of the accusers is to establish their truth, they are probably all false. In December 1696, evidence against Nicholson had been invited by the Board of Trade2, but the result can hardly have been condemnatory, since on the resignation of Andros now an old man, in May 1698, Nicholson was appointed to succeed him as governor of Virginia3. He was succeeded in Maryland by Nathaniel Blakiston4, but did not shake the dust of that colony from his feet until he had expressed his feelings with freedom: I think some have endeavoured to raise a rebellion, or at least have made very great disturbances. . . . Some were very willing that the King should deliver them from popery and slavery, and protect them in time of war . . . but now they are not satisfied with his government, because it curbs in their former atheistical base, and vicious way of living, and debars them of their darling illegal trade. He added that agitation for the restoration of the proprietary government was being carried on by the disaffected, to accomplish that independence which they were conscious of having lost5. For the last few years of the reign, the legislation was concerned with the establishment of the Church of England in Maryland, and the payment of ministers on a special scheme, since the English practice of tithes was impossible. Blakiston appears to have carried on the tradition of efficiency established by Nicholson, as he was later included in the small but select group of governors who could be trusted to exercise discretion6. (d) THE PERIOD OF BELLOMONT Union of New England While the affairs of the southern colonies were continuing on their placid course, New England was faced with important
118 changes. In 1697, the Board of Trade had presented a report on colonial union, in which they embodied the chief problems connected with that question, and suggested a solution1. The chief proposition, according to the report, was the union of Massachusetts, New York and New Hampshire under one civil governor, and the addition of Connecticut and Rhode Island for military purposes only. Of the colonies concerned, Connecticut objected even to military union, under a governor who had power to demand men, as grievous and a breach of their charter. New Hampshire—or rather Allen (whose outlook was that of the land interest) and the government—objected to union with Massachusetts, on the ground that such union would increase only the charge, not the strength, of New Hampshire, owing to the different conditions of defence in the two geographical areas. The Agents for New York opposed the scheme, on the ground that the colonies were far apart and rivals in trade, and urged the hardship of New York being inferior to Boston for purposes of government, ‘or for the Governor’s salary, which is paid by the people, to be spent elsewhere than in New York.’ The report, after quoting these objections, stated their further opinion that different forms of government in the various colonies rendered impracticable any union except under such a military head, and that the regulations of 1694 about quotas for defence had been so little complied with that it required the exercise of a more vigorous power than had yet been used to produce the desired effect. The council therefore recommended that a governor be appointed over Massachusetts, New York and New Hampshire, with the powers of Captain-General of all the forces in Connecticut, Rhode Island and the Jerseys, that his chief residence should be, at New York during the war, but that he should be free to move from time to time to Boston, leaving a lieutenant-governor at either place during his absence. ‘We think that hereby the General Assemblies of the colonies may be made to understand their own interests, and to enact such laws as will enable your Captain-General to execute his commissions2.’
119 Following this report the Earl of Bellomont was appointed to the new governorship1; and at the same time the attorney-general received orders from the King to inspect the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island in relation to government and power of constituting a governor2. Bellomont Bellomont was an Irish peer: and his arrival as governor of the northern colonies marks the beginning of an interesting three years. His dispatches are full of life, and yet his downright character seems to have been not without great ability and tact. Moreover, even his enemies could find little to accuse him of except in policy3. The corruption of the period touched him so little that he died a poorer man for big three years’ rule; and left his family in extreme necessity4. In New York From the first, the new governor denounced his predecessor’s administration, and entered too readily into the factions which had divided New York since the revolution. In his first dispatch Bellomont spews his attitude towards the Leislerites by the statement that the first occasion of the divisions was the execution of those who had been most forward in the happy revolution. He charged several of the council with abetting breaches of the Navigation Laws and proceeded to suspend these members, he took bond from Fletcher to answer for some moneys that the late governor was alleged to have embezzled and converted to his own use, and he further charged Fletcher with encouraging piracy5: ‘I find,’ he declared, ‘that my predecessor has left me a divided people, an empty treasury, a few miserable, naked, half-starved
120 soldiers—not half the number the King allowed and paid for—in a word the whole government out of frame . . .1 .[’] There is much discontent among those who have been prevented by foul play from sitting in the House. . . . He [Fletcher] went so far as to publish a book . . . to revive the old story of Leisler2. Thus the charges mounted up: Fletcher had received £400 for passing an act prejudicial to New York City, and so forth3. In two respects it appears fairly clear that Fletcher’s conduct had been unsatisfactory, in granting land extravagantly to a few landowners—the whole province was granted to about thirty owners—he had prevented the adequate defence of the frontier, and the troops guarding that frontier had been neglected, and were found by Bellomont to be starving. How far this state of things was the fault of Fletcher, and how far it was due to the lack of money voted, the evidence does not decide. Since Bellomont thus took up a pro-Leisler attitude, complaints from the other side followed naturally—from merchants, who deplored the Leislerite influence encouraged by the governor and resulting, they asserted, in the appointment of unsuitable officers4. Moreover Bellomont was in 1699 kept for six months without news or orders from home, and this neglect gave the ‘Jacobite party,’ as he called them, ground for giving out that he was in disgrace5. Bellomont himself denied the charge of favouring either party. Early in 1699 he decided to call an assembly ‘to cure the present unhappy differences among the people6.’ The anti-Leislerites went to the poll with the claim of being the ‘English’ party, but Bellomont ridiculed this claim: three of the four candidates they set up were as mere Dutch as any in this town . . . Johannes van Kipp, Rip van Dam, and Jacobus van Cortlandt. The names speak Dutch, and the men can scarce speak English 7. . . . I discourage all I can these distinctions of Dutch and English, and I tell ’em that the only Englishmen are those who live in obedience to the laws of England. . . . The execution of Leisler and
121 Milborne was as violent, arbitrary and cruel a proceeding as in any age under an English government1, and Bellomont spoke with scorn of Nicholls, Bayard, Brooke ‘and the rest of the Bloodhounds2.’ The governor seemed certainly to have some justification now for his attitude, whether or not the party principles were the same under Fletcher; for the anti-Leislerites sought to win the elections on the cry of doing away with the customs; and in the assembly they moved for the omission of the word ‘Happy’ in references to the late revolution3. This was the state of parties in New York, the heritage of the revolution. Meanwhile Fletcher’s case had come before the Lords of Trade; and he was found guilty of actions contrary to his duty in connection with the trade laws and piracy although with the consent of the council; whilst his land policy of exorbitant grants was also condemned. The general verdict was that he had shewn lack of caution, and the charges of neglecting defence were not considered proved4. Bellomont now proceeded to revoke Fletcher’s grants of land as far as possible, with the order from the Lords Justices. Having this order, he said, I value not the resentment of a few undeserving men, being sure that ’tis not for the interest of the Crown or the Provinces that three parts out of four of the lands should be in the hands of ten or eleven men. Therefore am I for abolishing the rest of the Palatinates (for such vast tracts deserve no less a name) the next Session, if I have strength. But indeed I can promise nothing without a good lawyer to be Chief judge, and a good active lawyer to be Attorney-General. I have stood single on my own legs in all these difficulties, and ’tis impossible for me always to bear the burthen of business. The Bill for vacating grants begun with us at the Council Board, and we sent it down to the Lower House, and there they added a clause for depriving Mr Dellius of his benefice at Albany, so that we were obliged to pass that clause as part of the Bill, or we must have lost the Bill, and I thought it better to loose a wicked clergyman than good Bill5.
122 The governor in his zeal for reform even went to the length of reversing one of Fletcher’s judgments—a dangerous precedent1. To Bellomont also historians are indebted for a classic description of the legal officers in the colonies: The Chief Justice . . . is no sort of lawyer, having been bred a soldier. He is a man of sense, and a more gentlemanlike man than any I have seen in this province, but that does not make him a lawyer. . . . He lives fourscore miles off, and comes but twice a year to this town, at the time of the Supreme Court’s sitting, just to earn his salary. . . . As to the men that call themselves lawyers here and practise at the Bar, they are almost all under such a scandalous character that it would grieve a man to see our noble English laws so miserably mangled and prophaned. I do not find that a man of ’em ever arrived at being an Attorney in England. So far from being barristers, one of them was a dancing-master, another a glover by trade; a third was condemned to be hanged in Scotland for burning the Bible and for blasphemy . . . and there are two or three more as bad as the rest. . . . They are all, except one or two, violent enemies to the Government2. In face of this report, the King decided to send a Chief justice and an attorney-general from England, with fixed salaries paid from home3. Massachusetts In Massachusetts it was evident that the old charter struggle was by no means dead and in 1701 the colony was petitioning for power to choose its own governor4. In many ways attempts to evade English constitutional control revealed themselves, although, as has been pointed out, allowance must always be made for the difficulty of communication, which sometimes gave the impression of deliberate evasion to actions that were designed merely to facilitate public business5. Of two Massachusetts Acts repealed at this time in England, one incorporating Harvard College, did not give power to the King to appoint visitors and was disallowed on that ground; the other directed that all cases should be tried by jury, thus contradicting the provisions made, under the Act for Preventing Frauds6, for the
123 trial of offenders, against the Navigation Laws. Moreover the practice was discovered of grouping acts relating to different subjects in such a way as to ensure the passage of all; and also a more dangerous principle—the assembly was found to be evading the disallowance of their acts by passing them for short periods, and renewing them, if or before they were disallowed, in the same or similar terms1. Bellomont was instructed to prevent this2. In the same year, Massachusetts sought to obtain final judgments in the colony, and to prevent the right of appeal to England by customs officers, in disputed cases of trade—an attempt the success of which would threaten to undermine the entire navigation system. The custom officers’ right was however confirmed, with a caution against its abuse. As to the laws of England, they abhor the very thought of them; and Acts of Parliament they look upon to be only obligatory when the Province is particularly named. . . . Little better is to be expected till Parliament think fit to take away their charter, and His Majesty shall . . . send judges of his own. . . . Some declare publicly that they will oppose the landing of Col. Dudley (the governor appointed after Bellomont’s death). Thus wrote the commissioner sent out from England in connection with new schemes for suppressing illegal trade3. He also noted an interesting change of character in the colony: ‘Here is a great many young men educated at the College in Cambridge, who differ much in their principles from their parents’—perhaps an indication of relaxation in the rigid Puritan standards of Boston. New Hampshire Bellomont had to deal not only with New York and Massachusetts, but with the lesser governments over which his authority extended. Of these, New Hampshire had been in an unsettled state ever since the revolution4. Its four towns had
124 not succeeded in agreeing upon a constitution at the critical moment of revolt, and as a result, Samuel Allen, who had purchased as he supposed vast claims to land in the province, was nominated governor, and in turn appointed his son-in-law, Usher, lieutenant-governor, the latter having also an interest in preserving the proprietary system, owing to his claims over land in Maine. Usher however was unable to preserve unity in the colony, and was constantly complaining of the people’s attitude, and of that of the neighbouring colonies, especially Massachusetts, who accepted certain responsibility over defence in New Hampshire. In 1693, Usher left his government as he could do nothing through fear of the people1. In 1696 a new lieutenant-governor arrived, one Partridge, about whose appointment there is some uncertainty, but for whom the inhabitants had petitioned. The colony now divided into the parties of Partridge (and the council) and Usher; but the former succeeded in restoring some measure of peace2, Usher protesting throughout that no real settlement was being made: ‘If these actions be right, let them be excused, if not, dealt with according to their demerit3’ was his plea. Still however affairs were allowed to take their course without interference from home, and in October 1698 the proprietor arrived in person to bring order into the province. Partridge refused to give way, and continued to carry on government in spite of Allen. Finally in 1699 Bellomont arrived to settle affairs4. He decided that the disturbances were mainly due to Allen’s vast and uncertain claims over the land, and to Usher’s ‘unhappy choleric temper,’ although the latter had meant well. Bellomont regularized Partridge’s administration, and proposed a settlement of the difficulties by paying Allen £250 (at which price he bought his claims to a vague three millions) and urged that any attempt by Allen to enforce these claims should be resisted by force5. Allen however preferred the verdict of a jury on his rights, and
125 in 1700 this verdict was given against him in a test case. Allen appealed against this verdict, but the New Hampshire judges, following the precedent of Massachusetts, refused to allow an appeal to the King. This decision was resented by William, and the Board of Trade wrote to Bellomont accordingly: This declining to admit appeals to His Majesty in Council is a matter which you ought very carefully to watch against in all your governments. It is an humour that prevails so much in proprieties and charter governments, and the independence they thirst after is now so notorious that it has been thought fit those considerations, together with the objections against those colonies, should be laid before Parliament. A Bill has therefore been brought into the House of Lords for uniting the right of government in these colonies to the Crown1; and on the recommendation of the Board of Trade, Allen’s appeal was admitted2. While exploring the documents of New Hampshire, Bellomont discovered a contract between Allen and William Blathwayt, the influential colonial administrator and member of the Board of Trade, by which contract Blathwayt obtained an interest in the proprietorship of that colony3. ‘By this bargain,’ commented Bellomont, ‘it is plain who sold the lands in New York to Fletcher’—meaning presumably that Blathwayt was responsible for the instructions which enabled Fletcher to make his extravagant grants of land—‘he has made a milch cow of ’em for many years together: It is also almost certainly Blathwayt that Bellomont is hinting at when he says sarcastically: The King will have an eternal obligation to that man that advised the reduction of the Four Companies, and that has compassed their being so ill paid, for I strongly suspect both these arrows have come out of the same quiver4. In this connection, it is noteworthy that among the numerous presents of money voted in 1694 by Massachusetts to agents and others who had served the colony, there figures one item of ‘£100 to William Blathwayt,’ thus indicating that the latter
126 had in some way served the interests of Massachusetts, at a time when that colony was still struggling for its old charter rights1. Rhode Island Bellomont was also commissioned to examine the State of Rhode Island2. This colony had been governed since the revolution on the basis of its former charter, which had been surrendered to James II on a writ of quo warranto. The new government found difficulties in its way, and was not easy on the rights of its position. In 1691 its representatives wrote that they had no orders from the King; ‘we do not know under what government we are tho’ our charter is neither condemned nor taken from us3.’ The colony nevertheless took upon itself to resist Phips’ commission over its militia4, with the complaint that he disregarded their nominations for officers and appointed those to whom the ‘Governor and Company’ objected5. In 1694, a legal opinion was given that the King might appoint a commander-in-chief in time of urgency, but that local command rested with the province, thus apparently the resumed charter was tacitly acknowledged6. The charter government however seemed to fail in the main duties of a government. According to Randolph the governor, Carr, was an illiterate man; the place harboured pirates7; Quakers and Anabaptists managed the colony; neither judges, juries or witnesses were under any obligation; and the condition was sufficiently bad to induce several men of good estate to offer £500 towards the support of a royal governor8. A commission as judge of Admiralty had been granted by the English authorities to one Peleg Sanford, but Governor Clarke had appropriated this commission to himself, as it conflicted with the ordinary system of justice9. Bellomont arrived to investigate,
127 and decided that the Rhode Islanders were ‘the most irregular and illegal in their administration that ever any English government was1.’ Their main delinquencies consisted in the method of calling an assembly, the position of the governor, the election of military officers by the soldiers, restricted elections for the assembly, which also sat wrongfully as a court of judicature, illegal raising of taxes, non-recording of acts, and many technical irregularities2. In short, the government seems to have been purely extempore, without reference to the colony’s rightful status or its relations with England. In 1701 the death of Bellomont removed the ablest colonial governor in America during William’s reign. ‘He wore out his spirits and put an end to his life by the fatigue he hourly underwent to serve him [the King] in this far country.’ His family ‘were made poorer by this Government which was given as a mark of His Majesty’s favour.’ Thus wrote Lady Bellomont3. The late governor did not even leave a sufficiency for the support of his family or for the discharge of his funeral expenses without private credit, having spent considerable sums on a ship laden with timber, which he sent home to the Admiralty in connection with his schemes for producing naval stores in New England. The New York Council, in asking for a new governor, petitioned for one having ‘the same honourable principles and zeal for His Majesty’s interest and the good of the inhabitants as the Earl of Bellomont, whose loss we can never enough bewail4.’ And the council realized the debt they owed to the late governor when, after his death, they were obliged to pledge their private credit for the maintenance of garrisons5. After Bellomont’s death, the factions of New York fall little short of completing the circle of fluctuations since the revolution. A bill for refunding part of Leisler’s expenses was brought in, and no objections were raised to it; but for accidental reasons it did not become law6. The Leislerite party in fact gained such
128 strength during the vacancy of the governorship that Bayard, one of Fletcher’s principal councillors, was committed for high treason1, and was only saved by the opportune arrival of the new governor, Lord Cornbury, whose arrival as governor of New York had been delayed by certain negotiations concerning army contracts and pay—negotiations which proclaimed Cornbury to be an unworthy successor of Bellomont2. The proprietary governments The closing years of William’s reign saw an added interest taken in the proprietary governments. Of these, Maryland affairs had been settled with comparative success; Carolina was hardly of sufficient importance as yet to cause much cogitation, but Pennsylvania and New Jersey came into temporary prominence. New Jersey, divided and subdivided, was in the hands of various proprietors, under groupings that tend to baffle; but the eastern part was the property of several English gentlemen, who aroused the attention of the home government by their desire to make Perth Amboy, their trading port, free to commerce. The New York collector of customs protested that all goods coming into the Jerseys must be entered at New York, in accordance with the long-established practice3; and the law officers of the crown confirmed this by finding that the Duke of York had no power to create ports, and therefore could not grant such right to the Jersey proprietors4. The council of Trade and the royal order therefore decided against Perth Amboy5. The proprietors however pressed their case, offering to raise the same duties as at New York, and to give half the proceeds to New York fortifications6; and finally they asked for the trial of their cause at Westminster Hall7. The Board of Trade recommended this trial, and cunningly combined with the question at issue the proprietors’ title to the government,
129 ‘a matter in which they are very tender1.’ The proprietors now offered to surrender their rights of government, on condition of retaining their lands and the quit-rents on them; and of Perth Amboy becoming a free port; whilst West Jersey, for the most part under the same proprietors, expressed surprise at the titles being questioned, and pointed out how grievous would be annexation to New York2. While delaying the trial, thus altered from their original plan, as much as possible, the proprietors sought to strengthen their position by asking the royal approbation for the new governor of West New Jersey; but the Board of Trade saw through the attempt, and replied that their title must first be established3. It was evidently expected that the title would be found invalid4; but contrary to anticipation the proprietors won their case, their claims were justified, and Perth Amboy became a free port5. Meanwhile New Jersey itself was in a troubled state. The royal collector was threatened in the execution of his duty by ‘twenty persons disguised, armed with clubs, pallizadoes and other weapons of a prodigious bigness,’ and the goods seized by him forcibly removed6. Some planters were advancing the opinion that the King’s right to the American countries discovered by English subjects was only notional and arbitrary, and that the Indian natives were the absolute independent owners, and had the sole disposal of lands7. The proprietors used these opinions to strengthen their own position, by identifying such speakers with those who were petitioning against proprietary government in Jersey; but all their efforts were to gain good terms for the surrender of their rights, on which they appear to have been determined8. Meanwhile Pennsylvania was the subject of considerable correspondence. Penn arrived in 1699, and his first acts were such as to satisfy even Colonel Quary, the judge of Admiralty
130 and the inveterate denouncer of Quaker illegalities1. But this satisfaction was short-lived. In the same year, Quary was again complaining, this time including Penn in his grievance: ‘Now that he has made all things easy and smooth at home, he runs counter to all’ . . . although ‘he would not have appeared so barefaced had not his Quaker friends forced him to it by keeping the purse strings close.’ Penn had even taken away the Courts of Admiralty, erected to suppress piracy and illegal trade2, and appointed his own officers to exercise that function3. Another grievance, concerning the defence of the frontier, was that non-Quakers, although in the majority, were not allowed to take up arms, because none of the magistrates was a member of the Church of England4. In 1701, the Board of Trade recommended the resumption of proprietary governments, on the ground of ‘irregularities daily increasing, to the, prejudice of trade, revenue and the other plantations’; and because they had not answered the design for which privileges were given. They were refuges for pirates, they neglected defence and delayed appeals to England; and moreover they tended to encourage woollen and other manufactures proper to England instead of applying their thoughts and endeavours to the production of such commodities as are fit to be encouraged in these parts, according to the true design and intention of such settlements5. A Bill was therefore brought before the Lords6, ‘for re-uniting to the Crown the government of several colonies in America’; but it was shelved. The Board of Trade did all that its powers would permit, sending letters to Nicholson and Blakiston, and later to Cornbury, Dudley and Randolph, to send over proofs of misdemeanours of proprietary governments and governors in their neighbourhood7. Nicholson proposed that, if such a bill did not pass, ‘the late revolution in the Bahama Islands
131 may be countenanced, and then the like thing may happen to most of the other proprietary and charter governments1.’ Penn of course protested against the Act. Basing his opposition on denial of the charges, and on the sacredness of property, he concluded: Nor is it the powers of government alone that here is contended for; our liberties and the first inducements to undertake so hazardous and difficult an enterprise are struck at by that Bill, and must inevitably fall if carried on upon the bottom it now stands. . . . I have been a constant drudge to all your directions, and a King’s governor in all things but a salary2. The Bill, however, brought forward in 1702, did not pass—for lack of time; and Penn’s fears were not realized. But early in the year, the surrender of the charters of East and West New Jersey was received3. Meanwhile, almost without comment, the united government of New England had lapsed with Bellomont’s death, and the system of separate governorships returned, Lord Cornbury going out to New York, and Colonel Joseph Dudley to Massachusetts. (e) THE WEST INDIAN GOVERNMENTS The three main governments in the West Indies—Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands—were throughout this period the scene of protracted struggles between governors (and other royal officials) and their assemblies, which invariably refused to cooperate heartily in the working of the Navigation system of restriction and privilege. The governors therefore were often tempted to make matters easier for themselves by winning over the leading men of the island by means of that influence which a governor always had at his disposal, and which was not always within the scope of the honourable conduct of his office. At the same time the officials not appointed directly from home had even less incentive to court unpopularity by associating themselves too closely with the cause of a distant but
132 Map facing page 132: The West Indian Islands 1696 interfering government. The problem of this situation was constantly before the governors appointed in William III’s reign; and as in many cases they were men of outstanding character and ability, their methods of dealing with the difficulty, and their criticisms of governmental policy and of colonial administration, are of considerable importance in analysing the problem. The Governorship of the elder Codrington The principal achievements recorded in the first half of William’s reign are due to Codrington’s efforts in the Leeward Islands. Codrington was a rich planter of Antigua, but a soldier as well; and, taking over the government soon after war was declared against France, he threw himself wholeheartedly into the task of organization among the divided little communities of the English West Indies. The government of the Leeward Islands comprised the islands of Antigua, Nevis, Montserrat and the English half of St Kitts, each of which had its own lieutenant-governor (except Antigua, where the general governor resided), council and assembly. There was moreover a General Assembly, originated about 1674, but not gaining legislative power until seven or eight years later, to which two representatives were sent from each island’s council and assembly. This body (and the system of unified control) was not popular, and fell into disuse early in the eighteenth century, the period of the two Codringtons being its time of greatest activity1. There was an ever-present tendency for the islands to assert themselves against the general authority of the governor. In 1689 Nevis refused to obey Codrington’s orders to transport the St Kitts refugees from Nevis to Montserrat, where they would have the chance of a better livelihood2; and in 1696 the same assembly objected to the instructions given to their lieutenant-governor, by which the island was deprived of the power to pass laws by Governor, council and assembly3. Antigua also protested in 1698 against the undue position of the Governor-in-Chief, who performed only the duties of a private
133 governor, received too large an allowance, and by means of the general assembly could resist legitimate demands made unanimously by one of the islands. They sought a remedy in a larger representation from the islands in the general assembly, and in greater powers, with armed force, for the lieutenant-governors, the Governor-in-Chief to command only the naval force besides the soldiers of his own island. This scheme, it was pointed out, would result in better information for the Board of Trade1. For the purposes of the war with France, however, Codrington succeeded in overcoming the tendency to separation within his own government, and even recommended that the Leeward Islands should be annexed to the Kingdom of England, with representation in the English Parliament2. Constitutional questions The small islands themselves in Codrington’s government had their constitutional questions, causing much agitation, and generally following the line of development on which the English constitution had developed. Antigua, in reply to a protest from the Governor against certain words spoken in the assembly, asserted that ‘to be called to account for words spoken in the House was a breach of privilege3.’ Nevis was divided by a quarrel between council and assembly, the latter claiming the right to decide whether members were duly elected, the council refusing to swear such members as it believed not to be qualified4. The assembly retaliated by refusing to participate in a joint commission from the two bodies to carry on the war, until its members should be duly sworn. Shortly after, they presented a complaint to the governor about the conduct of the war; and, upon the council’s refusal to reply, the assembly resolved itself into a committee of the whole, to meet from time to time, for the good of the country5. Montserrat, on the other hand, was constitutionally quiet, its main concern being to guard against the negroes. The typical extracts from Montserrat records deal with the appointment of patrols, who, on meeting negroes
134 without their owner’s ticket, should ‘beat or slash them, and if congregated together . . . disperse them, pistolling and killing them if need be1.’ One negro was cut to pieces for stealing nine pigs. Another had an ear cut off and his breast burned for ‘having some unaccountable fresh flesh in his house2.’ While these measures shew that fear of negro insurrection was uppermost, black labour was urgently needed and on occasion negroes convicted even of murder would be preserved on payment of a heavy fine by their masters3. The population of Montserrat was in fact made up in a proportion quite different from that of the other islands, the negroes outnumbering the English by about eight to seven, whilst the Irish, who were also keenly distrusted, equalled approximately the two together4. The end of Codrington It is unfortunately true that Codrington, great as were his achievements, did not succeed in setting his standard of government completely above the corruption which prevailed so frequently at this period. The main accusation brought against him was that of shielding one Arthur from prosecution on the charge of speaking highly criminal words, Codrington having an interest through illicit trade in Arthur’s freedom. In spite of the faults committed by his accusers and the magistrates, the Board of Trade decided that ‘none of these things excuse Governor Codrington from omitting to do many things which his duty required of him5.’ There were other charges of similar import, concerning Codrington’s persecution of one Lucas; and in this case also his conduct was condemned. While the charges were still before the home authorities, Codrington was spared further disgrace by his death in December 16986—an unhappy ending to an able and not essentially corrupt administration. The governorship of the younger Codrington If however his death leaves a gap hard to fill in the history of West Indian politics, the choice of his successor does much
135 to compensate for this. Another Christopher Codrington, as able as his father, and more brilliant, was appointed to succeed the first as governor of the Leeward Islands. The new governor, a distinguished Oxford scholar and courtier, had, besides his literary accomplishments, a strength of character which offers a tempting parallel between his rule in the West Indies and that of Bellomont in America. He was prepared to give his best to his government; but he did not lack a shrewd common-sense, which shewed itself at the outset. Although appointed in 1699, he refused to set out until the four years’ arrears of salary due to his father were paid; and in fact he did not leave until August 1700. On his arrival, Codrington found the islands disturbed by several quarrels of importance. Nevis had refused to quarter the royal soldiers unless they worked with the negroes on the plantations; and Colonel Fox, the Lieutenant-General, had therefore refused to pass any acts until the island relented2. The Lieutenant-Governor of St Kitts also was making a disturbance by his expressed intention to govern by his sword and cane3, and was made the subject of an inquiry4, which found him guilty of conduct unworthy of one in his position: the Acts of Trade were being broken; ‘the noble governor would condescend to plunder even for a pound of soap, as well as shoebuckles . . .5’ and was fitter to ‘be a Rapparree than a Governor6.’ Thus Codrington decided, and after some experience of his new position, he sent home some more interesting reflections on it. After pointing out that his salary covers only a fourth part of his expenses, he continues: In respect of governors who come abroad to make their fortunes, as I did to understand and establish mine, Acts of Trade, Instructions, and all your Lordships’ wise and good orders to them are verbs et praeterea nihil . . .7. Governors must be put upon a very different footing before these colonies are made so serviceable to the Trade of England as they may be. Whilst governors are dependent
136 on their Assemblies, Acts of Trade will never be observed. If you knew who were the leading men in the several assemblies, you would be convinced that governors ought to have better salaries and not be permitted to take any presents from the people. Whilst they do, there will be illegal indulgences in point of Trade, justice will be bought and sold, Chancery suits protracted, and the poor oppressed . . .1. The colonies abroad will be then governed as they ought to be when Governors are made independent of their assemblies, and after that hanged up when they don’t do their duty. . . . If I had not an estate here I would not serve in this Government for £2000 a year2. Codrington is no doubt right in his remedy, but such reports as this confirmed the assumption that the interests of the colonies were different from those of the mother country, and as the latter were considered to be paramount, it naturally followed that colonial interests must not be allowed to influence governmental policy—an assumption which, once acted on, led straight to separation. Repression of local interests to serve an external government cannot last for ever. Barbados under Kendall In Barbados also constitutional questions of interest arose. In 1690 the assembly summoned the customs officers to answer charges of extortion. They refused to attend, and were supported in their refusal by Governor Kendall, on the ground that such affairs were no business of the assembly3. In 1691, Kendall was attacked by one Colonel Hallett, a councillor who had been required to give up certain parts of his land for the purpose of fortifications. Hallett refused to consent, ‘conceiving it to be against Magna Carta that this should be done without compensation4.’ Two years later it was again the turn of the assembly to quarrel with the governor. The House refused to fulfil a promise that it would grant more money if required; and Kendall, to get rid of opposition, enforced a law compelling all deputies to receive the sacrament, with the result that only seventeen could take their seats as duly returned, fifteen being necessary for a quorum. Three of these seventeen were prevailed
137 on to absent themselves, and a deadlock ensued1. Some weeks later instructions disallowing the Sacraments Act arrived from England, obtained, Kendall believed, by surreptitious means2. Throughout all these disputes, however, personal feeling does not appear to have become much embittered; and in the same month the departure of Kendall was the occasion of a vote of thanks from Council and assembly, and a present of £5003. Charges against him appeared of course; but they were neither serious nor effective4. Both Kendall and his successor, Russell, seem to have been sound administrators, as popular at Barbados as any governor was likely to be, and at the same time trusted by the neighbouring islands and by the home government. Russell Russell found the island in a poor way, as a result of the war, and public credit so bad that people would not work for it or trust it5. He too succeeded to the steady quarrel with the assembly, which was now claiming the right to approve expenditure, and had induced the Treasurer to give account to itself; whilst the necessity for a quorum still gave factious interests the means of baulking an undesirable measure. Russell however was equally determined; and on one occasion, when he required an act passed, refused to adjourn the House until its members did as he wished, with the result that fear of infection from a prevalent disease soon brought about the required consent. The assembly however took their revenge by refusing to find the governor a house where he might reside during the epidemic which had seized fourteen out of the sixteen members of his household6. Later in the same year (1695) the assembly refused to vote provisions for the King’s ships; and the governor was obliged to pledge his own credit. In this connection the Speaker boasted that ‘he had opposed all governors and all governments7.’ In 1696 Russell died, and the government, in
138 spite of his attempt two years earlier to appoint a suitable successor, devolved by law upon a President, one Francis Bond, ‘an aged and crazy man1.’ The Council now read Russell’s instructions which until his death had never come to their sight, with the result, according to their complaint, that their opinion had never been asked on such matters as the appointment of judges, for many years past, nor did they know that it was their duty to give it2. Grey The remaining years of William’s reign are chiefly remarkable in Barbados, under Governor Grey3, for a great outcry against the administration of justice. In 1697 the Earl of Bridgwater brought to the Board of Trade a letter from the island complaining that the judges and assistants had spent more time in perusing journals, letters and waste books than in reading Coke and Littleton; and urging the appointment of lawyers approved by the law officers of England4. In 1700 an eloquent description of the state of justice in the American colonies, and especially in Barbados, was sent to the Board through Mr Pollexfen. According to this account5, English merchants found more security and better and more speedy justice in the most distant provinces of the Ottoman dominions than they did in some of the American colonies. It is grown a proverb with the English merchants that if a man goes over never so honest to the Plantations, yet the very air does change him in a short time. But it is not the air; it is the universal corruption of justice. Jamaica under Beeston In Jamaica, the third of the chief West Indian governments, the constitutional struggle was as keen as in any, and is moreover somewhat easier to follow, centring as it does in the determination of the home authorities to obtain the grant of a permanent revenue from the island, and the equally strong resistance of
139 the Assembly to this proposal. The dispute was of long standing, and in 1683, owing mainly to the efforts of Governor Lynch, a grant of revenue had been made for twenty-one years1. Strengthened by this minor success, the royal officials made further attacks on their objective, and in 1688 obtained a grant of perpetual revenue2. The circumstances of this grant were however not above suspicion, and even the successful party was not prepared wholeheartedly to press its advantage; for there were many doubtful features in the administration of Jamaica before the Revolution. Under Albemarle The rule of the Duke of Albemarle, from 1689 until shortly before the deposition of James, had been notoriously corrupt and ill-advised; and his constitutional alterations had been cancelled by James. One of William’s earliest acts was to renew this cancellation and restore all persons to the offices held before the Duke’s arrival3. The President, Sir Francis Watson, now took over the government, but appears to have been incapable of wise rule; and in 1690 he was quietly superseded by the action of the council, who took advantage of his doubtful title to the deputy-governorship to assert that power rested in President and Council; and the records even tell of a member being suspended. ‘Sir Francis Watson dissenting4.’ Jamaica, according to the attorney-general writing early in 1689, had been subjected to great abuses of the constitution. Men had been turned out of public office and their places filled with such as ‘tapsters, barbers, and the like’; elections had been interfered with, freeholders condemned for riot and fined excessively—in short it is ‘as if Empson and Dudley had returned5’ (to quote one of the many instances where landmarks in the growth of English liberties are used in support of the cause of colonial liberties).
140 Inchiquin However, in May 1690 a new governor, the Earl of Inchiquin, arrived. He decided that ‘the animosities here are due to fifteen or sixteen years standing of turbulent and pernicious advisers’; and one of his first measures was to suspend the Receiver of Revenue1. Inchiquin did not live long to enjoy his new government. He was soon involved in the struggle with his turbulent Council and assembly2, but in January 1692 his death vacated the governorship once more and there survive conflicting records of his conduct in that office. ‘No governor ever had so much money in so short a time—£15,000 is well within compass—nor strove so earnestly to get it3.’ The writer of this however had some personal bias, and Inchiquin’s secretary brought counter-charges: ‘the very men he delivered from the oppression of a former government and made councillors now strive to misrepresent his actions and asperse his memory4.’ One fact may be noted in passing: under Inchiquin Jamaica was exceptionally quiet both in war measures and in affairs of trade; and yet it sprang very soon into prominence under Beeston. This fact may easily indicate a lack of personality in the former governor; for every other colonial administrator of strong character made his presence felt in the colony and his acts well known to those at home. The reign of William III was not a time when a strong governor could rule an English settlement in quietness. Beeston In 1693 Colonel Kendall of Barbados was appointed governor5, but this appointment never took effect. At the same time it was pointed out that an economy could be effected by keeping Sir William Beeston—who had returned to Jamaica as Lieutenant-Governor after the great earthquake of 1692—in that capacity at a salary of £1000, instead of appointing him Governor, with the usual salary of £20006; and this somewhat discreditable
141 arrangement held good until the end of 1694 when Beeston was made Governor, although his salary still figured as £1000 in 16971. He frequently complained of the inadequacy of this income. In 1693 he wrote that the cost of living was double his allowance, nor was even that at his disposal, owing to the lack of money to pay it2. Again in the following year, the Treasury was so poor that he could not take his allowance3. The assembly too was not on better terms with Beeston than were those of the other islands with their governors. In 1694 it refused to raise money except on the bargain that the governor should reimpose martial law instead of civil, the purpose being, he declared, to shield six or eight of the members from the necessity of paying their debts. The entertainment of soldiers was also disputed. As Beeston added, the Assembly knew its power4. It was with reluctance that the House could be persuaded to vote £11,000 for the payment of its creditors; and the greater part refused to have anything to do with an increase of revenue and with the collection of quit rents. And yet by some means Beeston succeeded in obtaining a bill voting the revenue indefinitely5. However, the hopes raised by this were shattered the following year. The new assembly declared that the previous bill was passed by an unduly elected House; and Beeston could not persuade them to make a new bill for perpetual revenue. ‘If they must have fetters, they would rather have them put on by others than themselves6.’ Another sore point with the Assembly was the disallowance of their laws at home: the people think it hard that after the trouble and expense of calling an assembly, a law should be rejected on the bare opinion of one or two in England, who have nothing to do with it; and say that people in England cannot so well know the reason for making a law as those who make it7. Trial of public officers by the English council was also resented—especially in connection with a new law of 1698 forbidding any Governor, Lieutenant-Governor or judge to be a factor in the sale of negroes—the objections being based on the
142 idea that it was contrary to Magna Carta that a man should be tried elsewhere than by his neighbours where the fault was committed1. Friendly relations between colony and mother country were not improved when a Jamaica act, compelling holders of offices under patent to reside in the island, was repealed in 1700 on the ground that it was derogatory to the royal prerogative2; and Beeston ended his period of government unsatisfactorily. After years of depression, he was at last able in 1700 to report that ‘all things go well and quietly3’; but his satisfaction was premature. The Board of Trade was determined to obtain an act for perpetual revenue, since the period of twenty-one years for which the governor was empowered, under the vote obtained by Lynch, to raise revenue, would come to an end in 1704. In 1701 they threatened, unless the assembly would comply with their wishes, to revive the act of 1688 for permanent revenue—the act of doubtful legality, which had been shelved4; but the representatives were not to be intimidated and protested5. A quarrel now began between assembly and governor. The House issued a proclamation without the governor’s consent; and its marshal was therefore arrested by Beeston for executing the order6. The assembly then passed a Bill putting the expenses of quartering troops on the Treasury of Jamaica. Beeston thereupon placed the island under martial law: ‘it’s the people grown rich and proud, and now would set up for themselves,’ he lamented7. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Selwyn had been appointed to relieve the sturdy governor8, and Beeston had the mortification of leaving the island in confusion, when he hoped that at last its prosperity was assured. In the remaining West Indian governments, the Bermudas and the Bahamas, political affairs during this period were in an almost chaotic condition. Both groups of islands were too small
143 to be considered colonies in the full sense of the term, and, being also far removed from the main centres of civilization even in the New World, while yet situated on or near the main trade routes, they tended to lapse into barbarity and to form an asylum and rendezvous for pirates and other undesirable characters. Thus their constitutional disputes appear, after a lapse of 200 years, much in the nature of comic relief, after the spectacle of a steady fight for power in the greater colonies, and yet the main actors must have felt more of tragedy in their situation. Bermuda In 1690 Bermuda complained that the governor would not take the advice of his council, or impart public letters to its consideration, and that he refused to admit a Collector of Customs. The petitioners illustrated his corrupt practices by instancing his appropriation of a stranded sperm whale, which Governor Robinson had in some way contrived to convert to his own use. This petition was stated to be the second of its kind since the first had been intercepted, with the privity of the Governor1. The council took revenge on the arbitrary Robinson by refusing him a house or rent2. When a new governor, Isaac Richier, arrived in 1691, he found acts passed without any record remaining, Robinson having kept acts in his custody, and suffered no public matters to be recorded. All the acts of the previous assembly had therefore to be annulled3. Moreover the assembly itself was too large, numbering thirty-six; and important people had great powers of influence for themselves4. The following year, changes of disaffection were brought against Richier himself, and the Board of Trade decided to investigate5. A new governor, one Goddard, was appointed to supersede him, and on his arrival found great confusion, owing, he claimed, to Richier. There had been an attempt at open rebellion in which one of Richier’s friends was killed; and when
144 the murderer was placed in irons, a protest followed that such an act was against Magna Carta1. The new governor soon wearied of his government, and in 1694 was petitioning for his transference to Maryland, the perquisites in Bermuda being so small that they hardly paid his expenses2. Meanwhile he threw himself heartily into the prosecution of Richier, bringing charges against the latter of cutting down the King’s timber for his own use, trading directly with Scotland, and neglecting defence against pirates3; and he also demanded that Richier should hand over half the profits made since the date of Goddard’s commission. On Richier’s refusal to grant this somewhat arbitrary request, Goddard imprisoned him4. The prisoner succeeded in sending home a message to the authorities, who ordered his release on giving due security, Goddard to obtain full evidence on both sides for his trial5. Richier however was still in prison a year later (March 1695)6; and his case did not come before the Board of Trade until 1697. He described Goddard’s action in making himself and the council into a peculiar court to try and to sentence Richier; and the Board of Trade decided that the only step which could be taken under the circumstances was to recall both governors7. The new governor, Day, on his arrival made a clean sweep of all concerned in the Goddard-Richier case, which had brought the island to great disorder8, but Day himself was very soon in the same disfavour as his predecessors, and was recalled in 1700 to answer charges of corruption9. His chief offence had been the imprisonment of Edward Randolph, the Surveyor of Customs, for his conduct in enforcing the regulations of the Navigation system10. Randolph’s report on Bermuda is therefore bitter; but his conclusion is worthy of record: ‘the best and
145 only means for preventing the succeeding ‘governors from oppressing the inhabitants by arbitrary practices is for the governor to be allowed not less than £500 a year1.’ It was at least the duty of the English government to take steps that would break the succession of governors established by Robinson, Richier, Goddard and Day. In 1701 Bermuda, hearing that it was proposed to reunite the Bahama Islands to the crown, asked that it might be joined to that government for mutual interest. Then followed the remark that Bermuda could well spare five hundred men, women, children and negroes for the Bahamas2, an offer which shews that Bermuda did not suffer from the depopulation which was the common complaint of the larger islands. It may be accountable on the grounds either that there was not a livelihood for the population, which seems an unlikely state of things, or that the planters wished to preserve the private and exclusive nature of their government against an increasing population. The Bahamas The Bahama Islands were alone in the West Indian islands—in proprietary hands, under the same proprietors as Carolina3, but this peculiarity does not seem to have ensured a better government than in the crown colonies. The first governor, Cadwallader Jones, was directed by the proprietors to rule with council and assembly4; but he does not appear to any large extent in the records and indirect evidence points to his being of not too high character5. His successor Trott also appears to have participated in corruption6. In the case of either, however, it must be conceded that, in the words of Mr Fortescue, ‘had he been an honest man, he would have found himself very solitary in the Bahamas of that day7.’ In December 1696 a new
146 governor, Webb, superseded Trott; and the Board of Trade attempted to prevent a repetition of bad government by insisting on his approval by the King before the appointment could take effect1. Some suspicions of Webb disturbed the Board2, but the proprietors supported him and agreed to augment his salary; and the board agreed to the appointment3. Again in 1700 the proprietor’s nominee received approbation, but this time the Board of Trade asked security from the proprietors for his good conduct4. The attorney-general however could not support this claim of security given for a deputy; but pointed out that if the laws were not obeyed the charter might be forfeited, and with this the board were obliged to rest content5. Whether the new governor, Haskett by name, maintained a higher standard after this is not clear; but a year later he was writing home in panic, asking for a guard of at least thirty soldiers, and fearing that he would be roasted alive, as the Spaniards had treated a governor in that neighbourhood, for interfering with illegal trade6. Haskett escaped this uncomfortable fate, but a revolution did break out in the Bahamas, and he was shipped to New York. ‘My justly and honestly putting the King’s laws in execution were the cause that I very nearly escaped being executed myself7,’ was the comment with which Governor Haskett disappeared from the scene. Thus the close of William’s reign saw the Bahama Islands without any governor at all. (f) THE POLITICAL SITUATION The defects of small communities It is evident from such a study of the political aspects of colonial affairs that the colonies unfortunately suffered from the defects peculiarly associated with small communities. There was the narrowness of outlook which saw only the interests of the small group, and divided the settlements beyond hope of active defence; there was the slanderous disposition which made almost every high official the butt of false accusations, which
147 hindered good administration and failed adequately to discredit bad; and above all there was the association of public position with private gain, seen at its worst in Bermuda and the Bahamas, but quite evident also in the careers of Benjamin Fletcher and the elder Codrington. The governor had many opportunities for thus adding to his fortune, and the general circumstances of his treatment by the English government were not such as would discourage the use of these. There was great temptation for a governor left without pay, as in the cases of Beeston in Jamaica and Ingoldsby in New York, to obtain a salary at the cost of honest administration, either by corrupt appointments, as in the charges against Fletcher; by selling popular privileges, the ease of which is seen in the case of the Pennsylvanian Bill for a new constitution1; or by the judicious use of the Navigation system. This latter practice was perhaps the most widespread of all, since evasions of the trade laws do not appear to have counted as serious offences against the standards of honourable conduct. Not only were the offenders found in the disorganization of such settlements as South Carolina, where Governor Blake ‘drove a fine trade of seizing and condemning vessels2’; by this sin fell also Fletcher and Codrington. And it is not without significance that the younger Codrington, whose career is stained by no such accusations, explains that he would not have accepted the governorship of the Leeward Islands, if he had not possessed an estate there which needed supervision. For that reason alone it was to his interest to accept the position3. Constitutional conflicts During William’s reign, there emerged into light two main lines of conflict within the constitutional system of colonial government—conflict between governor and assembly, and between crown and proprietary (or charter) governments. In the West Indies the first of these conflicts is seen without the complications caused by the second; but on the mainland, its effects are equally pronounced and more important. In the case of the mainland colonies, the first struggle, in order of development,
148 was that between the crown and the proprietor or the charter-government. In Maryland, William superseded the Roman Catholic proprietor, whose authority was shaken by the revolution; in Pennsylvania, a similar policy was attempted, but the result was not successful, and ended in compromise. In New Jersey, crown rights were asserted even more zealously than legal proceedings subsequently justified, but the proprietors, in spite of their victory, found their position untenable and surrendered their rights at the end of the reign. Even in the Bahamas, where, as in Carolina, private interests were allowed to run amok, there were suggestions that royal interference was imminent1. In the proprietary colonies, the revolution was welcomed as the occasion of gaining riddance from private control—except in the one case of Pennsylvania, and there royal aggression did not succeed—and thus no great effort on the part of English authority was needed to oust the unpopular proprietors. In Massachusetts, the stronghold of charter rights, the reverse was the case. The struggle in Boston was directed against the English government as such, for the colony was its own proprietor; and thus the revolution increased rather than appeased the zeal of that colony for independence. Nevertheless, the new King confined the indomitable spirit, although but temporarily and within wide bounds. In the colonies which had passed to the stage of crown government, the conflict was between governor and assembly. This was the case in the three West Indian governments; and, on the mainland, in New York and Virginia, then in Maryland and New England, where time after time the popular House refused grants of revenue, or made them only conditionally, to the governor, even in time of urgent need. The accession of William III stood for representative government, and may therefore fairly be taken as the beginning of that movement by which the assembly of a colony, gradually appropriating to itself the power over taxation and revenue, reduced the power of the governor—and therefore in practice that of the crown—and brought about the deadlock which in fact issued in separation. In both these conflicts, the difficulties were made more
149 acute by the French war, and the measures necessary for defence. The necessity of preserving the bounds of empire—of trade-empire that is—made the crown unwilling to press resistance in the colonies to the point of danger; while it also led to schemes of union, such as that of New England under Bellomont, which accentuated the natural tendencies of the colonies to disunion and increased mutual jealousies. The meaning of the colonial desire for independence. What the colonies really wanted was an isolated independence; free from those state ties which had irked them in England. They still maintained a keen sense of those objects which had induced their pioneers to leave England. Apart from the immediate causes of their migration there were certain features in English government against which they, equally with other Englishmen, had rebelled. These are symbolized in the allusions to Empson and Dudley, and to the contraventions of Magna Carta. But whereas Englishmen at home had almost forgotten them, as belonging to the remote past, the settlers in the New World still feared their revival, not in the shape of royal tyranny against the people of England; but as English tyranny against the people of America. Moreover this was not an essentially unreasonable view. The whole navigation system assumed, and even apart from this, there was a tendency for colonial administration to assume, that colonial interests were different from those of England, and that English claims must always come first—not necessarily that England must have the whole field; she could make concessions involving self sacrifice; but England must always be first in that field. Therefore the rise of popular government against the English administrator must be carefully watched and restrained. It is not an exaggeration to say that in this reign the rival ideas can be seen rapidly approaching an impasse. For the following sixty years the catastrophe was postponed by danger from outside carelessness and neglect, but without a change of attitude on one side or the other it was bound to come in the end. And at last English statesmen discovered how far they had drifted under the Hanoverian régime. |
Dinsmore Documentation presents Classics of American Colonial History