The disadvantages of the navigation system were brought home by war, which accentuated the difficulties of working; whilst there was no tendency to mitigation or re-organization. Meanwhile the colonies were developing.

     Perhaps the greatest factor in bringing about that fatal difference of thought between England and the American settlements was the trade system, the ideas of which are best expressed in the writings of William’s reign. The old view of excessive tyranny, by which the mother country took all from the colonies and gave nothing in return, has undergone much modification under the light of historical research; but however the navigation system may be justified, the fact still remains that those Englishmen who guided and expressed the policy of their country towards the colonies, were bound completely by what may be called the ‘Plantation’ view of colonization. The colonies, in their view, were productive settlements which must bring additional gain in some form to the land which made them. Considering the previous history of colonization under Spain and Portugal, and the history of British settlements themselves during the first half-century of their foundation, even astute statesmen can hardly be blamed for such ideas. They could see the West Indian sugar-producing settlements, rich in one of the essentials of a trade-empire; the tobacco production of the southern colonies of North America, with a ready market in England, and, through England, in Europe; the fisheries of Newfoundland, also rich in produce and moreover a regular training ground for seamen, the backbone of Imperial defence, recognized again at the end of the Stuart rule, as at the beginning. These possibilities were responsible for the interest in colonies, aroused under the Commonwealth and continuing after the Restoration. A productive use was now seen

in the settlements which were rightly or wrongly considered to have been settlements by the refuse of population¹. Some, such as New England, could not yet fall into this scheme; but possibilities were appearing with the increased production of naval stores to supplant the Baltic products; and meanwhile that portion of the American mainland had to be considered an unproductive settlement, disadvantageous to the home country. This view of the colonies, as serving primarily to enrich England, carried with it the navigation system, justified typically by Sir Josiah Child in well-known sentences²:

     All Colonies or Plantations do endamage their Mother Kingdoms, whereof the Trades of such Plantations are not so confined, by severe laws and good execution of those laws, to the Mother Kingdom. . . . The Dutch will reap the greatest advantage by all Colonies issuing from any Kingdom of Europe, whereof the Trades are not so strictly confined to the proper Mother-Kingdom.

. . . New England is the most prejudicial Plantation to the Kingdom of England.

. . . It is more for the advantage of England that Newfoundland should remain unplanted.

     An earlier extract shews even better the type of consideration which would be given to an objection made by the colonies to the English imperial policy, as expressed in the Laws of Trade³:

     The inhabitants and planters of our plantations in America say, this Act will in time ruin their plantations, if they may not be permitted at least to carry their sugars to the best markets, and not be compelled to send all to, and receive all commodities from England. I answer, If they were not kept to the Rules of the Act of Navigation, the consequence would be that in a few years the benefit of them would be wholly lost to the nation; it being agreeable to the policy of the Dutch, Danes, French, Spaniards and Portuguese and all nations in the world to keep their external Provinces and colonies in a subjection unto and dependency upon the Mother Kingdom; and if they should not do so, the Dutch, who as I have said are masters of the Field in Trade, would carry away the greatest of advantages by the plantations of all the Princes in Christendom, leaving us and others only the trouble of breeding men and sending them abroad to cultivate the ground and have bread for their industry.

     No doubt in all this there was a semi-conscious balancing of the privilege granted to the emigrants of still bearing their English name and a vague tight to protection in their newly-found liberty from more definite and irksome government—this privilege, with the duty of serving the commercial interests of the country they had left. But in any case the interest of England was the main criterion of colonial policy. This point of view is, I repeat, not an altogether unreasonable one at the time; but, unfortunately for all parties concerned, new factors were arising to upset the smooth working of such a system.

     In the first place, as we have seen, the advance of France on the northern frontier made it necessary for England to take up a definitely imperial position—or to refuse to do this; at any rate some decision had to be made, one way or the other. She decided imperially and was therefore compelled to face problems of organization. Secondly, the colonies were by now gaining real political feeling and some approach to national aspirations within their own small states. Both these factors meant that no longer could the colonies be considered purely as trading settlements, with commercial interests alone. No one will of course attempt to declare that in the reign of William III these factors suddenly appeared. Nevertheless the period affords a better opportunity of observing the development than any other, owing no doubt to the accident of the revolution and the French war, which hastened an otherwise gradual movement. The navigation system was designed to control trade settlements alone. The harm it did was the result of an attempt to control communities which were rapidly developing political characteristics, and with them definite political interests, which did not coincide with those of England.

     The navigation system then continued to dominate the practice of colonial policy during William III’s reign. In 1689 the Spanish commissioner-general for the introduction of negroes into the Spanish Indies, asked for power to buy negroes from British ships for exportation, and to import Spanish

produce into the West Indies, for the relaxation of penalties in cases of unlawful trade by subordinate sailors, andfor arbitration by the governor of a colony in cases of disputes with foreigners; but the English Government refused to relax the spirit of the navigation system, replying that the Trade Laws must be observed. Apart from this, Spanish interests would be considered¹. Moreover, not content with this determined attitude, the home authorities attempted by a statute of 1696² to stiffen the framework and to fill up the sources of leakage in the system. This act, ‘for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade,’ began by stating that great abuses were daily committed to the prejudice of the English navigation, and the loss of a great part of the plantation trade to this Kingdom. It first laid down that no goods should be exported from or imported to the plantations except in ships built there or in England or Ireland, with three-quarters of the crew Englishmen. The governor of each plantation was for the future bound by oath to enforce this statute and the other requirements of the navigation system; naval officers were to give security to the English Commissioner of Customs for the due performance of their duty, and officers of the revenue in the colonies were given the same powers of search and seizure as customs officers in England with similar powers of requiring assistance. Provision was further made for the reward of informers, on whom the prosecution of offenders mainly depended. It was also enacted that the payment of duties on goods passing from one colony to another did not exempt them from the necessity of giving security against those goods being shipped to foreign countries. With these and other minor regulations this statute attempted to enforce more efficiently the navigation laws of the Restoration. It decreed moreover that the penalties attached to offences against these laws should be enforced

in any of His Majesty’s courts at Westminster or in Ireland, or in the court of admiralty held in His Majesty’s plantations respectively, where such offence shall be committed, at the pleasure of the officer or informer;

thus providing against the opposition of colonial courts or juries by the system of admiralty courts, extended during the latter half of the reign.

     The attempt to strengthen the administration by the wide extension of courts of admiralty began with the New Council of Trade in 1696, who recommended the establishment of such courts in each colony, for the prosecution of bonds, the trial of seizures, and for other matters of similar nature¹. Record of previous commissioners of admiralty granted to governors survives only to the cases of Andros (from the Duke of York) in 1678, Dongan from the King in 1682, and Fletcher in 1692, the latter commission including the Jerseys, Pennsylvania and other outlying areas². Randolph therefore submitted the names of suitable persons to be officers of these courts, and his nominations were embodied in the official recommendation³. The Admiralty now reported that all governors might have commissions of admiralty if they would apply, but that several had not requested such authority. Commissions had, However, been granted to the governors of nine colonies, including all the most important⁴. The Board of Trade now ascertained from the law officers that the King could appoint commissioners of admiralty in the proprietary colonies⁵; and by means of thus utilizing a system which was already partially in practice, the English Government was enabled to spread its responsible officers among all the colonies and groups of settlements. In these admiralty courts, which were without juries, there was a considerably greater likelihood of the English interest being served and authority upheld; but admiralty jurisdiction was particularly repugnant to the people of America, and brought in fresh difficulties, as will later be seen.

     For the colonies, the revolution of 1689 and the consequent war with France meant disastrous loss of trade. In September 1689 it was reported that sixty-two English ships, chiefly from America and the West Indies, had been recently taken by French privateers¹; and Macpherson relates² how in the account laid before Parliament in 1692 it appeared that the French had, in the past two years of war, taken from England no fewer than 3000 sail of trading vessels great and small; whilst within the same period we had taken from France only 67 merchant-ships. It was further explained that France owed her comparative immunity to the extent to which her trade was conducted in foreign ships; but this did not diminish the actual loss inflicted on British shipping. Moreover, there was at the same time great difficulty in raising the required complement of sailors either for a merchant-ship or for a man-of-war; since for the navy, recruiting was hindered by the low pay, whilst for the merchant service, which was constrained to offer double the royal rate, men were dissuaded by the irksome liability to be pressed for the King’s ships. Thus Sir Francis Brewster in 1695 was complaining that seamen could not be obtained to man our ships and that foreign shipping had to be employed³. He also suggested that the only remedy was for volunteers for the merchant ships to be promised freedom from empressment; so that, with this increase in numbers, the rate of pay would not need to be so high; and this fall in rate of pay would encourage recruiting for the King’s ships, which maintained a low rate⁴. However, be this as it may, the fact remains that there was a shortage of seamen during the war. A third discouragement to merchant shipping lay in the system of convoys, which were required to guard against French privateers. In certain cases, the commissioners of customs would refuse to

clear ships, which were ready to sail, until their convoying fleet was made up, often a long process¹; so that this necessary measure of defence often involved considerable delay and inconvenience. Such difficulties naturally inflicted hardship on the colonies, and shewed the disadvantages in time of war of the navigation system. In 1696 the West Indies, especially Jamaica, were complaining that ‘there came not from England necessaries enough to furnish the people’s wants, nor ships enough to take away their produce. . . . Their wants oblige them to countenance all importers².’ Again the following year, the burden of complaints from the same quarter was that no ships came from England to take away their produce, and no one else was allowed³. In so far as the navigation system was responsible for the ill condition of any colony, the remedy of evasion lay obvious and ready to hand; and, in fact, complaints of illegal trade and piracy became very widespread during the war. The two offences, although distinct, may be classed together in this period, as a great proportion of the charges against the colonies include the two as one. Illegal trade and the harbouring and encouragement of pirates were merely two forms of evading the troublesome trade restrictions.

     In Massachusetts, complaints occurred with the revolution, when the arrest of Captain George prevented him from preserving the coasts from pirates and enforcing the acts of navigation⁴; and the following year Randolph preferred charges against the Boston people, alleging daily violations of the laws of trade⁵, which charges were borne out by letters to merchants in England, and by the reports of visitors, and were accepted by the Board of Trade for inclusion in their representation to the King. Dealing especially with Boston, Randolph stated that the aims of that town were to restore free trade for their vessels to all parts of Europe, to prevent any collector accepting duty

(for instance, by imprisonment and threatened execution of Randolph himself), and to make Boston a depot for European commodities. He challenged the town to shew copies of bonds taken from captains of merchantmen loading the enumerated commodities¹. The Bostoners in self-defence asserted that Randolph sought to be the only informer, and to discredit their charter, which he was compassing with destruction by false reports. They appended disproofs of his charges in several cases, but left the main accusations unrefuted². Usher also declared that Massachusetts was frequently sending the enumerated commodities to France, Holland and Spain, and importing goods thence without clearing in England; whilst the collectors were ‘laid aside’ and obstructed³. Phips himself was accused by Collector Brenton of hindering him with violence in the execution of his duty, Phips himself carrying on illegal trade, and having prevailed on the assembly to exempt ships trading from colony to colony from entering or clearing⁴.

     In Rhode Island the local government excused itself by explaining their need of better fortifications before they could compel ships trading there to yield obedience to law⁵; and the colony certainly appeared to need this explanation. According to Randolph it was ‘a free port to illegal trading and pirates for all places⁶’; and a Boston merchant expressed himself still more strongly: ‘they are such a bloody crew of privateers at Rhode Island that the government cannot rule them, and sober men are in fear of their lives’; there is daily plundering of vessels as they come in; and ‘unless the King take present care, privateers will rule the Island⁷.’ The Board of Trade considered towards the end of the war that in the trial of pirates there was too frequent mention of New England as the place from which

the pirates were fitted out, and where they were entertained¹. As an example of this, a long account was given of the pirate Tew—also largely responsible for the fall of Fletcher—fitting out at Rhode Island for piracy in the Red Sea².

     Nor do the other colonies seem exempt from a share of blame. Maryland is ‘a loose government, and suffers illegal traders, so their tobacco sells well and they have plenty of goods³.’ A man reported to have brought £3000 of goods direct from Holland was regarded with something akin to respect for his conduct; although his case might indicate that such persons were rarer in Maryland than in New England. Masters of ships did indeed complain of his being permitted to trade; and the deponent explained this by asserting that the collectors were probably bribed. ‘Clandestine trade is easy, as the collectors live far up in the country⁴.’ Randolph also included Maryland in his general denunciation, after making a tour of inspection there⁵; and although Governor Copley complained of the surveyor’s conduct, he confined his complaint to Randolph’s methods, rather than his aims. ‘He has made the country weary of him; . . . boasts that he has lived 25 years on the curses of the people, and I am sure he never wants them⁶.’ Randolph was often unfortunate in the issue of his prosecutions. In July 1696 he sent a list of the vessels seized and prosecuted by him in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, showing that he lost his suit in every case⁷. He further sent reasons for the continuance of illegalities, attributing these to the ignorance, remissness or connivance of collectors; persons of little estate given as security; the partiality of juries and courts, some not qualified to act; the large stocks of goods kept on shore and easily increased surreptitiously before an incoming ship was cleared; and the use of forged certificates, through the fault of

the naval office. Randolph added details, blaming especially the proprietary governments¹. In some ports, he declared, false seals and certificates were kept, and stores were collected in quiet places for the use of illegal traders². Lawrence, the secretary of Maryland, stated that county juries would hardly ever find against an illegal trader³; and Governor Nicholson also found difficulty in getting either juries or judges to convict. He therefore proposed special courts of exchequer in Maryland and the neighbouring colonies; but the Board of Trade pointed out that the courts of vice-admiralty would serve this purpose, and although Nicholson disagreed, he could not obtain his exchequer courts⁴. Nicholson added a significant qualification to his statement of judicial appointments: ‘I have put into them [i.e. the courts of judicature] able, rich, and honest men (except in the way of illegal trade).’ Maryland, he declared, would not petition for a royal frigate, because it would tend to check their misdemeanours⁵.

     In Virginia there was little serious outcry except by Randolph. Andros implied that the laws were not kept by referring ‘to his desire for fixed ports which would be a more effectual prevention⁶: In 1699, under Nicholson’s government, an act was passed against piracy, giving any civil or military officer power to arrest, and kill if resisted.

     In Pennsylvania, the complaints were directed chiefly to breaches of the law committed by Scotchmen. Complaints against illegal trade generally did appear, and Nicholson found several places ‘fit to manage illegal trade, and the people generally inclined to make use of them whenever they can.’ Pirates also were there, having brought great spoils from the Red Sea⁷. Pennsylvania was however especially guilty with

Scotland¹. The Lords of the Treasury included both Virginia and Pennsylvania with Maryland in their report on illegal trade of July 1694, deciding that the merchants trading fairly had great cause for complaints and malting the usual ineffective suggestions that suitable vessels should be sent with experienced commanders, to cruise on the coasts, the officers to inspect collectors’ books, under the supervision of the governor².

     In 1699, shortly after the arrival of Bellomont in New England the report on Fletcher’s conduct was compiled. He was found guilty of actions contrary to his duty and tending to encourage piracy; and had offered no extenuation of his intimacy with the notorious pirate, Tew, except the pleasantness of the latter’s conversation, and Fletcher’s desire to reclaim him from an ill habit of swearing³. The Board of Trade agreed that many of Fletcher’s offences were committed with the consent of his council⁴.

     Bellomont on his arrival in New York found the customs decreased by one half from the receipts of ten years previous, in spite of the fact that the volume of trade had been doubled, and the city grown vastly rich and prosperous⁵. The merchants were so much used to unlawful trade that they were almost ready to mutiny on some seizures that Bellomont caused to be made on unfree bottoms. The collector, one of Fletcher’s adherents, was lax in his duty, and by his delay, the ships were enabled to unload £20,000 worth of cargo. Bellomont proceeded to describe the ‘unaccustomed disturbance’ caused by

the laws being enforced¹, and the great numbers of pirates who were fitted out at New York or Rhode Island, and manned at New York, openly declaring their destination to be the Red Sea and the East Indies. Fletcher must have connived at this conduct², for such to be the condition. While Bellomont was thus zealous for the law, Randolph was no whit behind. He confirmed the statement that pirates had been abetted in Rhode Island³; and Bellomont in 1699 was writing home that piracy and illegal trade were the ‘belov’d twins’ of New York⁴, and would prevail until good judges and law officers were sent out, a man-of-war with an honest captain provided, and pay and recruits sent for the four companies of regular soldiers⁵. Randolph meanwhile had been suffering several set-backs in his determined prosecution of illegalities. Within a few months he was arrested in New York for making certain seizures in Virginia and was then imprisoned in Pennsylvania for telling the governor that he ought to have the royal approbation⁶.

     Pennsylvania was still a thorn in the flesh of its neighbours. Colonel Quary, the judge of Admiralty, complained that its government was enjoining trial by jury in all cases, thus annulling his commission against pirates⁷. In 1699 he was obliged to hold his court forty miles from Philadelphia, because of abuse levelled at him and his authority: ‘I might as well have stayed at home, since no obedience is paid to the orders and decrees of the court⁸.’ The marshal of the Court of Common Pleas, on producing Quary’s commission, was thus greeted by the attorney-general of Pennsylvania: ‘What hast thou got there, John? A fine Bay? Dost think we are afraid of a Baby?’ (pointing to the King’s effigies) ‘and a Pinn Box’ (the Great Seal)⁹. While allowing for the effect of this peculiarly irritating method of opposition, it can hardly be claimed that the royal

measures against illegalities in trade were likely to gain active support in Pennsylvania, for hostility did not stop short with abuse. The justices opposed the courts of admiralty as enemies of ‘the Governor and the Friends’; and the attorney-general refused to prosecute¹. Quary bombarded the Council of Trade with his accounts of abuses, and appeals for help, stating at one time that he had traced a number of pirates, but could not lay his hand on them because the government would not give him men: ‘There are 7000 men, capable to bear arms, yet no militia or any means to serve the King,’ all of whose servants were growing more uneasy at the neglect with which their complaints were received; and, Quary went on, unless some action were taken, it would soon be impossible to get men to take duty, especially in the admiralty department, where there were no salaries². By October 1699 Quary was becoming desperate³; and Nicholson also had written urging the Board of Trade to act in the matter of Pennsylvanian laxity, for the salve of example to other colonies⁴. The same year the Board of Trade reported on the colony; deciding that Lieutenant-Governor Markham had acted without the royal approval, and had connived at and encouraged illegal trade; and that Penn had, without authority, disallowed as regards Pennsylvania the act for preventing frauds in the plantations⁵.

     The disorders in trade and piracy became so marked at the end of the century that the home government was driven to busy itself with suggestions and laws to establish its authority on a stronger foundation. In January 1700 it was decided that pirates should be sent home for trial, with the modification that Bellomont, Nicholson and Blakiston—that is, the governors who could be trusted—might conduct trials in the colonies when they thought it advisable⁶. Three months later, it was again decided to have the offenders tried in the plantations; and provision

for this was made by an act for the suppression of piracy, which Parliament

having in view the refractoriness of New England and the other Plantations, has framed . . . extending to all the Plantations and other foreign parts, by which those of New England may perceive that where the public good does suffer by their obstinacy, the proper remedies will be easily found here¹.

This act was brought in, according to the Board of Trade, because that body, being sensible of great irregularities in the proprietary and charter governments not only in regard to illegal trade and piracy, but otherwise, had required governors to receive royal approbation; this had not been complied with, nor had the security been given which ought to have accompanied the receiving of approbation, so that without provision by statute, ‘we do not see anything capable of reducing them to more regular compliance with their duty in reference to the Trade of England².’

     In the colonies meanwhile, the end of William’s reign saw the climax of piratical activity. Virginia was by this time conducting its trade by a system of convoys precisely as in time of war³. ‘All the news is the swarming of pirates, not only on these coasts but all the West Indies over, which doth ruin trade ten times worse than a war,’ wrote Quary⁴. ‘Hardly a ship doth come through the gulf or on our coast but is plundered’; this from Carolina⁵. ‘Here in New York they run all the goods they can’; whilst in Massachusetts,

some gentlemen of the council expressed great discontent at the Acts of Trade and Navigation, that restrained them from open free trade to all parts of the world; they alleged that they were as much English as those in England, and thought they had a right to all the privileges that the people of England had⁶.

In 1701, Mr Larkin, commissioned to arrange for the trial of pirates under the recent act, reported also from Boston:

     As to the laws of England they abhor the very thought of them. . . . Scarce a merchant here but what is guilty of carrying on an illegal trade, and the Courts protect them in it, for judgment is generally given against the King. . . . Truly, I believe they would have been much better pleased if your Lordships had sent them an Act of Parliament for encouragement of so beneficial a Trade¹.

Nicholson in Virginia set a notable example of determination on behalf of authority. A large pirate ship being reported near at hand, Nicholson immediately went on board H.M.S. Shoreham, and tackled the intruder.

     The fight continued from 8 a.m. till 5 p.m., in all which time he never stirred off the quarter-deck, but by his example, conduct and plenty of gold . . . made them fight bravely till they had taken the pirate ship with 100 odd prisoners, the rest being killed. A few more such expeditions, brave and generous actions from other governors would quickly clear these coasts of pirates,

wrote Quary, bringing also the evidence of prisoners to skew that but for Nicholson the pirate would have been allowed to escapes. In November however Bellomont was writing that, though ‘there was too much unlawful trade, that from Madagascar seems to be at a stand at present, and I think piracy too is in its wane³.’ Larkin confirmed this, as far as piracy was concerned, at the end of 1701⁴.

     The West Indies throughout this period were chiefly concerned with the depopulation and loss of trade due to the war, and their urgent necessities took precedence at times of the requirements of the navigation laws. Jamaica early proposed pardon for pirates who should give security in land for their future good conduct⁵. This island had lost many men, especially seamen, owing to the earthquake and sickness, to empressment

for royal ships, and to Inchiquin’s policy with regard to the rewards of prize ships¹. In 1695 it was stated that Spanish ships traded openlyin Jamaica, in defiance of the Laws of Trade; thereby obtaining the best negroes from Africa². The following year, Beeston wrote that pirates had arrived in the Bahamas with treasure, and had sent to him privately to see if he would pardon them, in which case it would be worth ‘a great gun’ (£20,000) to him³. In fact the state of Jamaica made it difficult to avoid some illegal trade, there being ‘no money, no Assiento nor trade, nor other way to get anything⁴’; so that the wants of the people obliged them to encourage all importers⁵. In 1697 there were great difficulties about money, the treasury was in debt and all things excessively dear; people could not sell their produce because there were not ships to carry it away⁶. In 1698 however Beeston wrote that there were no pirates in Jamaica, except some French who preyed upon the island, nor should any be suffered to come. The laws of Jamaica had been cited as an example in the new act concerning trade to the plantations (1696), and the people were ‘much pleased that the island which formerly had the greatest name for privateering in these parts should now have its laws made an example to the rest of the King’s dominions⁷.’

     In Barbados depopulation was the great cry. In 1691 the great need of white servants was put forward⁸. For heavy mortality had carried away great numbers; and the difficulty was increased by the repeal of the act concerning the participants in Monmouth’s rebellion, in whose case a curious situation had arisen through the revolution. The prisoners from Monmouth’s army had been deported to Barbados and sold into servitude to the planters, who bought them on condition

that their possession was fixed by act of parliament at ten years or more. The repeal of this act would therefore defraud the planters of half their bargain; and a compromise was ultimately effected to improve their condition but preserve their labour¹. In 1692 a sad account of the colony was sent to England, the dearth of white servants which handicapped its trade in peace being greatly aggravated by the war. The proportion of men formerly sent to fight from a parish was now greater than the total number of men in it². Such a state of need encouraged complaints, and as usual the 4½ per cent. duty on sugar exported was vigorously attacked, as usual also without effect³. In 1695 a case was quoted to shew that ships could land negroes at night before reporting, and that such traders would not scruple to assault the party of authority⁴; in 1698 a description related how goods were loaded in small bays and creeks and carried aboard; and in 1699 the Barbados government requested two men-of-war to enforce the Acts of Trade. Meanwhile Governor Grey carried out his duty as best he could with a ‘heavy, crazy vessel, miscalled a cruiser⁵.’ It would appear that, after the Peace of Ryswick, either illegal trade increased in volume, or the authorities became more rigorous—probably both causes operated to produce the increasing number of cases reported and methods described. In 1699 the collector of customs was complaining of open breaches of the laws of importation; and he had seized all offending vessels with the result that claims for nearly £10,000 had been made against him, and one customs officer arrested, the others trying to resign their posts. The governor however publicly declared his support of the laws of trade and of the customs authorities—apparently not an unnecessary procedure—and obtained the release of the imprisoned collectors.

     The Leeward Islands also shared the general depopulation and loss of trade¹; and beyond the charges brought against Codrington afford little evidence of an extensive irregular trade during the war. In 1698 however Codrington himself had to suspend the lieutenant-governor of Nevis and the deputy-governor of St Kitts for not taking the oath in connection with the navigation laws as required by the act for regulating frauds². St Kitts had apparently fallen into bad ways since its re-settlement after the French occupation; and the younger Codrington’s account was not encouraging:

     The disorder in trade is so great that I almost deplore of doing any good in it, and there is so much ignorance and laziness or corruption in Naval or Customs officers. I [know] a hundred things are done every day which I cannot possibly prevent, prejudicial to the trade and interest of England³.

     In Bermuda and the Bahamas one would expect from the general disturbance of political affairs that irregularities would be prevalent; and there are many suspicious incidents during the period. In the Bahama Islands the governor, Nicholas Trott, who had previously figured in cases of irregular trading in Bermuda⁴, was in 1696 charged with allowing pirates to land there in consideration of presents, and of taking part of the cargo⁵; and he was therefore recalled⁶. In 1699 his successor Webb—who incidentally supported Trott⁷, as Trott supported his predecessor, Cadwallader Jones, an equally shady character⁸—left his government for America, and was robbed in Virginia of £7000 in gold and £1000 in goods. Bellomont suggested the inquiry how he had continued to make £8000 during a stay of two years in the Bahama Islands⁹.

In Bermuda the sheriff was sued in 1692 for £3000, because of his seizure of a ship by order of the governor, and he was likely to be ruined by the action, he of course claiming that the judge was partial and the jury packed¹. The following year Governor Richier was condemned, although unheard, for illegal trading²; and the unsavoury quarrel between him and his successor, Goddard, began. By 1699 Bermuda, according to the new governor, Day, was rigidly enforcing the Laws of Trade; a naval officer had been appointed under bond of £1000 and was apprehending pirates, for which an act had been specially prepared³. Randolph however visited the island as surveyor, and peaceful conditions came to an abrupt end. According to Randolph, Day refused to recognize his collector, since the naval officer had just been appointed—the importance of the distinction lying in the fact that the collector was appointed by the English customs authorities or their deputy, and the naval officer by the governor. The protesting collector was threatened by Day⁴; and shortly after Randolph was committed to prison on the charge of ‘writing and contriving certain false and dangerous papers, words, reports and expressions, by him secretly and maliciously spoken and expressed towards his Excellency⁵.’ The Board of Trade considered the imprisonment illegal and after applying to the Lords justices for his release, severely reprimanded Day for his ‘unexampled presumption,’ the ‘unwarrantableness of his proceedings,’ and ‘illegality and prejudice to his Majesty’s service⁶.’ The governor however postponed the order after receiving it and Randolph was not released until January 1700⁷, having spent over six months in prison. It is typical of his character that on the very day of his release he seized a vessel and prosecuted it (unsuccessfully) in the court of admiralty⁸.

     The treatment of customs officers in fact throws much light on the attitude of the colonies to the Laws of Trade and the English authority. Randolph himself is a standing example of a life long conflict between local and central administration. Arrested in Virginia¹, New York, Pennsylvania and Bermuda, he may have been largely to blame for his own misfortunes, but he was at least consistently supported without qualification by the home government. Bellomont had great difficulty in finding suitable customs officers. The post was thankless, and was not made easier by such protests as that of Massachusetts against the right of appeal by customs officers from the decisions of local courts to England². In 1699 Bellomont appointed one Townsend as collector for Nassau Island, with a salary of £30 a year and one-third of the seizures. Within a month he and his sureties came and begged his release from duty since ‘though most of that town were his near relations, yet he was threatened by them to be knocked on the head, and he had already suffered many abuses, insomuch as he was in fear of his life.’ The governor also offered one of the lieutenants of the New York companies £100 a year with horses and men to be riding surveyor of Nassau Island, but he ‘though accounted a brisk man, and ready to starve for want of his pay and subsistences, told me in plain terms that he thought it too hazardous an undertaking for him³.’ In Pennsylvania, during the same year, Colonel Quary with much difficulty persuaded the customs officers to continue in the execution of their respective duties until he could hear from home⁴.

     In Barbados, William Sharp, the commissioner and collector of customs at Bridgetown, described the boast of the traders and planters there, that

they will make it not worth any man’s while to serve the King here, and if they put in execution the unreasonableness, as they call it,

of the Acts of Trade and Navigation, it shall cost them a thousand pounds sterling but they will either get them turned out at home or ruin them here.

They threw one officer into the common gaol for carrying out his duty, and intimated that the rest would soon follow him; several others, wrote Sharp,

in the greatest dread and concern imaginable brought me their commissions, saying it was hard indeed a man must either be forsworn, betray his trust, or be thrown in to a gaol and ruined by these . . . most dangerous sort of people¹.

     Throughout William’s reign there is much evidence of Scottish activity in the colonies; and this evidence is focussed in the history of the Darien scheme, which was responsible for an open declaration of English policy in colonial affairs towards her northern neighbour. Before the scheme materialized the Scottish nation had many representatives in America. In New Jersey the principal traders were Scots, reported Governor Basse². In New York, there were Scots enough to be sureties for returning members of the Darien expedition³. Randolph had ‘never observed so many Scotsmen as are now in Pennsylvania, and so I am informed in Virginia and Maryland⁴.’ The legal position of Scotchmen was not clearly understood. Maryland condemned ships that had Scottish owners, unless they were resident in England or Ireland⁵; and the law officers were called in to settle other disputes, deciding that Scotchmen were natural-born subjects of England within the meaning of the Acts of Trade, and could therefore engage in trade with the plantations⁶. Their activity however was not confined to lawful trade, and in 1695 Randolph submitted some suggestions

for preventing illegal traffic between the tobacco plantations and Scotland, in which he claimed that the Scots ‘counterfeited’ Englishmen, and also planted colonies in places not inhabited, making treaties of peace and commerce with governors and proprietors and paying an acknowledgment to the King. These settlers served as a centre for other trading Scots. Randolph therefore proposed that South Carolina and the Bahamas should be taken over by the crown, that North Carolina should be joined to Virginia, and the Delaware country to Maryland; and that no one should be allowed to alienate to any Scot any island or plantation between 32° and 44° of latitude¹. As a result of this appeal, the King strictly enjoined the governors to suppress Scottish traders, but the rest of Randolph’s plan fell to the ground².

     The main features of the Darien scheme, its great popular support, and the results of its failure seen in the union of Scotland and England, are well known. Setting sail in the autumn of 1698 under a charter from the English government, stipulating certain conditions, the expedition finally settled at the isthmus of Darien and the English government began to realize the importance of the event. In May 1699 the Board of Trade issued a report on the Scottish settlement³, in which they recapitulated the articles of the charter binding the Scots not to settle on any inhabited place without consent of the inhabitants, nor upon places possessed by any European prince or people. The settlers claimed that the spot they had selected was never before possessed by Spaniards⁴; but the Board of Trade was of opinion that the Spanish claim to the territory was valid, and for that reason others had refrained from colonization there. If that was so, the Scotch had violated their charter, and also the Angle-Spanish treaty of 1670. This report was no doubt accurate, but it is worthy of remembrance that in respect of the latter charge—that of breaking the Anglo-Spanish

treaty—there is no reason to suppose that the Board of Trade objected to that agreement being infringed: in fact, they had in 1697 themselves advised the seizure of Golden Island and a port on the mainland for the crown¹, which would have been at least an equal violation. Certainly the King of Spain regarded the settlement at Darien as ‘a mark of little friendship and a rupture of the alliance between the two Crowns².’

     The settlers meanwhile had emerged victorious from a skirmish with the Spaniards; and the enterprise was appealing to the national spirit throughout the colonies. Scotchmen in the Jerseys declared that if the King interrupted the settlement it would endanger a rupture between the two nations. Governor Basse of New Jersey was of opinion that ‘Caledonia promises to be of great prejudice to our nation and revenue, and to be the emporium of the trade and riches of America, connecting the East and West Indies, and tapping the wealth of Mexico and Peru³. In January 1699 orders had been issued to all the colonies that help should not be given in any way to the new settlement⁴. This order was formally proclaimed in Barbados, Jamaica, New York, New England, New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia⁵; the Spaniards however refused to differentiate between the two nations under one crown, and injured British shipping indiscriminately⁶. The French also urged Spain to activity, telling them that the proclamations against assistance were merely a blind to cover joint action—that the English and Scotch were one⁷. Spain certainly believed that England gave help to the colonists, in spite of assurances to the contrary⁸; and it was difficult to contradict that belief, with the existing numbers of Scots in the plantations, and the ease with which the ordinary regulations of the navigation system were evaded. The most that can be said is that help was not given officially. The Scotch settlement however was not destined long to withstand

the attack of Spain; and when that country brought up a force of 15 ships with a land army, the main party of settlers, weakened by famine and disease, surrendered, leaving the Spaniards in possession¹.

     During William’s reign suggestions are put forward of development in several directions, some of great interest for later history, others relatively unimportant, but all breaking new ground, at a time when it was by no means clear what the future position of the North American continent was to be. At the beginning of the French war, the danger of French aggression in the region west of the line of English colonies became manifest, since France now controlled both the northern extremity in Canada and the southern outpost in Louisiana. Some English merchants therefore saw possibilities of gain in a rival scheme of commercial aggression, and in 1689 requested a patent for the country lying in

the centre of the Northern part of America, between 361°, the Northern boundary of Carolina, and 46½°, the Southern boundary of Canada; on the East, the western bounds of Virginia and Maryland, and to the West the Pacific or Southern Sea.

The chief advantages of this development were urged to be that the French would be deprived of some of the richest branches of their commerce, the fur trade being cut off, which was worth £50,000 to them; that great profit could be made from the ‘Pesikions or Sibils, whose hair is like Spanish wool’; and that there was great mineral wealth and good dyeing woods². In September 1690 a draft charter appeared for incorporating a company on these lines³; but after this the scheme seems to have lapsed.

     If however possession of the hinterland seemed to be one of the necessities of development, a more generally recognized

deficiency in the economic life of America—considered from the standpoint of English statesmen—lay in the position of New England, which had hitherto been considered as a settlement incompatible with the main principles of the navigation system. It produced little or none of the commodities which England desired, and also threatened to develop on the same commercial lines as the mother country, by its rivalry doubly defeating the ends of English trade policy. Thus several efforts were made to transform New England into a colony producing some commodity useful to the home country. In 1697 an attempt was made to form a company for working copper mines there. A petition followed from merchants and others concerned in New England trade stating that such an application had been made to monopolize the whole trade of New England by the ruin of the country people¹. The proposed company replied with the suggestion of combining the production of naval stores with its mining activities, and promised to substitute colonial for foreign productions, thereby greatly increasing New England trade². The agent for Massachusetts opposed the scheme, saying that the same proposal had been rejected under Charles II and James II and that if any new reasons could be urged in its favour, Massachusetts would counter them³. The main objections were grounded on the failure of previous efforts, on the idea of monopoly, since the company offered only to produce what individuals could, and moreover other corporations had long survived in the face of complaint⁴.

     The development of which there was most discussion and report was the production of naval stores (masts, pitch, tar, rosin and similar products) especially in New England, by which the monopoly of the Baltic countries would be overthrown, and a supply would be guaranteed for time of war. Brewster, writing in 1695, pointed out that New England was superior to any of the Northern Crowns for timber, masts, pines and

firs to make pitch and tar, for soil to raise hemp, and was good enough for making iron. If this could be developed, he maintained, ‘it would make New England of the most useless and unprofitable plantation of this nation the best and most advantageous¹.’ In 1696 Randolph spoke of the large possibilities of New England in ship-building and naval stores, little cultivated, as also in Maryland, for want of a market². Another letter, from a New England merchant, confirmed the proposal³, and later in the year commissioners were appointed to consider the matter⁴. Bellomont on his arrival entered heartly into the project, and indeed gave it life. After receiving a report from the joint commission of representatives from the Navy Board and New England, in which they expressed themselves well satisfied with the produce⁵, his next step was to propose that in the Albany and Senectady area soldiers should be employed on cultivation of such products, with 4d. a day extra pay, and after seven years should receive grants of land, inalienable, because of the natural tendency for them to gamble it away⁶. New Hampshire, which Bellomont accused of ‘ploughing with his heifer,’ proposed the same scheme for Maine⁷. These proposals however needed sanction for the expenditure involved, and implied the speedy revocation of Fletcher’s grants of land; and in the meantime Bellomont forbade the cutting of trees suitable for masts⁸; and attempted to stop a shipload of timber leaving New England for Portugal, fearing that it would eventually reach France; but finding no law to warrant his action, he reluctantly allowed it to proceed⁹.

     In 1700 Bellomont was still pursuing his scheme: ‘Tar, masts and timber may be produced for half what they cost at present, and the whole Eastland trade for Naval stores, except flax and hemp, may be turned this way¹⁰.’ The produce was again inspected

with varying results, some experts loud in praise, others decrying it as compared with the stores obtained from the Baltic countries¹; and Bellomont suspected the prejudice and opposition of the Eastland merchants². A private company now attempted to step into the breach, but the Board of Trade demanded too large a guarantee³. The board also suggested that the soldiers be forthwith employed as Bellomont proposed⁴; but the governor reminded them that this was not practicable until he received permission, by an act which had not as yet received the royal assent⁵, to revoke the large grants of land made by Fletcher, since ‘the King has not an acre of land or a tree in the province’; and moreover the soldiers had no pay⁶. Bellomont however pushed on the scheme on his own credit, sending at his own cost a shipload of timber as specimens shortly before his death, which event prevented his knowing that the ship was wrecked off Cornwall, and the whole cargo lost⁷.

     Bellomont, although not going so far as the company which proposed to settle the interior, also realized the French danger in the hinterland. His remedy was for the Indians in that region west of Virginia and Maryland to be engaged in trade by those colonies, and thus bound commercially to the English interest against the schemes of France. To this end he asked for encouragement of the beaver trade, which had suffered by that dictate of fashion which discouraged beaver hats in England⁸. The proposal did not meet with hearty support from the colonies concerned, although the Board of Trade approved ‘provided it do not interfere with the planting of tobacco, which in those provinces is to be preferred before all things⁹.’

     The Board of Trade however when it reiterated this fundamental principle of English colonial policy, had already been

faced with a more dangerous development in the economic life of the same colonies, Virginia and Maryland. In 1697, Andros had remarked casually that owing to the shortage of supplies from England a little linen and woollen manufacture and shoemaking was growing up there, but that this was inconsiderable compared with the tobacco industry; the volume of trade remaining almost constant in the previous years¹. The English government however realized that this new departure was far from insignificant, and directed its attention to the question of manufactures in the American colonies, as in Ireland, where a similar process was developing. As early as November and December 1688, the Assembly of Maryland, ‘considering the great quantities of Linen and Woollen cloth brought in, for want of like policy and industry as other countries have attained unto’ enacted that a system of bounties, payable in tobacco, by the commissioners of the County courts, should reward the manufacturers of every yard of woollen and linen cloth of standard width and that special prizes should be given for the best piece of each at a certain fixed size. Moreover encouragement on similar lines was to be given for the sowing and making of flax and hemp, whilst fines were imposed on the exportation of wool². By 1699 the manufacture of woollen and linen goods had become notable enough to attract the notice of the legislature of England. In January of that year, the Board of Trade wrote to the House of Commons that

     Our intent in settling our Plantations in America was that the people there should be only employed in such things as are not the production of this kingdom, except for provisions for themselves and their neighbours. . . . Yet they here applied themselves to much besides other things to woollen manufacturing which in its proportion is as prejudicial to the Kingdom as those in Ireland,

wherefore it was submitted that a like prohibition be made. The draft of such a clause was agreed on, and Blathwayt desired to present it to the committee of the House³. It was therefore decreed by an act of Parliament that, whereas

wool and woollen manufactures are the greatest and most profitable commodities of this Kingdom, on which the value of lands and the trade of the nation do chiefly depend . . . and great quantities of the like manufactures have of late been made and are daily increasing in the Kingdom of Ireland and in the English plantations in America, and are exported from thence to foreign markets, heretofore supplied from England, which will inevitably sink the value of lands and tend to the ruin of the trade and the woollen manufactures of this realm. . . .

No wool etc., or woollen manufactures whatever, being of the

product or manufacture of any of the English plantations in America shall be loaded or laid on board on any ship or vessel . . . within any of the said English plantations . . . or upon any horse, cart, or other carriage, to be conveyed out of the . . . plantations to any other of the said plantations;

this regulation to be enforced by the penalty of fines and the governors to be cautioned concerning its due observance¹. Thus appears the first mention of American woollen manufactures in the Statute Book, and with it the threat of real economic rivalry between the New World and the Old. It had previously been complained that New England by supplying provisions to the other colonies was usurping the rights of the mother country; but provisions of food were admittedly in a class by themselves, and some of the more prudent statesmen and writers confessed that there might even be advantage in having a supply of necessaries near to the market for them. The rise of manufactures however would be a distinct and unmistakable usurpation of commercial prerogative. Thus, to the conflict of political interests between the colonies, now growing into states, and the mother country, there was added a conflict of commercial interests; and the two eventually brought about the downfall of the navigation system by destroying the colonial relationship.

     It is thus evident that during the reign of William III developments took place in the three principal branches of colonial government. In the sphere of foreign relations the revolution brought with it the war with France—a war which would no doubt have come without it, but the outbreak of which was hastened and made more decisive by the accession of William. This war brought to the front the problem of colonial defence, a question to which no answer was given until the separation; and the burden of defence was therefore sustained inadequately, and the organization of resources imperfectly carried out. There was in short no final responsibility, but mutual dissatisfaction. In the second place, political affairs now began to centre around the conflict for power between the crown and the local assemblies. The increase of royal power at the expense of proprietary governments was a necessary step in the political development of the colonies; but it merely cleared the ground for the keener struggle between centralization and local government, represented in most cases by the governor and the assembly respectively. The colonies undoubtedly wished for a larger share of political independence than England was prepared to concede, even if she ever grasped the meaning of the conflict. They were deeply imbued with English political ideals, especially with the hatred of tyranny; and, in allowing no outlet—except what was forced—for their political aspirations the English government began to assume in their eyes the position of tyrant. The landmarks of English liberties could therefore be quoted in support of American liberties. For, in the third place, in commercial affairs, the colonies were beginning actively to resent the system of government which regarded them solely as commercial settlements and ignored or opposed their political existence. The navigation laws were therefore widely attacked and evaded; and in one case at least the products of the home country were discriminated against¹. In face of such opposition

England sought to stiffen and maintain by force the system of restriction on which its entire colonial policy was based, and especially endeavoured to crush new developments of manufacture, which would rival English products and thereby destroy the basis of commercial and colonial policy.

     England was therefore required in her colonial policy to face and to solve three problems—the adjustment of defence, the constitutional position of the outlying states, and the commercial system in which they and the mother country should work together. But these are surely the main problems of empire in its modern sense—as opposed to the purely commercial empires of Spain, Portugal and Holland—provided only that the colonists in question are vocal, active and educated, which in this case they certainly were. Is it then too much to claim for the events of this period that they inaugurated that imperial system which is the peculiar feature of modern history, especially of British history? The English crown found itself in the difficult position of ruler over a number of settlements which were by this time something more than mere trading stations, and which had clear cut ideas of political independence and liberty. It had no experience of such a position, of the government of outlying states, constitutionally formed and demanding constitutional methods and constitutional development on the same lines as the English model, which had itself in the revolution taken one more of the steps by which it became the pattern for new communities. Never before—at any rate since medieval times—had such an empire existed. Moreover, with the methods of communication at its disposal at that time, the government of such an empire involved perhaps greater difficulties even than the later world wide spheres of government. The importance however lay in the fact that it was a political relationship that was needed, and in part was implied, to meet the growing needs of the states which began as trading settlements.

     Originally, the empire of the old colonial system may have conformed—nay, it certainly did conform—to that type of

empire which was based on trade and trade alone; but since, unlike the other trading empires, its members went out with definitely political ideas, it was faced with larger problems, and as it was unique in this respect, so also, failing to bring a new understanding to a new situation, it failed in a more signal, more dramatic collapse than they. And the measure of difference between that empire, its nature and its possibilities, and the other trade-empires, may be found in the present difference between the United States and the South American republics.

<—Chapter IV   Table of Contents   Appendices —>