Notes
from a voyage. Baie de la Moselle, Noumea Harbor, New Caledonia.
The cargo ships are moored up from the yachts and fishing
boats. All of this can be observed from the hulking ferries,
and the waterfront shops along the Rue Jules Ferry, offering
hats, pareos, and hundred Pacific franc books with images
of the famous islands and reefs, fish cake from China, and
squid seasoned in Sendai. Beyond the circle of rocks and islands,
the Pacific ocean, hot and blue heading down to the Anse Vata.
Along the Avenue Georges Clemenceau, daily bus schedules to
the Tjibaou Cultural Center, celebrating Kanak arts and history,
tour packages promoting other French territories in Polynesia.
Posters of flowers and beaches and broad smiling faces; in
humid book stores, ragged copies of Mwa vþþ, Le
Mariage Franco-Tahitien, Do Kamo, and Islands of Love,
along with numerous essays on "les evenements," the French
and Kanak violence which claimed so many livesãincluding Jean-Marie
Tjibaou'sãin nationalist and liberation struggles of the last
decades.
I
think of an 1888 survey of South Pacific islands by diplomat
Charles Victor Crosnier de Varigny arguing, "Each of the European
races has its own mode of colonization...the battle in Oceania
is between England, personifying the spirit of conquest, the
substitution of the white for the native race, and France,
in which is incarnated a profoundly human genius which allows
two distinct races to live side by side on the same soil."
Denouncing the crass force of England and its lost colonies
(they destroyed the Australian aborigines and the thirteen
Atlantic colonies revolted), de Varigny presented the superior
fidelity of "our most beautiful possessions" in the Pacificãthe
paradise of Tahiti, the prosperity of New Caledonia, the solid
Catholic faith of Wallis and Futuna--a portrait of affection
and gratitude.1
The
Tjibaou Center has been called a "gift" of cultural recognition
of the French state for Kanak culture. Oceanic empire built
on narrations of affinity and affection mark three centuries
of accommodation and contested claims. Ann Stoler has drawn
out the "tense and tender ties" of the Dutch and French in
Indonesia and Vietnam; Vince Rafael has excavated the White
Love of Filipino elites for supposed American progressivism
and Japanese pan-Asian modernity; Sonia Faessel has explored
the force of eros in South Pacific storytelling; John Hirst
has played out the unifying narrative of Australia as the
forging of a "Sentimental Nation."2
In New Caledonia, conciliation and association are framed
by other Pacific legacies, of Eastern Polynesian idylls from
Bougainville to Gauguin's Polynesia, the Sacred Heart Passions
of missionaries and Wallisian kings, to l'amour de la patrie
that shaped tales of love and empire for monarchs, diplomats,
collaborators, and gunboat commanders.
By
narrating tales of love in the history of French empire in
the Pacificãa shifting series of strategic and sentimental
geographies ranging from Southeast Asia to the Society Islands--we
see endless variations in proclamations of Christ's brotherly
passion in Futuna, military writings on native resistance
in Tahiti, the organizing familial principle for administrators
in New Caledonia, the conjugal narratives of "Indochina's"
history, debates over the possibility of Japanese affection.
Missionaries regularly employed "love" as well as novelists,
patriots as well as traders and adventurers. Max Radiguet
concluded his The Last Savages about the Marquesas
islands (1842-1859) with the line, "the presence of an armed
force at Nukahiva will only result in fear and respect for
the name of France. That is already something, but it remains
now to make it loved and blessed." 3
In
the evening the Place des Cocotiers is crowded with Wallisiansãten
percent of the immigrant populationãby residents and visitors
from Papua New Guinea and Fiji, young tourists from Tokyo
following the ubiquitous Japanese signs, and Vietnamese restaurant
and shopkeepers, settled for family connections, former engineers,
teachers, and musicians. Civic posters promote a multicolored
society.
An
Empire of Love? In the mid-twentieth century the Cambodian
prince Sisowath Youtþvong had provided an ideal expression
of this politically amorous vision: "France has gathered around
her many civilizations which have marked the artistic, philosophical,
and spiritual history of humanity; these civilizations...
consent to enrich themselves, to love and to serve, but not
to give themselves up. What is created in the habits of the
common life, voluntarily accepted or not, is not a relation
of servitude, but one of love."4
It
is exactly the tensions between such love and servitude that
I examine as they manifest themselves in the shaping of empire.
Pacific empire is itself drawn upon a template of affinities,
obligations, and contested ideologies of care in nations and
state projecting power upon islands and beaches. The important
point here is that "empire" was and is never merely a blatant
exercise of force and contempt, but a force exercised through
institutions and ideologies of transformation, and affection.
At its most insidious it was rendered attractive, and
simultaneously adopted and appropriated, from mission Christianity
to regional nationalisms.
Vilsoni
Hereniko has suggested the difficulty of disentanglement from
European and American empires as have other critics trying
to understand the world through an "Oceanic Imaginary." Hereniko
suggests that globalization, commercial capitalism, and nation-state
encroachments are not as great dilemmas for Pacific worlds
as is the "colonization of the mind," to wit, that visions
of Pacific island peoples appropriating imported goods are
not necessarily a function of economic dependency, but something
more insistent: that they have modeled themselves on the colonizers.
Caroline Sinaviana has similarly suggested that the great
dilemmas are not the nation state and globalism, but internalized
colonialism, the psychosocial and emotional aspects of a closed
subjectivity.5
In
tourist literature and local archives, I search for the traces
of emotion and affinity, empire as love: not an individual
sentiment, but an organizing force. In tales from Asia
and Ocenia "love" was never merely a generic island sensuality
but an unstable and potentially violent series of contested
crossings underscored by multiple, highly political appropriations
of devotion, care, sacrifice, and sexuality. "Love" infused
tales of affection and alliance, family and loyalty, and thus
of struggles in nation and empire.
Under
a bright sun, St. Joseph's cathedral marks the Noumean landscape,
looking down over the Centre Ville, as will the Marist missions
along the Hienghúne and Touho coasts. The school of the Sacre
Coeur on Boulevard Vauban in Noumea is centered around the
statue of Marcellin Champagnat of the Marist Brothers. I think
of their first martyr. In the central Pacific islands of Wallis
and Futuna, Christian missions established a Catholic influence
in Oceania, self-described by Marist Fathers as "the love
of a priest for his flock...the love of the same for his child;
even more...the love of Jesus Christ for his church. In Rome
this love would become commemorative veneration as the Pope
agreed to declare a 1889 beatification of Father Pierre Chanel,
killed on the island of Futuna a generation earlier, thus
making him the first martyr of the Church in Oceania; his
beatification would later be confirmed by his 1954 canonization
as Saint Pierre Chanel by Pope Pius XII. 6
Such
overlayering of authority dramatically affected political
relations, like those between a suspicious monarch Niuliki
on Futuna, and his convert son. Where the king argues "my
rights are abolished by all you believe," Mþitala intones,
"Your rights, no! Your errors!" Niuliki's position is
subsumed to the Marist's power of love as the son tells his
father, "since I have loved God our holy master, I have even
more love for you, I know better to recognize this."7 That love is no longer
under the chiefly rule of the father, but the Marist's authority
of the Father.
The
struggle over such love continues. At the Centre Tjibaou an
exhibition of the Pasteur Maurice Leenhardt features a translation
of a "parole" in eight local languages: "Dieu est amour, Dieu
seul amourÄ" Tjibaou's own words are illuminated in transparent
panels: "If you read the Old Testament you will find similarities
with Kanak culture, the myths, the genealogies, etc." If you
speak of Greco-Latin Christianity, I don't knowÄ" The force
of God's love is there, but in Oceanic fashion and meaning,
turned both to strong faith and practice and liberation politics.
Boulevard
Vauban, the quiet road fronting the escarpment of the Valleþ
du Gþnie, rolls along from the school of the Sacre Coeur to
a peach-colored batiment surrounded by a white grille
and mast flying the tricolor. Its sober pediment announces
Commandement Supþrieur des Forces Armeþs, Pacifique,
while two metal plaques intone, "Protected zone: entry forbidden
without authorization." Just down the hill a souvenir shop
features Hinano Beer T-shirts and the famous stylized vahine
of French Polynesia. The military and the vahine take me to
the Society Islands; at Farepiti wharf the inter-island boats
dock from Tahiti and Raiatea and other islands carrying cargo,
passengers, tourists to the postcard views of Bora Bora; markets,
craft centers, laundries foreground the famous blue lagoons
and green peaks.
The
case of French Polynesia is steeped in generations of images
from Bougainville's eighteenth-century islands of love to
Gauguin's paintings. Years of armed resistance to a French
seizure of Papeete in 1841 and decades of guerilla warfare
are aesthetically subsumed to tales, like the operatic pleasures
of French exoticist Pierre Loti's liaisons rendered for the
European stage: "I saw brilliant French officers come down
from the Neptune," and "it is our land of love, island of
dreams," while closing with the anguish of "Manþhu," who is
warned that while Frenchmen may come to Polynesia, Polynesians
may not go to Europe. "No Manþhu, you cannot follow him to
France...the flowers of our land fade in the land of exile
and lose their attraction. They need the sun, the scents,
the mystery, the enchantment of our forests." The islander
may not act, but must remain remote and wistfully preserved,
only to wait on the island of dreams, and ultimately despair,
"Oh! To be no longer loved, to be a thing vile and without
radiance! Sweet past times of light, fatal awakening!"8
The awakening was long delayed. Bounded as colonial territories,
the islands became closed to grand legacies of Polynesian
navigation and migration, to the kinships, exchanges, and
encounters of the Oceanic world. Imperial narratives
of the isles fix on apartness, collapsing the heroic eighteenth-century
European romanticism of Cook, Bougainville, and Chateaubriand
into the nineteenth century visions of sensual expiration
of Loti and Gauguin. In 1886 Guy de Maupassant wrote of Loti,
"across the mists of an ocean unknown to our eyes, he showed
us an adorable island of love, and he remade with Loti and
Rarahu the poem of Paul and Virginie. We did not ask ourselves
if the tale was true, as it spoke to us with such charm."9 Maupassant touches the essential points: "Tahiti" was
a singular land of love in a literary tradition which set
aside truths of warfare, of event and meaning.
Back in New Caledonia, at Bourail, the hills and plains, the
solid "Caldoche" or settler community, the cemeteries,
the museum displaying the artifacts of the settlers and an
enclosed case, or great residence behind. In New Caledonia,
histories of love could mean neither paradise nor salvation,
but rather redemption based upon solid imputed bourgeois values
of work and family: the model of Pacific empire as domestic
bliss. Free settlers joined with former penal colony convicts.
Condemned women were sent to the South Pacific as prisoners;
not just to serve out terms, but as prisoners uniquely targeted
for marriage with liberated male former-convicts. The governor
at Noumea filed regular reports to Paris, such as an 1873
memo indicating "all of the female prisoners have been received
with all the precautions demanded by their sex and their position."
The important part of the report is the governor's obviously
proud declaration that "of fifty women come to the colony,
thirty-four have already contracted marriage, two more are
authorized to do so, and the majority of these households
live rather comfortably." In establishing its plans for housing
the female convicts transported to New Caledonia, the Ministry
of Colonies envisioned "about one hundred women and ten to
twelve Catholic sisters to watch over them. Although this
penitentiary ought to be absolutely isolated from that of
the men, it is useful that it be as little distant from the
locale of the released prisoners working concessions, in order
to facilitate marriages."10
This
project of marriage and affection was reappropriated, even
by some of the French colony's fiercest opponents, such as
the great Kanak chief Atai, who led a bloody rebellion against
settler encroachments in 1878. Yet Atai knew well, and
in his own way shared a joint Caledonian fate for the politics
of love, violence, and family--whether created by governors
or destroyed by colonialism. In commander Henri Riviúre's
writings we find a portrait of an anonymous Madame X, an "intelligent,
active, very courageous" colonial widow and her encounters
with an Atai unfamiliar to most journalistic accounts, yet
one who so perfectly captures the islands's hopes and dilemmas.
"He was her neighbor and came often to see her. He brought
her fruits and she offered him coffee, bread, and wine. He
smoked his pipe on the veranda." The two apparently talked
quite a bit, and, "One fine day, he proposed, suddenly and
serenely, to marry her." Madame, stupefied, refused the offer.
"Atai repeated the proposition several times and was not pleased."
Garnier goes so far as to suggest, "his resentment, perhaps,
had something to do with the revolt. There is almost always
a female reason determining great projects." Madame's house
was untouched during the violence; notes Garnier, "Many times
I told Madame X...that she should have surrendered herself
and she would have prevented the Insurrection. She did not
disagree."11
In
New Caldonia, Tokinese, Japanese, Javanese were brought at
the turn of the twentieth century to labor in plantations
and mines. Everywhere, from Melanesia to Polynesia to Australia
and New Zealand, the faces and peoples of Asia. The names
of Japanese and Korean corporations, the Chinese newspapers
and shops, the rows of Thai and Vietnamese businesses, restaurants,
giftshops. In Noumea on the Rue de Verdun Trinh auto-radio
squares up its fences against Restaurant Indochine.
Monsieur Hoang of the nearby Vilbar snack corner dispenses
advice on marrying Laotians. I am reminded how tales of love
also frame a chronology of France and Cochinchine, Annam,
Tonkin, Laos, and Cambodia as they were protected, possessed,
and colonized into "Indochina."
From
the middle nineteenth century, military men like Pierre Loti
or Captain Francis Garnier declared missions of passionate
fraternalism become patriotism, adventures transmuted into
the "Conquest of Hearts" of geographer Auguste Pavie at the
turn of the century. The "possession of the native" promoted
by colonialists was realized in civil policy of the early
twentieth century through state-approved mixed liaisons and
colonial marriage fictions. The possibilities and limits
of this imperial romance were tested and constantly renegotiated
by generations of Vietnamese like Bui Tanh Vanh or Tran Van
Tung, who accepted France as affectionate mother, brother,
or lover, or Nguy¡n An Ninh, who reversed the romance, intoning,
"it is not for a sentimental project that France has gone
to IndochinaÄone would have to be the most stupid sort of
colonial to believe in "the Civilizing Mission."12
At
the Vilbar snack corner, M. Hoang tells of his life as a concert
musician in Vietnamãhe was a cellist. I think of the essays
of Bui Tanh Vanh, who founded a European classical music school
in Huþ in the 1920s. In the colonial era Bui imagined himself
the (perhaps unappreciated) son of a loving French mother.
"It would be na´ve to think that France has crossed seven
thousand kilometers of ocean to come in good will, extending
us a hand, without expecting anything of us. She perfectly
has all the rights that justice confers upon an adoptive mother."
Bui even asserts a parallelism between French gunboat officers
and motherly love: "the policy of our affectionate adoptive
mother is the same as that applied by a generous ship's captain
regarding strangers stowed away on board." He also finds common
cause with "our good adoptive brothersÄthey honor their mother
as they make themselves honorable; they love all as they make
themselves loved."13
Colonial functionaries promoted this vision. The geographer
and diplomat Auguste Pavie's best known book, based on his
journals and oral histories, was his A la conquúte des
coeurs (Conquest of Hearts), a popular work of ethnographic
romance. Georges Clemenceau himself wrote the preface to the
1921 edition, calling it "the best colonial book that I know."
What the "Tiger" of French politics so admired was not a tale
of ferocious adventure, but of one man, "barefoot, without
provisions," marching though Southeast Asia "toward that ideal
to make the lands you crossed French with the assent of their
inhabitants." What Clemenceau particularly fixed on was Pavie's
ability to relate stories of "populations you have seducedÄand
which you love; you have dedicated yourself to inspire in
them the sentiments for France that you yourself have for
her." The result of this was a particular kind of empire:
"having given birth to devotion, you have, in gaining their
hearts, conquered lands which, morally, give themselves up
upon knowing you."14
One who certainly did
put his heart into it was the essayist Tran Van Tung, whose
R¡ves d'un campagnard Annamite traces the self-conscious
sentimental education of a village boy longing for a French
identity. Governor General Jules Brþviþ wrote a preface describing
"the obstinate ascent of a little Annamite peasant toward
what might be conveniently called Western Civilization." The
Governor could hardly have asked for a more laudatory text,
for here love and ideology are remarkably aligned. As Tran
puts it: "The France I love is that of all the Great MenÄhow
could I not love her when she bears me all reasons to live,
when my head is full of her thoughts, when my heart is full
of her sentiments?" This perfectly realized subject of the
Empire of Love further avows, "this love that I have for you,
for your people, I want to keep it in all its purity, in all
its freshness to communicate it to my brothers, to my friends,
to my readersÄto engrave in fiery letters your well-loved
names in the memories of all children of Annam." To this enthusiastically
pedagogical project Tran exults "O my France, you will never
know how much I admire, respect, and love you. You will never
know all the depth of my love." This astonishingly romantic
reverie even has the author confessing, "My France, will you
believe me now, if I tell you quietly that I love you more
than my own country, more than my little Indochina?"15
That love, of course, was not always shared, and did not linger.
Within
such an imperial vision, no country could seriously claim
to be home to a truly civilized people without a "proper"
foundation in "love." I think again of the "gift" giving of
the French government, or in other territories, the massive
foreign aid given over the last decades by Japan. The everyday
influence is reciprocated at the Asical market on Noumea's
Rue Sebastopolãvente des produits asiatiquesãwhere
imported Japanese ramen, shoyu, mirin, and sencha pack the
displays. I am reading Sandra Tarte's engrossing coverage
of concessions of fishing and timber rights, of Japanese capital's
enormous impact in Oceania. I think again to great deal of
attention to questions of 'love' in French Meiji-era writings
about Japan, and the logic by which interrogations of love
might even have explained Japan's nineteenth-century successes
in commerce and political economy.
Ludovic
Naudeau's Le Japon moderne suggested that Japanese
men were quick to build up the 'grandeur of Japan' which threatened
European commercial and military interests in Asia because
unencumbered by the demands of intimate relations and la
vie amoureuse. The idea of romantic love was presumably
non-existent. In a detailed study of La Sociþtþ Japonaise,
scholar Andrþ Bellessort, remarked how both the Japanese and
French were fond of what seemed to him theatrical farces and
swashbuckling heroics (musketeer and samurai tales) yet concluded,
'to be sure, one must not push the comparison too far! I know
how very much our conception of life and especially of love
distinguishes us from the Japanese.' In fact he argued, 'The
idea of love... hardly flowers among the Japanese. This individual
sentiment does not fit into the frameworks of society.'16
Individual sentiment was the presumptive basis of morality
and the historical development of civilization. The question
of romantic love thus became critical to grasping whether
Japan were truly or falsely modern. Pursuing love was the
way to go to the heart of things, to see the real behind the
manners and masks. What would it mean if a civilization with
Krupp cannons, French naval officers and silk factories, heavy
industry, telegraphs, armies, schools, and railways should
be found incapable of love? What Europeans prized as 'love'
and 'affection' were, presumably, alien to Japan. Suggested
Bellessort, 'In the eyes of the Japanese a marriage for love
is...a sort of forfeiture, at the very least the admission
of a contemptible weakness.' Affection, he argued 'is admitted,
but in the manner of a parasitic plant.'
Yet
however broadly Europeans condemned the emotional insincerity
of modern Japan, these same French commentators still widely
agreed that 'the most noble sentiment' of love did in fact
exist, and quite powerfully, in Japan: it was called patriotism.
Here was truly the site of Japanese passions, the manifestation
of 'the sentiments of love and of ardent ambition.'17 Writing in 1895 at the time of the
Sino-Japanese War, political journalist G. Apport, despite
his ambivalence about Japanese imperial designs, commented
with admiration: 'The Japanese love their homeland with a
passion which is not always clear, but which necessarily must
be respected.' Japanese diplomat the Baron Suyematsu would
concur, 'A nation is on the right road when it places its
loyalty in the sovereign and love of the country above all
other private and petty considerations.'18
Here
was anxious European recognition that "love" could be both
an ennobling emotion, and also a national force. As travel
writer Maurice Dekoba had it, "I do not mean to say that people
of the West are wanting in patriotism, but with us, especially
in France, it is, so to speak, sporadic and manifests itself
only in critical moments. It does not in the least resemble
the patriotism of the Japanese who is constant and expresses
every day, every hour, the uninterrupted and feverish condition
of his mind, and his love of collectivity." 19 Within an imperial view, what most threatened was the
notion that another could loveãand organize around that loveãa
contrary political force.
That
force has many faces. Jean-Marc Regnault welcomes me in Papeete,
"the myth of a terrestrial paradise attached to the name of
Tahiti occludes the fact that a mouvement revendicatif
could develop."20 In Noumea the evening is filled with
young dancers in cultural performance, proudly determined
before a crowd which simply appreciates; few cameras flash
for souvenirs, there is little reflexive applause; it is like
a great gathering of families. Yet the dazzling color and
sound of the dancing is only one tale of the program. At the
bus exchange the young Kanak men stamp out their own beat
in their baggy trousers and running shoes. One woman appreciates
the rhythms, tells me she is from the north of the island
and would like to see a nickel mine and factory to help development
aid which, she believes, all currently goes to stockholders
in Paris, and clans and politicians in the south. We, the
KanakÄ" she comments, noting her disapproval of Philippine
workers being invited to work the Goro southern mine project
while fiercely illuminating the tactile beauty of Kanak carvings
and art. Her community in art and action. Tjibaou had
put aside the distinction between cultural traditions and
political acts: "the refusal of colonization is for us a tradition."
I travel north to Hienghene to meet his son. "You may see
yourself in a fun-house mirror, but it's still you."21
The collapsing of Oceanic culture and politics, the affinities
of community and the energies of colonial resistance has me
thinking of the deforming imperial visions running through
seascapes and littoral cultures. Gifts, affinities, and ships
point me to not the land and sea, but to the Àscapes themselves.
This, as theorist Kenneth Olwig reminds, is a derivation not
unlike that of friendship or citizenship, which
is clearly to note that it is a community notion. Thus a seascape
is primarily and necessarily founded upon a community of memory,
custom, and practice. This is a divided notionãbetween the
place of memory, custom, and community, and that of the imperial
power to view, from a dominant vision, "seascapes" themselves;
in considering our themes we are radically implicated in these
apparent disjunctures between the local and the global or
imperial.
Equally to note is the critical observation that these "ships"
are indeed literally "ships." That is, they are continuously
mobile and negotiated constructions, bearing meaning yet dependent
upon the familiars who create themãif we strongly consider
such terms as "citizenship," with all of its evocations of
the ship of state, we see uniquely how it is very much a question
of "representation." In the image then, to represent the seascape,
is also to struggle with the notion of representationãthe
politics of community, accountability, and voice, and the
struggle over those seascapes which are unrepresented, which
have no "ships," whether communities evoked, rights to be
enjoyed or demanded, or mobile cultures in which to participate.22
This
in fact is where much contest is, as seascape scholars and
activists such as Sue Jackson and Nonie Sharp will tell us.
Imperial histories and littoral cultures meet met over the
question of the meeting of the landscape and the sea. The
Japanese shops in French Polynesia make me think of Hokkaido,
where on the windy beach outside Abishiri, I shop for Japanese
dried fish and pickled vegetables. A local official encourages
our spending, though informs us that we could take back across
the Pacific whatever we wanted from the sea, but not from
the land. Crab shells and beach shells were fine, but had
to be carefully divested of soil. Plants and animals were
strictly forbidden, but fish and sea animals not. The logic
of this is compelling; states and governments wish to restrict
the transfer, the contagion and ecological imperialism of
foreign and invader species. Yet, simultaneously, the
sea is not subject in the same way:, the sea is one and what
will wash ashore on one island or continent will also wash
up on different shores across the world. So, as with histories?
Are continents, or nations divided, while "oceans connect?"
From where will be drawn the restrictions of soil, but the
open carry bags filled with dried fish?
This
makes me think of J. Cordell's juridical reading of "the nature
of the sea as a continuous water column" and the "freedom
of the seas" convention that "living resources it contained
were thought to be, by definition, "common property." He examines
this question not in a celebration of dynamic global flows,
but their opposite: the assertion of local communities, the
question of indigenous peoples and sea-rights, marine tenure.23
The Territorial Museum in Noumea somberly displays magnificent
Kanak fish traps, hooks, spears, and tools. But it is still
a museum, struggling to make the enthographic conservation
of the past into a vital and contested present. Heading down
to Australia and New Zealand, the French colonial model is
in my mind, but the power of affinity, affection, and collective
attachment have me reading Nonie Sharp's challenging of national
(and international) voices as the sole expressions of political
fellow-ship. In Saltwater People she cites Sir Tipene
O'Regan of the Waitangi Tribunal Fisheries Commission: "When
someone wants to take what is someone else's, they say it
belongs to everyone."24 The sea is supposedly a region of
tides and currents, endlessly circulating, endlessly available
to appropriationãpossession by territorial, colonial, imperial
laws and jurisdictions. From Manifest Destiny and Terra Nullius
to Mare Nullius; the empty sea. Our legal colleagues will
no doubt detail for us John Selden's 1663 Mare Clausum:
The Right and Dominion of the Sea, or Hugo Grotius' doctrine
of the "natural law" of water and the freedom of the high
seasãa liberty supporting, notably, the Dutch East India Company
which Selden's doctrine was attempting to exclude.25
Along
the Torres Straits between Indonesia and the Northern Territories
of Australia, at the edge of Arnhem land and Dampier land,
the criteria of exclusive marine tenure zones are historically
and juridically renegotiated along questions of how nation
states and body politics have appropriated as open to all
then the land and sea liberties which were once provinces
of families, clans, and communities of Yolngu and Bardi. Arguments
divide over questions like fishing rights and estuary conservation,
the "history" vs "tradition" of protection and harvesting
privileges. At stake is an apparent question: is the
littoral a resource and site of development, or of an "obligation
of care," a "habitat of affinity" crossed by "sacred sites
and dreaming paths at sea?"26
Back
in Noumea, I am still unsure of where empires of love and
devotion, and obligations of care and habitats of affinity
engage. It is clearer that the question is unfulfilled by
any simple dualities suggesting that local communities are
composed of obligations and affinities while the colonial
or imperial nations are driven by vagaries of legality and
commercial interest. What shall be a littoral culture, how
determined its exchange networks and association to land and
sea? At once it is the Bardi, hunting fish, shellfish, turtle,
the trochus shell, tied to the reef and village by sacred
sites, native title, and ancestral descendence. Is it also
Noumea, Papeete, or Sydney harbor, where stories of discoverers,
convicts, settlements, and islanders, from Eora to Kanak to
Maohi come together? To the one side, the ports and passages,
the museums of maritime history, fishing boats, cargo ships,
and yachts, warships and replicas of the Bounty, state-funded
vitrines dedicated to Polynesian navigation and European exploring.
To the other, the waterfront of hotels, galleries, banks and
trading houses, where tourists ply the promenades and artists
in white and ochre paint intone upon the didgeridoo, the Lebanese
bakers and the Chinatown which broaches the edge of the sparkling
digital IMAX entertainment center. This too is a littoral
culture, marketing pleasures and romance, one which has built
its empire upon tales of love.