VIETNAM STUDIES

The Role of
Military Intelligence 1965-1967

by
Major General Joseph A. McChristian

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1994

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-600003

First Printed 1974-CMH Pub 90-19

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S., Government Printing Office
Washington D.C. 20402

Foreword

The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units.

It is still necessary for the Army to continue to prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements.

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical record and providing the American public with an interim report on the performance of men and officers who have responded, as others have through our history, to exacting and trying demands.

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were taking place in the present.

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official records, with additional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key

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participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Major General Joseph A. McChristian is particularly well qualified to write of the role of military intelligence in Vietnam from 1965 through 1967. During that period he served on the staff of General William C. Westmoreland as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

General McChristian's background in military intelligence is one of long and distinguished service. After World War II he served as Third U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence under General George S. Patton, as Third Army Deputy G-2, and as Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces, Austria. In 1948 he was assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army General Staff. In 1949, during the Greek-Communist War, General McChristian became a member of the first joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Athens and, later, from June 1956 through May 1960, he served as U.S. Army Attaché to Greece. From January 1962 through February 1963 General McChristian was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, where he was Chief of the Western Division of Foreign Intelligence. From April 1963 through June 1965 he served as U.S. Army, Pacific, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Fort Shafter, Hawaii; from there he went to Vietnam. In August 1968 he became Chief of Army Intelligence. General McChristian retired from active duty in 1971.

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Preface

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Contents

 

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	3
The Challenge	3
Intelligence Philosophy	6
Evolution of the Military Assistance Command Intelligence Organization	12
II. COMBINED INTELLIGENCE	21
The Combined Intelligence Concept	21
The Military Intelligence Detachment Exchange Program	24
The Combined Interrogation System	26
Combined Document Exploitation	32
Combined Materiel Exploitation	40
The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam	45
The Sector Intelligence Support Program	64
The Combined Intelligence Staff	71
III. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE	94
Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance	95
Operations	106
Exploitation Division	113
Operation Cedar Falls	116
IV. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION	126
Development and Publication of the Military Assistance Command Order of Battle Summary	129
Development and Publication of Infiltration Statistics	131
Publication of Enemy Tactics Studies	132
Aerial Rice Survey of IV Corps Tactical ,Zone	134
The Combined Intelligence Center Imagery Interpretation Photo Study Program	136
V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	138
Developing the Counterintelligence Effort	138
Counterintelligence Operations	139
Security of Military Information	142
Communications Security	146
VI. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	148
Management	148
Plans and Training	155
Weather	156
VII. SUMMARY	157
Appendix A: J-2, Military Assistance Command, Staff Officers, September 1965-March 1967	160
Appendix B: J-2, Military Assistance Command, Staff, May 1967	161
Appendix C: Military Intelligence Organization, 1967	162
Appendix D: Military Intelligence Unit Commanders, Mid 1965 - Mid 1967	163
Appendix E: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Military Intelligence Detachment Division (Airborne - Marine Brigade)	164
Appendix F: Compatibility of J-2, Joint General Staff, and J-2, Military Assistance Command	165
Appendix G: Summary of Briefing on Viet Cong Taxation	166
1. Finance and Economic Section	167
2. Impact of Viet Cong Taxes	168
Appendix H: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Intelligence Organization	169
Appendix I: Intelligence Structure, 2d Air Division	170
Appendix J: Intelligence Structure, Naval Forces, Vietnam	171
GLOSSARY	172

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