Chapter XI: The Women's Army Rights Movement and the WAC

Chapter XI

The Women's Army Rights Movement and the WAC

It would be hard to deny the tremendous impact of the women's rights movement upon policies affecting the WAC and the status of the Corps. Beginning in 1969, the movement garnered such wide media and public support that its leaders quickly established a solid political base. Legislators, national and state, supported the movement's goals in hopes of capturing the women's vote. In the primary races leading to the national election in 1972, that vote appeared crucial for presidential contenders Nixon and McGovern and for other office seekers. Both parties supported passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, the primary goal of the movement. In March 1972, lawmakers in the Senate and the House passed, by an overwhelming majority, the bill that sent the proposed ERA to the states for ratification. The early success of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment stimulated inquiries to the Pentagon from Congress, the press, and the public on how the ERA, if passed, would affect women in the military services.

In August 1972, at the suggestion of the DCSPER, then General Kerwin, Chief of Staff Bruce Palmer, Jr., appointed an ad hoc committee to determine the effects of passage of the Equal Rights Amendment on the Army. The group was further charged to propose the Army's position on the issues raised by the women's movement. Known as the ERA Committee, the group was made up of eighteen men and womenofficers, NCOs, and civilians.1

The committee completed its work in four months and concluded that if the ERA passed, the Army would be pressed to justify the existence of a separate women's organization. Differences in the rules under which men and women were enlisted, trained, assigned, and discharged would

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be difficult to defend. The committee emphasized, however, that the wording of the amendment was so general that the courts would be required to settle disputes. The committee believed the courts would take a balanced approach in deciding issues involving the military services and national defense and would uphold differences in housing policies to preserve privacy between the sexes; involuntary discharge on pregnancy to preserve mobility; and exclusion of women from combat to preserve tradition. Whether or not the amendment was ratified by the states, the committee recommended a number of positions for the Army to take:

-A noncombat role for women

-Continuation of the WAC as a separate corps

-Retention of the director and other key officers

-Assignment of WAC officers to the WAC as a branch or to other branches

-Maintenance of a separate WAC promotion list

-Enrollment of women in the U.S. Military Academy

-Retention of WAC enlistment standards

-Retention of separate noncombat basic training for women

-Retention of current policies on discharging women

If the amendment became part of the Constitution, the committee recommended that registration and induction be applied equally to men and women and that deferments be given to mothers and to pregnant women. The DCSPER, then Lt. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, concurred in most of these positions but ordered studies on those he disagreed with or felt needed further review-admission of women to the academy, nonelimination of the WAC as a separate corps, separate basic training, and defensive weapons training for women. He ordered that no actions be taken at that time regarding registration, induction, deferments, retention of the position of the director of the WAC, or policies concerning enlistment qualifications or discharges.2

The committee's report reflected the traditional conservatism of the WAC. Its members had bowed to progress only in recommending that women officers be allowed to transfer to other branches and that women enter the U.S. Military Academy, which did not educate officers exclusively for the combat arms. But, despite the Army's tendency to maintain the status quo, society was increasingly demanding changes in the role of women. To lose as little ground as possible, the Army (including the WAC) initiated a few changes-appearing to keep in step but moving little. The Army supported this course because it believed that the courts would allow separate rules for women in justifiable cases. And on that

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point, the Army was wrong. By February 1973, the increasing momentum of the women's movement led General Rogers to direct his staff to "review where we stand and where we should go" and develop a plan for improving utilization and administration of the WAC. General Rogers' guidance to his staff was brief-"use the plateau approach" and "do what is best for the Army and best for women." Any recommendations for change would be judged on their potential to enhance Army effectiveness, not on their popularity.3

The WAC director, General Bailey, approved the Plateau Plan produced by the DCSPER staff and the order of priority developed to improve the utilization and administration of women. Almost half of the "take action now" items that concerned WAC officers had been generated by the Army's new Officer Personnel Management System. The other items in this group and in the higher plateaus had evolved from the WAC expansion plan, the affirmative action plan, or the report of the ERA Committee. (See Chart 4.)

CHART 4-PLATEAU PLAN-UTILIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY

Women should "never" do	28 Physical combat in conventional or unconventional units. 29 Assignments which preclude privacy in the field
Do not foresee within 3-5 years. Do not plan now	25 Disestablish DWAC 26 Equalize enlistment standards 27 Change separation policies on marriage/pregnancy
Include as objective in the Army Personnel Plan	20 Eliminate separate promotion list 21 Disestablish WAC as separate branch 22 Conduct Basic Training at other centers 23 Determine whether to allow women cadets at USMA 24 Identify noncombatants positions for women in Cat I units below division level
Take action now	5 Expand training facilities (barracks) to support training in skills already open to women

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CHART 4-PLATEAU PLAN-UTILIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY-Continued

Take action now

6. Equal moral and administrative waivers for reenlistment.
7. Standard criteria and procedures for OCS.
8. Develop career progression patterns with each branch for women officers, excluding combat arms.
9. Authorize branch transfers for WAC officers.
10. Authorize separation of sole surviving daughter.
11. Examine policy on assignment of married women and women with minor dependents.
12. Examine the officer procurement requirement with a view to permitting women in ROTC at all institutions.
13. Provide weapons familiarization and defensive combat.
14. Aviation training.
15. Establish career development for present senior WAC officers under OPMS.
16. Identify additional MOSs, skills to open to enlisted women.
17. Identify additional MOSS, skills to open to officers.
18. Determine appropriate numbers in baseline force.
19. Identify positions for women in division and corps headquarters.

Continue to do

1. Authority for WACs to command.
2. Approved expansion of WAC.
3. Include WAC officers in the same senior service college selection process as male officers.
4. Monitor progress of Equal Rights Amendment.

Source: DF, DCSPER DPPB to all DCSPER directorates and ODWAC, 16 Feb 73, sub: Utilization of Women in the Army.

Pregnancy and Parenthood Policies

Among the regulations that the women's rights movement attacked were those that discharged unmarried, pregnant women and single women with minor dependents. Leaders of the movement were pleased when an article concerning the ERA and these matters appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1971. The article stated that after the ERA passed,

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unmarried women could not be discharged for pregnancy unless men shown to be fathers of children born out of wedlock were also discharged. If single women with dependent children were discharged, then men in the same circumstances would also be discharged. After the ERA passed, the armed forces would, the article continued, treat both sexes alike by retaining single people who fathered or bore children, by providing day care for the children, or by giving a discharge to parents who could not take care of their children if they remained on active duty.4

The Army, however, continued to hold the view that its current policies were best both for the national defense effort and for the personnel involved, parents and children. In some areas, procedures were tightened. Because detection of early pregnancy during an enlistment physical examination was almost impossible, proposals had been made that a pregnancy test (blood or urine) be administered immediately before or after women actually entered active duty. The surgeon general of the Army had rejected such suggestions because the tests were not reliable; the director of the WAC had rejected them because they insulted women applying for enlistment. The problem, not a major one during the WAC's first quarter century, was ignored until 1973.5 By then, pregnancy out of wedlock was so generally accepted that young women believed the Army would take care of them if pregnancy were discovered after they had enlisted. In August of that year, however, the Army initiated an expeditious discharge procedure that administratively eliminated men and women within 180 days after enlistment when it was discovered they failed to meet minimum mental or physical standards or exhibited characteristics that did not warrant continued service. Women found to be pregnant upon enlistment could be discharged under this rule because they did not physically qualify for enlistment. 6

With this issue seemingly resolved, the Army began to encounter greater problems as society's attitudes became increasingly more liberal. The first indication of the extent of the problems came in December 1973 when the deputy assistant secretary of defense (M&RA) for military personnel policy (DASD [M&RA] MPP), Lt. Gen. Leo E. Benade, sternly reminded the services: "It is the intent of the Secretary of Defense to eliminate all laws and regulations which make an unnecessary distinction in the treatment of men and women . . . and [further] to assure that women are accorded equal treatment." With this, he proposed repeal of the law that authorized involuntary discharge of a woman who became

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pregnant, a parent, or assumed custody of a minor. He asked each service for its evaluation of the impact of the proposal.7

Since 1971, the Army had grudgingly allowed waivers for these circumstances, and it had no desire to make further concessions. In responding to General Benade, General Rogers, the DCSPER, voiced strong objections to losing involuntary discharge authority and showed how the waiver policy had reduced the number of women discharged on pregnancy and parenthood. (See Table 27.) 8

TABLE 27-ARMY ENLISTED WOMEN DISCHARGED FOR PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Enlisted strength	10,700	11,100	11,900	12,100	14,800
Discharged, pregnancy	1,444	1,446	1,412	1,166	1,034
Discharged, parenthood	24	20	11	12	22
Loss rate, percentage	13.7	13.2	11.9	9.7	7.1

Source: Strength of the Army Report (DCSPER 46), Part I (Strength), Part II (Gains and Losses).

To ward off imposition of the policy proposed by General Benade, the Army hurriedly implemented other policies it hoped would appease the Department of Defense:

-Marriage as a reason for discharge was deleted for commissioned and warrant officers and enlisted women.

-Women whose pregnancy terminated in an abortion, miscarriage, or stillbirth remained on active duty.

-Unmarried as well as married pregnant women could request retention on active duty.

A single enlisted woman requesting retention had to provide a written explanation of how she intended to support and care for the child and the name of the person who would care for her child if she were temporarily or permanently reassigned to another station or deployed overseas. She also had to certify that she understood her obligation to purchase and wear civilian maternity clothing when she outgrew her uniforms.9

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The DCSPER also eliminated parenthood as a basis for discharge for women officers, single or married. The Army considered the officers to be financially and psychologically capable of fulfilling child-care responsibilities. However, it debated extending the same provision to enlisted women. 10

These changes technically eliminated involuntary discharge on pregnancy and parenthood by allowing married and unmarried women who became pregnant or who became parents to request retention on active duty. To the DCSPER, General Rogers, and the DWAC, General Bailey, the new policies represented a reasonable alternative, which, they expected, would satisfy the deputy assistant secretary of defense. It did not. After General Benade and his staff had gathered and studied the impact statements submitted by the services, they decided, over objections from all the services, that the laws and regulations authorizing involuntary discharge on pregnancy and parenthood should be repealed. General Benade directed the services to cease invoking such policies and to develop uniform policies regarding these matters. He provided sixteen policy changes.11

General Bailey was astounded. She could not believe the Defense Department would reject the policies the Army had proposed. In a fourpage memorandum to General Rogers on 22 August 1974 entitled,

"Maternity, Mobility, and Mission," she presented the case for retaining authority for involuntary discharge on pregnancy and parenthood. She asked the DCSPER to stand fast on the policies and not make any further changes unless ordered to do so by court action. "It appears incomprehensible," she wrote, "that the Army's mission, recruiting requirement, and mobility of its members would not be fairly considered in a court action." And, she added that "preferential treatment of mothers in assignments would discriminate against fathers and single personnel." She voiced her fear that unmarried pregnant women would abuse the system by remaining in service for "security, protection, and the entitlements" and then request discharge on parenthood.12

The DCSPER agreed that single pregnant women and unmarried mothers would be a problem to the Army, and in his reply he told General Benade that the Army's latest policy changes had already eliminated involuntary separation on pregnancy by providing a retention procedure and that discharge on parenthood had been abolished for officers.

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Nonetheless, in an effort to cooperate, based on the sixteen suggested changes, the Army would make additional modifications:

-Women who became pregnant and could not complete their required training would be involuntarily discharged but would receive maternity care benefits.

-Commanders would be required to counsel pregnant women who had been granted a waiver for retention on active duty on their obligation to complete their enlistment and, after delivery, to accept worldwide assignment without expecting special consideration.

-The maximum postpartum absence would be six weeks unless the surgeon general of the Army approved an extension.

-A hardship discharge would be provided single parents (men or women) who could not satisfactorily perform their military duties or parental responsibilities.13

Again the Army's reply did not satisfy the Defense Department. General Benade retired in September 1974; his replacement, Vice Admiral John G. Finneran, told the DCSPER that he, General Rogers, had misunderstood the 7 June 1974 memorandum. Admiral Finneran stated that the memo had not suggested changes, but had transmitted to the services a DOD-directed policy that women would not be involuntarily separated for pregnancy or parenthood; that women would be automatically retained unless they requested voluntary separation because of pregnancy or parenthood; and that the sixteen changes would be uniformly integrated into the services' policies. He requested that the DCSPER send him copies of the Army regulations implementing these new policies.14

A few days later, the secretary of defense's general counsel appointed the Army as the executive agent to develop uniform pregnancy and parenthood policies throughout the services and to draft the legislation required to repeal the offending sections of law. 15 Like the Army, the

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other services had also interpreted the 7 June memo as guidance; in fact, they had not yet responded to it. And like the other services, the Army deeply resented DOD's intrusion into its personnel policies. But DOD's goal was to eliminate all the differences in personnel management that could be attacked as discriminatory while an all-volunteer force was needed. With no choice, the Army moved to comply. The judge advocate general prepared the draft legislation. The DCSPER, now Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore, met with representatives of the other services at the Pentagon on 15 January 1975 to align their policies. On 28 March, General Moore wrote Admiral Finneran that the services' policies were as similar as possible; the Air Force had conformed to the DOD guidance that month, and, as soon as DOD revised its directive on administrative discharges (DOD Directive 1332.14, Administrative Discharges), the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would issue their implementing instructions.16

This move also appeared to Admiral Finneran to be foot-dragging. On 11 April, his principal deputy, John F. Ahearne, wrote to the assistant secretaries (M&RA) of the Army and of the Navy and asked them to publish and implement their new policies not later than 15 May 1975without waiting for revision of directive 1332.14. "Publication of changes in the DOD Directive will not," he wrote, "alter the decisions and policy revision approved herein."17

With this, General Bailey again jumped into the fray. In a memo sent through channels to Secretary of the Army Callaway, she expressed her profound concern over the impending loss of the involuntary discharge authority and the impact it would have on Army readiness, the deployability of women, the lives of unmarried pregnant women and their children, and the morale of soldiers who would be required to carry the work load of pregnant women. "I recommend," she wrote, "that this far reaching policy change be further addressed prior to the Army's acceptance of this DoD imposed requirement." 18 Assistant Secretary of the

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Army (M&RA) Donald G. Brotzman also wrote to the secretary: "This directed policy change has caused Generals Moore, Putnam, and Bailey to seek our assistance in rescinding the policy. We apparently have become the victims of the ERA without the benefit of properly assessing the impact." 19

Upon receiving these memos, Secretary Callaway wrote Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA) William K. Brehm and cited his objections: "I am concerned that we are overreacting to special interest social pressures and are failing to recognize Army defense requirements .... Military service requires a service member (male or female) to be able to move without notice, to be prepared to work long and irregular hours without relief in order to meet unit mission requirements, and to live under adverse conditions. These work conditions are not suited for advanced stages of pregnancy nor for the care of minor dependents."20 But Secretary Brehm had little sympathy for the Army's problems. Making it clear that he spoke for the secretary of defense, if not the administration, he replied, "The determination ... that we will not separate women for pregnancy or parenthood is one which we have accepted in order to best apply the concepts of equal opportunity for our people." He agreed, however, to review the impact of the new policy after the services had had a year's experience implementing it.21

In the ensuing twelve months, General Moore collected statistics, evaluations, and costs resulting from implementing the new policies. A review of the data revealed that repeal was warranted, and he requested a reversal of the policy in light of its adverse impact on readiness, deployability, and mission accomplishment. The Defense Department did not respond. Finally, in April 1977, General Moore sent another memorandum with updated information, reminding Secretary Brehm that he had promised to review the policy. This time, however, the paper got no farther than the new secretary of the Army, Clifford L. Alexander, who had been appointed by President James E. Carter on 11 February 1977. Secretary Alexander refused to support the Army's position and sided with the Defense Department. Since the new secretary's views on ensuring equal opportunity and improving the quality of life for all minorities within the Army were well known, his stand came as no surprise. Before the end of the month, General Moore withdrew the Army's request to reinstate involuntary separation on pregnancy.22

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In a few years' time and over the objections of the DCSPER, DWAC, and major Army commanders, discharge policies for women had taken an abrupt turn. Married and unmarried pregnant women could now remain on active duty for any number of pregnancies, with time away from duty to include four weeks prenatal sick-in-quarters time, an unrestricted number of days for hospitalization during childbirth, and six to eight weeks of postpartum convalescent leave. Commanders were directed to certify that they had advised pregnant women of the options-to remain on duty or be discharged-and of the responsibilities and benefits of remaining on duty. Pregnant women could not be sent overseas as individual replacements or as members of a unit; temporary deferments from overseas duty expired six weeks after childbirth or the termination of a pregnancy. Balancing this rule for active duty women was a long-standing policy that allowed servicemen whose wives were in an advanced stage of pregnancy to request a twelve-week deferment from overseas duty to be with their wives until delivery of the child. Single and married military members with minor dependents remained eligible for overseas duty.23

When personnel were first assigned to new units, their commanders attempted to ensure that those with custody or responsibility for minor, aged, infirm, or handicapped dependents had arranged for their care in the event of absence or deployment overseas. Personnel who had dependents and who had less than three years' service submitted a dependent care plan for approval. If an individual could not make satisfactory arrangements, if the dependent's needs interfered with performance of duty, or if a dependent suffered from lack of care, a commander could recommend that the soldier, male or female, consider requesting a hardship discharge. When unsatisfactory situations persisted, the commander could recommend involuntary discharge for unsuitability or unfitness. In overseas commands, when events dictated evacuation of dependents and noncombatants, under Army policy, women in the eighteenth or later weeks of pregnancy were to be evacuated. Other pregnant women would be evacuated based upon the advice of medical officers. No other military women were to be evacuated from an area that was designated a hostile fire zone.24

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Despite its efforts to reduce time lost because of pregnancy, the Army continued to experience difficulty. A 1978 DCSPER study, "Evaluation of Women in the Army" (EWITA), showed that of 45,237 enlisted women on duty in FY 1977, 6,895 became pregnant-39 percent delivered a child, 36 percent had abortions, and 15 percent requested discharge. Of those who remained on active duty after they had delivered a child, approximately 40 percent requested discharge after the expiration of six weeks' postpartum leave. The average amount of time lost in carrying a pregnancy to full term was 105 days; time lost for an abortion was 3 days. The cost for time lost due to pregnancies was estimated at $10,762,150.25 As the number of women in the Army increased, so did the number of days lost, the cost, and other problems associated with retention of pregnant women. Yet, later studies requested by DOD indicated that, except for the Air Force, enlisted men generally had a higher rate of lost time than women. Men's time was lost primarily because of desertion, AWOL, or alcohol and drug abuse; women's for pregnancy and medical care.26 The Army (and the other services) abandoned their efforts to regain the authority to discharge women involuntarily for pregnancy and accepted the attendant costs in time and money. Even the collection of time-lost statistics was not pursued diligently after DOD showed that, considering all causes, men lost more time from duty than women.

Eliminate the Corps?

On 7 March 1973, the secretary of the Army, then Robert F. Froehlke, through his assistant secretary for manpower and reserve affairs, Hadlai A. Hull, had given the Army staff these directives:

-Immediately prepare legislation to eliminate the legal requirement for a separate WAC Corps.

-Prepare long-range plans for integrating WAC officers into normal assignment patterns and into the Army Promotion List for promotion and management.

-Study eliminating gender indicators on manpower documents by making all noncombat jobs "interchangeable" and requiring commanders to justify noninterchangeable spaces.27

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The cornerstone for the action was an April 1972 memo in which Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA) Roger T. Kelley had said, "Separate organizations and restricted assignments do not provide adequate career opportunity for women." 28

Three reasons further buttressed the decision for the directed actions. First, separate corps status prevented WAC officers from being assigned to other branches in which they qualified for duty. Second, having a separate promotion list gave WAC officers an advantage over their male peers. Third, the 364 WAC officers and 1,166 enlisted women who worked in WAC administrative and support positions could be "more productively utilized in the real work of the Army." The memo concluded with a prediction that the Equal Rights Amendment would be ratified in 1973 and such ratification would require eradication of the Corps, the promotion list, and manpower gender indicators.29

None of the issues raised was new. They had surfaced in earlier studies. General Bailey had agreed to elimination of the separate promotion list, once permanent transfer to other branches had been accomplished and WAC officers had acquired the training and experience to compete equitably with their male peers for promotion. And, of course, she had never objected to making all possible Army positions interchangeable. However, she and her staff were incensed over the immediacy of the secretary's directive eliminating the Corps and his stated reasons for doing it.

In General Bailey's absence, Col. Maida E. Lambeth supplied General Rogers, then the DCSPER, with strong arguments against it. Appointment in WAC branch, she noted, had rarely hurt a woman officer's career. The current law prevented only regular officers from being appointed to other branches, but consistency demanded that reserve WAC officers be similarly treated. Thus, both regular and reserve officers frequently spent one or more tours with other branches, coming back to the Corps to maintain their branch qualification and mobilization readiness. Women who were lawyers received appointments in the WAC, but were permanently detailed to the Judge Advocate General's Corps. WAC officers with special interests and talents were able to enter career specialization and thus develop their careers along a functional line (logistics, research and development, etc.). Authorizing the transfer of regular officers to other branches and eliminating the separate promotion list did not require elimination of the WAC. The Corps gave women an identity, some visibility, and a unifying symbol in an otherwise all-male Army. Already, early news stories about eliminating the Corps were being inter-

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preted among enlisted women as an example of the Army's denial of the achievements of the WAC. If these misconceptions continued, the deputy director warned, they could adversely affect WAC reenlistment, retention, and morale, and the whole expansion effort. WACs took great pride in their past accomplishments, their performance, and their organizations, all represented by the Pallas Athene insignia that would be lost if the secretary eliminated the Corps.

Colonel Lambeth reserved her strongest words to rebut the secretary's statement that women who were performing WAC cadre, recruiting, and training duty could be "more productively utilized in the real work of the Army." At best, the statement was thoughtless; at worst, it was male chauvinist insensitivity. Men or women performing these duties were, she declared, doing the "real work" of the Army. These jobs had to be done and whether men or women did them was irrelevant. She concluded by noting that the popularity of the ERA had faded and its ratification was no longer certain. If it were to pass, the Army would have ample time to make any needed changes.30

When General Rogers responded to the directive, he used some of the deputy director's arguments. After pointing out that the proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) included sections to eliminate the separate WAC promotion list and to permit women to be appointed in any Regular Army branch, he noted that the secretary of defense had directed that no separate legislation be forwarded if its goals would be accomplished by passage of DOPMA. In view of this, the DCSPER said that if DOPMA passed, he would then prepare any additional legislation required to comply with the secretary's directive. He also described the Plateau Plan and the manner in which it would improve WAC administration and utilization in a measured and orderly manner and included a copy of it.31

The DCSPER's response satisfied the assistant secretary that everything the Army staff could do for the present was being done. General Bailey and her deputy drew sighs of relief as the crisis seemed to pass. But their reprieve was short-lived. While revising DOPMA in September 1973, the study group preparing the proposed legislation inserted a paragraph repealing three sections of Title 10, U.S. Code:

-Section 3071, which authorized the WAC as a separate corps, its director, deputy director, and additional officers for administration and training;

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-Section 3580, which authorized the secretary of the Army to prescribe the command authority WACs could exercise;

-Section 3818, which authorized the Army to discharge Regular Army women for pregnancy and other causes not authorized by law for the discharge of men.

The only section in which all could concur was 3580 because the secretary had recently used his regulatory powers to give WACs authority to command men except in combat units. Repealing the other sections presented problems.

Assigned to assess the DOPMA revision, the director of military personnel management (DMPM) prepared a reply and sent it to the DWAC and other directorates for comment. He first addressed Section 3580 and concurred in its repeal. However, he firmly stated that Section 3818 could not be repealed because it was the only law the secretary could use to involuntarily discharge Regular Army women who were pregnant or had minor dependents. It was, in fact, irreplaceable because it balanced another law under which the secretary could similarly discharge women in the reserve components. The third section under discussion, Section 3071, could be repealed because it created a separate corps (the WAC) based solely on gender, and the secretary could disestablish "a category of personnel [that was] based primarily on sex and [was] therefore discriminatory." And, he continued, "It is anticipated that the position and functions of the Director of the Women's Army Corps will be redesignated by Secretarial authority."32

General Bailey disputed the DMPM's proposed reply regarding Section 3071. She argued that eliminating the Corps through the repeal of Section 3071 would neither end discrimination nor give women equal opportunity. The Corps had a mobilization mission and other responsibilities that needed the leadership of a director, deputy director, and other WAC officers. Repeal of Section 3071 could not and should not be recommended, she said, until it had been thoroughly studied to determine its full impact. In an earlier meeting, Chief of Staff Abrams had personally assured her that he would not yield to outside pressures unless any proposed changes had been determined to be right for women and right for the Army.33

General Rogers considered General Bailey's opinion, but, in the end, he supported the recommendation to repeal Section 3071: "I have approved action to support its repeal basically for two reasons: because I believe such action to be consistent with long range officer personnel

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management goals; and because inclusion in the DOPMA package provides a timely vehicle for such a legislative position without undue publicity and fanfare." He did not anticipate that repeal of Section 3071 would result in the "precipitous disestablishment of the Women's Army Corps," but believed that it would continue under secretarial authority unless a study indicated that this would not be prudent.34

The DCSPER's words did not soothe General Bailey. She was so displeased with his decision that, with his approval, she obtained an appointment with General Abrams on 18 October 1973. In their ninety minute conference, General Bailey outlined the need for a complete study on repeal and forecast that without such a study, the Army would incur adverse reactions from veterans, parents, and the public; that WAC recruiting could be jeopardized; that provisions had to be made to protect WAC assignments, promotions, and training opportunities; and that without the WAC and a director of the WAC, women's issues would be neglected. She said that for thirty-one years women had had to accept discrimination and exist on motivation, innovation, and pride, even though they were highly qualified, underutilized, and slighted on resources. Today's women, more vocal and militant, would not be satisfied as the women of World War II had been. They would demand the same opportunities men had. She concluded by saying that the WAC and its director were needed to ensure that the Army lived up to its promises and commitments to women. Before changes were made, the promised study to determine impact was needed.35

General Bailey persuaded General Abrams. The day after their conference, the chief of staff asked General Rogers to withdraw the Army's concurrence in repealing Section 3071. In a memorandum on his conversation with General Abrams, General Rogers wrote that he had advised the chief of staff that the Defense Officer Personnel Management System (DOPMS) legislation was at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and had informed him of "the M&RA interest [both Defense and Army] in Sec. 3071." Even so, he believed that the Army "could pull back the applicable part of the DOPMS legislation."36 In accordance with the chief's wishes, General Rogers withdrew the Army's approval. Meanwhile, General Abrams obtained a strong ally for his position after discussing the issue with Secretary of the Army Callaway, who had

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replaced Secretary Froehlke.37 For the WACs, General Abrams' decision was a morale-building event; because he was supported by the secretary, the Army staff might dislike but could not challenge his decision.

For almost a year, the director's office heard no more on eliminating the Corps or the position of director. Then, on 4 October 1974, the WAC lost one of its strongest supporters with the death of General Abrams. About the same time, an Army War College research study proposing several new ideas for consideration by the secretary of the Army made its way through the Army staff, who commented on it, to Mr. Callaway. He was impressed with it: "This study represents the kind of original thinking that I believe we must have in Today's Army .... I, unfortunately, note a degree of negativism in some of the Staff comments." One of the "new" ideas proposed was elimination of the WAC as a separate corps of the Army. Evidently forgetting his 1973 commitment, on 7 October 1974 he directed the Army staff to explore the idea: "Women should no longer be looked upon as a separately managed group with a limited role but must be recognized for what they are, full and equal members of the Army in every sense. Elimination of the WAC is part of such recognition in my view."38 In a year's time, something-perhaps the administration's views on eliminating differences between men and women in the armed forces had changed Secretary Callaway's mind.

A few days after the secretary's directive arrived in ODCSPER, General Bailey responded with her familiar proposal that a detailed study be made to examine all aspects of a phase-out of the WAC. The impression that the WAC was being precipitously abandoned would give the women's movement the additional leverage it sought to force the Army into "admitting women to USMA and permitting women to perform in the combat role." An in-depth study would provide time to develop, if necessary, a step-by-step program to implement the proposal. She emphasized that many "important actions must be accomplished before any phase-out of the WAC." It would be impossible to eliminate the Corps without jeopardizing many careers.39 As a result of advice from the DWAC and other ODCSPER directorates, General Rogers obtained a few months' hiatus to study the secretary's proposal before replying. In the interim, the director of military personnel management prepared a reply, on which General Bailey commented, and on 30 January 1975, the DCSPER told the secretary that the Plateau Plan for the improved

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utilization and administration of the WAC was being implemented to provide "for the integration/phase-out of the Women's Army Corps." Optimum utilization of women in the Army was, he wrote, both feasible and consistent with phasing out the Women's Army Corps as a separate entity. He told the secretary that many milestones of the plan had been executed: integration of training and housing, disestablishment of WAC units, integration of the staffs of the WAC Center and School, WAC officers sitting as primary (not alternate) members of all officer boards. On 1 July 1974, all WAC officers had been permanently detailed to other branches (combat excepted) and were being managed by those branches. Women officers were participating in the new officer personnel management system. He noted that DOPMA would eliminate the WAC promotion list; meanwhile, WAC officers were receiving training and assignments in new branches to achieve a competitive position with men. He went on to point out that the separate corps, however, would be eliminated by the ERA only if proof emerged that "the existence of the WAC deprives women of equal opportunity. Disestablishment of the WAC, if the proposed ERA passed," he wrote, "would depend upon proof that its existence does in fact serve to discriminate against women." If the director's job were eliminated, the placement of a senior female officer in a prestigious, visible position would, in the future, provide a focal point for women and ensure "continuation of the traditions and heritage, the esprit and pride" of women in the Army.40

In her comments, General Bailey recommended that if the Corps were phased out by passage of the ERA, the term "WAC" be retained to distinguish male from female soldiers; that the Pallas Athene insignia be worn until an MOS was earned; and that the WAC anniversary, 14 May 1942, continue to be recognized. Like the DCSPER, she recommended that a senior female officer be retained in a visible position to represent women, advise on women's matters, and serve as a spokeswoman for women.41

A masterpiece of bureaucratic ambiguity, the DMPM/DCSPER reply was interpreted differently by Secretary Callaway and General Bailey. The memorandum from the DCSPER assured the secretary that between the Plateau Plan and DOPMA, the Women's Army Corps, for all practical purposes, would undoubtedly be eliminated within a three-year timeframe. In going along with the reply, the director had hoped to gain time in which anything could happen-DOPMA might not pass, the ERA might not be accepted by the states, a new chief of staff or Army secretary might come along and reject discontinuance of the Corps, or

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the success of the WAC expansion might convince everyone the Corps should be retained. The secretary approved the DCSPER response on 7 February 1975 and did not direct any further action regarding the WAC.

Again, General Bailey had some months to breathe easily before a new storm erupted. This time it began in June 1975, during hearings on DOPMA before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. On the first day of the hearings, Samuel S. Stratton of New York and Marjorie S. Holt of Maryland both asked why the Army retained a separate corps for women under a bill "which purports to remove discriminatory provisions for women."42

When the DOD witness did not provide a satisfactory reply, the Army's representative at the hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA) Paul D. Phillips, knew that the Army would be asked the same question when its turn came at the hearings. In a memorandum for the Army staff, he said it appeared to most of the subcommittee members that the Army used the WAC "as a cover to provide the opportunity for continued discrimination." He asked that General Abrams' ruling in 1973 that the WAC must not be eliminated under the DOPMA legislation be reversed, so that "we can admit to the Committee that we no longer see the need for a separate WAC."43

General Moore, who had replaced General Rogers as the DCSPER at the end of 1974, discussed the memorandum with General Bailey and, with her concurrence, asked the secretary of the Army to approve the deputy assistant secretary's recommendation. He wrote: "In view of the progress being accomplished in establishing women equities comparable to men, it is believed that continuation of the legal statute (Title 10, USC, Section 3071) to provide for a separate Women's Army Corps, director and deputy director is not justified. However, there is foreseen a need for a full time senior female officer to act as advisor to the Secretary and Chief of Staff on WAC matters and to be a spokeswoman for women in the Army. This senior female advisor and spokeswoman is necessary to guide the continued expanding use of women in the Army." 44

Again General Bailey viewed her concurrence as a means of gaining time. Discontinuance of the Corps and the office of the director was tied to whether the DOPMA passed, and she knew from her experience in legislative liaison that the bill could be debated in Congress for years before it passed or was shelved.45 The drive to ratify the proposed Equal

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Rights Amendment had already stalled, and it appeared the amendment would not be ratified by the necessary thirty-eight states.

When the subcommittee reconvened the following week to discuss DOPMA, the secretary of the Army informed the committee that the Army would no longer object to deletion of the WAC as a separate corps. The bill, however, did not pass in 1975. It was rewritten for introduction in the next session of Congress and included a provision for elimination of the WAC as a separate corps two years after passage of the bill, but the House Armed Services Committee recommended that the Corps be abolished ninety days after enactment of the bill:

The committee believes that having a separate corps is a vestige of the time when women were not treated equally and that such a corps is inconsistent with the insistence on equal treatment .... The bill as submitted by the Department of Defense would have provided for the abolition of the Women's Army Corps but would have allowed two years for the change. The committee believes an extended period is not required, and, therefore, has set a 90-day termination limit.46

The committee's amendment eliminated the Corps, the offices of the director and deputy director, the appointment of women officers in the WAC, the separate WAC promotion list, the secretary's responsibility to prescribe the authority to be given women, and separate retirement and mandatory separation procedures for women officers.47

The hope of retaining the WAC as a separate corps had ended in June 1975 when the secretary of the Army told Congress that the Corps was no longer needed and that its removal would ensure full integration of women into the Army. Congress agreed. In the 1948 hearings, Congress had not permitted women to be integrated into the Regular Army unless they had a corps of their own. Thirty years later, with the help of women's rights advocates, Congress said women could not be fully integrated unless it dissolved the separate corps status of the WAC. Disestablishing the Corps proved easier than establishing it.

Women Enter the U.S. Military Academy

Another objective of the women's rights movement was to open the doors of the service academies to women. This question became the most bitterly contested of the issues concerning women and equal opportunity in the armed forces during the 1970s. In 1972, Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee denied admission to the U.S. Naval Academy to two women nominated by Senator Jacob Javits of New York and Congressman Jack McDonald of Michigan. The legislators responded by introduc-

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ing bills in both houses to make it illegal for the services to deny admission to the academies on the basis of sex.48

This was not the first time that legislation regarding women and the academies had been introduced in Congress. In November 1944, Congressman Eugene E. Cox of Georgia introduced a bill that would appoint a commission to plan a service academy for women as an initial step to giving women permanent military status.49 The bill died in committee. In June 1945, Congressman James G. Fulton of Massachusetts introduced a bill to establish an academy for aviators and another for military women.50 This bill also failed. In February 1955, Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico introduced a joint resolution to establish a women's armed services academy. At the time, Congress was considering a bill to establish an Air Force academy. In recommending passage of the bill for a women's academy, Senator Chavez said, "It is now fitting and proper that the opportunities for education and training afforded to selected young men in our several service academies be now extended in full measure to our young womanhood with the same purpose and objectives in view."51 The bill to establish the Air Force Academy was approved, the bill for the women's services academy was not. Surprisingly, the idea was resurrected in 1972 by John W. Thompson, Jr., a civilian aide to Secretary of the Army Froehlke. "With the emphasis on women in the service," said Thompson, "I am wondering if the time has not come to establish a National Defense Academy for Women to develop women at the officer level similar to the three military Academies and the Coast Guard Academy." The secretary replied that such an academy was "unnecessary since sufficient women are coming into the Army under existing programs."52

Proposals to include women at the military academies made little progress during 1972 and 1973. The 92d Congress adjourned in 1972 before action could be taken on the bills introduced by Senator Javits and Mr. McDonald. In 1973, a new bill, H.R. 10705, was introduced by Pierre S. DuPont of Delaware in the 93d Congress, but hearings on it were deferred until 1974. At that time the proposal was opposed by the Department of Defense, the three services, and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, F. Edward Hebert.53 Meanwhile, in Septem-

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CARTOON BY JOHN STAMPONE, 15 MAY 1974. (Courtesy of Army Times.)

ber 1973, the women who had been denied entry to the Naval Academy filed suit in Federal District Court, Washington, D.C., charging that their civil rights had been denied. The court ruled in June 1974 that because the law precluded women from serving in combat, no need existed for them to attend the academy. A federal appeals court overturned this ruling later in 1974 and ordered the case to trial.54 But, when Congress decided the matter in 1975, the cases were dropped. The DACOWITS was also active on the matter and, beginning in 1973, repeatedly recommended to the secretary of defense that in the interests of equality, women should be admitted to the service academies. But Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger was adamant, telling members that until such time as Congress or the public decided that women should enter combat, the services would educate only men at the nation's military academies.55

During this time period, another government-sponsored academy set an example. The U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, operated by the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce, opened its doors to women in July 1974. After the second session of the 93d Congress began in 1974, no fewer than five separate bills, endorsed by thirty-three members of Congress and proposing that

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women be admitted to the service academies, were under consideration.56 During hearings before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that summer, all the service secretaries, the chiefs of staff, and the chief of naval operations expressed their strong opposition to the legislation. Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway, a West Point graduate, argued, "The United States Military Academy is dedicated to the development of combat leaders." To accommodate women, he said, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point would be required to adopt less demanding standards, which would lower the standards for men and dilute the quality of the male graduates. He warned, "Admitting women to West Point will irrevocably change the Academy. And . . . the change can only be for the worse." 57 No further hearings were held on the service academies bills in 1974; Congress and the nation became preoccupied with the action to impeach President Nixon that resulted in his resignation. Vice President Gerald Ford became president on 9 August 1974.

Momentum toward achieving the academy goal grew. When the 94th Congress opened in January 1975, six bills to admit women to the service academies were introduced-five in the House, one in the Senate.58 Because no House committee hearings were scheduled, Congressman Stratton attached an amendment to open the academies to women to the Defense Authorization Bill of 1976 in May 1975. In arguing for approval of the amendment, Mr. Stratton cited a General Accounting Office (GAO) report showing that of 30,000 service academy graduates on duty on 1 October 1974, 3,777 (12.3 percent) had never held a combat assignment. The report also included the judgment that women who met the physical requirements for entry into the services could successfully accomplish the rigorous physical training programs at the academies. The report convinced Stratton and many other members of Congress that women could compete in all aspects of academy training and, if 12 percent of academy graduates held noncombat positions, that adequate assignment possibilities existed for women in all the services after graduation.59 The services continued to argue that laws and regulations ex-

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cluded women from serving in combat and that the traditional mission of the service academies was all-male combat training. They insisted that Congress resolve the question of whether women should serve in combat before voting on the academies amendment. Their argument, however, was declared irrelevant. According to an article in Army, "Efforts to settle this aspect before proceeding with debate on the admission amendment were beaten back and denounced by the measure's supporters as a 'red herring.' "60

One aspect of the dispute, the process of branch selection of academy graduates, was more complex than either side admitted. It was true that not all West Point graduates entered the combat arms (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, and Engineers) or the combat support arms (Signal, Military Intelligence, and Military Police). Since 1965, men who became physically disqualified for combat or combat support after entering West Point had been able to request assignment to one of the administrative or technical branches (e.g., Transportation, Ordnance, Adjutant General, Finance, Chemical). The policy was abandoned after 1972, when women were first nominated to the service academies, because it detracted from West Point's combat posture.61 Regardless, Mr. Stratton's arguments and the GAO report persuaded the majority of members that the academies were not solely devoted to producing combat officers. On 20 May 1975, the House voted 303 to 96 to approve the amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill of 1976 to admit women into the service academies. On 6 June, the Senate followed suit with an approving voice vote. On 7 October 1975, President Ford signed the bill into law.62

The women's rights movement had won another battle. Many men in the military services were stunned. The impossible had happened, and they had no recourse but to carry out orders. The superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point considered resigning but changed his mind. In an open letter to the graduates of the academy he wrote: "Since it is the will of Congress and the President, we are welcoming women candidates as we welcome men candidates to West Point. We expect to make this change smoothly and efficiently."63

After the bill was signed, the Army galvanized its resources to prepare to admit women to West Point. The academy's staff revised and implemented its contingency plan (USMA OPLAN 75-1, 15 Sep 75) for the

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training, administration, housing, and clothing of women. The Army hired Fashionaire, a subsidiary of Hart, Schaffner and Marx, lowest of five bidders, to develop a uniform for women cadets. It also launched a national publicity campaign to attract women applicants for entry into the Class of 1980. The DCSPER, General Moore, formed a committee, headed by Brig. Gen. Philip Kaplan, deputy director of the Military Personnel Management Directorate, to resolve policy issues and guide the admission, enrollment, and administration of women at West Point. The committee included the director of the WAC and representatives from other Army staff offices-DCSLOG, TAG, Chief of Information, Surgeon General, and the Judge Advocate General.64 The law stated that requirements for men and women would be alike concerning appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning except "for those minimum essential adjustments in such standards required because of physiological differences between male and female individuals."65 As a result, standards were identical except for the physical aptitude tests-no pull-ups for women-and for physical training-no wrestling or boxing for women. Women participated in the full academic program and in field training, including parachute school, helicopter flight school, and northern warfare and jungle warfare. Ranger training, a combat course, was not open to women.66 Brig. Gen. Mary E. Clarke (then DWAC) and her staff participated in the discussions, inspections, and decisions and provided advice during and after the entry of women into the academy.

More women officers were soon assigned to the academy staff and faculty. In June 1973, 1st Lt. Virginia K. Fry had been assigned to the faculty; she taught geography to first- and second-year students until September 1976. In the summer of 1976, ten more women officers arrived at West Point. Five taught, one became a tactical officer (i.e., troop leader), and four served in administrative positions on the academy staff. In September 1979, Col. Mildred P. Hedberg was assigned as chief of staff for the Corps of Cadets and served in that position until 1981, when she was selected for promotion to brigadier general and assigned to Germany. 67

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CLASS OF 1980 Cadets Carol A. Young, Gregory Stephens, and Kathryn A. Wildey at West Point, December 1976.

Despite dire predictions that women would lower standards and disrupt cadet life at West Point, the "long grey line" admirably survived the entry of women. A report prepared at West Point after graduation of three classes that included women (classes of 1980, 1981, and 1982) showed that women received lower ratings than men in physical training, leadership, military science, and some applied science courses, but that they did better than men in the humanities, social sciences, and behavioral science courses. Enduring common hardships and rigorous training led to some development of camaraderie, but a strong antifemale bias persisted on the campus and increased the women's hardships. Despite that, the report concluded with optimism: "After three years of coeducation, it appears that the majority of male cadets understand that coeducation can and will work at West Point. This realistic view will help prepare all graduates to lead in an Army which requires the full, integrated services of men and women."68

General Bailey's Departure

In May 1975, General Bailey announced she would retire upon completion of four years in office on 31 July. A few weeks later, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Col. Mary E. Clarke for promotion to

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brigadier general and appointment as director of the WAC. General Bailey's tour had been highlighted by the successful WAC expansion, introduction of innovative uniform items, and, as she wrote, "more changes in law, regulations, and policies concerning uniformed women than in the entire preceding twenty-eight years."69 Many of the changes had major importance:

-All MOSs were opened to women except those involving direct combat.

-Women entered the Army's ROTC programs.

-WACs were authorized to command men except in combat units.

-Servicewomen received dependency entitlements.

-Assignment constraints were removed on utilization of women.

-WAC units were combined with those for men.

-Housing was combined for men and women, but privacy was maintained.

-Mandatory discharge on pregnancy and parenthood was eliminated; voluntary discharge on marriage was eliminated.

-Women were permitted to enlist at age 18 without their parents' consent and at 17 with their parents' consent.

-WAC officers were permanently assigned to other branches.

-Mandatory weapons training was initiated for enlisted women and officers.

-Army aviation and airborne training were opened to women.

-An optional mint-green summer uniform, black beret, Army green pantsuit, fatigues, and black raincoat were added to women's uniform wardrobe.

General Bailey's public relations talent and hard work had contributed to the success of the WAC expansion. Because of the need for women, the secretary of the Army had increased the director's travel funds in response to the DCSPER's desire that she devote a large part of her time and energy to promoting WAC recruiting and monitoring the impact of WAC expansion in the field. As a result, General Bailey visited WAC units in CONUS and overseas twice during her four-year tour of duty; funds allotted to the former directors had allowed only one visit to each of the commands. General Bailey welcomed the opportunity to travel, to increase the public's knowledge of the WAC, to visit the women and explain the expanded WAC policies to them and to commanders in the field. She promoted recruitment, improved the morale of the enlisted women, educated male members of the Army on women's role, and

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evaluated the progress of the expansion. She later estimated that she spent approximately 80 percent of her time traveling and away from her desk at the Pentagon.70

In her end of tour report, General Bailey expressed satisfaction with the progress made in recruiting, training, and utilization of women, but she also noted her concern about matters left unresolved. Principal among these was the negative attitude of male soldiers toward women in the Army. Though much had been done to provide equal opportunity, discrimination lurked behind many doors and would continue to deprive qualified women of opportunities to succeed. She recommended "training programs for all Army personnel that will create awareness and understanding."71

She pointed out that although the enlisted women's strength had tripled during her tour, the number of women officers lagged. She recommended that officers be selected on a "best qualified basis without regard to sex" once the Army had obtained adequate numbers of combat officers. She recommended that the inequality in awarding ROTC scholarships be investigated with a view to increasing women's share of the 6,500 available scholarships. General Bailey reserved her greatest misgivings for the change in policy that allowed pregnant women and women with minor children to remain on duty. The role of mother affected a woman's assignment flexibility and mobility and her unit's mission accomplishment and readiness. Almost 8 percent of the enlisted women on duty had minor children, and 2.2 percent (approximately 650 women) were single parents. She predicted that their number would increase substantially over the years because single parents received greater support, stability, and security in the Army than in civilian life.

She asked the secretary to delay integration of women officers on the Army Promotion List until they had achieved a degree of competitiveness with their male peers; to resist efforts of the women's rights organization to give women a combat role and lower enlistment standards; to continue to provide women with a stylish uniform of good fabric; and, if the position of director were abolished, to retain a senior woman officer adviser at high level on the Army staff. She concluded her report by saying: "The years immediately ahead will not be headline makers for Army women as the past five have been but a period of implementation, analysis, and assessment of progress. The calm voice of reason is needed to carry out our goals."72

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The Army held General Bailey's retirement activities at the WAC Center and School. They included a formal evening reception, a retirement review, and a brunch. Lt. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), personally presented General Bailey with the Distinguished Service Medal for her performance on duty as director of the WAC from 1971 to 1975. At her retirement parade on 30 July 1975, General Bailey told the women of the Corps, "you can maximize women's contributions to the Army's mission; accelerate progress and enhance the position of womankind if you are willing to establish goals which transcend personal interests; be realistic as well as idealistic; accept the hazards of equality as well as its obvious attractions; are persevering, dedicated, and willing to work for a cause."73

General Bailey's end of tour report encouraged General Moore to review the unresolved issues she had noted. After the review, he increased the programmed number of women line officers for FY 1981 from 3,336 to 3,540. Although he did not agree with deferring integration of women officers into the Army Promotion List, he established a system to monitor each promotion board's results to ensure equitable treatment of women officers. He saw no need to permit continuing pressure from the women's rights movement to change Army policy regarding women in combat or to lower women's enlistment standards. The DCSPER directed the commander of the Military Personnel Center to gather statistics to assist in determining whether an individual's dependents affected unit readiness or deployability, and he directed the commander of the Personnel and Administrative Combat Developments Activity to plan supportive training programs "to minimize human relations problems associated with the WAC expansion." The DCSPER assured the chief of staff that he would continue to emphasize improvement in women's uniforms, and he increased the number of ROTC scholarships for women from 80 in 1975 to 225 in 1976. He did not discuss elimination of the Corps or the office of the director of the WAC.74

When the new director arrived at the Pentagon in August 1975, she knew she was ascending a shaky throne. It seemed that only a miracle or a turnabout by Congress could prevent her from presiding over the demise of the Corps, or allow her to complete a full four-year term of office after the DOPMA passed. The momentum of the expansion, however, was a bright aspect of her new position, providing hope for new opportunities for women in the Army. Meanwhile, the fate of the command she had just left-WAC Center and School-hung in the balance and its destiny had to be settled.

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Endnotes

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